




Environment  
Canada

Environnement  
Canada



The Honourable Peter Kent  
Minister of the Environment

# UNITED NATIONS FRAMEWORK CONVENTION ON CLIMATE CHANGE - 17<sup>th</sup> Conference of the Parties


## Supplementary Documents

Durban, South Africa  
December 6-9, 2011

s.19 (1)

Canada

000001



## Table of Contents

**TUESDAY DECEMBER 6 – FRIDAY DECEMBER 9, 2011**  
**17<sup>th</sup> Conference of the Parties (CoP17)**  
**Durban, South Africa**

TAB	
	<b>Background Documents</b>
1	Cancun Agreements versus the Kyoto Protocol
2	Moving Beyond the Kyoto Protocol
	<b>Country Climate Change Profiles</b>
3	Australia
4	Brazil
5	China
6	European Union
7	France
8	Germany
9	India
10	Indonesia
11	Italy
12	Japan
13	Mexico
14	Russia
15	South Africa
16	South Korea
17	United Kingdom
18	United States




**Comparing the Cancun Agreements and the Kyoto Protocol**


	<b>Cancun Agreements</b>	<b>Kyoto Protocol</b>
Environmental effectiveness	Parties with mitigation commitments represent 80% of global emissions	Parties with mitigation commitments represent 30% of global emissions in the first commitment period  Would be down to 17% in a second commitment period
Issues covered	A global temperature goal Mitigation actions by all major developed and developing country emitters Adaptation Finance Technology Deforestation in developing countries Enhanced transparency and accountability, including by developing countries	Emission reduction targets by 37 developed countries  The world's two top emitters (US and China), who represent over 40% of global emissions, are not covered by emissions reductions targets  Adaptation and technology actions very limited
Rules	Parties are negotiating for emissions accounting rules that take into account unique national circumstances  Seeking a facilitative process for review of actions	One-size-fits-all, top-down rules Does not take into account national circumstances  <b>s.15(1)</b>  review process, with incentive types of penalties
Canadian climate policy harmonisation with the US	Canada is in the same agreement as the US  Canada's target mirrors the US target	US is not a Kyoto Protocol Party and has stated that it never will be

# Moving Beyond the Kyoto Protocol


**KP 1st  
Commitment Period**



**KP 2nd  
Commitment Period**




**Cancun  
Agreements**



Aggregate share of 2005 global GHG emissions captured under each regime

Source: WRI CAIT database  
000004

# China, the US, and EU-27 represent over half of global emissions



**Share of 2005 global GHG emissions**

World Total: 37,634 Mt

Source: WRI CAIT database  
000005

# AUSTRALIA – Economy, Emissions, Commitments


	Indicators	Australia	Canada
Economy	GDP (PPP – 2010 est.)	US \$889.6B	US \$1.3T
	Commerce (2010)	Exports to Australia: \$1.8B	Imports from Australia: \$1.6B
Emissions*	Total 1990 GHGs	418.4 Mt CO <sub>2</sub> eq.	591.8 Mt CO <sub>2</sub> eq.
	Total 2008 GHGs	549.5 Mt CO <sub>2</sub> eq. (31.4% increase on 1990 levels)	734.4 Mt CO <sub>2</sub> eq. (24.1% increase on 1990 levels)
	2008 GHG/capita (Annex 1 rank)	25.6 t CO <sub>2</sub> eq. per person (1st)	22.0 t CO <sub>2</sub> eq. per person (4th)
	2008 GHG/GDP	673.3 t CO <sub>2</sub> eq./M US\$	557.2 t CO <sub>2</sub> eq./M US\$
	2008 % of Annex 1 total	Approximately 3.09%	Approximately 4.14%
Commitments	Kyoto Protocol	Ratified December 2007, <b>8% increase</b> on 1990 levels	Ratified February 2002, <b>6% reduction</b> from 1990 levels
	Copenhagen Accord	<b>Unconditional 5% reduction</b> on 2000 levels by 2020 (or <b>15 - 25%</b> reduction conditional to an ambitious global deal)	<b>17% reduction</b> from 2005 levels, aligned with U.S. target

\*GHG figures include CO<sub>2</sub>, CH<sub>4</sub>, N<sub>2</sub>O, PFCs, HFCs, SF<sub>6</sub>; not LULUCF or international bunkers.


Sources: GDP (PPP-2010 est) and GDP for 2008 GHG/GDP (PPP-2008 est.): CIA World Fact Book ([www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook](http://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook)); GHG emissions data: UNFCCC (<http://unfccc.int/di/FlexibleQueries/Event.do>); Population source for GHG/capita data: UNFCCC (<http://unfccc.int/di/FlexibleQueries/Event.do>).

# AUSTRALIA – Comparative GHG Emissions Performance

Australia - GHG Emissions by Sector (2008) – Total 549.5 Mt\*



Canada - GHG Emissions by Sector (2008) – Total 734.4 Mt\*



\*GHG data includes CO<sub>2</sub>, CH<sub>4</sub>, N<sub>2</sub>O, PFCs, HFCs, SF<sub>6</sub> and not LULUCF.


\*\*IE = Included Elsewhere, NA = Not Applicable

Sources: UNFCCC ([http://unfccc.int/ghg\\_data/ghg\\_data\\_unfccc/ghg\\_profiles/items/4625.php](http://unfccc.int/ghg_data/ghg_data_unfccc/ghg_profiles/items/4625.php))

# AUSTRALIA – Recent GHG Projections

- Recent analysis shows that Australia is projected to reach its Kyoto target of **8% above 1990 levels** over the Kyoto period (2008-2012) without the use of flexibility mechanisms or imported emissions permits.
- Plans to meet its 2020 target through abatement measures including: renewable energy, energy efficiency, carbon price.
- Along with continued strong economic and population growth, the energy sector is a major driver of the emissions increase; energy emissions are offset considerably by decreasing deforestation emissions and sequestration from forest plantations
- If government takes no action by 2020, emissions could be 20% higher than in 2000, not 5 to 25% lower as the Government intends.

## Emissions trends: 1990 to 2020



Source: Australia's Emissions Projections 2010, Department of Energy and Climate Change, Commonwealth of Australia, 2010

# AUSTRALIA - Domestic Targets and Commitments

<b>Emissions and Targets</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>On track to meet its Kyoto target of 8% above 1990 levels during first commitment period (2008-12) – currently projected to be +6%</li> </ul>
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Emissions intensity declined 36.4% between 1990 and 2007</li> </ul>
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Reduce carbon pollution <b>25% below 2000 levels by 2020</b>, conditional on an ambitious global agreement that stabilises GHGs at 450 parts per million</li> </ul>
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>2020 emissions projected to be 24% over 2000 levels without new policy initiatives; reaching 5% cut requires reduction of 160 Mt CO<sub>2</sub>eq</li> </ul>
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Lower House and Senate passed legislation in October/November 2011 for a carbon tax from July 1, 2012, moving to a market based trading scheme in 2015                             <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>The top 500 carbon polluting companies will pay A\$23 per tonne, rising by 2.5% a year</li> <li>Scheme aims to cut emissions by 5% on 2000 levels by 2020</li> <li>Agriculture, forestry and land are exempt</li> </ul> </li> </ul>
<b>Energy</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>2020 Renewable Energy Target: 20% of electricity to be sourced from renewables (currently at 3%)                             <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>From 2011, obligations for liable entities (electricity retailers) to purchase renewable energy; system for large and small-scale producers to sell certificates</li> </ul> </li> </ul>
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>The \$4.5B <b>Clean Energy Initiative</b> furthers innovation in clean energy generation and supports the research, development and demonstration of low-emissions technologies, including industrial-scale carbon capture and storage, solar energy and non-solar renewable technologies</li> </ul>
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>World's largest coal exporter; reliance on coal for 80% of electricity-generation</li> </ul>

# AUSTRALIA – International Position

Australia's 2020 emissions reduction target inscribed in the Copenhagen Accord	Canada's 2020 emissions reduction target inscribed in the Copenhagen Accord
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>An <b>unconditional 5% reduction</b> on 2000 levels (OR a 15 - 25% reduction conditional on the world agreeing to an ambitious global deal)</li> <li><b>Associated</b> with the Accord</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li><b>17% reduction</b> from 2005 levels, aligned with U.S. target</li> <li>Associated with the Accord</li> </ul>

- **Pledged AUD\$599M (CDN\$608M) over three years, with 78% allocated to countries, regions and specific multilateral initiatives:**
  - AUD\$131M for **multilateral agencies** helping developing countries transition to low-carbon growth pathways & adapt to climate change
  - AUD\$146M for the **International Forest Carbon Initiative**
  - AUD\$248M for the **International Climate Change Adaptation Initiative**
  - AUD\$36M for **Climate Change Partnerships for Development**
  - AUD\$38M as the climate change component of Australia's funds to the **Global Environmental Facility**



# AUSTRALIA – Canada's Engagement

<p><b>Bilateral Engagement</b></p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Potential for enhanced cooperation under the <b>Canada - Australia Joint Statement on Climate Change and Energy</b> signed by Prime Minister Harper in September 2007</li> <li>• Like Canada, Australia is a net energy exporter (coal, natural gas)</li> </ul>
<p><b>Technology Partnerships</b></p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Given the similarity between Australia and Canada's legal and political systems, Australia's domestic approach to biodiversity issues has been instructive in the ongoing development of <b>Access and Benefit Sharing</b> policy in Canada</li> <li>• Australia was a founding member of the now-concluded <b>Asia-Pacific Partnership on Clean Development and Climate (APP)</b> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>– Committed \$142M to support its APP projects</li> <li>– Was a strong supporter of Canada's membership bid</li> </ul> </li> <li>• Founded the <b>Global Carbon Capture and Storage Institute</b> in September 2008 and has committed AUD\$100M in annual funding to 2012           <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>– The Government of Canada is a Foundation Member</li> </ul> </li> </ul>

# AUSTRALIA – Other Considerations

<b>Multilateral Fora</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• Participates in:<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>– Major Economies Forum (MEF)</li><li>– Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD)</li><li>– G20</li><li>– Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC)</li><li>– Renewable Energy &amp; Energy Efficiency Partnership (REEEP)</li><li>– International Partnership for the Hydrogen Economy (IPHE)</li><li>– Global Methane Initiative (GMI)</li></ul></li></ul>
<b>International Negotiations</b>  s.15(1) s.21(1)(a) s.21(1)(b)	

# BRAZIL – Economy, Emissions, Commitments

	Indicators	Brazil	Canada
Economy	GDP (PPP – 2010 est.)	US \$2.2T	US \$1.3T
	Commerce (2010)	Exports to Brazil: \$2.6B	Imports from Brazil: \$3.3B
Emissions*	Total 1990 GHGs	690.2 Mt CO <sub>2</sub> eq.	591.8 Mt CO <sub>2</sub> eq.
	Total 2005 GHGs	1011.6 Mt CO <sub>2</sub> eq. (46.6% increase on 1990 levels)	739.4 Mt CO <sub>2</sub> eq. (25% increase on 1990 levels)
	2005 GHG/capita (rank globally)	5.4 t CO <sub>2</sub> eq. per person (87th)	22.9 t CO <sub>2</sub> eq. per person (10th)
	2005 GHG/GDP	639.2 t CO <sub>2</sub> eq./Mill. \$Intl. 2005	653.7 t CO <sub>2</sub> eq./Mill. \$Intl. 2005
	2005 % of global total	Approximately 2.68%	Approximately 1.96%
Commitments	Kyoto Protocol	Ratified August 2002, but has no GHG target	Ratified February 2002, <b>6% reduction</b> from 1990 levels
	Copenhagen Accord	Emissions reduction in the range of <b>36.1% to 38.9%</b> of projected emissions	<b>17% reduction</b> from 2005 levels, aligned with U.S. target


\*GHG figures include CO<sub>2</sub>, CH<sub>4</sub>, N<sub>2</sub>O, PFCs, HFCs, SF<sub>6</sub>; not LULUCF or international bunkers.

Sources: GDP (PPP – 2010 est) and GDP for 2005 GHG/GDP (PPP – 2005 est): CIA World Fact Book ([www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook](http://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook)); GHG Emissions Data: Climate Analysis Indicators Tool (CAIT) Version 8.0. (World Resources Institute, 2011, <http://cait.wri.org/cait.php>);


Total 1990 GHGs for Canada: UNFCCC data. ([http://unfccc.int/ghg\\_data/ghg\\_data\\_unfccc/items/4146.php](http://unfccc.int/ghg_data/ghg_data_unfccc/items/4146.php))

# Brazil – Comparative GHG Emissions Performance

**Brazil – GHG Emissions by Sector (2005) - Total 1011.6 Mt\***



**Canada - GHG Emissions by Sector (2005) – Total 739.4 Mt\***




\*GHG data includes CO<sub>2</sub>, CH<sub>4</sub>, N<sub>2</sub>O, PFCs, HFCs, SF<sub>6</sub> and not LULUCF.

Sources: *Climate Analysis Indicators Tool (CAIT) Version 8.0.* (Washington, DC: World Resources Institute, 2011, <http://cait.wri.org/cait.php>); UNFCCC data for 2005 Canadian total GHG emissions (<http://unfccc.int/di/FlexibleQueries.do>).

# BRAZIL – Projections & Mitigation Scenarios

- **Future emissions** will be affected by population, economic growth, and technological change
- Emissions from **electricity generation & transport** are relatively low due to extensive use of hydroelectricity & biofuels
- In 2005, **oil** accounted for more than 40% in final energy consumption and hydroelectricity power plants accounted for 89% of electricity generation
- In 2007, **renewable energy** accounted for 46.4% of all energy consumed
- **Sugarcane products** are the second most important primary energy source - reaching 16.6% - after petroleum in 2006
- **Deforestation** is the major source of Brazil's CO<sub>2</sub> emissions

Estimated mitigation potential of climate change plan and other proposed measures: **12% reduction** below 2020 BAU projections



Sources: Ecofys and Wuppertal Institute (2008) *Proposals for Contributions of Emerging Economies to the Climate Regime under the UNFCCC post 2012* and Centre for Clean Air Policy and Ecofys (2009) *Developing countries' climate plans*.

# BRAZIL — Domestic Targets and Commitments

<b>Emissions</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Voluntary target to <b>reduce 36 – 39% GHG emissions by 2020</b>; announced in October 2010 that emissions fell by 34% in last 5 years</li> </ul>
<b>Renewable Energy and Energy Efficiency</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Increase the use of biofuels, encourage an <b>increase of annual ethanol consumption by 11%</b> in the next ten years, and implement a 5% biodiesel blending requirement from 2010 rather than 2013 as previously planned</li> </ul>
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Maintain a high proportion of Brazil's electricity supply from renewable sources. Overall, about 45% of its energy comes from renewable sources</li> </ul>
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Increase energy efficiency to <b>decrease electricity consumption by 10%</b> by 2030, thereby avoiding emission of 30 Mt, compared to current levels</li> </ul>
<b>Forests</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Announced a US\$200M plan in September 2010 to protect the Cerrado, a mixed woodland-savannah covering 21% of Brazil's landmass</li> </ul>
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li><b>Reduce deforestation</b>, particularly in the Amazon region, <b>by 70% between 2008 and 2018</b> which will result in a reduction of 4.8B tons of CO<sub>2</sub> emissions in that period</li> </ul>
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>In August 2008, launched an <b>international fund to protect the Amazon</b>. The fund plans to raise <b>US\$21B by 2021</b> and will promote alternatives to forest-clearing and support conservation</li> </ul>
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>In November 2010, the State Development Bank opened a 1B reais (\$588M US) fund to rehabilitate forest land degraded by agricultural expansion</li> </ul>
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>In May 2008, launched the <b>Sustainable Amazon Plan</b> aimed at securing sustainable development in Brazil's Amazon forest region</li> </ul>

# BRAZIL – International Position & Mitigation Actions

Brazil's domestic mitigation actions inscribed in Copenhagen Accord	Canada's 2020 emissions reduction target inscribed in Copenhagen Accord
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Expected emissions reduction in the range of 36.1% to 38.9% of projected emissions to be achieved from:                             <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Reduction in Amazon and Cerrado (tropical savannah region) deforestation</li> <li>- Restoration of grazing land</li> <li>- Integrated crop-livestock system</li> <li>- No-till farming</li> <li>- Biological N<sub>2</sub> fixation</li> <li>- Energy efficiency</li> <li>- Increase use of biofuels</li> <li>- Increase in energy supply by hydroelectric power plants</li> <li>- Alternative energy sources</li> <li>- Iron &amp; steel (replace coal from deforestation with coal from planted forests)</li> </ul> </li> <li>Associated with the Accord                             <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- CA only a political instrument; not a stand-alone plurilateral instrument</li> </ul> </li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li><b>17% reduction</b> from 2005 levels, aligned with U.S. target</li> <li>Associated with the Accord</li> </ul>

- At a January 2010 meeting of **BASIC countries**, environment ministers announced plans to develop a framework to:
  - Develop a permanent scientific cooperation on climate change
  - Extend financial and technological support for adaptation to other developing nations, especially least developed countries and small island developing states

# BRAZIL — Canada's Engagement

<b>Bilateral Engagement</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Canada and Brazil have signed a <b>number of agreements</b> with respect to energy and climate change,               <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>– 2007 – Ministry of Foreign Affairs committed to launching an energy dialogue where climate change could be discussed</li> <li>– 2004 – Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) on cooperation on climate change, including the CDM, (MOU expired November 2009)</li> <li>– 1996 – MOU on Environmental and Sustainable Development Consultations and Cooperation.</li> </ul> </li> <li>• </li> </ul>
<b>Technology Partnerships</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Brazil is a Canadian priority country under its <b>Americas Strategy</b> and the <b>Global Commerce Strategy</b></li> <li>• <b>Member</b> of Global Methane Initiative (GMI) and the Renewable Energy and Energy Efficiency Partnership (REEEP)               <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>– At present, Canada has no projects with Brazil under these partnerships</li> <li>– Discussions on cooperation from a technology standpoint could take place under the auspices of GMI or REEEP</li> </ul> </li> </ul>



# BRAZIL – Other Considerations

Energy	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>World's <b>2<sup>nd</sup> largest producer and largest exporter of ethanol</b> from sugar cane; its extensive use of ethanol and other biofuels have put it at the forefront of international efforts to address climate change</li> </ul>
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>The <b>3<sup>rd</sup> largest hydroelectricity producer</b> in the world after China and Canada; in 2009 hydroelectricity accounted for 84% of electricity production</li> </ul>
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Jan. 2009, <b>Brazil and China</b> agreed to collaborate on developing technologies to tackle energy problems and climate change, focusing on biofuels and improving GHG emissions estimates</li> </ul>
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Mar. 2010: <b>US and Brazil</b> signed a <b>Memorandum of Understanding on Cooperation Regarding Climate Change</b> which includes:                             <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Strategies for reducing greenhouse gas emissions;</li> <li>Joint efforts on research, development, deployment and dissemination of clean energy technologies;</li> <li>Adaptation;</li> <li>Cooperation on climate change scientific research; and</li> <li>Capacity-building in sectors related to climate change.</li> </ul> </li> </ul>
International Negotiations	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li></li> </ul>

s.15(1)  
s.21(1)(a)  
s.21(1)(b)

# CHINA – Economy, Emissions, Commitments

	Indicators	China	Canada
Economy	GDP (PPP – 2010 est.)	US \$9.9T	US \$1.3T
	Commerce (2010)	Exports to China: \$13.2B	Imports from China: \$44.5B
Emissions*	Total 1990 GHGs	3593.6 Mt CO <sub>2</sub> eq.	591.8 Mt CO <sub>2</sub> eq.
	Total 2005 GHGs	7232.8.3 Mt CO <sub>2</sub> eq. (101.3% increase on 1990 levels)	739.4 Mt CO <sub>2</sub> eq. (25% increase on 1990 levels)
	2005 GHG/capita (rank globally)	5.5 t CO <sub>2</sub> eq. per person (84th)	22.9 t CO <sub>2</sub> per person (10th)
	2005 GHG/GDP	1361 t CO <sub>2</sub> eq./Mill. \$Intl 2005	653.7 t CO <sub>2</sub> eq./Mill. \$Intl 2005
	2005 % of global total	Approximately 19.13%	Approximately 1.96%
Commitments	Kyoto Protocol	Ratified August 2002, no target	Ratified February 2002, <b>6% reduction</b> from 1990 levels
	Copenhagen Accord	Endeavours to <b>lower CO<sub>2</sub> emissions per unit of GDP by 40-45%</b> on 2005 levels	<b>17% reduction</b> from 2005 levels, aligned with U.S. target


\*GHG figures include CO<sub>2</sub>, CH<sub>4</sub>, N<sub>2</sub>O, PFCs, HFCs, SF<sub>6</sub>; not LULUCF or international bunkers.

Sources: GDP (PPP – 2010 est) and GDP for GHG/GDP (PPP – 2005 est): CIA World Fact Book ([www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook](http://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook)); GHG Emissions Data: Climate Analysis Indicators Tool (CAIT) Version 8.0. (World Resources Institute, 2011, <http://cait.wri.org/cait.php>); Total 1990 GHGs for Canada: UNFCCC ([http://unfccc.int/ghg\\_data/ghg\\_data\\_unfccc/items/4146.php](http://unfccc.int/ghg_data/ghg_data_unfccc/items/4146.php))


000020

# CHINA – Comparative GHG Emissions Performance

China – GHG Emissions by Sector (2005) - Total 7232.8 Mt\*



Canada - GHG Emissions by Sector (2005) – Total 739.4 Mt\*



\*GHG data includes CO<sub>2</sub>, CH<sub>4</sub>, N<sub>2</sub>O, PFCs, HFCs, SF<sub>6</sub> and not LULUCF.


Sources: Climate Analysis Indicators Tool (CAIT) Version 8.0. (World Resources Institute, 2011, <http://cait.wri.org/cait.php>);

UNFCCC data for 2005 Canadian total GHG emissions (<http://unfccc.int/di/FlexibleQueries.do>).

# CHINA – GHG Projections and Mitigation Scenarios

- **Coal** is responsible for about 80% of national emissions
- In 2005, coal accounted for 68.9% of energy; oil (21%); hydro (7.2%), biomass and waste, gas, nuclear energy and hydropower play a minor role
- In 2000 most emissions resulted from power production (31%), agriculture (25%) and industry (23%)
- Under BAU scenario, the trend is projected to be more or less similar; the share of power production will increase slightly, while the share of agriculture will decrease
- China's **absolute emissions** are projected to **increase** by about 3.3% per year between 2000 and 2020 under the BAU scenario; no clear timeline for emissions peaking

**Estimated mitigation potential of announced climate change plan and other proposed measures: a 15% reduction below 2020 BAU projections**



Sources for chart and information: Ecofys and Wuppertal Institute (2008) *Proposals for Contributions of Emerging Economies to the Climate Regime under the UNFCCC post 2012* and Centre for Clean Air Policy and Ecofys (2009) *Developing countries' climate plans*.

# CHINA – Domestic Targets & Commitments

<b>Emissions</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• <b>Intensity target: cut CO<sub>2</sub> emissions by 40 – 45% per unit of GDP by 2020;</b> expected that absolute emissions will continue to increase</li> </ul>
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• <b>Stabilize</b> nitrous oxide from industrial processes at 2005 levels by 2010</li> </ul>
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• End of 2009: a 16% reduction in energy intensity on 2005 levels was reported</li> </ul>
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• <b>11<sup>th</sup> 5 Year Plan:</b> nearly achieved its energy intensity reduction target of 20%</li> <li>• <b>12<sup>th</sup> 5 Year Plan:</b> environment, energy and climate change figure prominently; aim to cut energy and carbon intensity of GDP by 16% and 17% respectively over 2010 levels by 2015</li> </ul>
<b>Renewable Energy</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• <b>Increase share of renewable energy to 15% by 2020:</b> 5 GW by 2010 &amp; 100 GW by 2020. It has consistently outpaced these goals.</li> </ul>
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• <b>Increase</b> share of non-fossil fuels in primary energy consumption to around 15% by 2020</li> </ul>
<b>Energy Efficiency</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• <b>Reduce energy consumption</b> per unit of GDP by 20%</li> </ul>
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• <b>Top 1000 Energy-Consuming Enterprises Program</b> sets energy-saving targets for China's 1000 highest energy-consuming enterprises: responsible for two-thirds of energy efficiency gains in 2006 and for half in 2007</li> <li>• <b>Energy Efficiency Law</b>, Implemented in 2008, local governments are required to increase urban energy efficiency in buildings and public transport to meet the 20% energy intensity goal. Local government plans are audited by the central govt.</li> </ul>
<b>Forests</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• <b>Increase forest coverage by 40 million hectares by 2020</b> from 2005 levels by planting an additional 23M hectares of forest, bringing forest coverage rate to a little over 22%</li> </ul>

# CHINA – International Position

China's domestic mitigation actions inscribed in Copenhagen Accord	Canada's 2020 emissions reduction target inscribed in Copenhagen Accord
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Endeavours to <b>lower CO<sub>2</sub> emissions per unit of GDP by 40-45%</b> on 2005 levels</li> <li>• Increase share of <b>non-fossil fuels</b> in primary energy consumption to around 15% by 2020</li> <li>• <b>Increase</b> forest cover by 40M hectares and forest stock volume by 1.3B m<sup>3</sup> by 2020 on 2005 levels</li> <li>• Associated with the Accord in March 2010</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• <b>17% reduction</b> from 2005 levels, aligned with U.S. target</li> <li>• Associated with the Accord</li> </ul>

s.15(1)

- about the Cancun Agreements:

– It's a 'balanced agreement which reflects the opinions of all parties'

# CHINA – Canada's Engagement

<b>Bilateral Engagement</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• <b>Climate Change Working Group</b>, met in Beijing on March 8th, 2011</li> <li>• <b>MOU</b> on Climate Change Cooperation signed December 3rd 2009 - focuses on policy dialogue, mitigation and adaptation issues of mutual interest</li> </ul>
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• <b>Science &amp; Technology Agreement</b> – environment and energy key priorities</li> </ul>
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• <b>Environmental Cooperation MOU</b> – work plan developed through the <b>Joint Committee on Environmental Cooperation</b>. Focuses on biodiversity, water, mercury emissions, environmental emergencies, environmental monitoring etc.</li> </ul>
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• <b>Canadian companies</b> increasingly engaged with Chinese partners in wind, solar, bioenergy, fuel cells, coal bed methane, emissions reduction and green buildings; China has a keen interest in <b>Canadian technologies</b></li> </ul>
<b>Technology Partnerships</b>	<p>Participates in:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Carbon Sequestration Leadership Forum (CSLF)</li> <li>• Renewable Energy &amp; Energy Efficiency Partnership (REEEP)</li> <li>• Global Methane Initiative (GMI)</li> <li>• International Partnership for the Hydrogen Economy (IPHE)</li> </ul>
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Since 2007 Canada invested over \$8M in 22 clean tech projects in China under Asia Pacific Partnership on Clean Development and Climate (APP) and GMI, leveraging close to \$32M from the private sector and other governments</li> <li>• Canada also collaborated with China and other APP member countries in four additional projects</li> <li>• In total, the 26 projects in or with China have leveraged a over \$70M in public-private funding</li> </ul>

# CHINA — Other Considerations

Energy	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>World leader in <b>clean energy production and manufacturing</b> and <b>industrial pollution</b></li> </ul>
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li><b>Largest coal producing and consuming country</b>; coal assumed to be its dominant energy source in the future</li> </ul>
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li><b>Energy security</b> is a key concern: a \$30B state-backed loan was granted to the China National Petroleum Corp to fund overseas acquisitions in immature or un-tapped oil-fields, with activity expected to be focused in Latin America and <b>Canada oil sands</b></li> </ul>
s.15(1) s.21(1)(a) s.21(1)(b)  International Negotiations	
Climate Change Impacts	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li><b>Vulnerable</b> to climate change; already experiencing droughts</li> </ul>
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Melting of the <b>Himalayan glaciers</b> will disrupt the flow of river systems and food supply for more than 1.6B people in South Asia if current trends persist until 2050</li> </ul>



# EU-27 – Economy, Emissions, Commitments

	Indicators	EU-27	Canada
Economy	GDP (PPP – 2010 est.)	US \$14.9T	US \$1.3T
	Commerce (2010)	Exports to EU: \$34.5B	Imports from EU: \$47.9B
Emissions*	Total 1990 GHGs	5567.1 Mt CO <sub>2</sub> eq.	591.8 Mt CO <sub>2</sub> eq.
	Total 2008 GHGs	4939.7 Mt CO <sub>2</sub> eq. (11.3% decrease on 1990 levels)	734.4 Mt CO <sub>2</sub> eq. (24.1% increase on 1990 levels)
	2008 GHG/capita (Annex 1 rank)	9.9 t CO <sub>2</sub> eq. per person (23rd)	22.0 t CO <sub>2</sub> eq. per person (4th)
	2008 GHG/GDP	326.7 t CO <sub>2</sub> eq./M US\$	557.2 t CO <sub>2</sub> eq./M US\$
	2008 % of Annex 1 total	Approximately 27.81%	Approximately 4.14%
Commitments	Kyoto Protocol	Approved May 2002; for EU-15 (i.e. the 15 member states when Kyoto was signed) aggregate target is an <b>8% reduction</b> from 1990 levels	Ratified February 2002, <b>6% reduction</b> from 1990 levels
	Copenhagen Accord	<b>20% unconditional reduction</b> on 1990 levels; OR 30% conditional reduction	<b>17% reduction</b> from 2005 levels, aligned with U.S. target


\*GHG figures include CO<sub>2</sub>, CH<sub>4</sub>, N<sub>2</sub>O, PFCs, HFCs, SF<sub>6</sub>; not LULUCF or international bunkers.

Sources: GDP (PPP – 2010 est.) and GDP source for 2008 GHG/GDP data (PPP – 2008 est.): CIA World Fact Book ([www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook](http://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook)); GHG Emissions data: UNFCCC (<http://unfccc.int/di/FlexibleQueries/Event.do>); Population source for 2007 GHG/capita: Eurostat (<http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/tgm/table.do?tab=table&language=en&pcode=tps00001&tableSelection=1&footnotes=yes&labeling=labels&plugin=1>) accessed May 6, 2010


000027

# EU-27 – Comparative GHG Emissions Performance

EU-27 - GHG Emissions by Sector (2008) – Total 4,939.7 Mt\*



Canada - GHG Emissions by Sector (2008) – Total 734.4 Mt\*



\*GHG data includes CO<sub>2</sub>, CH<sub>4</sub>, N<sub>2</sub>O, PFCs, HFCs, SF<sub>6</sub> and not LULUCF.


\*\*IE = Included Elsewhere, NA = Not Applicable

Sources: UNFCCC ([http://unfccc.int/ghg\\_data/ghg\\_data\\_unfccc/ghg\\_profiles/items/4625.php](http://unfccc.int/ghg_data/ghg_data_unfccc/ghg_profiles/items/4625.php))

# EU-27 – Recent CO<sub>2</sub> Projections & Mitigation

- Total emissions in the EU-27 (without LULUCF) decreased by 9.3% from 1990 to 2007. In the EU-15 total emissions decreased by 4.3% over the same period
- GHG emissions in the EU-15 are projected to be 7.5% below base year emissions in 2010.
- The implementation of additional measures is projected to reduce EU-15 emissions to 9.2% below base year emissions
- Emissions of GHG in the EU-27 are projected to be 9.7% below 1990 levels in 2010 as a result of implemented measures
- EU-27 emissions are projected to be 6.4% below 1990 levels in 2020 under the “with existing measures” scenario and 14.3% below 1990 levels under the “with additional measures” scenario

## EU-27 Emissions Projections (excluding LULUCF)



# EU-27 – Domestic Targets & Commitments

<b>Targets and Emissions</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Objective of reducing emissions to 80-95% below 1990 levels by 2050.</li> <li>• <b>Roadmap for Low Carbon Economy</b> (Mar 2011) sets out a cost-efficient pathway to meet this objective, recommending the most cost-efficient way is a 25% reduction by 2020 - instead of the current target of 20% - through <b>domestic measures alone</b></li> </ul>
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• <b>EU-15</b> has a collective target of -8% from 1990 levels; in 2009, EU-15 GHGs were <b>12.7% below</b> 1990 base year</li> </ul>
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• In 2010, EU-27 GHGs are estimated to have increased by 2.4% over 2009 levels. These estimates put total GHG at 15.5% <b>below</b> the 1990 level. With existing measures in place, the European Environment Agency (EEA) predicts that EU-27 emissions will be 19% below 1990 levels by 2020, just short of its 20% reduction target.</li> </ul>
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Mar 2011: <b>Transport Roadmap</b> outlines 40 initiatives for next decade to increase mobility, reduce dependence on imported oil and reduce traffic-related emissions by 60% by 205</li> </ul>
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• <b>Falling emissions</b> since 2005 have resulted from lowered use of fossil fuels in households and services – sectors not covered by ETS – but are among the highest sources of GHGs in EU</li> </ul>
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Emissions from <b>EU businesses</b> participating in the ETS fell 11.6% in 2009 from 2008 levels, due in part to the recession, the low price of gas in 2009 and the carbon price in phase 2</li> </ul>
<b>Emissions Trading Scheme</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• <b>Cornerstone</b> of climate change policies: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>– Covers approx. 40% of emissions including power, heat generation and manufacturing sectors</li> <li>– Largest multi-national cap and trade system in the world</li> <li>– Aviation emissions will be included from 2012</li> <li>– From 2013, single cap introduced and more sectors and gases included</li> <li>– Member states agreed to allocate billions of Euros from ETS to help develop renewable power and carbon-trapping technology (February 2010)</li> </ul> </li> </ul>
<b>Energy</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• 2008 <b>Climate and Energy Package</b> sets goals of: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>– A <b>20% increase in energy efficiency</b> by 2020</li> <li>– An <b>increase to 20% of renewables in overall energy consumption</b> by 2020</li> </ul> </li> </ul>

# EU-27— International Position

EU's 2020 emissions reduction target inscribed in the Copenhagen Accord	Canada's 2020 emissions reduction target inscribed in the Copenhagen Accord
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• 20% <b>unconditional</b> reduction on 1990 levels</li> <li>• <b>OR</b> As part of a global comprehensive agreement for the period beyond 2012, the EU reiterated its <b>conditional</b> offer to move to a 30% reduction by 2020 compared to 1990 levels, <b>provided</b> that other developed countries commit themselves to comparable emission reductions and that developing countries contribute adequately according to their responsibilities and respective capabilities</li> <li>• Associated with the Accord</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• <b>17% reduction</b> on 2005 levels, aligned with U.S. target</li> <li>• Associated with the Accord</li> </ul>

• A May 26<sup>th</sup> 2010 European Council communication setting out the implications of the 20% and 30% targets, did not recommend moving to a 30% target as the conditions of its offer have not yet been met. European Commission is preparing further analysis to move to 30% target.

**s.15(1)**

• In its March 2010 conclusions on the financing of climate change, the Council reaffirmed the EU's commitment of a **total of €7.2B** (US\$10B) over the 2010-12 period for fast start financing. In November 2011, the Council confirmed that of that total, approximately **€4.68B** (US\$6.25B) has already been mobilized.

- Depending on the member state, the EU's fast start financing may include some new money as well as previous announcements programmed for the 2010-12 period
- For 2010: 63% of funds went to mitigation; 37% went to adaptation; €1.21B (US\$1B) went to the Paris-Oslo/REDD+ Initiative

# EU-27 – Canada's Engagement

<b>Multilateral Fora</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Participates in: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>– The Major Economies Forum (MEF)</li> <li>– Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD)</li> </ul> </li> </ul>
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Although not officially a member of the <b>G8</b>, it has participated in meetings since 1977 and is represented by the EU Commission and the country holding EU Council Presidency (currently Poland)</li> </ul>
<b>Bilateral Relations</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Cooperates and shares information on a broad range of areas such as clean air, climate change and chemicals management</li> </ul>
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Annual <b>High-Level Meeting</b> on the Environment <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>– Cooperate and share information on a broad range of areas such as clean air, climate change and chemicals management</li> <li>– At last meeting in July 2009, climate change was not on the agenda</li> </ul> </li> </ul>
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Currently negotiating a Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA) <span style="float: right;">s.15(1)</span></li> </ul>

# EU-27 – Other Considerations

<b>Energy</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• <b>Oil and gas production</b> is decreasing; <b>Russia</b> has historically been a major source of energy</li> </ul>
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Oil, gas, coal and uranium are major primary energy sources now and into the future; looking to <b>diversify energy supply</b>, mostly Liquefied Natural Gas (esp. from Africa and the Middle East)</li> </ul>
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Renewable energy share in 2007 was 9%; majority is from biomass and biowaste</li> </ul>
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• <b>Challenges for a unified system include:</b> functioning markets, established interconnections, diversification and redundancy of import capacity, and regulatory or contractual arrangements</li> </ul>
<b>International Negotiations</b> s.15(1) s.21(1)(a) s.21(1)(b)	
<b>EU Governance</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• <b>Poland</b> assumed the rotating presidency of the EU Council on July 1, 2011</li> </ul>

# FRANCE – Economy, Emissions, Commitments

	Indicators	France	Canada
Economy	GDP (PPP – 2010 est.)	US \$2.2T	US \$1.3T
	Commerce (2010)	Exports to France \$2.3B	Imports from France \$5.4B
Emissions*	Total 1990 GHGs	566.1 Mt CO <sub>2</sub> eq.	591.8 Mt CO <sub>2</sub> eq.
	Total 2008 GHGs	531.8 Mt CO <sub>2</sub> eq. (6.1% decrease on 1990 levels)	734.4 Mt CO <sub>2</sub> eq. (24.1% increase on 1990 levels)
	2008 GHG/capita (Annex 1 rank)	8.2 t CO <sub>2</sub> eq. per person (30th)	22.0 t CO <sub>2</sub> eq. per capita (4th)
	2008 GHG/GDP	246.4 t CO <sub>2</sub> eq./M US\$	557.2 t CO <sub>2</sub> eq./M US\$
	2008 % of Annex 1 total	Approximately 2.99 %	Approximately 4.14%
Commitments	Kyoto Protocol	Ratified May 2002; France's target of 0% on 1990 levels contributes to the aggregate target of the EU-15 (i.e. the fifteen member states when Kyoto was signed) of an 8% reduction from 1990.	Ratified February 2002, 6% reduction from 1990 levels
	Copenhagen Accord	20% unconditional reduction on 1990 levels; OR 30% conditional reduction	17% reduction from 2005 levels, aligned with U.S. target

\*GHG figures include CO<sub>2</sub>, CH<sub>4</sub>, N<sub>2</sub>O, PFCs, HFCs, SF<sub>6</sub>; not LULUCF or international bunkers.


Sources: GDP (PPP-2010 est), GDP source for 2008 GHG/GDP (PPP-2008 est.): CIA World Fact Book ([www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook](http://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook)); GHG emissions data: UNFCCC (<http://unfccc.int/di/FlexibleQueries/Event.do>); Population source for 2008 GHG/capita: UNFCCC (<http://unfccc.int/di/FlexibleQueries/Event.do>).

000034




# FRANCE — Comparative GHG Emissions Performance

France - GHG Emissions by Sector (2008) – Total 531.8 Mt\*



Canada - GHG Emissions by Sector (2008) – Total 734.4 Mt\*



\*GHG data includes CO<sub>2</sub>, CH<sub>4</sub>, N<sub>2</sub>O, PFCs, HFCs, SF<sub>6</sub> and not LULUCF.


\*\*IE = Included Elsewhere, NA = Not Applicable

Sources: UNFCCC ([http://unfccc.int/ghg\\_data/ghg\\_data\\_unfccc/ghg\\_profiles/items/4625.php](http://unfccc.int/ghg_data/ghg_data_unfccc/ghg_profiles/items/4625.php))

# FRANCE – GHG Projections & Mitigation Scenarios

- Its *Fifth national Communication* to the UNFCCC (2009) estimates that implemented and adopted measures will result in 2.2% reduction in emissions in 2020 relative to 1990, and reach 22.8% reduction with additional measures compared to the baseline scenario
- Plans to achieve significant future reductions from transportation, energy efficiency measures, and renewable energy
- The total effect of planned measures is projected to avoid an additional 25.5 Tg CO<sub>2</sub> eq. in emissions, most notably in the **transport and energy sectors**

CO2 Emissions Projections, 2002-2030



# FRANCE — Domestic Targets and Commitments

<b>Emissions</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Legally bound by <b>Grenelle Act 1</b>, to cut national emissions by four by 2050, and to contribute to the 2020 EU goals of a 20% reduction in GHG emissions</li> </ul>
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li><u>Renewables Energy Law</u> paves the way for an expansion of wind power in special wind development zones through a guaranteed feed-in tariff</li> <li><u>Climate Change Action Plan</u>, drawn up in 2004 and updated each year, demands a 5.76% penetration of biofuels in transport by 2010</li> </ul>
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>In 2009, France had exceeded its EU burden sharing target of 0% growth as emissions were 8.3% below 1990 levels</li> </ul>
<b>Renewable Energy &amp; Energy Efficiency</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Legally bound by <b>Grenelle Act 1</b>, to a 20% improvement in energy efficiency and, produce 23% of its energy needs through renewables</li> </ul>
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Jan 2011: Sarkozy announces \$13.6B plan to build the country's first offshore wind project for 600 turbines with a total capacity of 3,000MW</li> </ul>
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Solar power production has increased 10x over the last 2 years; success due to feed-in tariffs for large-scale and residential systems. On track to greatly exceed targets of 1,100MW by 2012</li> </ul>
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li><b>Tax credits</b> of up to 40% energy efficient equipment for the housing sector</li> </ul>
<b>Carbon tax</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>After being ruled unfair in Dec. 2009, President Sarkozy announced in March 2010 that it will <b>abandon</b> the proposed national carbon tax plans, arguing that a carbon tax would have to be introduced at the <b>European level</b> in order to not harm the competitiveness of French companies</li> </ul>

# FRANCE – International Position

France's 2020 emissions reduction target inscribed in Copenhagen Accord	Canada's 2020 emissions reduction target inscribed in Copenhagen Accord
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Included in the EU's inscribed emissions reduction target, which is an <b>unconditional</b> 20% reduction on 1990 levels <b>or</b> a <b>conditional</b> 30% reduction <b>provided</b> that other developed countries commit themselves to comparable emission reductions and that developing countries contribute adequately according to their responsibilities and respective capabilities</li> <li>Associated with the Accord</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li><b>17% reduction</b> from 2005 levels, aligned with U.S. target</li> <li>Associated with the Accord</li> </ul>

- In its March 2010 Council conclusions, the EU reaffirmed its pledge of a **total of EUR7.2B** (US\$10.4B) over the 2010-12 period. Depending on the member state, this will include some new money as well as previous announcements programmed for the 2010-12 period
  - For its part, **France has pledged and committed a total of EUR1.26B** (US\$1.74B)
  - EUR246M or 20% for REDD+ for 2010-2012

# FRANCE — Canada's Engagement

## Multilateral Engagement

- Participant in the **following international fora**:
  - G8
  - Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD)
  - Renewable Energy and Energy Efficiency Partnership (REEEP)
  - Major Economies Forum (MEF)
  - International Renewable Energy Agency (IRENA)
  - Lead partner in La Francophonie
- The **fifth largest exporter** in the world (WTO 2007), with major interests in the aerospace industry
- In June 2009, France published '**Possible outline of a fair and ambitious agreement in Copenhagen**'
  - The report argues **Canada and the United States** are not on course to cut emissions by the level needed, making it difficult for rich nations to meet the 25-40 percent collective reduction in greenhouse gases
  - States that "It is necessary for Canada and the U.S. to take on commitments which are at least on a par with the EU's, compared with 1990 levels"

# FRANCE – Other Considerations

<b>Economic Tools</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• In Fall 2007, Sarkozy expressed interest in using <b>economic levers</b> (such as border tax adjustments) to help balance the playing field between countries taking action to address climate change and those that are not</li> <li>• Since being elected in 2005, Sarkozy, like his predecessors, former President Chirac and Prime Minister de Villepin, has pushed for the introduction of <b>border measures adjustments</b> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>– Argues that a carbon border tax at Europe's borders would allow it to counter "ecological dumping" by countries that "refuse to protect the environment."</li> </ul> </li> </ul>
<p>s.15(1) s.21(1)(a) s.21(1)(b)</p> <b>International Negotiations</b>	
<b>Forests</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Interested in preserving the worlds' major forests (Amazon, Congo, Indonesia); hosted a meeting in March 2010 on this issue. Sees halting deforestation as the most effective way to combat climate change</li> </ul>

# GERMANY – Economy, Emissions, Commitments

	Indicators	Germany	Canada
Economy	GDP (PPP – 2010 est.)	US \$3.0T	US \$1.3T
	Commerce (2010)	Exports to Germany: \$3.9B	Imports from Germany: \$11.3B
Emissions*	Total 1990 GHGs	1231.8 Mt CO <sub>2</sub> eq.	591.8 Mt CO <sub>2</sub> eq.
	Total 2008 GHGs	958.06 Mt CO <sub>2</sub> eq. (22.2% decrease on 1990 levels)	734.4 Mt CO <sub>2</sub> eq. (24.1% increase on 1990 levels)
	2008 GHG/capita (Annex 1 rank)	11.7 t CO <sub>2</sub> eq. per person (14th)	22.0 t CO <sub>2</sub> eq. per person (4th)
	2008 GHG/GDP	323.8 t CO <sub>2</sub> eq./M US\$	557.2 t CO <sub>2</sub> eq./M US\$
	2008 % of Annex 1 total	Approximately 5.39%	Approximately 4.14%
Commitments	Kyoto Protocol	Ratified May 2002; Germany's target of <b>21% below</b> 1990 levels contributes to the aggregate target of the EU-15 (i.e. the 15 member states when Kyoto was signed) of an <b>8% reduction</b> from 1990	Ratified February 2002, <b>6% reduction</b> from 1990 levels
	Copenhagen Accord	Under EU target of <b>20% unconditional reduction</b> ; or 30% conditional reduction on 1990 levels	<b>17% reduction</b> from 2005 levels, aligned with U.S. target


\*GHG figures include CO<sub>2</sub>, CH<sub>4</sub>, N<sub>2</sub>O, PFCs, HFCs, SF<sub>6</sub>; not LULUCF or international bunkers.

Sources: GDP (PPP-2010 est.), GDP for 2008 GHG/GDP: CIA World Fact Book ([www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook](http://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook)); GHG emissions data: UNFCCC (<http://unfccc.int/di/FlexibleQueries/Event.do>); Population source for GHG/capita: Population Reference Bureau, 2007 World Population Data Sheet, ([http://www.prb.org/pdf07/07WPDS\\_Eng.pdf](http://www.prb.org/pdf07/07WPDS_Eng.pdf))


000041

# GERMANY – Comparative GHG Emissions

Germany - GHG Emissions by Sector (2008) - Total 958.06 Mt\*



Canada - GHG Emissions by Sector (2008) – Total 734.4 Mt\*



\*GHG data includes CO<sub>2</sub>, CH<sub>4</sub>, N<sub>2</sub>O, PFCs, HFCs, SF<sub>6</sub> and not LULUCF.

\*\*IE = Included Elsewhere, NA = Not Applicable


Source: UNFCCC ([http://unfccc.int/ghg\\_data/ghg\\_data\\_unfccc/ghg\\_profiles/items/4625.php](http://unfccc.int/ghg_data/ghg_data_unfccc/ghg_profiles/items/4625.php))

000042



# GERMANY – CO<sub>2</sub> Projections & Mitigation Measures

- In its *Fifth national communication to the UNFCCC*, Germany projects that with existing policies and measures, emissions will further **decrease** to 31% below 1990 levels by 2020
- Approx. 50% of reductions are from the collapse of inefficient industry in former East Germany. The remainder is due to **improved efficiency** in coal fired power plants, and **climate policies** on energy efficiency, renewable energy and ecological tax reform



Source: Climate Analysis Indicators Tool (CAIT) Version 6.0. (Wo000043

# GERMANY – Domestic Targets & Commitments

<b>Emissions Targets</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Has an <b>unconditional</b> GHG reduction target of -40% by 2020 and by 80-95% by 2050 compared to 1990 levels</li> </ul>
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>In 2009, Germany <b>already achieved its burden-sharing</b> target with a <b>25.4% reduction</b> on 1990 levels</li> </ul>
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>GHG <b>reduction targets</b> to be met through reduced and more efficient energy consumption, increasing renewables and modernizing power plants</li> </ul>
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Aims to reduce energy consumption from buildings 20% by 2020 and 80% by 2050; target to reduce energy consumption from transportation by 10% in 2020 and 35% by 2050</li> </ul>
<b>Renewable Energy</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>40-Year Energy Plan, released September 2010, increased <b>targets for renewable energy</b> to 35% by 2020; and 80% by 2050</li> </ul>
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>In 2010, <b>renewable energy</b> accounted for around 11% of total final energy consumption for electricity, heat &amp; fuels - almost tripling the share of renewables in final energy consumption from 3.8% in 2000</li> </ul>
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>From 2013, all proceeds from the sale of CO<sub>2</sub> emissions will fund the expansion of renewable energy</li> </ul>
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Market incentive program provides US\$308M annually in grants to renewable projects</li> </ul>

# GERMANY – International Position

Germany's 2020 emissions reduction target inscribed in the Copenhagen Accord	Canada's 2020 emissions reduction target inscribed in Copenhagen Accord
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Included in the EU's inscribed emissions reduction target, which is an <b>unconditional</b> 20% reduction on 1990 levels <b>or</b> a <b>conditional</b> 30% reduction <b>provided</b> that other developed countries commit themselves to comparable emission reductions and that developing countries contribute adequately according to their responsibilities and respective capabilities.</li> <li>• Associated with the Accord</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• 17% reduction on 2005 levels, aligned with U.S. target</li> <li>• Associated with the Accord</li> </ul>

- In its March 2010 Council conclusions, the EU reiterated its pledge of a **total of EUR7.2B** (US\$10.4B) over the 2010-12 period. Depending on the member state, this will include some new money as well as previous announcements programmed for the 2010-12 period
  - For its part, **Germany has pledged a total of EUR1.26B** (CA\$1.7B)
  - ~1/3 of funds for adaptation; at least EUR350M for REDD; remainder for energy-related mitigation

# GERMANY – Canada's Engagement

<b>Bilateral Engagement</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• Germany participates in:<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>– G8+5</li><li>– Major Economies Forum (MEF)</li><li>– Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD)</li><li>– Global Methane Initiative (GMI)</li></ul></li></ul>
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• Highlights of the German-hosted 2007 G8 Summit Declaration include:<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>– Committing G8 members to consider a 50% cut in GHG emissions</li><li>– G8 recommitted to a UN process to seek a post-Kyoto framework</li><li>– Welcomed the U.S. Major Economies Initiative</li><li>– Prominent mention of involving major developing countries</li></ul></li></ul>
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• Europe's largest economy and among the world's top exporting countries<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>– among the world's largest and most technologically advanced producers of iron, steel, coal, cement, chemicals, machinery, vehicles, machine tools, electronics, food and beverages, shipbuilding, textiles</li></ul></li></ul>

# GERMANY – Other Considerations

<b>Emissions</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>In 2009, CO<sub>2</sub> <b>emissions fell</b> by just under 9% to their lowest level since 1990 reflecting declines in industrial activity due to the economic crisis <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Carbon intensive industries have reported decreases in production: steel (32%), chemicals (10%) and cement (8%)</li> </ul> </li> </ul>
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>the <b>EU will meet its unified target of 8%</b> below 1990 levels <b>s.15(1)</b> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li><b>Over two-thirds</b> of EU emissions reductions under the burden sharing agreement achieved by Germany</li> </ul> </li> </ul>
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li><b>1990 Kyoto base year advantageous</b> for Germany: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Post-Soviet economic collapse and German reunification considerably softened targets</li> <li>Between reunification and 1995, emissions dropped over 11%; from 1995 to 2007, emissions fell 12%</li> </ul> </li> </ul>
<b>Nuclear Energy</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>May 2011: government announced a reversal of policy that will see all its nuclear power plants phased out by 2022 <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Biggest industrial power to announce plans to give up nuclear energy <b>s.15(1)</b></li> <li>Merkel's decision to extend the life of nuclear plants last fall</li> </ul> </li> </ul>
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>A mix of policies – emissions trading, standards, regulations, incentives – and investments and planning in its longer-term infrastructure will transition Germany away from nuclear energy and low carbon energy systems</li> </ul>
<b>Technology Partnerships</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Spearheaded the creation of the <b>International Renewable Energy Agency (IRENA)</b></li> </ul>

# INDIA – Economy, Emissions, Commitments

	Indicators	India	Canada
Economy	GDP (PPP – 2010 est.)	US \$4.1T	US \$1.3T
	Commerce (2010)	Exports to India: \$2.1B	Imports from India: \$2.1B
Emissions*	Total 1990 GHGs	1106.1 Mt CO <sub>2</sub> eq.	591.8 Mt CO <sub>2</sub> eq.
	Total 2005 GHGs	1859 Mt CO <sub>2</sub> eq. (68.1% increase on 1990 levels)	739.4 Mt CO <sub>2</sub> eq. (25% increase on 1990 levels)
	2005 GHG/capita (rank globally)	1.7 t CO <sub>2</sub> eq. per person (149th)	22.9 t CO <sub>2</sub> eq. per person (10th)
	2005 GHG/GDP	760.3 t CO <sub>2</sub> eq./Mill. \$Intl 2005	653.7 t CO <sub>2</sub> eq./Mill. \$Intl 2005
	2005 % of global total	Approximately 4.92%	Approximately 1.96%
Commitments	Kyoto Protocol	Accession, but has no GHG target	Ratified February 2002, <b>6% reduction</b> from 1990 levels
	Copenhagen Accord	Endeavours to <b>reduce the emissions intensity of its GDP by 20-25% by 2020</b> in comparison to the 2005 level	<b>17% reduction</b> from 2005 levels, aligned with U.S. target


\*GHG figures include CO<sub>2</sub>, CH<sub>4</sub>, N<sub>2</sub>O, PFCs, HFCs, SF<sub>6</sub>; not LULUCF or international bunkers.

Sources: GDP (PPP – 2010 est.) and GDP for 2005 GHG/GDP (PPP – 2005 est): CIA World Fact Book ([www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook](http://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook)); GHG Emissions Data: Climate Analysis Indicators Tool (CAIT) Version 8.0. (World Resources Institute, 2011, <http://cait.wri.org/cait.php>); Total 1990 GHGs for Canada: UNFCCC ([http://unfccc.int/ghg\\_data/ghg\\_data\\_unfccc/items/4146.php](http://unfccc.int/ghg_data/ghg_data_unfccc/items/4146.php))


000048

# INDIA – Comparative GHG Emissions Performance

India – GHG Emissions by Sector (2005) - Total 1859 Mt\*



Canada - GHG Emissions by Sector (2005) – Total 739.4 Mt\*



\*GHG data includes CO<sub>2</sub>, CH<sub>4</sub>, N<sub>2</sub>O, PFCs, HFCs, SF<sub>6</sub> and not LULUCF.


Sources: *Climate Analysis Indicators Tool (CAIT) Version 8.0.* (World Resources Institute, 2011, <http://cait.wri.org/cait.php>);

UNFCCC data for 2005 Canadian total GHG emissions (<http://unfccc.int/di/FlexibleQueries.do>).

# INDIA – GHG Projections & Mitigation Scenarios

- Emissions **projected to increase** by about 4.2% per year between 2000 and 2020 under BAU scenario
- With high economic growth rates and over 15% of the world's population, it is a significant consumer of energy resources
- Energy demand in the transport sector is expected to be particularly high in the years ahead
- In 2000, **most emissions** resulted from power production (36%), agriculture (22%) and industry (16%). This trend is projected to be similar under the BAU scenario
- In 2003, 56% of primary energy was supplied from **coal or oil**; coal is likely to remain important for future energy supply
- **Solar and hydropower** are increasingly important sources of energy

**Estimated mitigation potential** of announced climate change plans and other proposed measures: a **12% reduction below 2020 BAU projections**



Sources for chart and information: Ecofys and Wuppertal Institute (2008) *Proposals for Contributions of Emerging Economies to the Climate Regime under the UNFCCC post 2012* and Centre for Clean Air Policy and Ecofys (2009) *Developing countries' climate plans*.



# INDIA – 2008 National Action Plan on Climate Change

The **National Action Plan on Climate Change** promotes sustainable development mainly by focusing on domestic actions under eight missions that run to 2017

<b>Mission</b>	<b>Objective</b>
<b>Solar</b>	20,000 MW of solar power by 2022
<b>Energy Efficiency</b>	10,000 MW of energy efficiency savings by 2020
<b>Sustainable Habitat</b>	Energy efficiency in residential & commercial buildings, public transport and solid waste management
<b>Water</b>	Water conservation, river basin management
<b>Sustaining the Himalayan Ecosystem</b>	Conservation and adaptation practices, glacial monitoring
<b>A Green India</b>	6M hectares of afforestation over degraded forest lands by the end of the 12 <sup>th</sup> 5 Year Plan
<b>Sustainable Agriculture</b>	Drought proofing, risk management, agricultural research
<b>Strategic Knowledge for Climate Change</b>	Vulnerability assessment, research & observation, data management

# INDIA – International Position

India's domestic mitigation actions inscribed in the Copenhagen Accord	Canada's 2020 emissions reduction target inscribed in the Copenhagen Accord
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Endeavours to <b>reduce the emissions intensity</b> of its GDP by <b>20-25%</b> by 2020 in comparison to the 2005 level (emissions from the agriculture sector will not form part of the assessment of emissions intensity)</li> <li>• Associated with the Accord March 2010</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• <b>17% reduction</b> from 2005 levels, aligned with U.S. target</li> <li>• Associated with the Copenhagen Accord</li> </ul>

- At a January 2010 meeting of **BASIC countries**, environment ministers announced plans to develop a framework to:
  - Develop a permanent scientific cooperation on climate change
  - Extend financial and technological support for adaptation to other developing nations, especially least developed countries and small island developing states

# INDIA – Canada's Engagement

<b>Bilateral Engagement</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Signed an <b>Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) on Energy Cooperation</b> in November 2009, which created a Forum for collaboration; first Forum meeting took place in Ottawa in May 2010</li> </ul>
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li><b>Science &amp; Technology Agreement</b> has resulted in \$24M in bilateral research projects since 2005</li> </ul>
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Work together on a range of environmental issues through the <b>Canada-India Environment Forum</b>; first meeting held in June 2009</li> </ul>
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Currently negotiating a Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement (CEPA)</li> </ul>
<b>Multilateral Engagement</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Participant in:                             <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>G20 and G8+5</li> <li>The Commonwealth</li> <li>Major Economies Forum (MEF)</li> </ul> </li> </ul>
<b>Technology Partnerships</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Participant in:                             <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Global Methane Initiative (GMI)</li> <li>Renewable Energy and Energy Efficiency partnership (REEEP)</li> </ul> </li> </ul>
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Four projects under the Asia-Pacific Partnerships (APP) were implemented in India in the three energy supply sector task forces: renewable energy and distributed generation, cleaner fossil energy and power generation and transmission</li> </ul>

# INDIA – Other Considerations

<b>Energy</b>  s.15(1)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>In 2010, clean energy investment increased 25% to US\$4B, of which 63% was in wind sector and 17% in solar</li> </ul>
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Its solar mission to deliver 20GW of power by 2022 is one of the world's most ambitious solar energy development plans</li> </ul>
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li><b>Significant coal reserves</b> (2B t), which are expected to last much longer than its oil and natural gas reserves</li> </ul>
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>In 2010, <b>enacted a levy on domestic and imported coal</b>: earnings to go into <b>National Clean Energy Fund</b> to support research, innovative projects in clean energy technologies and environmental remedial programs</li> </ul>
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>it has one of the world's <b>lowest marginal abatement costs</b></li> </ul>
<b>International Negotiations</b>  s.15(1) s.21(1)(a) s.21(1)(b)	
<b>Domestic Considerations</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li><b>Domestic pressure to mitigate</b> emissions and adapt to climate change</li> </ul>
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Recognizes that climate change could have a negative impacts on social stability as livelihoods will be adversely affected by changing monsoon patterns, water scarcity, flooding and rising temperatures</li> </ul>

# INDONESIA – Economy, Emissions, Commitments


	Indicators	Indonesia	Canada
Economy	GDP (PPP – 2010 est.)	US \$1.0T	US \$1.3T
	Commerce (2010)	Exports to Indonesia: \$1.1B	Imports from Indonesia: \$1.3B
Emissions*	Total 1990 GHGs	331.2 Mt CO <sub>2</sub> eq.	591.8 Mt CO <sub>2</sub> eq.
	Total 2005 GHGs	583.2 Mt CO <sub>2</sub> eq. (76.1% increase on 1990 levels)	739.4 Mt CO <sub>2</sub> eq. (25% increase on 1990 levels)
	2005 GHG/capita (rank globally)	2.7 t CO <sub>2</sub> eq. per person (118th)	22.9 t CO <sub>2</sub> eq. per person (10th)
	2005 GHG/GDP	827.1 t CO <sub>2</sub> eq./Mill. \$Intl. 2005	653.7 t CO <sub>2</sub> eq./Mill. \$Intl. 2005
	2005 % of global total	Approximately 1.54%	Approximately 1.96%
Commitments	Kyoto Protocol	Ratified December 2004, <b>no target</b>	Ratified February 2002, <b>6% reduction</b> from 1990 levels
	Copenhagen Accord	<b>26% reduction</b> by 2020 (no baseline provided) from BAU	<b>17% reduction</b> from 2005 levels, aligned with U.S. target

\*GHG figures include CO<sub>2</sub>, CH<sub>4</sub>, N<sub>2</sub>O, PFCs, HFCs, SF<sub>6</sub>; not LULUCF or international bunkers.


Sources: GDP (PPP – 2010 est) and GDP for 2005 GHG/GDP (PPP – 2005 est): CIA World Fact Book ([www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook](http://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook)); GHG Emissions Data: Climate Analysis Indicators Tool (CAIT) Version 8.0. (Washington, DC: World Resources Institute, 2011), <http://cait.wri.org/cait.php>; Total 1990 GHGs and Total 2005 GHGs for Canada: UNFCCC ([http://unfccc.int/ghg\\_data/ghg\\_data\\_unfccc/items/4146.php](http://unfccc.int/ghg_data/ghg_data_unfccc/items/4146.php))

# INDONESIA — Comparative GHG Emissions Performance

Indonesia - GHG Emissions by Sector (2005) – Total 583.2 Mt\*




Canada - GHG Emissions by Sector (2005) – Total 739.4 Mt\*



\*GHG data includes CO<sub>2</sub>, CH<sub>4</sub>, N<sub>2</sub>O, PFCs, HFCs, SF<sub>6</sub> and not LULUCF.  
 Sources: Climate Analysis Indicators Tool (CAIT) Version 8.0. (Washington, DC: World Resources Institute, 2011, <http://cait.wri.org/cait.php>); UNFCCC data for 2005 Canadian total GHG emissions (<http://unfccc.int/di/FlexibleQueries.do>).

# INDONESIA – Projections & Mitigation Scenarios

- Between 1990 and 2005, CO<sub>2</sub> emissions from power increased by 139%; from industry by 183% and from transport by 132%.
- In 2000, the largest share of emissions (60%) were from Land Use and Land Use Change and Forestry (LULUCF), arising from deforestation and peat fires.
- Energy emissions were the second largest source at 23% of the total; the most important of which were petroleum and gas refining (22%), transportation (18%) and electricity and heat (12%).
- To support mitigation effort in the energy sector, energy diversification and conservation and the implementation of clean technology are required.
- 2020 projections indicate that emissions will be double 2000 levels under a business as usual scenario (BAU)



ER = Emissions Reduction


Source: National Council on Climate Change, Republic of Indonesia, 2009

# INDONESIA – Domestic Targets & Commitments

<b>Targets and Emissions</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>At the 2009 G20 Summit, President Yudhoyono pledged to cut emissions 26% by 2020 and 41% if international assistance was offered; baseline not specified</li> </ul>
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>2008 G8 Summit: Yudhoyono committed Indonesia to <b>reducing emissions</b> from <b>deforestation</b> by 50% in 2009, 75% in 2012 and 95% by 2025.</li> </ul>
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>May 2011: instituted a 2-year moratorium on new permits to clear primary forests and peatlands, as part of a \$1B deal with Norway that could spur projects to cut emissions and slow plantation expansion</li> </ul>
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>World's 2<sup>nd</sup> largest tropical forest and the fastest deforestation rate; deforestation accounts for approximately 71% of its total GHG emissions</li> </ul>
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>2007 <b>National Action Plan on Climate Change</b>: a development strategy focusing on economic growth, poverty alleviation, and employment opportunities, combined with environmental protection</li> </ul>
<b>Energy</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Target of new and renewable energy utilization in 2025 is <b>17% of national energy consumption</b> (2003 figure was 4.5%)</li> </ul>
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Has the world's largest geothermal potential; almost all clean energy investment has been directed to geothermal energy, of which Indonesia has 1.19GW (2<sup>nd</sup> among G-20 members)</li> </ul>
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Target to improve energy efficiency by 30% by 2025, and achieve average reduction in energy intensity of economy of 1% annually 2003-2020</li> </ul>
<b>Climate Change Impacts</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Particularly vulnerable to the effects of climate change, including rising sea levels, erosion of coastal areas, increased frequency and intensity of extreme weather events, species extinction, and the spread of vector-borne diseases</li> </ul>



# INDONESIA – International Position

Indonesia's domestic mitigation actions inscribed in the Copenhagen Accord	Canada's 2020 emissions reduction target inscribed in the Copenhagen Accord
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• 26% reduction by 2020 (no baseline provided) to be achieved through the following mitigation actions:                             <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Sustainable Peat Land Management</li> <li>- Reduction in Rate of Deforestation and Land Degradation</li> <li>- Development of Carbon Sequestration Projects in Forestry and Agriculture</li> <li>- Promotion of Energy Efficiency</li> <li>- Development of Alternative and Renewable Energy Sources</li> <li>- Reduction in Solid and Liquid Waste</li> <li>- Shifting to Low-Emission Transportation Mode</li> </ul> </li> <li>• Associated with the Accord</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• <b>17% reduction</b> from 2005 levels, aligned with U.S. target</li> <li>• Associated with the Accord</li> </ul> 

- Calls on developed countries to provide new, ongoing and predictable financing to aid mitigation and adaptation in developing countries: 0.5-1% of Annex I GDP
- As a result of a \$1B contribution from Norway (US\$30 M in fast-start financing), is planning a 2-year moratorium on new clearing of natural forests and peat lands (2011-13)

# INDONESIA – Canada's Engagement

<p><b>Development Assistance</b></p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• One of Canada's 20 <b>countries of focus</b>; its poverty, strategic significance and transition to democracy underlie the Canadian International Development Agency's (CIDA) involvement               <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>– Has been providing development assistance since 1954</li> <li>– In 2008-09 Canada disbursed <b>\$79M in ODA</b></li> <li>– Focus was on large infrastructure projects: mainly in irrigation, transportation, electricity and communications</li> <li>– Cooperation gradually evolved towards: governance, environment and private sector development</li> </ul> </li> <li>• After the 2004 <b>Indian Ocean tsunami</b>, provided immediate humanitarian assistance; supported reconstruction efforts between 2005-09</li> <li>• Supported climate change projects under Canada Climate Change Development Fund (CCCDF) from 2000 to end of FY 2005-06</li> </ul>
<p><b>Multilateral Engagement</b></p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• <b>Participates in:</b> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>– Has enhanced status in the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD)</li> <li>– Major Economies Forum (MEF)</li> <li>– Renewable Energy and Energy Efficiency Partnership (REEEP)</li> <li>– Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC)</li> <li>– Global Methane Initiative (GMI)</li> <li>– G20; Sometimes participates in G8+ meetings</li> <li>– Member of the Commonwealth</li> </ul> </li> </ul>

# INDONESIA – Other Considerations

<p>s.15(1) s.21(1)(a) s.21(1)(b)</p> <p><b>International Negotiations</b></p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Hosted COP13 in Bali;</li> <li>•</li> <li>•</li> </ul>
<p><b>Energy</b></p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Significant reserves of oil and natural gas; a global leader in exports of liquefied natural gas. Committed at 2009 G20 to phase out fossil fuel subsidies</li> <li>• Progressing towards expanding biofuel production for domestic use to reduce oil consumption and for export to meet strong demand, especially in Europe               <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>– Demand for biodiesel is expected to increase to 5% of total diesel consumption in 2025; this will need 1.4M hectares of oil-palm plantations</li> <li>– Consequences for forest cover: already among the top three GHG emitters in the world resulting from <b>land use change and deforestation.</b></li> </ul> </li> </ul>

# ITALY – Economy, Emissions, Commitments


	Indicators	Italy	Canada
Economy	GDP (PPP – 2010 est.)	US \$1.8 T	US \$1.3T
	Commerce (2010)	Exports to Italy: \$1.9B	Imports from Italy: \$4.6B
Emissions*	Total 1990 GHGs	517.0 Mt CO <sub>2</sub> eq.	591.8 Mt CO <sub>2</sub> eq.
	Total 2008 GHGs	541.5 Mt CO <sub>2</sub> eq. (4.7% increase on 1990 levels)	734.4 Mt CO <sub>2</sub> eq. (24.1 % increase on 1990 levels)
	2008 GHG/capita (Annex 1 rank)	9.1 t CO <sub>2</sub> eq. per person (27th)	22.0 t CO <sub>2</sub> per person (4th)
	2008 GHG/GDP	293.0 t CO <sub>2</sub> eq./M US\$	557.2 t CO <sub>2</sub> eq./M US\$
	2008 % of Annex 1 total	Approximately 3.05%	Approximately 4.14 %
Commitments	Kyoto Protocol	Ratified May 2002; Italy's target of <b>6.5% below</b> 1990 levels contributes to the aggregate target of the EU-15 (i.e. the fifteen member states when Kyoto was signed) of an <b>8% reduction</b> from 1990.	Ratified February 2002, <b>6% reduction</b> from 1990 levels
	Copenhagen Accord	Under EU target of 20% unconditional reduction; or 30% conditional reduction on 1990 levels	<b>17% reduction</b> from 2005 levels, aligned with U.S. target

\*GHG figures include CO<sub>2</sub>, CH<sub>4</sub>, N<sub>2</sub>O, PFCs, HFCs, SF<sub>6</sub> and not LULUCF.


Sources: GDP (PPP-2010 est): CIA World Fact Book 2009, GDP source for 2007 GHG/GDP (PPP-2007 est.): CIA World Fact Book 2010 ([www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook](http://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook)) accessed online May 5, 2010; GHG emissions data: UNFCCC (<http://unfccc.int/di/FlexibleQueries/Event.do>); Population source for 2007 GHG/capita: UNFCCC (<http://unfccc.int/di/FlexibleQueries/Event.do>). 000062

# Italy – Comparative GHG Emissions Performance

Italy - GHG Emissions by Sector (2008) – Total 541.4 Mt\*



Canada - GHG Emissions by Sector (2008) – Total 734.4 Mt\*



\*GHG data includes CO<sub>2</sub>, CH<sub>4</sub>, N<sub>2</sub>O, PFCs, HFCs, SF<sub>6</sub> and not LULUCF.


\*\*IE = Included Elsewhere, NA = Not Applicable

Sources: UNFCCC ([http://unfccc.int/ghg\\_data/ghg\\_data\\_unfccc/ghg\\_profiles/items/4625.php](http://unfccc.int/ghg_data/ghg_data_unfccc/ghg_profiles/items/4625.php))

# ITALY – GHG Projections and Mitigation Scenarios

- Emissions in 2008 were **4.7% higher** than 1990 levels, significantly above the burden-sharing target of -6.5 % for the period 2008–2012
- Emissions from energy uses have increased by 9.3%, with the highest growth rate (+24.3%) in the transport sector, followed by energy industries sector (+17.6%). Emissions from the industry sector have decreased by 11.1%
- Annual emissions declined over 2006-2008 resulting from the economic recession and de-industrialisation
- Projections to 2020 indicate that **emissions will increase by 18.3% compared to 1990 levels** (or +6.4% compared to 2005 levels)

CO2 Emissions Projections, 2002-2030



# ITALY – Domestic Targets and Commitments

<b>Targets</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>National action plan aims to meet Kyoto GHG reduction targets                             <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Includes a variety of economic, fiscal and regulatory measures;</li> <li>In 2009, emissions were 5% below 1990 levels</li> </ul> </li> <li>Italian gas and electricity suppliers are obligated to improve energy efficiency by 9.6% by 2016 compared to the average of the 2001-05 period</li> </ul>
<b>Renewable Energy</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Italy plans to meet its commitment under the EU climate change plan to <b>increase renewable energy in electricity, heating &amp; cooling and transport</b> from 2005 levels by 5.2% to 17% by 2020 by:                             <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Priority access to the grid system is granted to electricity from renewable energy sources and combined heat &amp; power (CHP) plants</li> <li>Through the Green Certificates system, electricity producers are obliged to feed the grid with a minimum share of electricity produced by renewable energy sources</li> <li>A feed-in tariff for solar energy</li> </ul> </li> <li>Currently, electricity from renewable sources accounts for 18.8% of total</li> <li>Has highlighted its interest in formulating roadmaps for renewable energy and carbon capture and storage (CCS), and establishing private-public integrated framework for joint cooperation on development of breakthrough technologies</li> </ul>

# ITALY – International Position

Italy's 2020 emissions reduction target inscribed in the Copenhagen Accord	Canada's 2020 emissions reduction target inscribed in the Copenhagen Accord
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Included in the EU's inscribed emissions reduction target, which is an <b>unconditional</b> 20% reduction on 1990 levels <b>or</b> a <b>conditional</b> 30% reduction <b>provided</b> that other developed countries commit themselves to comparable emission reductions and that developing countries contribute adequately according to their responsibilities and respective capabilities</li> <li>• Associated with the Accord</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• 17% reduction on 2005 levels, aligned with U.S. target</li> <li>• Associated with the Accord</li> </ul>

- In its March 2010 Council conclusions, the EU reaffirmed its pledge of a **total of €7.2B** (US\$10.4B) over the 2010-12 period
- Depending on the member state, this will include some new money as well as previous announcements programmed for the 2010-12 period – Sources indicate that Italy's pledge amounts to US\$0.8B



# ITALY – Canada's Engagement

## Multilateral Engagement

- Italy **participates** in:
  - G8, G20
  - Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD)
  - Renewable Energy and Energy Efficiency Partnership (REEEP)
  - Global Methane Initiative (GMI)
  - Major Economies Forum on Energy and Climate (MEF)
- Hosted the **2009 G8 Leaders' Summit**, where climate change was a significant agenda item. The resulting **Leaders' Declaration** stated:
  - a global goal of 50% GHG emissions reduction by 2050
  - an aggregate goal of 80% reduction from developed countries by 2050, from 1990 or more recent baseline years
  - acknowledged that the **average global temperature** increase from pre-industrial levels should not exceed 2°C

# ITALY – Other Considerations

<p>s.15(1) s.21(1)(a) s.21(1)(b)</p> <p><b>International Negotiations</b></p>	
<p><b>Energy</b></p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• First country in which solar power has achieved price parity with other electric sources</li> </ul>
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Support for cogeneration (combined heat and power) has reduced GHG emissions from electricity sector</li> </ul>
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Advocates a level playing field by eliminating subsidies to polluting industries</li> </ul>
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• More than 80% of the country's energy sources are imported</li> </ul>
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• PM Berlusconi recently set target of 25% of energy from nuclear; only G8 country that does not produce nuclear power (eliminated in 1987). Referendum on issue will be held Spring 2011</li> </ul>

# JAPAN – Economy, Emissions, Commitments


	Indicators	Japan	Canada
Economy	GDP (PPP – 2010 est.)	US \$4.3T	US \$1.3T
	Commerce (2010)	Exports to Japan: \$9.2B	Imports from Japan: \$13.4B
Emissions*	Total 1990 GHGs	1268.7 Mt CO <sub>2</sub> eq.	591.8 Mt CO <sub>2</sub> eq.
	Total 2008 GHGs	1281.8 Mt CO <sub>2</sub> eq. (1.0% increase on 1990 levels)	734.4 Mt CO <sub>2</sub> eq. (24.1% increase on 1990 levels)
	2008 GHG/capita (Annex 1 rank)	10.2 t CO <sub>2</sub> eq. per person (22nd)	22.0 t CO <sub>2</sub> eq. per person (4th)
	2008 GHG/GDP	293.5 t CO <sub>2</sub> eq./M US\$	557.2 t CO <sub>2</sub> eq./M US\$
	2008 % of Annex 1 total	Approximately 5.39%	Approximately 4.14%
Commitments	Kyoto Protocol	Ratified June 2002, <b>6% reduction</b> from 1990 levels	Ratified February 2002, <b>6% reduction</b> from 1990 levels
	Copenhagen Accord	<b>25% reduction</b> from 1990 levels	<b>17% reduction</b> from 2005 levels, aligned with U.S. target

\*GHG figures include CO<sub>2</sub>, CH<sub>4</sub>, N<sub>2</sub>O, PFCs, HFCs, SF<sub>6</sub>, not LULUCF or international bunkers.


•Sources: GDP (PPP-2010 est.) and GDP for 2008 GHG/GDP (PPP-2008 est.): CIA World Fact Book ([www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook](http://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook)); GHG emissions data: UNFCCC (<http://unfccc.int/di/FlexibleQueries/Event.do>); Population source for 2007 GHG/capita data: UNFCCC (<http://unfccc.int/di/FlexibleQueries/Event.do>).

# JAPAN – Comparative GHG Emissions Performance

Japan - GHG Emissions by Sector (2008) – Total 1281.8 Mt\*



Canada - GHG Emissions by Sector (2008) – Total 734.4 Mt\*




\*GHG data includes CO<sub>2</sub>, CH<sub>4</sub>, N<sub>2</sub>O, PFCs, HFCs, SF<sub>6</sub> and not LULUCF.

\*\*IE = Included Elsewhere, NA = Not Applicable

Sources: UNFCCC ([http://unfccc.int/ghg\\_data/ghg\\_data\\_unfccc/ghg\\_profiles/items/4625.php](http://unfccc.int/ghg_data/ghg_data_unfccc/ghg_profiles/items/4625.php))

# JAPAN – Emissions Trends and Projections

- Japan's emissions peaked in 2007 at 9% over 1990 levels
- Emissions declined markedly in 2008 and 2009, largely due to the drop in energy demand in the industrial sector as a result of the economic downturn
- Increased nuclear plant utilization helped to reduce fossil fuel use
- To meet its Kyoto target of a 6% decrease, Japan acquired 95.10 Mt CO<sub>2</sub> credits as of April 1, 2009 (equivalent to 1.6% reduction)
- Future emissions reductions to come from the industrial, commercial, household and transport sectors (equivalent to a 9.6 % reduction)
- Expects enhancing forest sinks will lead to a further 3.5% reduction



# JAPAN – Domestic Targets & Commitments

<b>Targets &amp; Emissions</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Due to the March 11<sup>th</sup> earthquake, tsunami and nuclear crisis, the proposed Climate Change Bill is unlikely to be passed in the current Diet session <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>– Bill was to provide legislative basis for the 2020 target, provisions for domestic emissions trading system, carbon tax, and incentives to boost renewable energies</li> </ul> </li> </ul>
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Despite recent crises, Japan expects it will meet its commitments under the Kyoto Protocol and remains supportive of domestic efforts to reduce emissions <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>– Over the medium term, however, it will reconsider its overall energy strategy, which envisages over 50% of total electricity coming from nuclear power</li> <li>– A reassessment of its energy policy will likely impact domestic mitigation policies including its plans to reduce emissions 25% by 2020 on 1990 levels</li> </ul> </li> </ul>
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Aims to achieve 15% of cuts domestically, including through fossil fuel tax hikes, and 10% abroad, such as by carbon credit purchases</li> </ul>
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Beginning in 2010, the City of Tokyo established a cap-and-trade system to reduce municipal emissions by 25% by 2020 from 2000 levels</li> </ul>
<b>Energy</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Aug 2011: Upper and Lower Houses of Parliament approved a bill to subsidize electricity from renewable sources <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>– Allows for incentives that guarantee above-market rates for wind, solar and geothermal</li> <li>– The legislation will become effective on July 1, 2012 and will require that utilities to buy electricity generated by renewable sources.</li> </ul> </li> </ul>
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• <b>New Strategic Energy Plan (SEP)</b>, focusing on energy security, energy efficiency and energy-based growth, sets ambitious targets that will result in an expected 30% reduction in energy-based GHGs from 1990 levels for 2030</li> </ul>

# JAPAN – International Position

Japan's 2020 emissions reduction target inscribed in the Copenhagen Accord	Canada's 2020 emissions reduction target inscribed in the Copenhagen Accord
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• <b>25% reduction</b> on 1990 levels; the target is premised on the establishment of a fair and effective international framework in which all major economies participate and on agreement by those economies on ambitious targets</li> <li>• Associated with the Accord</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• <b>17% reduction</b> from 2005 levels, aligned with U.S. target</li> <li>• Associated with the Accord</li> </ul>

- Pledged US\$15B for fast-start funding: US\$7.2B in ODA and US\$7.8B in other official financing in collaboration with the private sector. Nearly half (US\$7.2B) has already been allocated. Priorities are mitigation, adaptation, and REDD+
- Although reconstruction after the March 11<sup>th</sup> earthquake and nuclear crisis is its financial priority, fast-start funding disbursements up to 2012 are expected to continue, but at a slower pace
- In Sept. 2009 announced US\$15B over three years in support for developing countries address climate change under the **Hatoyama Initiative**
  - Initiative built on its Cool Earth Partnership commitment of US\$10B over five years
  - Unclear if finance pledges under the Copenhagen Accord include Hatoyama Initiative commitments

# JAPAN – Other Considerations

<p>s.15(1) s.21(1)(a) s.21(1)(b)</p> <p><b>International Negotiations</b></p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>•</li> <li>•</li> <li>•</li> </ul>
<p><b>Energy</b></p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Energy accounts for 90.5% of total emissions – largely from fuel combustion and fugitive emissions</li> <li>• Having few fossil fuel resources, highly dependant on other countries for its energy. Given its foreign energy dependence, Japan has aimed to diversify its energy sources and maintain high levels of domestic energy efficiency</li> <li>• Currently one of the world's most efficient advanced economies, which will likely make additional emission reductions challenging; now working to achieve low-carbon growth</li> </ul>



# MEXICO – Commitments, Emissions, Economy

	Indicators	Mexico	Canada
Economy	GDP (PPP – 2010 est.)	US \$1.6T	US \$1.3T
	Commerce (2010)	Exports to Mexico: \$5.0B	Imports from Mexico: \$22.1B
Emissions*	Total 1990 GHGs	459.3 Mt CO <sub>2</sub> eq.	591.8 Mt CO <sub>2</sub> eq.
	Total 2005 GHGs	645 Mt CO <sub>2</sub> eq. (40.4% increase on 1990 levels)	739.4 Mt CO <sub>2</sub> eq. (25% increase on 1990 levels)
	2005 GHG/capita (rank globally)	6.3 t CO <sub>2</sub> eq. per person (75th)	22.9 t CO <sub>2</sub> eq. per person (10th)
	2005 GHG/GDP	498 t CO <sub>2</sub> eq./Mill. \$Intl 2005	653.7 t CO <sub>2</sub> eq./Mill. \$Intl 2005
	2005 % of global total	Approximately 1.71%	Approximately 1.96%
Commitments	Kyoto Protocol	Ratified Sept. 2000, no target	Ratified February 2002, <b>6% reduction</b> from 1990 levels
	Copenhagen Accord	Aims at reducing its GHG emissions up to 30% with respect to the business as usual scenario by 2020	<b>17% reduction</b> from 2005 levels, aligned with U.S. target

\*GHG figures include CO<sub>2</sub>, CH<sub>4</sub>, N<sub>2</sub>O, PFCs, HFCs, SF<sub>6</sub>; not LULUCF or international bunkers.


Sources: GDP (PPP – 2010 est) and GDP for 2005 GHG/GDP (PPP – 2005 est): CIA World Fact Book ([www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook](http://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook)); GHG Emissions Data: Climate Analysis

Indicators Tool (CAIT) Version 8.0. (World Resources Institute, 2011, <http://cait.wri.org/cait.php>);


Total 1990 GHGs for Canada: UNFCCC ([http://unfccc.int/ghg\\_data/ghg\\_data\\_unfccc/items/4146.php](http://unfccc.int/ghg_data/ghg_data_unfccc/items/4146.php))

# MEXICO – Comparative GHG Emissions Performance

Mexico - GHG Emissions by Sector (2005) - Total 645 Mt\*



Canada - GHG Emissions by Sector (2005) – Total 739.4 Mt\*



\*GHG data includes CO<sub>2</sub>, CH<sub>4</sub>, N<sub>2</sub>O, PFCs, HFCs, SF<sub>6</sub> and not LULUCF.


Sources: Climate Analysis Indicators Tool (CAIT) Version 8.0. (World Resources Institute, 2011, <http://cait.wri.org/cait.php>);

UNFCCC data for Canadian total GHG emissions (<http://unfccc.int/di/FlexibleQueries.do>).

# MEXICO – GHG Projections

- Energy system **highly dependant** on oil and gas; the dominance of oil in energy mix leads to comparatively high emissions; oil funds 40% of the national budget
- In 2006, the world's **6<sup>th</sup> largest producer of oil**, but production is declining
  - Proven reserves fell from 49.3B barrels in 1986 to 12.4B barrels in 2007
- **Electricity generation** is mainly from natural gas (36%), oil (28%) and coal (14.8%). Emissions from **land-use management** are also substantial
- A **high mitigation potential** exists at comparatively low costs
- Despite improvements in energy efficiency, **growth in emissions** is mainly driven by:
  - **High population growth rate:** 28% increase between 1990 and 2005
  - **Higher living standard:** GDP per capita grown 25% between 1990 and 2006
  - **Carbon intensity:** grown 7% between 1990 and 2005

Estimated BAU is forecasted to grow about 240% by 2040



# MEXICO – Domestic Targets & Commitments

<p><b>Targets</b></p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• <b>Special Program on Climate Change (PECC in Spanish) (June 2009):</b> a comprehensive strategy to <b>cut emissions</b> and <b>reduce energy use</b> while putting the Mexican economy on a <b>low carbon growth path</b></li> <li>• PECC anticipates long term mitigation plans that will accomplish a <b>21% emissions reduction by 2020 and 41% reduction by 2030</b> based on 2000 levels</li> </ul>
<p><b>Mitigation</b></p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• PECC has four main pillars: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>– <b>Long-term view</b> with a target of a 50% GHG emission reduction by 2050 from 2000 levels</li> <li>– <b>Mitigation:</b> de-carbonize the economy by reducing carbon intensity that will lead to 85% of the reductions called for by the plan. The remaining 15% will be achieved through 31 goals in four categories: energy generation, energy use, land use, land-use change and forestry, and waste</li> <li>– <b>Adaptation:</b> the main components of this policy are to develop capacity building objectives for people, their goods, infrastructures and the ecosystems and align public policy on adaptation. It identifies the importance of managing risks, in particular as it refers to extreme hydrometereological changes</li> <li>– <b>Transversal policy</b> to integrate climate change policies across government departments</li> </ul> </li> </ul>

# MEXICO – International Position & Mitigation Actions

Mexico's domestic mitigation actions inscribed in the Copenhagen Accord	Canada's 2020 emissions reduction target inscribed in the Copenhagen Accord
<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• Aims at <b>reducing its GHG emissions up to 30%</b> with respect to the business as usual scenario by 2020</li><li>• Associated with the Accord</li></ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• <b>17% reduction</b> from 2005 levels, aligned with U.S. target</li><li>• Associated with the Accord</li></ul>

# MEXICO – Canada's Engagement

<b>Bilateral Engagement</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Successfully used the <b>Canada-Mexico Partnership (CMP)</b> to discuss climate change issues</li> </ul>
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Since the March 2009 CMP meeting, cooperation has been advanced in:                             <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>– The comparability and compatibility of national GHG emission inventories and reporting systems</li> <li>– Identifying projects on methane capture initiatives in the oil, gas, landfill and agricultural sectors</li> <li>– Energy efficient housing</li> </ul> </li> </ul>
<b>Technology Partnerships</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Participates in:                             <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>– Global Methane Initiative (GMI)</li> <li>– Carbon Sequestration Leadership Forum (CSLF)</li> <li>– Renewable Energy and Energy Efficiency Partnership (REEEP)</li> </ul> </li> </ul>
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Canada and Mexico are currently working together on 77 Zero Energy Housing demonstration projects in Mexico</li> </ul>
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Under the <b>GMI partnership</b>, Canada and Mexico have <b>three projects</b> together under two subcommittees: landfill and oil and gas</li> </ul>
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Since 2009, Canada has invested over \$1.5M in clean technology projects in Mexico under REEEP and GMI; this investment has leveraged \$5.4M from the private sector and other governments</li> </ul>
<b>Multilateral Engagement</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Participates in:                             <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>– The Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD)</li> <li>– G8+5 Summits</li> <li>– Major Economies Forum (MEF)</li> <li>– Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC)</li> </ul> </li> </ul>

# MEXICO – Other Considerations

<p>s.15(1) s.21(1)(a) s.21(1)(b)</p> <p><b>International Negotiations</b></p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>•</li> <li>•</li> </ul>
<p><b>North American Cooperation</b></p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• <b>The Leader's Declaration on Climate Change and Clean Energy</b> from the August 2009 North America Leaders Summit (NALS) reaffirmed: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>– A shared vision for a <b>low-carbon</b> North America, through respective domestic implementation of mid-term and long-term goals to reduce emissions</li> <li>– Underscored the importance of developing and strengthening <b>financial instruments</b> to support mitigation</li> </ul> </li> </ul>
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• At the Council Session of the <b>Commission for Environmental Cooperation</b> (CEC) in June 2008, Mexico proposed preliminary exchange of ideas on a North American carbon market: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>– The objective was enhancing mitigation actions at a lower cost</li> <li>– Proposal is forward looking with the potential to bring the various sub-regional initiatives underway in the US and Canada into a coordinated North American framework</li> </ul> </li> </ul>
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Interested in <b>North American cooperation</b>, potentially including a common approach to emissions trading and common vehicle emissions standards</li> </ul>

# RUSSIA – Economy, Emissions, Commitments

	Indicators	Russia	Canada
Economy	GDP (PPP – 2010 est.)	US \$2.2T	US \$1.3T
	Commerce (2010)	Exports to Russia: \$1.2B	Imports from Russia: \$1.6B
Emissions*	Total 1990 GHGs	3321.7 Mt CO <sub>2</sub> eq.	591.8 Mt CO <sub>2</sub> eq.
	Total 2008 GHGs	2229.6 Mt CO <sub>2</sub> eq. (32.9% decrease on 1990 levels)	734.4 Mt CO <sub>2</sub> eq. (24.1% increase on 1990 levels)
	2008 GHG/capita (Annex 1 rank)	15.7 t CO <sub>2</sub> eq. per person (6th)	22.0 t CO <sub>2</sub> eq. per person (4th)
	2008 GHG/GDP	970.2 t CO <sub>2</sub> eq./M US\$	557.2 t CO <sub>2</sub> eq./M US\$
	2008 % of Annex 1 total	Approximately 12.55%	Approximately 4.14%
Commitments	Kyoto Protocol	Ratified, <b>0% reduction</b> from 1990 levels	Ratified February 2002, <b>6% reduction</b> from 1990 levels
	Copenhagen Accord	<b>15-25% reduction</b> on 1990 levels, associated with the Accord	<b>17% reduction</b> from 2005 levels, aligned with U.S. target


\*GHG figures include CO<sub>2</sub>, CH<sub>4</sub>, N<sub>2</sub>O, PFCs, HFCs, SF<sub>6</sub> and not LULUCF.

Sources: GDP (PPP-2010 est): CIA World Fact Book 2009, GDP source for 2007 GHG/GDP (PPP-2007 est.): CIA World Fact Book 2010 ([www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook](http://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook)) accessed online May 5, 2010; GHG emissions data: UNFCCC (<http://unfccc.int/di/FlexibleQueries/Event.do>); Population source for 2007 GHG/capita data: UNFCCC (<http://unfccc.int/di/FlexibleQueries/>)




# RUSSIA – Comparative GHG Emissions Performance

Russia - GHG Emissions by Sector (2008) – Total 2,229.6 Mt\*



Canada - GHG Emissions by Sector (2008) – Total 734.4 Mt\*




\*GHG data includes CO<sub>2</sub>, CH<sub>4</sub>, N<sub>2</sub>O, PFCs, HFCs, SF<sub>6</sub> and not LULUCF.

\*\*IE = Included Elsewhere, NA = Not Applicable

Sources: UNFCCC ([http://unfccc.int/ghg\\_data/ghg\\_data\\_unfccc/ghg\\_profiles/items/4625.php](http://unfccc.int/ghg_data/ghg_data_unfccc/ghg_profiles/items/4625.php))

# RUSSIA – Recent CO<sub>2</sub> Projections

- According to the World Resources Institute (WRI), BAU CO<sub>2</sub> emissions are estimated to **grow by about 20% by 2030**; there is little information that explains this estimated growth
- In June 2009, President Medvedev said emissions would be around 10-15% below 1990 levels by 2020, which means a rise from now since emissions were 34% below 1990 levels in 2007



Source: Climate Analysis Indicators Tool (CAIT) Version 6.0. (World Resources Institute, 2008)

# RUSSIA – Domestic Targets and Commitments

<b>Emissions Targets</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Due to its <b>post-Soviet economic contraction</b>, emissions are well below its Kyoto target to stabilize emissions at 1990 levels</li> </ul>
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Stated that it <b>will not take on a new target under a second commitment period</b> of the Kyoto Protocol</li> </ul>
<b>Domestic Policies</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Dec. 2009: Medvedev approved the <b>Climate Doctrine</b> containing an overview of goals, principles and ways to implement a unified public policy on climate change; no emissions target was identified</li> </ul>
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>May 2008: <b>Ministry of Natural Resources and Ecology</b> was created to bring all government bodies dealing with climate change and environment together                             <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>– Tasked with developing a federal program for ecological and radiation security, which will also include a climate change component</li> </ul> </li> </ul>
<b>Energy</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Jan. 2009 <b>Guidelines on Energy Efficiency</b> set targets for the share of renewable energy in electricity generation excluding large hydro over 25MW: 1.5% in 2010, 2.5% in 2015, 4.5% in 2020                             <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>– In 2009, renewables in electricity were less than 1%, excluding large hydro.</li> </ul> </li> </ul>
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>President has set the goal of reducing energy intensity by 40% by 2020</li> </ul>

# RUSSIA – International Position

Russia's 2020 emissions reduction target inscribed in the Copenhagen Accord	Canada's 2020 emissions reduction target inscribed in the Copenhagen Accord
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• A <b>15-25% reduction</b> on 1990 levels, which depends on the following conditions</li> <li>• Appropriate accounting of the potential of Russia's forestry in frame of contribution in meeting the obligations of the anthropogenic emission reduction;</li> <li>• Undertaking by all major emitters the legally binding obligations to reduce anthropogenic GHG emissions</li> <li>• Associated with the Accord</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• <b>17% reduction</b> on 2005 levels, aligned with the U.S. target</li> <li>• Associated with the Accord</li> </ul>

# RUSSIA – Canada's Engagement

<b>International Negotiations</b>	
<b>Multilateral Engagement</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• Participates in:<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>– G8</li><li>– Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD)</li><li>– Global Methane Initiative (GMI)</li><li>– Major Economies Forum (MEF)</li></ul></li><li>• Like Canada, signed the 2008 Hokkaido Summit Declaration, adopting a global goal of at least 50% reduction in global GHG emissions by 2050</li></ul>

# RUSSIA – Other Considerations

<p>s.15(1) s.21(1)(a) s.21(1)(b)</p> <p><b>International Negotiations</b></p>	
<b>Oil and Gas</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• A major exporter of oil and natural gas; its economic growth over past decade has been driven primarily by energy exports. Gets over half of its domestic energy needs from natural gas.</li> <li>• Strategic energy supplier to EU with 80% of its oil exports going there; EU's commitment to reduce emissions by 20% by 2020 could have economic consequences for Russia.</li> </ul>
<b>Forests</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Its forests are a critical component of the global carbon cycle, estimated to contain nearly 21% of the world's total forest stock, and potentially store 28% of global carbon.</li> </ul>
<b>Climate Change Impacts</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• May benefit from climate change as vast Northern region warms: Russian North-East Passage already open to commercial shipping.</li> <li>• Warming could make northern oil and gas reserves more accessible.</li> </ul>

# SOUTH AFRICA – Commitments, Emissions, Economy


		South Africa	Canada
Economy	GDP (PPP – 2010 est.)	US \$527.5B	US \$1.3T
	Commerce (2010)	Exports to South Africa: \$469M	Imports from South Africa: \$716M
Emissions*	Total 1990 GHGs	334.2 Mt CO <sub>2</sub> eq.	591.8 Mt CO <sub>2</sub> eq.
	Total 2005 GHGs	422.2 Mt CO <sub>2</sub> eq. (26.3% increase on 1990 levels)	739.4 Mt CO <sub>2</sub> eq. (25% increase on 1990 levels)
	2005 GHG/capita (rank globally)	9.0 t CO <sub>2</sub> eq. per person (54th)	22.9 t CO <sub>2</sub> eq. per person (10th)
	2005 GHG/GDP	1058.8 t CO <sub>2</sub> eq./Mill. \$Intl. 2005	653.7 t CO <sub>2</sub> eq./Mill. \$Intl. 2005
	2005 % of global total	Approximately 1.12%	Approximately 1.96%
Commitments	Kyoto Protocol	Accession July 2002; no target	Ratified February 2002, <b>6% reduction</b> from 1990 levels
	Copenhagen Accord	Will take nationally appropriate mitigation actions to enable a 34% deviation below BAU emissions growth trajectory by 2020	<b>17% reduction</b> from 2005 levels, aligned with U.S. target

\*GHG figures include CO<sub>2</sub>, CH<sub>4</sub>, N<sub>2</sub>O, PFCs, HFCs, SF<sub>6</sub>, not LULUCF or international bunkers.


Sources: GDP (PPP – 2010 est): CIA World Fact Book, GDP for 2005 GHG/GDP (PPP – 2005 est): CIA World Fact Book ([www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook](http://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook)); GHG Emissions Data: Climate Analysis Indicators Tool (CAIT) Version 8.0. (World Resources Institute, 2011, <http://cait.wri.org/cait.php>); Total 1990 GHGs and Total 2005 GHGs for Canada: UNFCCC ([http://unfccc.int/ghg\\_data/ghg\\_data\\_unfccc/items/4146.php](http://unfccc.int/ghg_data/ghg_data_unfccc/items/4146.php))

# SOUTH AFRICA — Comparative GHG Emissions Performance

South Africa - GHG Emissions by Sector (2005) – Total 422.2 Mt\*



Canada - GHG Emissions by Sector (2005) – Total 739.4 Mt\*




\*GHG data includes CO<sub>2</sub>, CH<sub>4</sub>, N<sub>2</sub>O, PFCs, HFCs, SF<sub>6</sub> and not LULUCF.  
 Sources: Climate Analysis Indicators Tool (CAIT) Version 8.0. (World Resources Institute, 2011, <http://cait.wri.org/cait.php>); UNFCCC data for 2005 Canadian total GHG emissions (<http://unfccc.int/di/FlexibleQueries.do>).



# SOUTH AFRICA – Projections & Mitigation Scenarios

- From 1990 to 2005, GHG emissions increased from power by 47% and transport by 47%; emissions from industry declined by 25%
- In the BAU scenario, the importance of power production will decrease and the shares of most other sectors will increase by a few percentage points
- About 70% of primary energy supply and about 90% of electricity supply are provided by coal; due to the extensive use of coal, its emissions per kWh of electricity are among the highest in the world
- Coal to remain the most important energy source for the next 20-30 years; biomass (11%), oil (10%), nuclear energy, gas and hydropower play minor role
- Emissions are likely to increase in the future due to development and the high importance of coal as energy source

Estimated mitigation potential of announced climate change plan and other proposed measures: **17% reduction** below 2020 BAU projections



# SOUTH AFRICA – Domestic Targets & Commitments

<b>Emissions</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Remains the largest source of GHG emissions in Africa                             <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>High carbon intensity of the economy is due to heavy use of coal</li> </ul> </li> </ul>
<b>Targets and Plans</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Announced in October 2011, will enact an emissions cap and new energy industry regulations in an effort to spur development of renewable energy and mitigate climate change                             <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>To be implemented over the next 2 years, intends to set reduction goals and limits in key sectors such as electricity, fuels, mining and transport industries</li> <li>Targeted companies and sectors will need to submit plans on how they plan to tackle emissions</li> </ul> </li> </ul>
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>In its <b>2008 climate change plan</b>, committed to a <b>substantial deviation</b> from baseline emissions levels, enabled by international funding and technology                             <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Committed to its <b>GHGs peaking between 2020 and 2025</b> then stabilizing around 100 Mt from current levels for a decade, before declining in absolute terms leading to a 30-40% reduction by 2050 compared to 2003 levels</li> </ul> </li> </ul>
<b>Energy</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Has invested \$125 million in clean energy as of 2009, placing it 17<sup>th</sup> out of the G20 nations, according to the Pew Charitable Trust                             <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>It targets an installed capacity of 1,667MW from renewables by 2013</li> </ul> </li> </ul>
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Increasing electricity supply important to development and poverty reduction                             <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>2 new coal plants under construction will be among the top 10 power plants ever built (4 GW each)</li> <li>Recent renewable energy developments include a 100MW wind farm, and a 100MW solar farm – target to reach 5,000 MW each by 2020</li> </ul> </li> </ul>

# SOUTH AFRICA – Mitigation Actions

South Africa's domestic mitigation actions inscribed in the Copenhagen Accord	Canada's 2020 emissions reduction target inscribed in the Copenhagen Accord
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Will take nationally appropriate mitigation actions to enable a <b>34% deviation below BAU emissions growth trajectory by 2020</b> and a <b>42% deviation below BAU growth trajectory by 2025</b></li> <li>• Associated with the Accord</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• <b>17% reduction</b> from 2005 levels, aligned with U.S. target</li> <li>• Associated with the Accord</li> </ul>

- Based on a December 7, 2009 announcement, target will be achieved by focusing on:
  - improving energy efficiency
  - increasing renewable energy and nuclear in electricity generation
  - increasing the price on carbon through an escalating CO2 tax
  - developing carbon capture and storage for coal fired power stations
- January 2010 BASIC meeting, Ministers announced plans to:
  - develop a framework for permanent scientific cooperation on climate change
  - extend financial and technological support for adaptation to other developing nations, especially least developed countries and small island developing states

# SOUTH AFRICA – Canada's Engagement

<b>Multilateral Engagement</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Participates in:                             <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>G8+5</li> <li>G20</li> <li>Carbon Sequestration Leadership Forum (CLSF)</li> <li>Major Economies Forum (</li> <li>Commonwealth</li> </ul> </li> <li>Has been critical of Canada's domestic plan in the past                             <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>At COP 14, South Africa stated that Canada along with Japan, Russia and Australia had "avoided putting their numbers on the table for too long. They now need to come forward with credible and ambitious mid-term targets within the 25-40% range for 2020"</li> <li>Mohau Pheko, South Africa's High Commissioner to Canada, recently criticized Canada for the decision to not sign on to a 2<sup>nd</sup> Commitment Period under the KP</li> </ul> </li> </ul>
<b>Bilateral Engagement Opportunities</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Shares Canada's interest in clean coal technologies but there are no Canadian-supported projects currently underway in South Africa</li> <li>Engagement is an opportunity to highlight and leverage Canada's development assistance for Africa</li> <li>Over last 20 years, Canada provided over \$200M in ODA; disbursed \$20.74M in 2008-09 - focused on capacity-building for service delivery</li> </ul>

# SOUTH AFRICA – Other Considerations

s.15(1)  
s.21(1)(a)  
s.21(1)(b)

**International  
Negotiations**

n

n

s

7

000095

# SOUTH KOREA – Economy, Emissions, Commitments


	Indicators	South Korea	Canada
Economy	GDP (PPP – 2010 est.)	US \$1.5T	US \$1.3T
	Commerce (2010)	Exports to S. Korea: \$3.7B	Imports from S. Korea: \$6.1B
Emissions*	Total 1990 GHGs	307.9 Mt CO <sub>2</sub> eq.	591.8 Mt CO <sub>2</sub> eq.
	Total 2005 GHGs	568.9 Mt CO <sub>2</sub> eq. ( 84.8% increase on 1990 levels)	739.4 Mt CO <sub>2</sub> eq. (25% increase on 1990 levels)
	2005 GHG/capita (rank globally)	11.8 t CO <sub>2</sub> eq. per person (29th)	22.9 t CO <sub>2</sub> per person (10th)
	2005 GHG/GDP	518.8 t CO <sub>2</sub> eq./Mill. \$Intl. 2005	653.7 t CO <sub>2</sub> eq./Mill. \$Intl. 2005
	2005 % of global total	Approximately 1.50%	Approximately 1.96%
Commitments	Kyoto Protocol	Ratified June 2002, <b>no target</b>	Ratified February 2002, <b>6% reduction</b> from 1990 levels
	Copenhagen Accord	<b>30% reduction</b> below BAU levels by 2020	<b>17% reduction</b> from 2005 levels, aligned with U.S. target

\*GHG figures include CO<sub>2</sub>, CH<sub>4</sub>, N<sub>2</sub>O, PFCs, HFCs, SF<sub>6</sub>; not LULUCF or international bunkers.


Sources: GDP (PPP – 2010 est) and GDP for 2005 GHG/GDP (PPP – 2005 est): CIA World Fact Book ([www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook](http://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook)); GHG Emissions Data: Climate Analysis Indicators Tool (CAIT) Version 8.0. (World Resources Institute, 2011), <http://cait.wri.org/cait.php>; Total 1990 GHGs and Total 2005 GHGs for Canada: UNFCCC ([http://unfccc.int/ghg\\_data/ghg\\_data\\_unfccc/items/4146.php](http://unfccc.int/ghg_data/ghg_data_unfccc/items/4146.php)).

# SOUTH KOREA — Comparative GHG Emissions Performance

South Korea - GHG Emissions by Sector (2005) – Total 568.9 Mt\*



Canada - GHG Emissions by Sector (2005) – Total 739.4 Mt\*




\*GHG data includes CO<sub>2</sub>, CH<sub>4</sub>, N<sub>2</sub>O, PFCs, HFCs, SF<sub>6</sub> and not LULUCF.

Sources: Climate Analysis Indicators Tool (CAIT) Version 8.0. (World Resources Institute, 2011, <http://cait.wri.org/cait.php>); UNFCCC data for 2005 Canadian total GHG emissions (<http://unfccc.int/di/FlexibleQueries.do>).

# SOUTH KOREA – GHGs Trends & Projections

- Over the 1990-2005 period, emissions almost doubled – the highest growth rate in the OECD - while per capita emissions rose by 71.6% mainly due to rapid economic growth, which doubled per capita income
- Total emissions are projected to **increase by about 70% by 2020 on 1990 levels**. However, the carbon intensity of the economy is expected to gradually decrease due to improvements in demand-side energy efficiency and shift to cleaner fuels



Sources for chart and information: Ecofys and Wuppertal Institute (2008) *Proposals for Contributions of Emerging Economies to the Climate Regime under the UNFCCC post 2012* and Centre for Clean Air Policy and Ecofys (2009) *Developing countries' climate plans*.



# SOUTH KOREA – Domestic Targets & Commitments

<b>Emissions and Targets</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Nov 2009: <b>voluntarily</b> announced its first emission reduction target to cut GHGs <b>30% below BAU forecast by 2020</b>; equivalent to 4% below 2005 levels</li> </ul>
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Industrial sector makes up a large share of emissions, but it is one of the world's most efficient                             <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Electricity system largely based on nuclear power, making emissions per kWh very low</li> <li>Transport and household emissions are high, agricultural emissions are not relevant</li> </ul> </li> </ul>
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li><b>2008 Comprehensive National Action Plan for the Reduction of GHGs</b> emphasized market mechanisms, cooperation with industry &amp; includes all GHGs                             <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Includes transportation efficiency measures, renewable energy targets, nationwide energy-saving campaigns, and plans for a domestic emissions trading scheme</li> </ul> </li> </ul>
<b>Green Growth</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Aug 2008: President proclaimed "Low Carbon/Green Growth" as the nation's vision to guide development for next 50 years</li> </ul>
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>July 2009: announced the <b>National Strategy for Green Growth</b> up to 2050; focuses on mitigating climate change, creating new engines for economic growth and improving the quality of life</li> </ul>
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>July 2009: to implement National Strategy, <b>Five Year Plan for Green Growth</b> called for spending 2% of GDP per year over the 2009-2013 period                             <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Includes developing railroads, mass transit, fuel efficient vehicles and clean fuels, energy conservation and environmentally friendly buildings; R&amp;D for green technology</li> </ul> </li> </ul>
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>June 2010: launched <b>Green Growth Institute</b>, a global think-tank to develop a green growth plan that could be applied by developed and developing countries                             <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Focuses on development &amp; spread of green technology in the international community</li> <li>Government will invest US\$10M per year</li> </ul> </li> </ul>

# SOUTH KOREA – International Position

South Korea's domestic mitigation actions inscribed in the Copenhagen Accord	Canada's 2020 emissions reduction target inscribed in the Copenhagen Accord
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• 30% reduction below business-as-usual levels by 2020</li> <li>• Associated with the Accord</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• 17% reduction on 2005 levels, aligned with the U.S. target</li> <li>• Associated with the Accord</li> </ul>

- Target is not conditional on international agreements and support

# SOUTH KOREA – Canada's Engagement

<b>Technology Partnerships</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Participates in: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>– Carbon Sequestration Leadership Forum (CSLF)</li> <li>– Renewable Energy &amp; Energy Efficiency Partnership (REEEP)</li> <li>– Global Methane Initiative (GMI)</li> <li>– International Partnership for the Hydrogen Economy (IPHE)</li> </ul> </li> </ul>
<b>Bilateral Engagement</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• In 2005, signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) on climate change initiatives, including cooperation under the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>– Dormant due to evolution of Canadian climate change policy</li> <li>– Cooperation on clean technology has continued under the APP</li> </ul> </li> </ul>
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• In 1995, signed <b>MOU on Environmental Cooperation</b>: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>– Established framework for improving environmental cooperation on clean technologies, environmental impact assessment, public education and awareness and atmospheric issues</li> <li>– Automatically renewed every three years</li> </ul> </li> </ul>
<b>Multilateral Engagement</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Participates in: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>– Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD)</li> <li>– G20; <b>hosted November 2010 meeting in Seoul</b></li> <li>– Major Economies Forum (MEF)</li> <li>– Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC)</li> </ul> </li> </ul>

# SOUTH KOREA – Other Considerations

<p>s.15(1) s.21(1)(a) s.21(1)(b)</p> <p><b>International Negotiations</b></p>	
<p><b>Regional Actions</b></p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Signed the 2007 <i>Sydney APEC Leaders' Declaration on Climate Change, Energy Security and Clean Development</i>, which outlined non-binding goals:               <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>– Reducing energy intensity 25% from 2005 levels by 2030</li> <li>– Increasing forest cover in the region by at least 20M hectares by 2020</li> </ul> </li> </ul>
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• East Asia Climate Partnership established in 2008:               <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>– Aims to identify a regional strategy for creating a win-win synergy between the climate and the economy by exploring a new sustainable economy-climate paradigm</li> <li>– Committed to a US\$200 M assistance package (2008-2012) for developing countries</li> </ul> </li> </ul>
<p><b>Energy</b></p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Has 660MW solar and 330MW wind power with the goal of 3GW installed clean energy by end of 2011</li> </ul>
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Aims to increase the share of renewables in total primary energy supply from 2.4% to 6% by 2020, 11% by 2030 and 30% by 2050</li> </ul>
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Nuclear energy's share of electricity generation is targeted to increase from 26% in 2007 to 41% by 2030</li> </ul>

# UNITED KINGDOM — Economy, Emissions, Commitments

	Indicators	U.K.	Canada
Economy	GDP (PPP – 2010 est.)	US \$2.2T	US \$1.3T
	Commerce (2010)	Exports to UK \$13.1B	Imports from UK: \$12.6B
Emissions*	Total 1990 GHGs	774.7 Mt CO <sub>2</sub> eq.	591.8 Mt CO <sub>2</sub> eq.
	Total 2008 GHGs	631.7 Mt CO <sub>2</sub> eq. (18.5% decrease on 1990 levels)	734.4 Mt CO <sub>2</sub> eq. (24.1% increase on 1990 levels)
	2008 GHG/capita (Annex 1 rank)	10.2 t CO <sub>2</sub> eq. per person (21st)	22.0 t CO <sub>2</sub> eq. per person (4th)
	2008 GHG/GDP	279.9 t CO <sub>2</sub> eq./M US\$	557.2 t CO <sub>2</sub> eq./M US\$
	2008 % of Annex 1 total	Approximately 3.56%	Approximately 4.14%
Commitments	Kyoto Protocol	Ratified May 2002. UK target of <b>-12.5% below</b> 1990 levels contributes to the aggregate target of the EU-15 (i.e. the fifteen member states when Kyoto was signed) of an <b>8% reduction</b> from 1990.	Ratified February 2002, <b>6% reduction</b> from 1990 levels
	Copenhagen Accord	<b>Under EU target of 20% unconditional reduction</b> ; or 30% conditional reduction on 1990 levels	<b>17% reduction</b> from 2005 levels, aligned with U.S. target


\*GHG figures include CO<sub>2</sub>, CH<sub>4</sub>, N<sub>2</sub>O, PFCs, HFCs, SF<sub>6</sub> and not LULUCF.

Sources: GDP (PPP-2010 est.): CIA World Fact Book 2009, GDP source for 2007 GHG/GDP (PPP-2007 est.): CIA World Fact Book 2010 ([www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook](http://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook)) accessed online May 5, 2010; GHG emissions data: UNFCCC (<http://unfccc.int/di/FlexibleQueries/Event.do>); Population source for 2007 GHG/capita data: UNFCCC (<http://unfccc.int/di/FlexibleQueries/Event.do>)


000103

# UNITED KINGDOM — Comparative GHG Emissions Performance

UK - GHG Emissions by Sector (2008) – Total 631.7 Mt\*



Canada - GHG Emissions by Sector (2008) – Total 734.4 Mt\*



\*GHG data includes CO<sub>2</sub>, CH<sub>4</sub>, N<sub>2</sub>O, PFCs, HFCs, SF<sub>6</sub> and not LULUCF.

\*\*IE = Included Elsewhere, NA = Not Applicable

Sources: UNFCCC ([http://unfccc.int/ghg\\_data/ghg\\_data\\_unfccc/ghg\\_profiles/items/4625.php](http://unfccc.int/ghg_data/ghg_data_unfccc/ghg_profiles/items/4625.php))


000104

# UNITED KINGDOM – Projections & Mitigation

• Policies in the **Low Carbon Transition Plan** are projected to save approximately 700 Mt of CO<sub>2</sub> eq. by:

- reducing demand for fossil fuels by 19% in 2020 by increasing the supply of renewable energy and improving energy efficiency
- securing power supplies and cutting emissions from power and heavy industry by 22% on 2008 levels by 2020
- cutting emissions from homes by 29% on 2008 levels
- cutting average emissions from new cars across the EU by 40% on 2007 levels; supporting the largest demonstration project in the world for new electric cars; sourcing 10% of transport energy from sustainable renewable sources by 2020

## UK GHG Emissions Reductions Projections



Sources: Climate Analysis Indicators Tool (CAIT) Version 8.0. (World Resources Institute, 2011); The UK Low Carbon Transition Plan (HM Government, 2009)

# UNITED KINGDOM – Domestic Targets & Actions

Targets	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Receiving Royal Assent in 2008, the <b>Climate Change Act</b> made it the first country to set legally binding carbon cuts: <b>34% by 2020 and least 80% by 2050</b>. May 2011: announced it will reduce GHGs by 50% by 2027.</li> </ul>
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>In 2009, the UK had achieved a 27.1% reduction on 1990 levels, already exceeding its target within the EU's Kyoto burden-sharing agreement of 12.5% below 1990 by 2012.</li> </ul>
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Climate Change Act set a system of five-year "carbon budgets" to provide a clear pathway for reducing emissions, beginning in 2008.</li> </ul>
Energy	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>July 2011: released its Electricity Market Reform (EMR) white paper: outlines the most far reaching reforms to the electricity sector since privatisation 20 years ago. Proposals will be put to Parliament in May 2012 and are expected to come into force in 2013.</li> </ul>
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Sept. 2010: Opened the world's <b>largest offshore wind farm</b></li> </ul>
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>By 2020 plans to generate <b>30% of its electricity from renewable sources</b></li> </ul>
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>2010/2011: Proposed <b>Energy Bill</b> has <b>3 objectives</b>: tackle barriers to investment in energy efficiency, enhance energy security, and enable investment in low carbon energy supplies.</li> </ul>
Low Carbon Growth	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Mar. 2011: Draft <b>Carbon Plan</b> sets out government's plan of action on climate change and focuses on electricity generation, heating in homes &amp; businesses, transport.</li> </ul>
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li><b>Low-carbon and environmental sectors</b> are already worth £112B, employing 910,000 people and comparable in size to healthcare and construction.</li> </ul>
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li><b>2011 Budget</b>: contains measure to hasten the speed &amp; scale of investment in low carbon energy projects, i.e., establishment of the <b>Green Investment Bank</b> and introducing a <b>floor price for carbon</b> for electricity from Apr. 2013.</li> </ul>



# UNITED KINGDOM – International Position

U.K.'s 2020 emissions reduction target inscribed in Copenhagen Accord	Canada's 2020 emissions reduction target inscribed in Copenhagen Accord
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Included in the EU's inscribed emissions reduction target, which is an <b>unconditional</b> 20% reduction on 1990 levels <b>or</b> a <b>conditional</b> 30% reduction <b>provided</b> that other developed countries commit themselves to comparable emission reductions and that developing countries contribute adequately according to their responsibilities and respective capabilities</li> <li>• Associated with the Accord</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• 17% reduction on 2005 levels, aligned with U.S. target</li> <li>• Associated with the Accord</li> </ul>

- In its March 2010 Council conclusions, the EU reiterated its pledge of a **total of EUR7.2B** (US\$10.4B) over the 2010-12 period. Depending on the member state, this will include some new money as well as previous announcements programmed for the 2010-12 period
  - For its part, **the UK has pledged a total of £1.5B** (US\$2.18B) for 2010-2012 period, with **£568M approved for specific programs for 2010-11**
  - 50% for mitigation, 50% for adaptation
- Government announced in its Spending Review in October 2010 that it will provide **£2.9B** for international climate finance for the period 2011/12 - 2014/15, ensuring that its Fast Start commitment is now **fully funded and budgeted for**

# UNITED KINGDOM – Canada's Engagement

<b>Bilateral Relations</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• An on-going policy dialogue on UK-Canada collaboration on clean technologies; similar interests in Carbon Capture and Storage (CCS) technology</li> <li>• DFID co-funds IDRC program <i>Climate Change Adaptation in Africa</i> (2006-2011)</li> </ul>
<b>Multilateral Fora</b>	<p>Participates in:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• The Commonwealth</li> <li>• Major Economies Forum (MEF)</li> <li>• Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD)</li> <li>• Renewable Energy and Energy Efficiency Partnership (REEEP)</li> <li>• G8,</li> </ul> <p style="text-align: right;">s.15(1)</p>

# UNITED KINGDOM – Other Considerations

<b>Targets</b>  s.15(1)  s.15(1)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Selection of <b>1990 Kyoto base year</b> especially advantageous to the UK as the switch from coal to natural gas for electricity slashed UK emissions from 1991</li> </ul>
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• the EU will meet its unified target of an 8% emissions reduction on 1990 levels</li> </ul>
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Strongly supports the move from a 20% to a 30% emissions reduction target for the EU</li> </ul>
<b>International Negotiations</b>  s.15(1) s.21(1)(a) s.21(1)(b)	
<b>Clean Technology</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Created the £800M <b>Environmental Transformation Fund</b>, part of which has been pledged to the World Bank fund to advance clean technologies in developing world</li> </ul>

# UNITED STATES – Economy, Emissions, Commitments

	Indicators	U.S.	Canada
Economy	GDP (PPP – 2010 est.)	US \$14.7T	US \$1.3T
	Commerce (2010)	Exports to U.S.: \$299B	Imports from U.S.: \$203B
Emissions*	Total 1990 GHGs	6111.8 Mt CO <sub>2</sub> eq.	591.8 Mt CO <sub>2</sub> eq.
	Total 2008 GHGs	6924.6 Mt CO <sub>2</sub> eq. (13.3% increase on 1990 levels)	734.4 Mt CO <sub>2</sub> eq. (24.1% increase on 1990 levels)
	2008 GHG/capita (Annex 1 rank)	22.5 t CO <sub>2</sub> eq. per person (3rd)	22.0 t CO <sub>2</sub> eq. per person (4th)
	2008 GHG/GDP	474.0 t CO <sub>2</sub> eq./M US\$	557.20 t CO <sub>2</sub> eq./M US\$
	2008 % of Annex 1 total	Approximately 38.99%	Approximately 4.14%
Commitments	Kyoto Protocol	Did not ratify	Ratified February 2002, <b>6% reduction</b> from 1990 levels
	Copenhagen Accord	In the range of a <b>17% reduction</b> on 2005 levels	<b>17% reduction</b> from 2005 levels, aligned with U.S. target


\*GHG figures include CO<sub>2</sub>, CH<sub>4</sub>, N<sub>2</sub>O, PFCs, HFCs, SF<sub>6</sub>; not LULUCF or international bunkers.

Sources: GDP (PPP 2010 est) and GDP for 2008 GHG/GDP: CIA World Fact Book ([www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook](http://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook)); GHG emissions data: UNFCCC


(<http://unfccc.int/di/FlexibleQueries/Event.do>); Population source for US 2008 GHG/capita: Population Reference Bureau, 2008 World Population Data Sheet, Population source for Canada 2008 GHG/capita: UNFCCC (<http://unfccc.int/di/FlexibleQueries/Event.do>).

# UNITED STATES – Comparative GHG Emissions Performance

United States - GHG Emissions by Sector (2008) - Total 6924.6 Mt\*



Canada - GHG Emissions by Sector (2008) - Total 734.4 Mt\*




\*GHG data includes CO<sub>2</sub>, CH<sub>4</sub>, N<sub>2</sub>O, PFCs, HFCs, SF<sub>6</sub> and not LULUCF.

\*\*IE = Included Elsewhere, NA = Not Applicable

Source: UNFCCC ([http://unfccc.int/ghg\\_data/ghg\\_data\\_unfccc/ghg\\_profiles/items/4625.php](http://unfccc.int/ghg_data/ghg_data_unfccc/ghg_profiles/items/4625.php))

# UNITED STATES – GHG Trends & Projections

- In its *5<sup>th</sup> National Communication (NC5)*, the US noted that its emissions rose by 17% from 1990 through 2007.
- From 2005 to 2020, NC5 projects that total GHGs will rise by 4% under a “with measures” scenario.
- Apr. 2011 projections by the Energy Information Administration (EIA) indicate that if no explicit action to regulate GHGs is taken, emissions will grow slowly (0.6% per year) over the next two decades, not returning to 2005 levels until 2027.
- Overall US energy intensity has continually decreased, indicating a trend toward increasing energy efficiency in the economy.



# UNITED STATES – Domestic Actions

<b>Legislation</b>	
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• In January 2011, the EPA began regulating GHGs under the Clean Air Act for mobile sources, i.e. light duty vehicles for 2012-16 model years, and for major new or modified stationary sources;</li> <li>• In August 2011, the first ever fuel efficiency and emission standards for heavy duty vehicles were announced for 2014-18 model years;</li> <li>• In 2012, the EPA is expected to propose regulations for petroleum refineries and for power plants</li> </ul>
<b>Emissions</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Total GHGs increased 7.3% from 1990-2009. However, they decreased by 6.1% in 2009 relative to 2008 levels due to: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>– Decreased economic output causing lowered energy consumption across all sectors</li> <li>– Decreased carbon intensity of fuels used in electricity generation due to fuel switching; the price of coal increased while the price of natural gas decreased significantly</li> </ul> </li> </ul>
<b>Energy</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• 2011 State of the Union Address called for: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>– Extensive public investment and incentives in clean energy to enhance its competitiveness, spur innovation, investment in energy infrastructure, create jobs</li> <li>– A new Green Energy Standard: produce 80% of electricity from clean sources by 2035</li> </ul> </li> </ul>

# UNITED STATES – International Position

U.S.'s 2020 emissions reduction target inscribed in the Copenhagen Accord	Canada's 2020 emissions reduction target inscribed in the Copenhagen Accord
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• In the range of a <b>17% reduction</b> on 2005 levels</li> <li>• Associated with the Accord</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• <b>17% reduction</b> on 2005 levels, aligned with the U.S. target</li> <li>• Associated with the Accord</li> </ul>

## Fast-start financing pledges (in millions)\*

	Adaptation	Clean Energy	Sustainable Landscapes	Totals
<b>FY 2010</b>	448	595	261	1.304B
<b>FY 2011</b>	577	751	397	1.725B
<b>FY 2012</b>	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A





# UNITED STATES – Canada's Engagement

<b>Bilateral Engagement</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Collaborate under the <b>Clean Energy Dialogue</b> (CED) on clean energy research; development and deployment of clean energy technology; building a more efficient energy grid</li> </ul>
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Cooperate on <b>environmental issues</b> through the International Joint Commission, Boundary Waters Treaty and Canada-U.S. Air Quality Agreement</li> </ul>
<b>North American Collaboration</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>The <b>Leader's Declaration on Climate Change and Clean Energy</b> from the August 2009 North America Leaders Summit (NALS) reaffirmed:                             <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>A shared vision for a <b>low-carbon</b> North America, through respective domestic implementation of mid-term and long-term goals to reduce emissions</li> <li>Underscored the importance of developing and strengthening <b>financial instruments</b> to support mitigation</li> </ul> </li> </ul>
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>The Western Climate Initiative (<b>WCI</b>), a multi-jurisdictional carbon market initiative (including BC, QC, ON, and MB) has been led by California, though six other states (NM, AZ, WA, OR, MT, UT) have recently withdrawn.</li> </ul>
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li><b>Commission for Environmental Cooperation</b> (CEC) addresses environmental issues, helps prevent potential trade and environmental conflicts and promote effective enforcement of environmental law</li> </ul>
<b>Technology Partnerships</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Participates in:                             <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Global Methane Initiative (GMI)</li> <li>Renewable Energy and Energy Efficiency Partnerships (REEEP)</li> <li>Carbon Sequestration Leadership Forum (CSLF) actions at a lower cost</li> <li>U.S. is also a member of the International Renewable Energy Agency (IRENA)</li> </ul> </li> </ul>

# UNITED STATES – Other Considerations

<p>s.15(1) s.21(1)(a) s.21(1)(b)</p> <p><b>International Negotiations</b></p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>•</li> <li>•</li> <li>•</li> </ul>
<p><b>Multilateral Engagement</b></p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• April 2009: Obama established the Major Economies Forum (MEF), a group of 17 major emitters representing 80% of global emissions. MEF parties established a Global Partnership to speed clean technology deployment.</li> </ul>
<p><b>Energy</b></p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• The world's largest producer and consumer of energy</li> <li>• As of 2009, renewable energy made up approx. 5% of the energy mix; Obama is committed to double the supply of renewable energy from 2008 levels by the end of 2012 under the <i>Strategy for American Innovation</i></li> <li>• The <i>American Recovery and Reinvestment Act (ARRA)</i>, signed into law in February 2009, allocated \$90B for investment in clean energy technologies</li> </ul>



## Table of Contents

**TUESDAY DECEMBER 6 – FRIDAY DECEMBER 9, 2011**  
**COP17 HIGH LEVEL SEGMENT**  
**Durban, South Africa**

<b>TAB</b>	
	<b>Overview</b>
<b>1</b>	Day at a Glance
<b>2</b>	Contact list
	<b>Tuesday, December 6, 2011</b>
<b>3</b>	Policy Overview for COP17
<b>4</b>	Scenario Note: Meeting with Umbrella Group Heads of Delegation
<b>5</b>	Scenario Note: 3rd Nobel Laureate Symposium on Global Sustainability
	<b>Wednesday, December 7, 2011</b>
<b>6</b>	<b>Draft</b> National Statement
<b>7</b>	Scenario Note: Working Lunch with Provinces and Territories
<b>8</b>	Scenario Note: Meeting with Canadian Youth Delegation
<b>9</b>	Scenario Note: Reception for Ministers and Heads of Delegation
	<b>Thursday, December 8, 2011</b>
<b>10</b>	Scenario Note: Meeting with Non-Governmental Groups
	<b>Friday, December 9, 2011</b>
<b>11</b>	Placeholder
	<b>Saturday, December 10, 2011</b>
<b>12</b>	Placeholder
	<b>Bilateral Scenario Notes</b>
<b>13</b>	United States Bilateral Meeting <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• United States Country Profile</li> </ul>
<b>14</b>	Japan Bilateral Meeting <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Japan Country Profile</li> </ul>

<b>15</b>	Russia Bilateral Meeting <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Russia Country Profile</li> </ul>
<b>16</b>	Mexico Bilateral Meeting <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Mexico Country Profile</li> </ul>
<b>17</b>	Christiana Figueres, UNFCCC Executive Secretary
<b>18</b>	Grenada Bilateral Meeting
	<b>Communications and Messaging</b>
<b>19</b>	Fast Start Financing Submission

01/12/2011 13:20

**THE HONOURABLE PETER KENT, MINISTER OF THE ENVIRONMENT**

**UNITED NATIONS CLIMATE CHANGE CONFERENCE – COP17**

**Durban, South Africa**

**December 4 – 9, 2011**

**Overview Program**

You will be attending the 17<sup>th</sup> Conference of the Parties (COP17) under the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) in Durban, South Africa.

The overall objective for COP17 is to continue negotiations towards a new global climate change regime, as well as make progress on implementing the Cancun Agreements.

**SATURDAY, DECEMBER 3, 2011**

**14:24**

**Depart Toronto**

Flight: AC4998

**s.19 (1)**

Note: \_\_\_\_\_ and \_\_\_\_\_  
will depart Ottawa at  
14:22 on United Airways flight 5812.

\_\_\_\_\_ will depart Ottawa at

**15:53**

**Arrival in Washington**

Note: \_\_\_\_\_ and \_\_\_\_\_  
16:02 and will meet you at the airport.

\_\_\_\_\_ arrive in Washington at

**17:40**

**Depart Washington**

Flight: SA Airways 208

Note: You will travel with \_\_\_\_\_

\_\_\_\_\_ and \_\_\_\_\_

**SUNDAY, DECEMBER 4, 2011**

**18:00**

**Arrival in Johannesburg**

Note: \_\_\_\_\_ from the High Commission will meet you upon  
arrival and facilitate VIP clearance. You, \_\_\_\_\_ and \_\_\_\_\_  
will have access to the VIP lounge during your layover.

**20:10**

**Depart Johannesburg**

000119

- 2 -

**s.19 (1)**

Flight: SA Airways 1445

**21:20**

**Arrival in Durban**

*You will be met upon arrival by High Commissioner Adèle Dion, and Stephen de Boer, DG/CCI. Superintendent Bruce Kirkpatrick of the RCMP will also meet you upon arrival; you will travel by embassy vehicle to your hotel.*

Van & Registration number: I

Driver and Cell number:

High Commission Driver:

Note: You will have one van at your disposal for the duration of your visit in Durban.

Note: Airport staff will pick up your luggage and the High Commission will provide support at the airport of

Note: Bruce Kirkpatrick is the RCMP Security Liaison Officer assigned to you for the duration of the COP17 event.

**Shortly after**

**Arrival and Check-in at Hotel**

Location: Southern Sun Elangeni Hotel

63 Snell Parade, Durban, South Africa 4001

Tel: + 27 31 362 1300

Fax: + 27 31 332 5527

For more information please visit:

<http://www.southernsun.com/hotels/elangeni/pages/overview.aspx>

Note: You will be met at the hotel by a member of the Canadian logistics team. She will facilitate your check-in to the Hotel. Your hotel room is 1414.

**MONDAY, DECEMBER 5, 2011**

**Morning**

**Private Program**

**11:30 – 12:00**

**Bilateral Meeting with Grenada**

Location: East Ilanga Room, Southern Dun Elangeni Hotel

Participants: Karl Hood, Minister of Foreign Affairs  
Joseph Gilbert, Minister of Environment, Foreign Trade and Export Development  
Guy Saint Jacques (pending availability)  
Paul Boothe  
Dan McDougall

Minister's Program

000120

- 2 -

- 3 -

Stephen de Boer

**s.19 (1)**

***Please see TAB 18 for scenario note.***

**12:00 – 12:30 Lunch Briefing with Chief Negotiator**  
Location: Lingela Restaurant, Southern Sun Elangeni Hotel  
Participants:

Paul Boothe  
Adèle Dion  
Dan McDougall  
Stephen de Boer

*You will be given a situation report on the progress of the negotiations during the first week of COP17 and on expectations for the coming week as well as on your program for the second week of negotiations.*

***Please see TAB 3 for policy overview note.***

**15:00 – 15:30 Bilateral meeting with Minister McQueen**  
Location: East Ilanga Room, Southern Sun Elangeni Hotel  
Participants: Guy Saint-Jacques

Paul Boothe  
Adèle Dion  
Dan McDougall

**15:30 – 16:00 Bilateral meeting with Minister Lake**  
Location: East Ilanga Room, Southern Sun Elangeni Hotel  
Participants: Guy Saint-Jacques

Paul Boothe  
Adèle Dion  
Dan McDougall

**17:00 – 17:30 Announcement on Fast Start Financing**  
Location: Canadian Press Theatre, North Ilanga room,  
Southern Sun Elangeni Hotel

**17:45 Depart Hotel for Dinner**

18:00

**EU Ministerial Dinner and Reception**

Location: ICC-Figtree Courtyard

Hosts: EU Commissioner for Climate Action,  
Representative of the Polish

Presidency of the EU Council

Participants: Minister Kent  
Guy Saint-Jacques  
Bruce Kirkpatrick

**TUESDAY, DECEMBER 6, 2011**

7:00 – 8:00

**Breakfast Briefing on Daily Program**

Location: Lingela Restaurant, Southern Sun Elangeni Hotel

Participants:

Paul Boothe  
Adèle Dion  
Dan McDougall  
Stephen de Boer  
Bruce Kirkpatrick

8:30

**Depart Hotel for ICC**

Van & Registration number:

Driver and Cell number:

8:45

**Arrival at ICC**

Note: Upon arrival, you will be escorted to your office by a member of the Canadian logistics team.

9:00 – 10:00

**Umbrella Group Morning Heads of Delegation Meeting  
(Ministerial Level)**

Location: Marula Room, ICC

Participants:

Paul Boothe  
Guy Saint Jacques  
Dan McDougall  
Stephen de Boer  
Richard Tarasofsky

***Please see TAB 4 for scenario note.***



- 5 -

**10:00 – 12:15 High Level Dialogue on Climate Change and Global Sustainability**

Location: African Pavilion, ICC

Participants: Minister Kent

Guy Saint-Jacques  
Paul Boothe  
Adèle Dion  
Dan McDougall

***Please see TAB 5 for briefing materials.***

**12:30 – 13:30 Lunch**

**s.21(1)(a)**

**s.21(1)(b)**

**13:30 – 14:00**

**s.15(1)**

Location: TBC

Participants: TBC

**14:30 – 15:00 Opportunity to meet members of the Canadian delegation**

Location: CanDel Room, ICC

**15:00 – 17:15 Opening Plenary: High-Level segment of COP17 and CMP7**

Location: ICC

Note: Plenary will be 1+3 format

Participants:

Paul Boothe  
Guy Saint-Jacques

Note: The High Level Segment will be inaugurated at this Plenary Session.

**17:15 Return to the Hotel**

*You will be transported back to your hotel by embassy vehicle.*

**17:30 Arrival at Hotel**

**17:30 – 18:15 Briefing with Chief Negotiator**

Location: Room 2108, Southern Sun Elangeni Hotel

**18:30 – 19:00 Press Briefing**

Location: Canadian Press Theatre, North Ilanga room,  
Southern Sun Elangeni Hotel

**19:15 Depart Hotel**

*You will be transported by embassy vehicle.*

s.19(1)

- 6 -

**19:30 - 21:00 Umbrella Group Ministerial Dinner hosted by Australia**  
Location: JAM Restaurant, Quarters Hotel Avondale  
Corner Cnr M17/Sindile Thusi (argyle Road) and  
Avondale Roads, Morningside, Durban  
Participants: Minister Peter Kent  
Guy Saint-Jacques  
Bruce Kirkpatrick

**21:00 Depart for the Southern Sun Elangeni Hotel**  
*You will be transported by embassy vehicle.*

**7:00 – 8:00 Breakfast Briefing on Daily Program**  
Location: Lingela Restaurant, Southern Sun Elangeni Hotel  
Participants:

Paul Boothe  
Adèle Dion  
Dan McDougall  
Stephen de Boer  
Bruce Kirkpatrick

s.16(1)  
s.16(2)(a)

**8:30 Depart Hotel for ICC**  
Van & Registration number: I  
Driver and Cell number:

**8:45 Arrival at ICC**

**9:00 – 10:00 Umbrella Group Morning Heads of Delegation Meeting  
(Ministerial Level)**  
Location: Marula Room, ICC  
Participants:  
Paul Boothe  
Guy Saint Jacques  
Dan McDougall  
Stephen de Boer  
Richard Tarasofsky

**11:30 – 13:00 Roundtable with Congo Basin Forest Fund (CBFF) (TBC)**  
Location: African Pavilion

Minister's Program

000124

- 6 -

- 7 -

Participants: TBC

Note: This may be an opportunity for you to make remarks and/or an announcement.

**10:00 – 13:00 Joint High-Level Segment of COP and CMP or  
Potential Negotiation Session**

Location: ICC

*At the Joint High-Level Segment, there will be an opportunity for you to deliver Canada's National Statement on DATE at the High-Level Segment. If you are required to attend a negotiation session, you will be supported by the Chief Negotiator.*

**TBC**

**Delivery of Canada's National Statement**

Location: ICC

Participants:

Guy Saint Jacques (pending availability)  
Adèle Dion/ Paul Boothe/Dan McDougall

Note: Minister Kent is NUMBER on the list to deliver his National Statement.

***Please see TAB 6 for a draft National Statement. The final version will be delivered to you on the ground.***

**12:00 – 13:30 Working Lunch with Provinces and Territories**

Location: Waterman Room, Durban Country Club

Hosts: High Commissioner to South Africa, Adèle Dion and  
Minister Kent

Participants: Minister Diana McQueen (Alberta) +1  
Minister Terry Lake (British Columbia) +1  
Chief of Staff to Minister Pierre  
Arcand (Québec)  
One representative from each province and  
territory

**s.19 (1)**

Paul Boothe  
Guy Saint-Jacques  
Dan McDougall  
Stephen de Boer

***Please see TAB 7 for scenario note.***

**15:30 – 16:00 Meeting with Youth Delegation (TBC)**

- 8 -

Location: CanDel Room, ICC

Participants: Guy Saint Jacques (pending availability)  
Paul Boothe  
Dan McDougall  
Stephen de Boer

s.19 (1)

*Please see TAB 8 for scenario note.*

**15:00 – 18:00 Joint High-Level Segment of COP and CMP or  
Potential Negotiation Session**

Location: ICC

*National Statements will continue at the High-Level Segment; if  
you are required to attend a negotiation session, you will be  
supported by the Chief Negotiator.*

**16:45 Return to the Southern Sun Elangeni Hotel**

*You will be transported back to your hotel by embassy vehicle.*

**17:00 Arrival at Hotel**

**17:00 – 17:45 Briefing with Chief Negotiator**

Location: Room 2108, Southern Sun Elangeni Hotel

**18:00 – 18:30 Press Briefing**

Location: Canadian Press Theatre, North Ilanga room,  
Southern Sun Elangeni Hotel

**18:30 Depart for Host Country Reception**

*You will be transported by embassy vehicle.*

**19:00 Reception for Ministers and Heads of Delegation**

Location: TBC

Host: Government of South Africa

Participants: Minister Kent  
Paul Boothe  
Guy Saint-Jacques  
Bruce Kirkpatrick

Note: The reception will begin at 18:00, but you will participate  
after your press briefing.

*Please see TAB 9 for scenario note.*

**TBC**

**Depart for Southern Sun Elangeni Hotel**

*You will be transported by embassy vehicle.*

- 9 -

7:00 – 8:00

**Breakfast Briefing on Daily Program**

Location: Lingela Restaurant, Southern Sun Elangeni Hotel

Participants:

Paul Boothe  
Adèle Dion  
Dan McDougall  
Stephen de Boer  
Bruce Kirkpatrick

s.19 (1)

8:30

**Depart Hotel for ICC**

s.16(1)

Van & Registration number:

Driver and Cell number:

8:45

**Arrival at ICC**

9:00 – 10:00

**Umbrella Group Morning Heads of Delegation Meeting  
(Ministerial Level)**

Location: Marula Room, ICC

Participants:

Paul Boothe  
Guy Saint Jacques  
Dan McDougall  
Stephen de Boer  
Richard Tarasofsky

10:00 – 13:00

**Joint High-Level Segment of COP and CMP or  
Potential Negotiation Session**

Location: ICC

Participants:

Paul Boothe/Dan McDougall  
Guy Saint Jacques

10:00 – 11:30

**Opportunities for Bilateral Meetings or Announcements**

s.15(1)

Location: ICC

Potential Countries:

Participants: Guy Saint Jacques (pending availability)

- 10 -

Paul Boothe  
Dan McDougall  
Stephen de Boer

s.19 (1)

***Please see TABs 13-18 for scenario notes.***

**11:30 – 13:00 UNEP Short Lived Climate Forcers Side Event (TBC)**

Location: TBC

Participants: TBC

**13:00 – 14:00 Lunch**

**14:00 – 14:30 Meeting with NGOs (TBC)**

Location: CanDel Room, ICC

Participants:

Paul Boothe  
Guy Saint Jacques (pending availability)  
Dan McDougall  
Stephen de Boer

***Please see TAB 10 for scenario note.***

**14:30 – 17:00 Opportunities for Bilateral Meetings or Announcements**

s.15(1)

Location: ICC

Potential Countries:

(TBC)

Participants:

Guy Saint Jacques (pending availability)  
Paul Boothe  
Dan McDougall  
Stephen de Boer

***Please see TABs 13-18 for scenario notes.***

**15:00 – 18:00 Joint High-Level Segment of COP and CMP or  
Potential Negotiation Session**

Location: ICC

*National Statements will continue at the High-Level Segment; if  
you are required to attend a negotiation session, you will be  
supported by the Chief Negotiator.*

**17:15 Return to the Southern Sun Elangeni Hotel**

- 11 -

*You will be transported back to your hotel by embassy vehicle.*

**17:30 Arrival at Hotel**

**17:30 – 18:15 Briefing with Chief Negotiator**

Location: Room 2108, Southern Sun Elangeni Hotel

**18:30 – 19:00 Minister's Press Briefing**

Location: Canadian Press Theatre, North Ilanga room,  
Southern Sun Elangeni Hotel

**19:00 Depart for Dinner**

**19:30 Dinner**

Location: Café Fish, 31 Yacht Mole, Victoria Embankment

Participants:

**s.19 (1)**

Paul Boothe  
Adèle Dion  
Dan McDougall  
Bruce Kirkpatrick

**21:30 Return to Southern Sun Elangeni Hotel**

*You will be transported by Embassy Vehicle.*

FRIDAY, 18 NOVEMBER 2011

**7:00 – 8:00 Breakfast Briefing on Daily Program**

Location: Lingela Restaurant, Southern Sun Elangeni Hotel

Participants:

Paul Boothe  
Adèle Dion  
Dan McDougall  
Stephen de Boer  
Bruce Kirkpatrick

**8:30 Depart Hotel for ICC**

**s.16(1)**

Van & Registration number:

Minister's Program

000129

- 11 -

Driver and Cell number:

- 8:45**                    **Arrival at ICC**
- 9:00 – 10:00**        **Umbrella Group Morning Heads of Delegation Meeting  
(Ministerial Level)**  
Location: Marula Room, ICC  
Participants: Guy Saint Jacques  
Dan McDougall  
Stephen de Boer  
Richard Tarasofsky
- 10:00 – 13:00**      **Joint High-Level Segment of COP and CMP or  
Potential Negotiation Session**  
Location: ICC
- 13:00 – 14:00**      **Lunch**
- 15:00 – 18:00**      **Joint High-Level Segment: Closing Plenary (TBC)**  
Location: ICC  
Participants: Paul Boothe/Dan McDougall  
Guy Saint Jacques
- Note: Plenary will be 1 +3 format.  
Ministers will participate in the closing session of COP17 and  
CMP7; if you are required to attend a negotiation session, you will  
be supported by the Chief Negotiator.*
- 17:15**                    **Return to the Hotel**  
Location: Southern Sun Elangeni Hotel  
*You will be transported back to your hotel by embassy vehicle.*
- 17:30**                    **Arrival at Hotel**
- 17:30 – 18:15**      **Briefing with Chief Negotiator**  
Location: Room 2108, Southern Sun Elangeni Hotel
- 18:30 – 19:00**      **Minister's Press Briefing (TBC)**  
Location: Canadian Press Theatre, North Ilanga room,  
Southern Sun Elangeni Hotel
- 19:30**                    **Dinner**  
Location: Lingela Restaurant, Southern Sun Elangeni Hotel



- 13 -

**21:00 Return to the ICC for the continuation of the Closing Plenary**

**SATURDAY, DECEMBER 10, 2011**

**8:00 – 9:00 Breakfast Briefing with Chief Negotiator**  
Location: Lingela Restaurant, Southern Sun Elangeni Hotel  
Participants:

**s.19 (1)**

Paul Boothe  
Adèle Dion  
Dan McDougall  
Stephen de Boer  
Bruce Kirkpatrick

**9:00 – 9:30 Press Briefing**  
Location: Canadian Press Theatre, North Ilanga room, Southern  
Sun Elangeni Hotel

**11:00 Depart hotel for airport**

**s.16(1)**

Van & Registration number:  
Driver and Cell number:

**14:25 Depart Durban**  
Flight: Mango Air JE248

Note: You will travel with and

**15:40 Arrival in Johannesburg**

**20:50 Depart Johannesburg**  
Flight: SA Airways 234

**SUNDAY, DECEMBER 11, 2011**

**6:25 Arrival at London Heathrow**

**9:00 Depart London Heathrow**  
Flight: AC 869

**12:05 Arrival in Toronto**

**s.19 (1)**

- 14 -

Note: : and will continue onto  
Ottawa on flight AC 454, departing at 14:10.

DRAFT

You will receive an updated program each day.

**Contacts**

Guy Saint-Jacques, Ambassador for Climate Change

Email: [Guy.Saint-Jacques@ec.gc.ca](mailto:Guy.Saint-Jacques@ec.gc.ca)

Mobile:

PIN:

**s.19 (1)**

Dan McDougall, International Affairs Branch

Email: [Dan.McDougall@ec.gc.ca](mailto:Dan.McDougall@ec.gc.ca)

Stephen de Boer, Climate Change International, Ministerial Program

Email: [Stephen.deBoer@ec.gc.ca](mailto:Stephen.deBoer@ec.gc.ca)

Félix Boudreault, Deputy Minister's Office

Email: [Felix.Boudreault@ec.gc.ca](mailto:Felix.Boudreault@ec.gc.ca)

Bruce Kirkpatrick, RCMP

Email: [bruce.kirkpatrick@rcmp-grc.gc.ca](mailto:bruce.kirkpatrick@rcmp-grc.gc.ca)

Kelsey Benson, Logistics Support

Email: [Kelsey.Benson@ec.gc.ca](mailto:Kelsey.Benson@ec.gc.ca)

Sarah Bristow, Ministerial Program

Email: [Sarah.Bristow@ec.gc.ca](mailto:Sarah.Bristow@ec.gc.ca)

1

Robert Giroux, IT Support

Email: [Robert.Giroux@ec.gc.ca](mailto:Robert.Giroux@ec.gc.ca)

**SECRET**

**s.15(1)**

**s.21(1)(a)**

**s.21(1)(b)**

**POLICY OVERVIEW**

**THE 17<sup>TH</sup> CONFERENCE OF THE PARTIES TO THE UNITED NATIONS  
FRAMEWORK CONVENTION ON CLIMATE CHANGE**

(For Information)

**PURPOSE**

To provide an update on the status of negotiations under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) and information concerning your participation at the 17<sup>th</sup> Conference of the Parties to be held in Durban, South Africa from November 28 – December 9, 2011.

**SUMMARY**

- The COP negotiations will take place over a two week period. You will be participating in the Ministerial High Level Segment that takes place from December 6-9. During this time, you will deliver Canada's National Statement, participate in high-level negotiations, and engage with international partners and stakeholders to advance Canada's interests.

**BACKGROUND**

International climate change negotiations under the UNFCCC have been taking place under two parallel tracks since 2007. The first track, under the Ad-hoc Working Group on Further Commitments for Annex I Parties under the Kyoto Protocol (AWG-KP) was

**SECRET**

established in 2005 in anticipation of the expiry of the first commitment period (1CP) of the KP in 2012. The AWG-KP aims to establish, for Annex I Parties with current legally-binding commitments (or “targets”) under the KP 1CP, targets under a 2<sup>nd</sup> commitment period (2CP) post-2012. This track of negotiations does not include the United States (US), which is not a Party to the KP.

**s.15(1)**

However, despite these ongoing negotiations, many Parties have now acknowledged that the KP is insufficient to meet the UNFCCC goal of stabilising greenhouse gas (GHG) concentrations in the atmosphere at a level that would prevent dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate system, by

In recognition of this, Parties agreed in 2007 to launch a second track of negotiations, under the Ad-hoc Working Group on Long-term Cooperative Action under the Convention (AWG-LCA), based on the Bali Action Plan, with a view to establishing a new, more comprehensive climate change regime that would include emissions mitigation commitments by all major emitters, and outlines global action on adaptation to climate change, climate finance, technology development, and reducing emissions from deforestation.

Both tracks of negotiations were intended to conclude by December 2009 at the 15<sup>th</sup> meeting of the Conference of the Parties (CoP15) in Copenhagen, Denmark, with the adoption of a legally-binding outcome but Parties were unable to reach agreement through the negotiating process. However, a majority of Parties indicated political support for the Copenhagen Accord, a Leader-level agreement on the key issues that had been under negotiation. The Accord, and the provisions it outlined, were formally supported by 140 of the 194 UNFCCC Parties, representing both developed and developing countries, and included mitigation commitments accounting for over 85% of global GHG emissions.

**s.15(1)**

CoP16, held in Cancun, Mexico in December 2010, was considered a significant achievement. The Cancun Agreements effectively formalized, under the UNFCCC, the commitments outlined in the Copenhagen Accord, thus legitimizing the Accord as the basis for a new international post-2012 climate change agreement. In addition, the Cancun Agreements further elaborated a number of key elements of the Accord, and provided a pathway for negotiations in 2011. Notably, the Agreements provided for:

- a framework for all major developed and developing countries to formally anchor their current GHG targets in a parallel manner;
- a framework for enhancing the transparency and accountability of all Parties' mitigation actions and GHG emissions through a system of measurement, reporting and verification (MRV);
- the establishment of a Green Climate Fund (GCF), which, once finalized, could be a key channel for delivering the US\$100 billion in multilateral climate funding assistance, as committed to under the Copenhagen Accord, that would be mobilized annually by 2020 for the mitigation and adaptation efforts of developing countries;
- the establishment of the Cancun Adaptation Framework to enhance action on adaptation to climate change;

**SECRET**

- the establishment of a Technology Mechanism to enhance technology development and transfer; and
- the establishment of a mechanism for reducing emissions from deforestation and degradation (REDD+) to enable such action in developing countries.

To support climate change mitigation and adaptation in developing countries in the short-term, developed countries also reaffirmed in Cancun their Copenhagen Accord commitment to provide fast-start financing approaching US\$30 billion in the period between 2010 and 2012 and to report on the delivery of this finance in May of each year within this period. Canada completed and submitted its first report this past May.

### **CURRENT STATUS**

**s.15(1)**

**s.21(1)(a)**

**s.21(1)(b)**

**Page(s) 000138 to\à 000141**

**Is(Are) exempted pursuant to section(s)  
est(sont) exemptée(s) en vertu de(s)(l')article(s)**

**15(1), 21(1)(a), 21(1)(b)**

**of the Access to Information Act  
de la Loi sur l'accès à l'information**



3rd  
Nobel Laureate Symposium  
on Global Sustainability  
Transforming the World in an Era of Global Change

Stockholm, 25 November 2011

**Updated invitation requesting confirmation**

**High-level Dialogue and Adaptation Roundtable: Global Sustainability in a  
Changing Climate**

Date: 6 December 2011

Time: Registration opens 09:30

Venue: Africa Pavilion, International Convention Centre, Durban, South Africa

Dear Minister Peter Kent,

In May this year members of the UN Secretary General's High-level Panel on Global Sustainability joined Nobel Laureates in Stockholm to discuss global sustainability in a high-level science-policy dialogue. At the conclusion of this meeting, the Laureates handed over a list of priority actions to the Panel in the form of *The Stockholm Memorandum*. To ensure that this dialogue between science and society continues we invite you to participate in a unique continuation, on African soil, of the *3rd Nobel Laureate Symposium on Global Sustainability*.


This letter updates you on the high-level dialogue and invites you, if you haven't already done so, to confirm your participation by sending your registration form to [marika.hjalsten@sei-international.org](mailto:marika.hjalsten@sei-international.org) by 30 Nov.

At the request of President Zuma, the dialogue will now incorporate the Roundtable on Adaptation. This has meant making some small changes to the agenda so that adaptation is addressed more explicitly and placed in the context of sustainable development. In addition, UN Secretary General Ban Ki-moon will join the dialogue.

The dialogue will take place under the Chatham House rule and actively involve 30 participants, including President Zuma, Ban Ki-moon, Connie Hedegaard, Achim Steiner, Paul Crutzen, Izabella Teixeira, John Schellnhuber, Nicholas Stern, Rajendra Pachauri, Will Steffen, Jacqueline McGlade, Lena Ek, and Youba Sokona.

The meeting will not be open to the media and will be conducted according to the Chatham House rule. Around 50 specially selected observers (ministerial aides, negotiators, researchers and senior representatives from civil society and the private sector) will also be present. The event will be opened by President Zuma and the UN Secretary General. Discussion topics will be introduced by short presentations from leading researchers and Nobel Laureates. The active participants will all have an opportunity to speak during the dialogue, which will be moderated by Professor Jacqueline McGlade, Executive Director of the European Environment Agency. The dialogue will be followed by a standing lunch reception to which you are very welcome.

As a world leader for Global Sustainability we would highly value your participation in the dialogue. It would be an honor if you are able to join us.



**Johan Rockström**

Chair of the 3rd Nobel Laureate Symposium on Global Sustainability

3rd  
Nobel Laureate Symposium  
on Global Sustainability  
*Transforming the World in an Era of Global Change*

## High-level Dialogue and Adaptation Roundtable: Global Sustainability in a Changing Climate

### **AGENDA**

6 December 2011

Durban, South Africa

International Convention Centre, African Pavilion

3rd  
Nobel Laureate Symposium  
on Global Sustainability  
*Transforming the World in an Era of Global Change*

in collaboration with

**UNITED POSTCODE LOTTERIES**

and the

**SEKUNJALO DEVELOPMENT FOUNDATION**

## High-level Dialogue on Global Sustainability in a Changing Climate

Tuesday, 6 December 2011	
09:00 – 10:00	Registration of participants / Refreshments / Group photo
Inaugural session	
10:00 – 10:30	<p><b>Welcome address by</b>  <i>Professor Johan Rockström and Professor Hans Joachim Schellnhuber, Co-Chairs of the 3rd Nobel Laureate Symposium on Global Sustainability, South Africa</i></p> <p><b>Opening statement by</b>  <i>The Hon Jacob Zuma, President of South Africa and Co-Chair of the UN Secretary General's High-level Panel on Global Sustainability</i></p> <p><b>Opening statement by</b>  <i>Mr. Ban Ki-moon, Secretary General of the United Nations</i></p>
10:30 – 11:15	<p><b>Track 1: Climate extremes and adaptation in the Anthropocene: a new challenge for development</b></p> <p>Moderator: Professor Jacqueline McGlade</p>
	<p>Short introductory presentations</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Welcome to the Anthropocene – <i>A message Professor Paul Crutzen</i> (5 min)</li> <li>- Opportunities within Planetary Boundaries - <i>Professor Will Steffen</i> (5 min)</li> <li>- New insights on climate risks - <i>Professor Rajendra Pachauri</i> (5 min)</li> </ul>
11:15 – 12:00	<p><b>Track 2: Solutions for a transition to Global Sustainability</b></p> <p>Moderator: Professor Jacqueline McGlade</p>
	<p>Short introductory presentations</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Connecting climate and development - <i>Professor Youba Sokona</i> (5 min)</li> <li>- From the economics of climate change to the economics of sustainability  <i>Professor Nicholas Stern</i> (5 min)</li> </ul>
12:00 – 12:15	<b>Chair's Summary</b>
	<i>Concluding remarks</i>
12:15 – 12:30	Break / Group photo
12:30 – 13:00	<p><b>PRESS CONFERENCE</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Presentation of "The Durban Vision Statement: Global Sustainability in a Changing Climate"</li> <li>- Final remarks from selected participants</li> </ul>
12:15 – 14:00	<p><b>RECEPTION (STANDING LUNCH)</b></p> <p>Refreshments for all participants and selected guests</p>

3rd  
Nobel Laureate Symposium  
on Global Sustainability  
Transforming the World in an Era of Global Change

High-level Dialogue and Adaptation Roundtable: Global Sustainability in a Changing Climate

**BACKGROUND AND INTRODUCTION TO THE EVENT**

The science on climate change is clear. Business as usual will not deliver a safe world for coming generations. However, the global climate challenge can only be solved if it is addressed in the context of the wider challenge of global sustainability. The latest report on adaptation from the IPCC<sup>1</sup> highlights the importance of integrating adaptation with the socio-economic factors that compound vulnerability to disasters and climate extremes. Moreover, climate change is one among many processes where humanity is pushing the planet beyond sustainable boundaries. And many of these boundaries play a critical role in adaptation and mitigation. As the UN Secretary General said in a recent speech (September 2011) to the UN General Assembly, “we are destabilizing our climate *and* stretching planetary boundaries to a perilous degree”.

A global transformation to sustainability is needed to ensure prosperity in a world which is under increasing social and ecological strain. The 3rd Nobel Laureate Symposium on Global Sustainability concluded in *The Stockholm Memorandum* (May 2011) that such a global transformation will need to combine planetary stewardship with transformative change at an unprecedented scale and speed.

[The Nobel Laureate Symposium, which gathered some 20 Nobel Laureates and leading global change scientists and policy makers, agreed, in a dialogue with the UN Secretary General’s High-Level Panel on Global Sustainability, that a global mind-shift is needed, where individuals and institutions reconnect with the biosphere, allowing for world development within the safe operating space of the Earth.]

To make sustainability a reality in the 21<sup>st</sup> century, new energy is needed in the multilateral processes, and new alliances among nations, businesses and communities will need to be established to move towards global sustainability. At a key moment in the fight against climate change and in the run up to next year’s UN Conference on Sustainable Development (Rio+20) this event will connect the insights of *The Stockholm Memorandum* to world leaders, bring the messages of the UN Secretary General’s High-level Panel on Global Sustainability to climate negotiators and explore the links between adaptation, ecosystems and development.

This will enable climate negotiations to be strategically positioned within the broader sustainability agenda, making clear that (i) the climate challenge is vitally connected to global sustainability – one cannot be solved without the other, (ii) that mitigation and adaptation to climate change form part of a new development paradigm providing resilient solutions for human prosperity and global sustainability, (iii) action to combat climate change must be taken immediately, to grasp the development opportunities in a low carbon economy, allow for sustainable adaptation and our ability to pull back from the brink of interconnected Planetary Boundaries.

---

<sup>1</sup> Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change Special Report, *Managing the Risks of Extreme Events and Disasters to Advance Climate Change Adaptation* (SREX)

3rd  
Nobel Laureate Symposium  
on Global Sustainability  
Transforming the World in an Era of Global Change

High-level Dialogue and Adaptation Roundtable: Global Sustainability in a Changing Climate

**DIALOGUE STRUCTURE**

The discussion will gather some 30 active participants in an informal and open dialogue. The meeting will not be open to the media and will be conducted according to the Chatham House rule. Around 50 specially selected observers (ministerial aides, negotiators, researchers and senior representatives from civil society and the private sector) will also be present. The event will be opened by President Zuma and the UN Secretary General. Discussion will be structured around the following two tracks, each introduced by short presentations from leading researchers and Nobel Laureates. The active participants will all have an opportunity to speak during the dialogue, which will be moderated by Professor Jacqueline McGlade, Executive Director of the European Environment Agency (TBC).

**Track 1: Climate extremes and adaptation in the Anthropocene: a new challenge for development**

Introduced by:

Professor Paul Crutzen, Nobel Laureate, Chemistry 1995  
Professor Will Steffen, Australian National University and Stockholm Resilience Centre  
Dr Rajendra Pachauri, Chair of the IPCC

How has humanity become the main force on the planet? What have the effects been? The driving forces behind the globalization of environmental challenges start in the mid 1950s. Up until this point, the relative impact from humanity on the global commons was low — the environmental impacts from almost 200 years of industrialization remained, until then, largely limited to local and regional impacts on water, land and air. After the mid-20th century the human enterprise changes pace. The industrial metabolism goes to scale, and we start seeing an exponential increase in social wellbeing, GDP growth, population numbers, health improvements and human impacts on the environment. This is the point when global environmental change manifests itself on essentially all parameters that matter for human wellbeing: from habitat loss to climate change. This scientific realization that humans are now one of the major agents of change on the planet should be on the agenda of all opinion shapers and decision makers. The need for 'management and governance mind shifts' to deal with humanity's new role is symbolized by the front cover of *The Economist* in June 2011, under the title "Welcome to the Anthropocene".

The latest report from the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change describes how anthropogenic climate change is leading to heavier precipitation, record high temperatures and heat waves, and that these trends can be expected to continue. These changes in the climate, combined with rapid population growth in exposed areas and high-value development, means much greater potential impacts from disasters. What are the implications for adaptation? Are there limits to adaptation? How do we enhance our capacity to adapt?

3rd  
Nobel Laureate Symposium  
on Global Sustainability  
*Transforming the World in an Era of Global Change*

High-level Dialogue and Adaptation Roundtable: Global Sustainability in a Changing Climate

**Track 2: Solutions for a transition to Global Sustainability**

Introduced by:

Dr Youba Sokona, Coordinator, Africa Climate Policy Centre  
Professor Nicholas Stern, London School of Economics

In an interconnected and environmentally constrained world, global sustainability is a precondition for poverty eradication, social justice and economic development. How we can live within planetary boundaries, reduce poverty and secure development? What are the opportunities and how and when do we seize them? As negative environmental pressures on the biosphere continue to grow, the final battle ground over avoiding human-induced warming that exceeds 2°C will shift from the current focus on reducing CO<sub>2</sub> emissions, to the sustainable management of land, water and biodiversity in the world's ecosystems. Food security, with its links to water and land use, is at the centre of the adaptation/development challenge. How do we scale up adaptation solutions from local successes to global outcomes?

Securing a safe climate future on our planet is determined by just one generation today. Greenhouse gases emitted now will contribute to an energy imbalance over the long term and can trigger potentially irreversible, non-linear changes in environmental systems. The prevailing social, political, business, and economic paradigms must be recalibrated to deal in the present with unacceptable, potentially disastrous risks in the long-term future. Radical reform of the economic policy framework cannot be left off the agenda. The challenge is not merely to move from conventional economic thinking to the economics of climate change, but to build the economics of sustainability.

Global sustainability is a prerequisite for human development, and for attaining the MDGs. Global sustainability is also a prerequisite for a safe climate future. And a safe climate future is an essential component for global sustainability. How do we embed planetary stewardship in global governance processes? Can we link together the negotiations in Durban, the summit in Rio and the looming finishing line for the Millennium Development Goals? What next after MDGs?

---

Prosperity For All Within Planetary Boundaries: A High-level Dialogue, Durban

---

**LIST OF PARTICIPANTS (under development)**

Jacob Zuma, President of South Africa and Co-chair of UN High-level Panel on Global Sustainability

Ban Ki-Moon, Secretary-General of the United Nations

Rajendra Pachauri, IPCC

Achim Steiner, Executive Director, UNEP

Connie Hedegaard, European Commissioner for Climate Action

Nicholas Stern, Chair of the Grantham Research Institute on Climate Change and the Environment

Paul Crutzen, Nobel Laureate and expert on the Anthropocene

Lena Ek, Swedish Minister for the Environment

Iqbal Survé, Executive Chairperson, Sekunjalo Development Foundation

Jim Balsillie, CEO, RIM and member of UN high-level panel

Guy Brasseur, Director of the Climate Service Center, Germany

János Pásztor, Special Adviser on Climate Change to Ban Ki-Moon

Niclas Kjellström-Matseke, CEO, Swedish Postcode Lotteries

Peter Victor, Economist, University of York, Canada

Will Steffen, Executive Director ANU Climate Change Institute, Australia

Youba Sokona, ACPC

Jacqueline McGlade, European Environment Agency

Hans Joachim Schellnhuber, Potsdam Institute for Climate Impact Research (PIK)

Izabella Teixeira, Brazilian Minister for the Environment

Sherry Ayittey, Minister of Environment, Ghana

You will receive a final draft of the National  
Statement on the ground.



<b><u>SCENARIO NOTE</u></b>	
<b><u>UMBRELLA GROUP MEETING</u></b>	
<b>TIME &amp; LOCATION</b>	<p><u>Date:</u> Tuesday, December 6<sup>th</sup>  <u>Time:</u> 9:00 – 10:00  <u>Location:</u> Marula Room, ICC</p>
<b>PARTICIPANTS</b>	<p><u>UG Countries</u>  Australia, Japan, Kazakhstan, New Zealand, Norway, Russian Federation, Ukraine, United States</p> <p><u>Government of Canada</u>  Minister Peter Kent <b>s.19 (1)</b></p> <p>Paul Boothe  Guy Saint Jacques,  Dan McDougall  Stephen de Boer  Richard Tarasofsky</p>
<b>CONTEXT</b>	<p>This meeting will be chaired by Australia. You will be accompanied at the meeting by Guy Saint-Jacques.</p> <p>Throughout the Conference of the Parties (COP) the Umbrella Group (UG) meets each day in the morning at the Head of Delegation level and at other times when required.</p> <p>A UG Heads of Delegation Strategy Meeting was held on Sunday, November 30 to discuss negotiation issues and a dinner will be hosted by the Australians tonight, which you and Guy Saint-Jacques will attend.</p> <p>The Umbrella Group Ministerial level meeting on the first full day of the high level segment will give ministers an opportunity to exchange views in advance of the formal negotiation proceedings. The event represents an opportunity for this small group of like-minded countries to exchange views and coordinate tactics in the negotiations.</p> <p>The Umbrella Group is a loose coalition of non-EU developed countries that formed following the adoption of the Kyoto Protocol. Although there is no formal list, the Group is usually</p>

	made up of Australia, Canada, Japan, Kazakhstan, New Zealand, Norway, the Russian Federation, Ukraine and the U.S.  <b>s.21(1)(a)</b> <b>s.21(1)(b)</b>
<b>CANADA'S OBJECTIVES</b>	

**Page(s) 000152 to\à 000152**

**Is(Are) exempted pursuant to section(s)  
est(sont) exemptée(s) en vertu de(s)(l')article(s)**

**15(1), 21(1)(a), 21(1)(b)**

**of the Access to Information Act  
de la Loi sur l'accès à l'information**

<b>SCENARIO BRIEF</b>	
<b>WORKING LUNCH WITH PROVINCIAL AND TERRITORIAL MINISTERS</b>	
<b>TIME AND LOCATION</b>	<p><u>Date:</u> Wednesday December 7, 2011</p> <p><u>Time:</u> 12:00 – 14:00</p> <p><u>Place:</u> Waterman Room, Durban Country Club</p>
<b>PARTICIPANTS</b>	<p><u>Government of Canada</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Minister of the Environment, Peter Kent</li> <li>Adele Dion, High Commissioner</li> </ul> <p><b>s.19 (1)</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Paul Boothe</li> <li>Guy Saint-Jacques</li> <li>Dan McDougall</li> <li>Stephen de Boer</li> </ul> <p><u>Provinces and Territories</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Provincial and Territorial Environment Ministers attending the Conference plus one staff. Note that Quebec will be represented by .</li> <li>In addition, one representative from each Provinces and Territories not represented by a Minister in Durban.</li> <li>Biographies and climate change profiles for provinces and territories with ministerial representation in Durban are annexed to this note; scenario notes prepared for your meetings with Minister McQueen and Minister Lake are also included.</li> </ul> <p><b>s.19 (1)</b></p>
<b>CONTEXT OF MEETING</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Adele Dion, High Commissioner in South Africa is hosting this ministerial lunch on your behalf.</li> <li>This meeting with provincial and territorial counterparts is part of the ongoing consultation strategy on international climate change negotiations.</li> </ul>
<b>ANTICIPATED OBJECTIVES, OUTCOMES, DELIVERABLES</b>	<p><b>s.15(1) s.14 s.21(1)(a) s.21(1)(b)</b></p>

## **RECOMMENDED APPROACH**

### **CONTEXT**

Adele Dion will begin the meeting by welcoming guests and giving brief introductory remarks before introducing you. After presenting an outline of Canada's objectives in the negotiations, you could then turn the floor over to Guy Saint-Jacques, Canada's Chief Negotiator and Ambassador for Climate Change. Ambassador Saint-Jacques will update the guests on the status of negotiations to date. Specific speaking points on the status of the negotiations will be provided to you prior to the lunch. You can then invite the provincial and territorial Ministers to each share their perspectives. Adele Dion will facilitate the lunch.

Canada actively engages provinces and territories on international climate change issues through an on-going consultation framework led by the Ambassador for Climate Change. All jurisdictions have been participating in these consultations and

The group has had several exchanges through face-to-face meetings, conference calls and e-mails. In addition, the Deputy Minister has had several exchanges with his counterparts as part of Canadian Council of Ministers of the Environment (CCME) and in other bilateral meetings.

### **Provincial/Territorial Positions**

For the most part, jurisdictions are comfortable with the positions taken by Canada, especially on the need to harmonize climate policies and measures with the US. ]

## **POINTS TO REGISTER**

### ***Progress in the negotiations***

- **Parties are working through a process that is complicated and challenging. Our work requires that many countries come together to arrive at a single consensus agreement on a wide range of complex and critical issues in the face of numerous competing considerations.**
- **In our view, the Cancun Conference was a major success in having been able to achieve such consensus on all the key issues as outlined in the Bali Action Plan.**
- **The Agreements anchor the mitigation pledges of all major emitters – developed and developing – and outline an enhanced framework for transparency and accountability. They also outline significant action on climate finance, adaptation, technology and reducing emissions from deforestation.**
- **We have worked with our allies throughout 2011 to advance implementation of the Cancun Agreements as a basis for negotiations towards a new, single international climate change agreement that is fair, effective, and includes commitments from all major emitters, including the US and China.**
- **While some incremental progress has been made at this meeting, we cannot expect a final treaty to be agreed here in Durban. However, all Parties are working collaboratively towards this goal.**

- **As part of a global solution, mitigation, adaptation, technology transfer and the mobilization of climate finance will be critical. Efforts must also continue to reduce emissions from deforestation and to enhance sustainable land use more broadly.**
- **Critically, we also need to enhance transparency and accountability on the part of all Parties in the UNFCCC, with a view to increasing trust and enhanced global ambition in the future.**
- **In seeking a single, legally-binding post-2012 agreement, Canada continues to be guided by the following key principles:**
  - 1) **Balancing environmental protection and economic prosperity;**
  - 2) **Maintaining a long-term focus to achieve deep reductions in emissions over time;**
  - 3) **Engaging and seeking commitments from all major economies;**
  - 4) **Developing and deploying clean technologies; and**
  - 5) **Supporting constructive and ambitious global action: working with North American partners and with all Parties to reach a fair, effective and comprehensive global climate agreement.**
- **We continue to be committed to providing our fair share of fast-start financing.**

*Second commitment period for the Kyoto Protocol*

- **While Canada will not take a target under a 2<sup>nd</sup> commitment period under Kyoto Protocol, Canada is not opposed to other countries inscribing pledges in a 2<sup>nd</sup> commitment period.**
- **An international climate change agreement that includes commitments by all the world's major greenhouse gas emitters is the only way to achieve real reductions in global emissions.**
- **There is no prospect that a 2<sup>nd</sup> commitment period under the Kyoto Protocol would achieve this critical goal. At present, countries that currently have legally-binding Kyoto Protocol commitment targets only account for about 30% of global emissions, and this percentage is declining.**

**s.21(1)(a)**

**s.21(1)(b)**

***Canada's climate change plan***

- **We support an approach to climate change that achieves real environmental and economic benefits for all Canadians. Given the highly integrated nature of the North American economy, this includes aligning our climate policies with the United States.**
  - **We are making progress towards our target of reducing our greenhouse gas emissions 17 per cent from 2005 levels by 2020 through a sector-by-sector approach aligned with the U.S., where appropriate.**
  - **Federal measures, combined with actions taken by provinces have brought us one quarter of the way towards our 2020 target.**
  - **We have started with transportation and electricity – the two largest greenhouse gas emitters – and we will continue to proceed to address emissions from other major-emitting sectors.**
  - **To close the remaining gap, the Government of Canada will develop and implement further measures to reduce greenhouse gas emissions in other major sectors of the national economy, complemented by additional provincial and territorial actions in their respective jurisdictions.**
- 
- **Canada recognizes that adaptation is a significant challenge for all countries. Priority for international financial and technical support in the**



**context of the UNFCCC should be on countries that are most vulnerable, including Least Developed Countries (LDCs), small-island developing states (SIDS), and Africa. We are ready to do our share.**

- **In Canada, the Government has also been focussed on adaptation to climate change in the domestic context. As you know, between 2007 and 2011, the Government invested 85.9 million in adaptation programs.**
- **A few weeks ago, I announced an investment of almost \$150 million over the next five years to help the country adapt to climate change. The funding involves 10 programs across nine Departments to build a credible, science-based response to the impact that climate change has on Canada and in particular on northern and Aboriginal communities.**

## **BACKGROUND**

### **Provincial and Territorial Consultations**

Following on the commitment made by former Minister Prentice at the February 17, 2009 CCME in Whitehorse, to consult provinces and territories on international climate change negotiation, a structured process of meaningful consultation was established and led by Canada's Chief Negotiator and Ambassador for Climate Change.

The Federal, Provincial Territorial Working Group on International Climate Change is comprised of senior officials from each jurisdiction. The agenda focuses on key policy issues under negotiation, and the participation of provinces and territories at negotiations. The group meets face-to-face at least twice a year and by conference calls prior to, and following each of the UN negotiating sessions. The last meeting of the Working Group was held via videoconference on November 8th. On November 21-22, the Deputy Minister, accompanied by the Chief Negotiator, provided an update to counterparts at a meeting of CCME Deputies.

### **Provincial and Territorial Participation at COP 17**

Consistent with Canada's commitment to meaningful consultation with the provinces and territories in the UN climate change negotiations, Canada is using the same model that was used in Copenhagen and Cancun for provincial and territorial participation. Under this model:

- Each jurisdiction names one delegate to be a full accredited member of the federal delegation throughout the entire meeting November 28 - December 9, 2011. The federal government provides hotel accommodation for these delegates on a cost-recovery basis but is not responsible for travel arrangements to and from Durban.
- These provincial and territorial delegates provide advice to the Head of Delegation. They do not act as Canadian negotiators or intervene in the negotiations, but they do have full access to the Canadian delegation office and are expected to participate in daily delegation meetings. Delegates signed a confidentiality agreement. Some provinces and territories send their own delegations; in some cases led by Ministers. The federal government provides accreditation for all members of these delegations.
- The federal government secures additional meeting space at the conference site for the shared use of provincial and territorial delegations. A federal official is designated to act as a liaison officer. Support for some provincial and territorial delegations in Durban is provided by the High-Commissioner, to the extent possible given the High-Commission's capacity and limits imposed by the South African hosts.

---

## ALBERTA

---



**Honourable Diana McQueen**  
**Minister of Environment and Water**  
MLA, Drayton Valley - Calmar

Minister McQueen was first elected as the Member of the Legislative Assembly for Drayton Valley-Calmar on March 3, 2008. She was appointed as Minister of Environment and Water on October 12, 2011.

In 2008, Minister McQueen served as Parliamentary Assistant to the Minister of Energy and the Minister of Environment and as a co-chair for Climate Change Central, a non-profit organization that encourages Albertans to take action on climate change through consumer rebate programs, demonstration projects and educational outreach. She was also member of the Standing Committee on Resources and the Environment and Standing Committee on Private Bills as well as Chair of the Regulatory Review Committee, Alberta Energy. She is currently a member of the Agenda and Priorities Committee and Cabinet Policy Committee on Energy.

Prior to being elected, Minister McQueen managed a retail business, worked for Amoco Canada and assisted in providing board development instruction with the provincial board development program.

Minister McQueen is active in her community, serving as school board chair and trustee as well as mayor of Drayton Valley.



# ALBERTA

## CLIMATE CHANGE PROFILE

---

Updated October 2011

Minister of Environment and Water: **Diana McQueen**

Deputy Minister: **Ernie Hui**

### RECENT DEVELOPMENTS

---

- In June 2011, the province signed a final agreement with Shell Canada Energy for the Shell Quest carbon capture and storage (CCS) project. The province has allotted \$745 million in funding for the Quest project over 15 years. The Government of Canada is contributing \$120 million toward this project through the Clean Energy fund.
- \$500 million has been budgeted over the three year period between 2011 and 2014 to support CCS projects, part of the province's \$2 billion commitment announced in July 2008.
- The 2011-2012 Budget allocated \$121 million for technologies to address climate change (through green energy production or greenhouse gas (GHG) emission reductions), including provincial revenues of \$68 million for the Climate Change and Emissions Management Fund (CCEMF) and \$51 million of support for projects under the Canada Trust fund for Clean Air and Climate Change.
- The Alberta government announced a reduction of 6.5 Mt from its expected levels in 2009 and additional investment of \$70 million (for a total of \$257 million) to the CCEMF.

### SUMMARY

---

- Alberta's GHG emissions of 233.5 Mt in 2009 represented 34% of the Canada total.
- Alberta's electricity supply mix in 2009 was 68% coal, 25% natural gas, 3% hydro, 2% other renewables, and 2% refined petroleum products.
- Alberta is the first jurisdiction in North America to implement greenhouse gas regulations, which require a one-time reduction in emissions intensity of 12% for all large final emitters.
- Alberta forecasts that its emissions will rise until 2020 (to 6% above 2005 levels), but has set a long term emissions reduction goal of 14% below 2005 levels by 2050.
- Alberta does not favour the use of economic instruments that include interregional transfers, instead preferring investment in local solutions.

### ALBERTA'S APPROACH TO CLIMATE CHANGE

---

#### Provincial Strategy

Alberta's 2008 *Climate Change Strategy* stated aim is to "ensure environmental protection while maintaining Albertans' quality of life and allowing continued economic growth". It sets a GHG emission reduction target equivalent to 14% below 2005 levels by 2050 and focuses on three main areas:

- Supporting CCS.
- Greening Alberta's energy production (primarily through wind and biomass) and promoting energy efficiency and conservation.
- Developing a provincial climate change adaptation strategy.



The July 2008 *Climate Change Action Plan* commits \$4 billion to reduce GHG emissions, divided between \$2 billion fund to advance CCS projects and \$2 billion to fund the new Green Transit Incentives Program (Green TRIP) to promote the use of local, regional and inter-city public transit in Alberta.

In December 2008, Alberta released its *Provincial Energy Strategy* which includes actions to:

- Address the environmental footprint of energy and encourage the development of renewable energy;
- Change energy-consumption behaviour by industry and consumers through conservation measures and a review of emissions targets and carbon charges for large industrial facilities;
- Improve innovation through increased investment in research, development, demonstration and deployment of energy technology; and
- Enhance the capability of the electricity system by planning for a comprehensive upgrade to strengthen the transmission system by identifying requirements, technical solutions, timing, and updating of the approval process.

The province has also committed to 5% ethanol content in gasoline by 2010 and currently purchases 90% green energy for all government buildings.

### Key Initiatives

Alberta passed the *Climate Change Emissions Management Amendment Act* in 2007 to regulate GHG emissions from large industry. Facilities that emit more than 100,000 tonnes of CO<sub>2</sub>e are required to reduce emissions intensity by 12% below their baseline level (average emissions intensity over the 2003-2005 period). These regulations apply to about 100 facilities that make up roughly 70% of emissions. Compliance options include trading with other regulated facilities in Alberta, purchasing offset credits in the Alberta-based offset system, and paying into a technology fund, the CCEMF, at a rate of \$15/tonne. CCEMF funds are then invested in projects and technology to reduce emissions. The CCEMF rate of \$15/tonne effectively sets a de facto price ceiling on carbon in the province. By 2012, Alberta companies are expected to have paid approximately \$350 million into this Fund since its inception in 2007.

In January 2008, Natural Resources Canada and Alberta Energy released the final report of the *Canada-Alberta Task Force on Carbon Capture and Storage*. Key recommendations included incorporating CCS into federal clean air regulations (accomplished) and targeting research efforts to lower the cost of technology. In April 2008, the province announced the establishment of the *Alberta Carbon Capture and Storage Development Council* to develop a roadmap for implementing CCS.

Between October and December 2009, Alberta announced the signature of four Letters of Intent with CCS project proponents:

- *Quest Carbon Capture and Storage*: this project will capture and store 1.2 Mt of carbon dioxide annually beginning in 2015 from Shell's Scotford Upgrader and its expansion, near Fort Saskatchewan. The project's proponent is the Athabasca Oil Sands Project, a joint venture among Shell Canada (60%), Chevron Canada Limited (20%) and Marathon Oil Sands L.P. (20%)
- *Project Pioneer*: this project is expected to capture 1 Mt of carbon dioxide annually from the coal-fired Keephills 3 power plant near Edmonton. Alberta Government funding will total \$436 million, and the Federal Government will provide another \$343 million through the Clean Energy Fund and the ecoENERGY technology initiative. The project's proponent is TransAlta Corporation.



- *Alberta Carbon Trunk Line*: this project includes a 240-kilometre line that will run from Fort Saskatchewan to near Red Deer. The Alberta Government will provide \$495 million with another \$63.3 million from the Federal Clean Energy Fund. The project's proponent is a joint venture between Enhance Energy Inc. and North West Upgrading Inc.
- *Synthetic Gas*: The in-situ coal gasification project will tap into a deep, unminable coalbed near Swan Hills and turn the coal into a synthetic gas to be used to generate clean electricity. The project will also capture up to 1.3 Mt per year of CO<sub>2</sub> to enhance the recovery of conventional oil in the area. The Alberta Government funding will total \$285 million and the project proponent is Swan Hills Synfuels.

### Partnerships

None identified.

**s.14**

## ALBERTA'S POSITIONS ON FEDERAL CLIMATE CHANGE ACTIVITIES

---

## LEGISLATION AND REGULATIONS

---

### Legislation

#### *Carbon Capture and Storage Statutes Amendment Act 2010*

This Act clarified that pore space in Alberta is owned by the province and enables the provincial government to accept long-term liability for injected CO<sub>2</sub> once the operator provides data showing that the stored CO<sub>2</sub> is contained. The Act also established a fund financed by CCS operators for ongoing monitoring costs and any required remediation.

#### *The Carbon Capture and Storage Funding Act (2009)*

This Act provides the Alberta government with the legal authority to administer a \$2 billion fund for CCS, enabling the province to support three to five large scale CCS projects.



#### *Climate Change and Emissions Management Act (2007)*

Beginning July 1, 2007, every facility that produces more than 100,000 tonnes of CO<sub>2</sub>-equivalent emissions per year must reduce its “emissions intensity” by 12% annually using an average of its emissions for the years 2003-2005 as a baseline. Approximately 100 such facilities produce about 70% of Alberta’s total GHG emissions.

### **Regulation**

#### *Carbon Sequestration Tenure Regulation (2011)*

This regulation establishes the process for companies to seek tenure rights for CCS projects

#### *Carbon Capture and Storage Funding Regulation (2010)*

This regulation authorizes spending for the Regulatory Framework Assessment as well as education and research regarding CCS projects.

#### *Specified Gas Emitters Regulation (2007)*

This regulation implements the *Climate Change and Emissions Management Act (2007)* by detailing various mechanisms by which affected companies can reduce their emissions intensity. In addition to undertaking facility-level improvements to reduce emissions at source, three other compliance options are available.

Companies can:

- Trade/purchase emissions performance credits (EPCs) from other regulated facilities in Alberta that have achieved facility-level reductions beyond those required for their own compliance;
- Purchase eligible third-party-verified, Alberta-based offset credits;
- Purchase CCEMF credits. Since CCEMF credits can be purchased for \$15/tonne of CO<sub>2</sub>e, this becomes the compliance option of choice if EPCs or offset credits become more expensive.

#### *Specified Gas Reporting Regulation (2004)*

This regulation outlines the key reporting requirements for GHG reporting in Alberta.

## **BACKGROUNDER COP 17**

### **ISSUE**

- Although Alberta Ministers of the Environment have participated in UNFCCC Conferences of the Parties in the past, it will be Minister McQueen's first COP. Alberta's oil sands attract the criticisms of environment groups and other countries.

- 

s.14(a)

s.21(1)(a)

s.21(1)(b)

- 

s.15(1)

### **BACKGROUND / CURRENT STATUS**

- 

- Environment Canada engages provinces and territories through the Federal, Provincial, Territorial Working Group on International Climate Change, led by Guy Saint-Jacques, the current Chief Negotiator and Ambassador for Climate Change.
- The Working Group meets regularly before and after negotiation sessions throughout the year to discuss developments and key issues. The last meeting conducted via videoconference, to update PTs on Canada's approach to COP17, was held on November 8. In addition on November 22<sup>nd</sup>, the Deputy Minister and the Chief Negotiator provide an update to the provincial and territorial deputies of the Canadian Council of Ministers of the Environment (CCME).



**Page(s) 000166 to\à 000167**

**Is(Are) exempted pursuant to section(s)  
est(sont) exemptée(s) en vertu de(s)(l')article(s)**

**14(a)**

**of the Access to Information Act  
de la Loi sur l'accès à l'information**

---

## BRITISH COLUMBIA

---



**Honourable Terry Lake**  
**Minister of Environment**  
MLA, Kamloops-North Thompson

Minister Lake was first elected as Member of the Legislative Assembly for the constituency of Kamloops-North Thompson in 2009 and was appointed Minister of Environment on March 14, 2011.

Minister Lake served as the Parliamentary Secretary for Health Promotion to the Minister of Health Services. Previous to that, he served as Parliamentary Secretary for the Ranching Task Force to the Minister of Agriculture and Lands. He also sat as a member of the Selecting Standing Committee on Aboriginal Affairs, on Health, and on Legislative Initiatives and was a member of the Early Childhood Education Innovations Committee.

A veterinarian by profession, Minister Lake served as the Mayor of the City of Kamloops from 2005-2008 and as a city councillor from 2002-2005.



# BRITISH COLUMBIA

## CLIMATE CHANGE PROFILE

---

Updated October 2011

Minister of Environment: **Terry Lake**

Deputy Minister of Environment: **Cairine MacDonald**

### RECENT DEVELOPMENTS

---

- In June 2011, British Columbia (B.C.) announced that it is the first province or state in North America to achieve carbon neutrality in its public sector (via a combination energy efficiency measures and offset purchases).
- BC is on track for the launch of the Western Climate Initiative (WCI) trading system in January 2012, along with Quebec and California.
- The 2011/2012 B.C. Budget indicated that the impact of the income tax cuts announced with the province's carbon tax exceeded revenues by \$122 million in 2010/2011, a trend expected to continue.
- In February 2011, B.C. and Washington State signed agreements on limiting carbon emissions from government operations and promoting awareness of the impacts of sea level rise on coastal areas.

### SUMMARY

---

- B.C.'s total GHG emissions of 63.7 Mt in 2009 represented 9.2% of the Canadian total.
- B.C.'s electricity supply mix in 2009 was 92% hydroelectricity, 4% natural gas, 3% other renewables, and 1% refined petroleum products.
- The province aims to reduce GHG emissions to 33% below 2007 levels by 2020 (equivalent to a 31% reduction below 2005 levels), with the longer term goal of an 80% reduction below 2007 levels by 2050. Legislated interim targets of 6% below 2007 in 2012 and 18 below 2007 in 2016 were established in 2008.
- B.C. advocates a strong role for sub-national governments in driving national-level policy on climate change.

### BRITISH COLUMBIA'S APPROACH TO CLIMATE CHANGE

---

#### Provincial Strategy

The 2007 *Greenhouse Gas Reductions Target Act* commits B.C. to reducing its GHG emissions by 33% below 2007 levels by 2020 and by 80% below 2007 levels by 2050. In July 2008, the B.C. Climate Action Team recommended interim targets of 6% below 2007 in 2012 and 18% below 2007 in 2016 which were subsequently adopted by the B.C. government. These targets represent the most ambitious effort of any jurisdiction in the country to address climate change and B.C. has implemented the most comprehensive approach of any Province or Territory (PT) to meet these objectives. As reported by the province, independent economic modelling estimates that the province's Climate Action Plan, when fully implemented, will achieve 73% of the 2020 reduction target. The remaining reductions are expected to be met through ongoing policy development and international agreements.

British Columbia's carbon tax came into effect on July 1, 2008, and applies to the purchase or use of fossil fuels within BC. The tax has gone up by \$5 per year since it came into effect, and on July 1, 2011 the rate went up to



\$25 per tonne of CO<sub>2</sub>-equivalent (CO<sub>2</sub>e). This rate will stabilize at \$30 per tonne on July 1, 2012. The broad-based, revenue-neutral tax applies to all liquid, gaseous and solid combustible fuels including gasoline, diesel, natural gas, coal, propane, home heating fuel, ethanol, and renewable diesel fuel purchases. The rate varies by fuel, since each type of fuel differs in how much CO<sub>2</sub>-e is emitted as it burns. Thus, the July 2011 tax rate translates to 5.56 cents per litre of gasoline, and 6.53 cents per litre of natural gas.

The 2011 budget introduced a carbon tax credit for biomethane, a carbon-neutral replacement for natural gas. If mixed with natural gas, the proportion of the blend made up of biomethane will be eligible for the credit. Since the carbon tax is considered revenue neutral, the Budget does not project any impact to consumers from the biomethane tax credit. While the carbon tax qualifies as revenue-neutral for consumers, the income tax cuts associated with the carbon tax represented \$313 million in tax expenditures in 2008/09, \$7 million more than the revenue generated by the carbon tax. This difference was \$225 million in 2009/10, \$69 million in 2010/2011, and \$67 million in 2011/12. .

In October 2010, B.C. released consultation papers on: (1) proposed emissions trading regulations; and (2) proposed offset regulations, with a backgrounder on B.C.'s approach to carbon pricing. A summary of public comments was released in February 2011. Regulations are expected to be finalized in 2011, while a third regulation on enforcement and penalties is expected for late 2011. The proposed regulations are intended to position B.C. to be able to meet the January 1, 2012 start date of the WCI cap and trade. It was also noted that B.C. intended the emissions trading system to cover those sectors not currently subject to B.C.'s carbon tax (e.g. non-fossil fuel combustion or process emissions from industry). The carbon tax would continue to be applicable to residential, commercial, and transportation emissions.

Other key elements of British Columbia's approach to climate change include:

- The requirement for provincial public institutions to be carbon-neutral by 2010. B.C. released a statement on June 30, 2011 stating that they have achieved this goal.
- Legislation for motor vehicle fuel and tailpipe emissions standards (equivalent to those in California's 2004 regulation) (no enabling regulations developed to date).
- The *Provincial Transit Plan*, a \$14 billion strategy for expanded public transit across British Columbia.
- The requirement that, starting January 1, 2010, all facilities emitting over 10,000 tonnes of carbon dioxide (CO<sub>2</sub>) equivalent annually must publicly report their emissions. Facilities emitting more than 25,000 tonnes must have these emissions verified by a third party.
- The *Bioenergy Strategy* to create new opportunities in clean technology.

## Governance

To help provincial public institutions meet their goal of carbon neutrality by 2010, the government created a provincial Crown corporation, the Pacific Carbon Trust, to acquire and sell GHG offsets from projects located in B.C. that meet the eligibility criteria defined by the Ministry of the Environment. As of May 2011, the trust has recorded the removal of more than 54,000 tonnes as a result of emissions offsets. In June 2011, the report *Carbon Neutral B.C. – transforming B.C.'s public sector* was released, outlining how BC achieved its carbon neutrality goal for 2010. For that year, B.C. purchased 729,782 tonnes of offsets at \$25/tonne to achieve neutrality (at a total cost of \$18,244,575).



In 2008, the provincial government provided \$94.5 million dollars as legacy funding to create the Pacific Institute for Climate Solutions, a university partnership to develop cutting-edge solutions for climate change mitigation and adaptation.

### **Key Initiatives**

B.C. is investigating the feasibility of storing CO<sub>2</sub> and hydrogen sulphide in natural geological reservoirs. With an investment of \$3.4 million from the provincial government, an exploratory project is planned at a Spectra Energy Transmission natural gas processing plant near Fort Nelson.

In October 2009, a special cabinet directive to B.C. Hydro and to the B.C. Utilities Commission removed the conventional natural gas-fired Burrard Thermal generating station as a source for future power, except for emergency backup purposes. Burrard Thermal does not meet the zero net carbon emissions by 2016 requirement of the *B.C. Energy Plan*.

### **Partnerships**

B.C. is a member of the Western Climate Initiative (WCI), a regional initiative whose members currently include seven US states: Washington, Utah, Arizona, California, Montana, New Mexico, and Oregon; and four Canadian provinces: British Columbia, Manitoba, Ontario and Quebec. There are several other states and provinces (and some Mexican states) that hold observer status. The WCI is set to launch a regional cap-and-trade system, with a subset of its membership expected to participate in the launch on January 1, 2012 (Quebec, B.C. and California). The WCI has a regional goal of reducing emissions to 15% below 2005 levels by 2020. Despite various legal challenges, California has declared it is officially still on track to commence trading on January 1, 2012.

B.C. is a member of the Climate Registry, a nonprofit collaboration of North American states, provinces, territories and Native Sovereign Nations aimed at standardizing reporting practices for GHG emissions.

B.C. is a member of the *International Carbon Action Partnership* (ICAP) of countries and regions that support carbon trading and are actively developing or have developed cap-and-trade systems.

In February 2011, B.C. and Washington State signed agreements on limiting carbon emissions from government operations and promoting awareness of the impacts of sea level rise on coastal areas.

Since 2008, the province has entered into Memoranda of Understanding with California, Oregon, and Washington on joint action on climate change and ocean conservation and other issues affecting the Pacific coast region. In February 2010, during the inaugural Leaders' Forum of the Pacific Coast Collaborative, these jurisdictions signed onto a series of joint actions through (1) an Action Plan on Innovation, the Environment and the Economy, and (2) an Action Plan on Ocean Conservation and Coastal Climate Change Adaptation.

The provincial government also collaborates with local governments on the issue of climate change. As of May 2011, 178 local governments had signed the *British Columbia Climate Action Charter*, pledging to become carbon-neutral by 2012. In order to support regional emission reduction initiatives, participating governments have their carbon tax fully refunded annually (\$2.9 million in returned taxes for 2010). BC has also developed Community Energy and Emissions Inventories (CEEI) for BC communities, providing most communities with a unique baseline from which to work.



s.14

## **BRITISH COLUMBIA'S POSITION ON FEDERAL CLIMATE CHANGE ACTIVITIES**

---

### **LEGISLATION AND REGULATIONS**

---

#### **Legislation**

*The Greenhouse Gas Reductions Targets Act (2007)* sets GHG reduction targets for the province and commits to having a carbon-neutral public sector by 2010.

*The Greenhouse Gas Reduction (Cap and Trade) Act (2008)* creates the framework to allow the province to take part in the cap-and-trade system developed through the Western Climate Initiative.

*The Greenhouse Gas Reduction (Vehicle Emissions Standards) Act (May 2008)* enables the adoption of vehicle emissions standards that will increase automobile fuel efficiency.

*The Greenhouse Gas Reduction (Emissions Standards) Statutes Amendment Act (2008)* focuses on reducing GHG emissions from certain industrial operations, while increasing opportunities in the bio-energy sector. For example, waste-management operations (including landfills, composting facilities and sewage treatment plants) will be required to manage GHGs by reducing emissions or capturing them, with the option of tapping into their energy-generation potential.

*The 2008 Utilities Commission Amendment Act (2008)* encourages public utilities to reduce GHG emissions, take steps to reduce demand, and generate and acquire electricity from clean or renewable sources.

*The Greenhouse Gas Reduction (Renewable and Low Carbon Fuel Requirements) Act (2008)* promotes the use of renewable fuel in transportation fuel blends by setting new requirements for transportation fuels. It is intended to decrease the amount of carbon in transportation fuels, and allow B.C. to meet its commitment to adopt a low-carbon fuel standard similar to that of California.

*The Local Government (Green Communities) Statutes Amendment Act (2008)* requires local governments to include targets, policies and actions for the reduction of GHG emissions in their Official Community Plans by May 31, 2010, and their Regional Growth Strategies by May 31, 2011.



The *Carbon Tax Act* (2008) introduced a \$10/tonne carbon tax that rises in annual \$5 increments to \$30/tonne by 2012.

The *Clean Energy Act* (2010) increases provincial commitments to conservation and the development of clean energy resources, including wind, solar, tidal and hydro power.

### **Regulations**

The 2008 *Greenhouse Gas Reduction (Cap and Trade) Act's Reporting Regulation* sets out regulations requiring operations within B.C. emitting 10,000 tonnes or more of CO<sub>2</sub>-e per year to report these emissions. In addition to this, facilities emitting more than 25,000 tonnes annually must have emissions verified by a third party.

The *Landfill Gas Regulation* (2008) requires that municipal solid-waste landfills with 100,000 tonnes or more of waste in place or with an annual waste acceptance rate exceeding 10,000 tonnes to undertake an assessment of landfill gas generation and to submit the results to the Ministry in a report by January 1, 2011.

The *Emission Offsets Regulation* (2008) sets out requirements for GHG reductions and removals from projects or actions to be recognized as emission offsets for the purposes of fulfilling the provincial government's commitment to a carbon-neutral public sector by 2010.

## **BACKGROUNDER COP 17**

### **ISSUE**

- Minister Lake will be attending this year for the first time.

- 

**s.15(1)**

- 

**s.14**

**s.21(1)(a)**

**s.21(1)(b)**

- 

### **BACKGROUND / CURRENT STATUS**

- 

- 

- Environment Canada engages provinces and territories through the Federal, Provincial, Territorial Working Group on International Climate Change, led by Guy Saint-Jacques. The Working Group meets regularly before and after negotiation sessions throughout the year to discuss developments and key issues. The last meeting conducted via videoconference, to update PTs on Canada's approach to COP17, was held on November 8. In addition on November 22, the Deputy Minister




and the Chief Negotiator provide an update to the provincial and territorial deputies  
of the Canadian Council of Ministers of the Environment (CCME).

**Page(s) 000176 to\à 000177**

**Is(Are) exempted pursuant to section(s)  
est(sont) exemptée(s) en vertu de(s)(l')article(s)**

**14(a), 21(1)(a), 21(1)(b)**

**of the Access to Information Act  
de la Loi sur l'accès à l'information**



# QUEBEC

## CLIMATE CHANGE PROFILE

---

Updated October 2011

Minister of Sustainable Development, Environment and Parks: **Pierre Arcand**

Deputy Minister: **Diane Jean**

### RECENT DEVELOPMENTS


---

- In August 2011, Quebec released a *Progress Report on the Fight Against Climate Change*. Quebec is projected to be on track to meet its 6% reduction target below 1990 levels by 2012.
- A regulatory amendment was proposed by the Government of Quebec in June 2011 that would effectively eliminate its provincial-level regulatory obligations for the Canadian auto industry and create a single national standard for greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions from passenger automobiles and light trucks. Consultations concluded in August 2011 and the text of the proposed amendment has yet to be finalized.
- Quebec continues to analyze comments received following the publication of a draft regulation to establish GHG emission rights for a cap and trade system. This proposed regulation is seen as an affirmation of Quebec's commitment to participate in the Western Climate Initiative (WCI) cap and trade program to be launched in January 2012, with a one year compliance grace period for emitters.
- Following the end of the federal "Retire your Ride" program on March 31, 2011, the Quebec government has revived its Clean the Air program whereby drivers are compensated for taking their old vehicles off the road. Quebec is investing a total of \$10 million over two years for the program.
- In March 2011, the federal government announced a deal with Quebec granting it royalties for the Old Harry oil and gas sub-sea reserves in the Gulf of the St. Lawrence. However, the province is awaiting the results of a strategic environmental assessment before allowing the development of any oil and gas reserves in the Gulf. The results of this study are expected in 2012.
- On March 8, 2011, Minister Arcand released a report on the sustainable development of the shale gas industry. The report recommends moving forward, but with a strategic environmental assessment. The report also recommended strengthening regulatory provisions. Quebec has imposed a temporary moratorium on commercial hydraulic fracturing until environmental assessments are completed.

### SUMMARY

---

- Quebec's GHG emissions of 81.6 Mt in 2009 represented 11.8% of the Canadian total. Owing to its large hydroelectric capacity, Quebec has the lowest provincial per capita GHG emissions in Canada. Quebec's 2009 electricity supply mix was 97% hydro, 2% nuclear and less than 1% natural gas, diesel, and other renewables.
- Quebec's GHG reduction target is 6% below 1990 levels by 2012 and a 20% reduction below 1990 levels by 2020.
- Quebec's *2006-2012 Action Plan on Climate Change* is focused on the transport sector, energy efficiency and innovation.



- The *2013-2020 Action Plan on Climate Change* is expected in spring 2012. A climate change adaptation strategy is currently under development, and some of those measures could be expected to form part of the *Action Plan*.

## **QUEBEC'S APPROACH TO CLIMATE CHANGE**

---

### **Provincial Strategy**

Quebec supports the objectives of the Kyoto Protocol. Quebec's 2006-2012 Action Plan on Climate Change aims to reduce GHG emissions by 14.6 MT or 6%, below 1990 levels by 2012. In 2008, the reductions were only 1.2% below 1990 but the Quebec government remains confident it can deliver a 6% reduction by 2012.

Quebec's Action Plan calls for investment of \$1.5 billion over six years, with the Federal government's contribution (\$350 million from the Federal Trust Fund for Clean Air and Climate Change) making up the remainder of the funding. This contribution was allocated from Canada's Trust Fund for Clean Air and Climate Change.

The Quebec government has set a 2020 emissions reduction target of 20% below 1990 levels. To achieve this objective, Premier Charest has prioritized the decarbonization of the Quebec economy with a focus on measures to target, among others, the energy (35.4% of 2009 emissions) and transportation (54.2% of 2009 emissions) sectors.

In April 2011 the Quebec government announced an Action Plan for electric vehicles which aims to encourage the purchase, use and manufacture of electric and hybrid vehicles. New investments of over \$165 million are planned over ten years. The plan will include discounts on the purchase of electric and hybrid vehicles and, starting in 2012, Quebec will be the first Canadian province to provide rebates for the purchase of charging stations at home. The strategy includes a goal of 25% of sales in the province in 2020 to be of electric vehicles.

During visits and missions outside of Canada, the Government of Quebec often showcases the importance of the leadership of Federated States in the effort to combat climate change.


### **Key Initiatives**

Quebec's *2006-2012 Action Plan on Climate Change* contains 26 implemented measures across 10 sectors including energy, transportation, technological innovation and adaptation. Investments amounting to \$975 million are already committed to across more than 2 000 projects submitted within 19 programs implemented thus far support the Action Plan. Five hundred other projects are currently under analysis.

A Carbon Levy was established in 2007 that returns \$200 million per year to the government. It is paid to the province's Green Fund, which funds elements of the Action Plan. There are not, however, any emissions reductions explicitly attached to the levy.

Part of the increase in gas tax during the period 2010-2013 is paid to the Fund on infrastructure, which serves in part to finance measures to promote public transit.

The main programs, measures and projects implemented under the *2006-2012 Action Plan* are:



#### Energy sector and energy efficiency

- Program reducing the consumption of heavy fuel oil ("Fuel Plan"): 144 projects funded, representing commitments of \$95 million.
- Refrigeration Optimization Program: 50 arenas and retail food stores shared \$4.9 million.
- Amendments to Building Code of Quebec to allow the enhancement of energy efficiency standards

#### Transport sector

- Increase the supply of transit service in the order of 19% between 2006 and 2009 (government target set at 16%). A program of capital assistance by public transport was introduced in 2008 and additional funding was provided to metropolitan Montreal and Quebec City in the most recent provincial budget.
- Projects targeting intermodal freight transport have been undertaken for a total of \$20.5 million.

#### Area of technological innovation

- Biogas Program: financial support for the capture and the commercialization of biogas. Eight projects were funded, representing commitments of \$20 million.
- Techno-climate Program: aims to demonstrate green technologies to reduce GHG emissions. Seventeen demonstration projects or recovery have been funded, representing commitments of \$29 million.
- Carbon sequestration: financing up to \$5 million for the creation in 2008 of a research chair in the geological sequestration of CO<sub>2</sub> located at the National Institute of Scientific Research (INRS-Water-Earth-Environment).
- EV20 Initiative: Electric vehicle development project, undertaken with the participation of the Quebec government, for manufacturing companies and international financial institutions. The Quebec government is chairing this initiative set up by The Climate Group.

#### Adaptation sector

According To Quebec's Action Plan, Quebec's economy is particularly vulnerable to climate change in part because a number of its Industry sectors rely on the extraction, processing and use of natural resources. Examples of initiatives meant to facilitate Quebec's adaptation to climate change include:


- Creation of a coastal geoscience research facility to study coastal erosion dynamics.
- Additional Funding of \$ 10 million over five years for the Ouranos Consortium to expand the scope of its scientific program into areas including regional climatology and adaptation research. Environment Canada is a partner of Ouranos.

#### **Partnerships**

Quebec is a member of the *Western Climate Initiative* (WCI), a coalition of Canadian Provinces and U.S. States supporting the establishment of a common market for the exchange of GHG emission credits. Quebec announced in May 2011 it would follow California and British Columbia in launching the program in 2013.

In 2008, Quebec signed the *Quebec-Ontario Partnership for a Cap-and-Trade Emissions System*.

In October of 2011, Quebec's Premier, Jean Charest, and the Prime Minister of France, François Fillion, signed a declaration aimed at promoting the development of joint initiatives connected to the *Plan Nord* (more details



below). Key areas singled out as priorities for cooperation include the environment, sustainable development, and scientific research.

Quebec is a member of the *Climate Alliance*, an international network of federated states and regional leaders that promotes the climate change initiatives of major multinationals and governments and supports the implementation of climate change mitigation measures by sub-national governments. *Climate Alliance* is a *Climate Group* initiative and holds its meetings in conjunction with United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) negotiating sessions.

Quebec has been a member of the *International Carbon Action Partnership* (ICAP) since December 2008, a coalition of North American and European governments that supports the global carbon marketplace to address climate change.

The Quebec government is a member of the Network of Regional Governments for Sustainable Development, a group of federated states behind the program territorial approach in the fight against climate change and has recognized observer status within the UNFCCC.

Quebec is also a member of the *New England Governors / Eastern Canadian Premiers* (NEG/ECP). Under its Climate Change Action Plan, the NEG/ECP has set a regional emissions reduction target. The NEG/ECP aims to assess and promote low carbon transportation fuels in a manner that delivers net GHG reductions over the fuel's life cycle.

Quebec is an official observer on the *Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative* (RGGI), an initiative led by ten northeast and mid-Atlantic U.S. states to limit GHG emissions. RGGI is the first mandatory, market-based CO<sub>2</sub> emissions reduction program in the U.S..

**s.14**

## **QUEBEC'S POSITION ON FEDERAL CLIMATE CHANGE ACTIVITIES**


---

### **LEGISLATION AND REGULATIONS**

---

#### **Legislation**

*An Act to amend the Environment Quality Act and other legislative provisions in relation to climate change* was adopted in 2009. This Act grants the Quebec government the necessary legislative powers to establish a cap-



and-trade system. It will allow the government to set caps on emitters determined by regulation, require emitters to report on their emissions and require emitters to cover their GHG emissions by recognized emission credits or allowances.

## Regulations

### *Regulation respecting greenhouse gas emissions reporting (modified in December 2010)*

- This regulation lowers the annual emissions threshold for mandatory reporting from 50,000 t CO<sub>2</sub>e to the more stringent WCI compliance threshold of 10,000 t CO<sub>2</sub>e. This change takes effect in 2011 and applies for all subsequent years. Emissions are to be calculated using a specific formula, provided by the Department of Environment and inscribed in the regulation. Additionally, from 2012 onwards, all emitters exceeding 25,000 t CO<sub>2</sub>e per year must have their emissions verified by an accredited third party.

New WCI regulations require that emissions calculation methods be harmonized with those of the US Environmental Protection Agency. These changes are presently being scrutinized, and Quebec will be holding public consultations once they have incorporated this modification into their GHG emissions reporting regulations.

### *Regulation respecting halocarbons (2009)*

- This regulation is intended to reduce the emission of halocarbons into the atmosphere to protect the stratospheric ozone layer and minimize increases in anthropogenic greenhouse gas emissions. This objective will be reached by requiring the recovery of halocarbons prior to work on refrigeration and air conditioning units most likely to produce these emissions.

### *Regulation respecting greenhouse gas emissions from motor vehicles (2009)*


- This regulation establishes progressively more stringent standards for tailpipe emissions from cars and light trucks of model years 2010 to 2016 sold in the province. Standards are similar to those first adopted in the State of California. In June 2011, Quebec issued a proposal to amend these regulations for model years 2012 to 2016, to harmonize with standards set out in Canada's recent *Passenger Automobile and Light Truck Greenhouse Gas Regulations* (which in turn are harmonized with the US EPA's standards for those years).

### *Regulation for a levy on gasoline and fossil fuels (2007)*

- This regulation stipulates the levy that is to be collected from each litre of gasoline and diesel fuel in the province.

### *Regulation on speed limiting devices on trucks (2006)*

- The regulation was passed in 2006, but not implemented until January 1, 2009, when the government of Quebec implemented speed limiting devices on all large trucks. It is expected that these speed limiters will offer economic benefits, promote safety and reduce GHG emissions.



## OTHER KEY INFORMATION

---

### **Shale gas**

Quebec looks set to become a key player in the production of natural gas, given the recent Old Harry offshore oil and gas deal, and the development of the shale gas industry. The development of these projects is on hold pending the outcome of strategic environmental assessments.

In terms of climate change, some studies have claimed that GHG emissions from the mining and burning of shale gas could exceed those from coal-fired electricity. This is mostly due to the inability to fully contain the methane released during the mining and extraction process. Some groups who gave input during the public consultation process expressed grave concerns about Quebec's ability to meet its 2020 GHG reduction targets, should the shale gas industry be given the green light to expand.

### **Northern development ("le Plan nord")**

The *Plan nord* is an economic development plan launched in May 2011 which covers approximately 72% of Quebec's territory, all of mainland Quebec situated north of the 49<sup>th</sup> parallel. The plan involves mining and mineral exploitation, significant hydroelectric development, as well as other clean energy initiatives, forestry sector expansion, and a plan to expand the bio-food sector into this region. There is also oil and natural gas potential in part of the territory covered by Plan Nord.

**s.14**

**s.21(1)(a)**

**s.21(1)(b)**



SCENARIO BRIEF	
MEETING WITH YOUTH GROUPS	
TIME AND LOCATION	<p><u>Date:</u> Wednesday December 7, 2011</p> <p><u>Time:</u> 15:30 – 16:00</p> <p><u>Place:</u> ICC Centre</p>
PARTICIPANTS	<p><u>Government of Canada</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Minister of the Environment, Peter Kent</li> <li></li> <li><b>s.19 (1)</b></li> <li>Paul Boothe</li> <li>Guy Saint-Jacques</li> <li>Dan McDougall</li> <li>Stephen de Boer</li> </ul> <p><u>Youth Delegation</u></p> <p>A list of potential invitees, with biographies, will be developed for your consideration when more information is available. We expect around 5-6 delegates for this meeting.</p>
CONTEXT OF MEETING	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>The Canadian Youth Delegation and the Quebec Youth Delegation have requested a meeting with you to discuss the negotiations.</li> </ul>
ANTICIPATED OBJECTIVES, OUTCOMES, DELIVERABLES	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li></li> </ul> <p><b>s.21(1)(a)</b> <b>s.21(1)(b)</b></p>

### RECOMMENDED APPROACH

Throughout the meeting, it is recommended that you adopt a positive tone, articulate the policy issues and rationale for federal actions, actively listen, and ask questions to seek clarification regarding stakeholders' perspectives.

## **CONTEXT**

### **Canadian Youth groups**

The Canadian Youth Delegation (CYD) is a project of the Canadian Youth Climate Coalition (CYCC).

Also this year, ENvironnement JEUnesse, a Quebec-based environment group, has launched the first Quebec Youth Delegation to the United Nations Conference on Climate Change. The delegation was created to represent Quebec youth, to promote French language, and to focus more on the political and social realities of Quebec. The Quebec delegation is comprised of five young people engaged in environment, and the group has the mandate to bring the voice of Quebec youth to COP17. The project, managed by Catherine Gauthier, includes training on issues related to climate change.

Using social media tools, including blogs, e-newsletters, Twitter, and Facebook, the Youth report on Canadian and international activities at the UNFCCC meetings. They also meet with other delegations. In the lead up to COP17, youth groups have met several times with Ambassador Saint-Jacques bilaterally and are planning on attending the daily stakeholders' briefings that Ambassador Saint-Jacques will chair each morning during the Conference.

### **Youth positions**

**s.15(1)**

**s.21(1)(a)**

**s.21(1)(b)**

The Youth, along with other environmental groups, have become highly vocal about the development of oil sands in Canada, emphasizing their environmental impacts on air, water and biodiversity in addition to the emissions related to its development.

**Page(s) 000186 to\à 000190**

**Is(Are) exempted pursuant to section(s)  
est(sont) exemptée(s) en vertu de(s)(l')article(s)**

**15(1), 21(1)(a), 21(1)(b)**

**of the Access to Information Act  
de la Loi sur l'accès à l'information**

## **Background**

### **History of youth involvement in the negotiations**

At the Earth Summit in Rio de Janeiro in 1992, young people, including Severn Cullis-Suzuki, daughter of David Suzuki made the first youth environmental statement in an international forum. At the Montreal Climate Change Conference in Montreal in 2005 youth participation exploded, mainly due to the organization of a Youth Summit in parallel of the negotiation.

Within the UNFCCC, youth are now recognized as a constituency called YOUNGO (YOUNG youth and NGO) since 2009. This status, like other constituencies such as industry, indigenous peoples and environment groups, allows them to intervene at the end of plenary sessions and to submit submissions to the Parties through the Secretariat. Young people spoke for the first time in plenary in Copenhagen and 16 interventions were made on behalf of the Youth International in Cancun. To date, there are a number of delegations of young people around the world, but most active are those of Australia, United States and Canada.

### **Profile: Canadian Youth Climate Coalition**

The Canadian Youth Climate Coalition (CYCC) is a united front of youth from across Canada working to encourage immediate and meaningful action on climate change by governmental and private sector leaders. Created in September 2006, the Coalition consists of 48 members representing labour unions, indigenous groups, green energy groups, student unions, environmental groups, and faith-based organizations. The CYCC is made up of three main bodies: (1) the Coalition which holds monthly calls including all members, (2) the Steering Committee consisting of six regional representatives providing grassroots feedback to staff, and (3) the Working Committees focused in two areas, actions and policy.

Acting locally, provincially, federally, and internationally, the CYCC combines its forces to organize action, influence government, and implement concrete solutions. The CYCC perceives climate change as a health, survival, sovereignty, cultural, and economic issue. The coalition envisions a country that generates clean energy, supports sustainable and accessible transportation, and where industry is accountable for its actions.

The CYCC demands that any plan to address climate change includes:

- Deep emissions reductions to meet international obligations, and the implementation of renewable energy strategies;
- The elimination of fossil fuel subsidies;
- A comprehensive adaptation strategy for those communities already affected by climate change and that considers indigenous communities;
- Reforms of curricula to properly educate youth; and
- Official positions for youth in directing Canada's climate change policies.

## **MEMBERS ORGANIZATION**

B.Y.T.E

Canadian Auto Workers Youth Network (CAWYN)

Emerging Leaders Committee

Canadian Federation of Students

Canadian Labour Congress

Check You Head

ENvironnement JEUnesse

Indigenous Environment Network

Manitoba Environmental Youth Network

Peel Environmental Youth Alliance (PEYA)

Sierra Youth Coalition

TakingITGloba

## **PROFILE: La Délégation de la jeunesse du Québec**

Au Sommet de la Terre, à Rio de Janeiro en 1992, quelques jeunes étaient présents, dont Severn Cullis-Suzuki, fille du reconnu David Suzuki, qui avait prononcé une allocution dont on entend encore parler. Ce n'est que lors de la conférence de Montréal, en 2005, qu'on a vu une explosion de la participation des jeunes grâce à l'initiative d'ENvironnement JEUnesse d'organiser un Sommet international de la jeunesse pour réunir des jeunes de partout dans le monde avant le début des négociations.

La Délégation de la jeunesse du Québec, c'est cinq jeunes engagés de 18 à 30 ans qui prendront part à la Conférence des Nations Unies sur les Changements Climatiques qui se déroulera à Durban, en Afrique du Sud, afin de porter la voix de la jeunesse québécoise. Les membres du groupe seront appelés à prendre position, à influencer les décideurs politiques et à partager leurs expériences et connaissances avec la population francophone.

<b><u>SCENARIO NOTE</u></b>	
<b><u>RECEPTION FOR MINISTERS AND HEADS OF DELEGATION</u></b>	
<b>TIME &amp; LOCATION</b>	<u>Date</u> : Wednesday, December 7th <u>Time</u> : 18:00 <u>Location</u> : TBC
<b>CONTEXT</b>	<p>This event is a regular occasion during the High Level Segment of UN Climate Conferences. The reception is hosted the COP Presidency, which this year is South Africa.</p> <p>There is no agenda for the event, as it is an informal event that provides an opportunity for Ministers to meet casually during the conference. We anticipate that, as host of the event, President Zuma, will provide some welcoming remarks.</p>
<b>CANADA'S OBJECTIVES</b>	

s.21(1)(a)  
s.21(1)(b)

s.15(1)

SCENARIO BRIEF	
MEETING WITH NON-GOVERNMENTAL GROUPS	
TIME AND LOCATION	<p><u>Date:</u> Thursday December 8, 2011</p> <p><u>Time:</u> 14:00 – 14:30</p> <p><u>Place:</u> ICC centre</p>
PARTICIPANTS	<p><u>Government of Canada</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Minister of the Environment, Peter Kent</li> <li></li> <li></li> <li><b>s.19 (1)</b></li> <li>Paul Boothe</li> <li>Guy Saint-Jacques</li> <li>Dan McDougall</li> <li>Stephen de Boer</li> </ul> <p><u>Environmental Groups (TBC)</u></p> <p>A list of potential invitees, with biographies, will be developed for your consideration when more information is available. We expect five to eight delegates for this meeting.</p>
CONTEXT OF MEETING	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>At the COP, the Minister of the Environment usually meets with representatives of civil society and other Canadian groups.</li> <li>On November 9, 2011, the Climate Action Network requested a meeting in Durban with you. (See MIN 151772).</li> </ul>
ANTICIPATED OBJECTIVES, OUTCOMES, DELIVERABLES	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li></li> </ul> <p><b>s.15(1)</b></p>

## RECOMMENDED APPROACH

Throughout the meeting, it is recommended that you adopt a positive tone, articulate the policy issues and rationale for federal actions, actively listen, and ask questions to seek clarification regarding stakeholders' perspectives.

## THE ORGANIZATIONS

**The Climate Action Network Canada (CAN)** is composed of member organizations committed to preventing dangerous levels of human interference with the global climate system, protecting environmental sustainability and public health, while upholding principles of just transition, equity and social justice. CAN's 60 member organizations include environmental NGOs, labour unions, faith-based organizations, and aboriginal organizations. CAN is very visible and vocal in the negotiations, mainly through the Fossil of the Day Awards.

CAN's mission is to support and empower Canada's governments, private sector, labour and civil society by designing, developing and implementing effective strategies to reduce greenhouse gas emissions at international, national and local levels, and to prevent dangerous levels of human interference with the global climate system.

CAN has a targeted communication and advocacy campaign to push Canada to:

- Adopt domestic measures to regulate the oil sands;
- Eliminate government fossil fuel subsidies to corporations;
- Adopt mandatory, science-based reduction targets in a new treaty;
- Commit to doing its fair share in assisting developing countries to limit their emissions and adapt to climate change; and
- Not block progress and consensus in the negotiations.

In Durban, the Climate Action Network is looking for three outcomes:

1. Adoption of a second commitment period of the Kyoto Protocol;
2. A mandate for negotiation of a more comprehensive and ambitious longer-term climate regime based on both scientific adequacy and the principle of common but differentiated responsible and respective capacity; and
3. A package of decisions facilitating near-term action on all the building blocks of the Bali Action Plan and implementation of the Cancun Agreements.

ISSUE

**s.21(1)(a)**  
**s.21(1)(b)**



**Page(s) 000196 to\à 000199**

**Is(Are) exempted pursuant to section(s)  
est(sont) exemptée(s) en vertu de(s)(l')article(s)**

**15(1), 21(1)(a), 21(1)(b)**

**of the Access to Information Act  
de la Loi sur l'accès à l'information**

**Briefing materials will be provided on  
the ground, as necessary.**

## United States

### Todd Stern, US Special Envoy for Climate Change



- Named by Secretary Clinton as the US Special Envoy for Climate Change on January 26, 2009; plays a central role in developing U.S. international climate change policy, is the Administration's chief climate change negotiator, and participates in the development of domestic climate change and energy policy. He is also a member of the Council on Foreign Relations.
- Served in the White House from 1993-1999, including as Staff Secretary; and in the Treasury from 1999-2001 where he advised the Secretary on economic and financial issues.
- Prior to joining the Obama Administration, he was a Senior Fellow at the Center for American Progress, and a partner at the law firm WilmerHale where he focused on public policy and strategy.

#### **Climate change position & policy:**

- The U.S. has associated with the Copenhagen Accord (CA) and has submitted an emissions reduction target of 17% by 2020 from a 2005 base year. Canada has aligned its own submission to the CA with the U.S. target.
- Canada and the U.S. are closely aligned with respect to the importance we attribute to the Cancun Agreements as a basis for moving forward with a new global climate change regime. Both countries also agree on the need for the implementation of financing commitments to go hand in hand with the balanced implementation of the Agreements, especially with respect to transparency.
- The U.S., like Canada, supports a mandate to negotiate a new, single post-2012 agreement only if it is balanced, and includes and applies equally to all major emitters.
- Canada and the U.S. collaborate under the Clean Energy Dialogue (CED) on clean energy research; development and deployment of clean energy technology; and building a more efficient energy grid.

#### **Key Messages:**

- 
- 
- 

s.15(1)  
s.21(1)(a)  
s.21(1)(b)

**Page(s) 000202 to\à 000202**

**Is(Are) exempted pursuant to section(s)  
est(sont) exemptée(s) en vertu de(s)(l')article(s)**

**15(1), 21(1)(a), 21(1)(b)**

**of the Access to Information Act  
de la Loi sur l'accès à l'information**

# UNITED STATES – Economy, Emissions, Commitments

	Indicators	U.S.	Canada
Economy	GDP (PPP – 2010 est.)	US \$14.7T	US \$1.3T
	Commerce (2010)	Exports to U.S.: \$299B	Imports from U.S.: \$203B
Emissions*	Total 1990 GHGs	6111.8 Mt CO <sub>2</sub> eq.	591.8 Mt CO <sub>2</sub> eq.
	Total 2008 GHGs	6924.6 Mt CO <sub>2</sub> eq. (13.3% increase on 1990 levels)	734.4 Mt CO <sub>2</sub> eq. (24.1% increase on 1990 levels)
	2008 GHG/capita (Annex 1 rank)	22.5 t CO <sub>2</sub> eq. per person (3rd)	22.0 t CO <sub>2</sub> eq. per person (4th)
	2008 GHG/GDP	474.0 t CO <sub>2</sub> eq./M US\$	557.20 t CO <sub>2</sub> eq./M US\$
	2008 % of Annex 1 total	Approximately 38.99%	Approximately 4.14%
Commitments	Kyoto Protocol	Did not ratify	Ratified February 2002, <b>6% reduction</b> from 1990 levels
	Copenhagen Accord	In the range of a <b>17% reduction</b> on 2005 levels	<b>17% reduction</b> from 2005 levels, aligned with U.S. target


\*GHG figures include CO<sub>2</sub>, CH<sub>4</sub>, N<sub>2</sub>O, PFCs, HFCs, SF<sub>6</sub>; not LULUCF or international bunkers.

Sources: GDP (PPP 2010 est) and GDP for 2008 GHG/GDP: CIA World Fact Book ([www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook](http://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook)); GHG emissions data: UNFCCC


(<http://unfccc.int/di/FlexibleQueries/Event.do>); Population source for US 2008 GHG/capita: Population Reference Bureau, 2008 World Population Data Sheet, Population source for Canada 2008 GHG/capita: UNFCCC (<http://unfccc.int/di/FlexibleQueries/Event.do>).

# UNITED STATES – Comparative GHG Emissions Performance

United States - GHG Emissions by Sector (2008) - Total 6924.6 Mt\*



Canada - GHG Emissions by Sector (2008) - Total 734.4 Mt\*




\*GHG data includes CO<sub>2</sub>, CH<sub>4</sub>, N<sub>2</sub>O, PFCs, HFCs, SF<sub>6</sub> and not LULUCF.

\*\*IE = Included Elsewhere, NA = Not Applicable

Source: UNFCCC ([http://unfccc.int/ghg\\_data/ghg\\_data\\_unfccc/ghg\\_profiles/items/4625.php](http://unfccc.int/ghg_data/ghg_data_unfccc/ghg_profiles/items/4625.php))

# UNITED STATES – GHG Trends & Projections

- In its 5<sup>th</sup> National Communication (NC5), the US noted that its emissions rose by 17% from 1990 through 2007.
- From 2005 to 2020, NC5 projects that total GHGs will rise by 4% under a “with measures” scenario.
- Apr. 2011 projections by the Energy Information Administration (EIA) indicate that if no explicit action to regulate GHGs is taken, emissions will grow slowly (0.6% per year) over the next two decades, not returning to 2005 levels until 2027.
- Overall US energy intensity has continually decreased, indicating a trend toward increasing energy efficiency in the economy.



# UNITED STATES – Domestic Actions

<b>Legislation</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• In January 2011, the EPA began regulating GHGs under the Clean Air Act for mobile sources, i.e. light duty vehicles for 2012-16 model years, and for major new or modified stationary sources;</li><li>• In August 2011, the first ever fuel efficiency and emission standards for heavy duty vehicles were announced for 2014-18 model years;</li><li>• In 2012, the EPA is expected to propose regulations for petroleum refineries and for power plants</li></ul>
<b>Emissions</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• Total GHGs increased 7.3% from 1990-2009. However, they decreased by 6.1% in 2009 relative to 2008 levels due to:<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>– Decreased economic output causing lowered energy consumption across all sectors</li><li>– Decreased carbon intensity of fuels used in electricity generation due to fuel switching; the price of coal increased while the price of natural gas decreased significantly</li></ul></li></ul>
<b>Energy</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• 2011 State of the Union Address called for:<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>– Extensive public investment and incentives in clean energy to enhance its competitiveness, spur innovation, investment in energy infrastructure, create jobs</li><li>– A new Green Energy Standard: produce 80% of electricity from clean sources by 2035</li></ul></li></ul>



# UNITED STATES – International Position

U.S.'s 2020 emissions reduction target inscribed in the Copenhagen Accord	Canada's 2020 emissions reduction target inscribed in the Copenhagen Accord
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• In the range of a <b>17% reduction</b> on 2005 levels</li> <li>• Associated with the Accord</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• <b>17% reduction</b> on 2005 levels, aligned with the U.S. target</li> <li>• Associated with the Accord</li> </ul>

## Fast-start financing pledges (in millions)\*

	Adaptation	Clean Energy	Sustainable Landscapes	Totals
<b>FY 2010</b>	448	595	261	1.304B
<b>FY 2011</b>	577	751	397	1.725B
<b>FY 2012</b>	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A

\*Source: WRI (Oct 2, 2010) Summary of Developed Country Fast-Start Climate Finance Pledges

# UNITED STATES – Canada's Engagement


<b>Bilateral Engagement</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Collaborate under the <b>Clean Energy Dialogue</b> (CED) on clean energy research; development and deployment of clean energy technology; building a more efficient energy grid</li> </ul>
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Cooperate on <b>environmental issues</b> through the International Joint Commission, Boundary Waters Treaty and Canada-U.S. Air Quality Agreement</li> </ul>
<b>North American Collaboration</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>The <b>Leader's Declaration on Climate Change and Clean Energy</b> from the August 2009 North America Leaders Summit (NALS) reaffirmed:                             <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>A shared vision for a <b>low-carbon</b> North America, through respective domestic implementation of mid-term and long-term goals to reduce emissions</li> <li>Underscored the importance of developing and strengthening <b>financial instruments</b> to support mitigation</li> </ul> </li> </ul>
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>The Western Climate Initiative (<b>WCI</b>), a multi-jurisdictional carbon market initiative (including BC, QC, ON, and MB) has been led by California, though six other states (NM, AZ, WA, OR, MT, UT) have recently withdrawn.</li> </ul>
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li><b>Commission for Environmental Cooperation</b> (CEC) addresses environmental issues, helps prevent potential trade and environmental conflicts and promote effective enforcement of environmental law</li> </ul>
<b>Technology Partnerships</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Participates in:                             <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Global Methane Initiative (GMI)</li> <li>Renewable Energy and Energy Efficiency Partnerships (REEEP)</li> <li>Carbon Sequestration Leadership Forum (CSLF) actions at a lower cost</li> <li>U.S. is also a member of the International Renewable Energy Agency (IRENA)</li> </ul> </li> </ul>

# UNITED STATES – Other Considerations

<b>International Negotiations</b>  s.15(1) s.21(1)(a) s.21(1)(b)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>•</li> </ul>
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>•</li> </ul>
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>•</li> </ul>
<b>Multilateral Engagement</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• April 2009: Obama established the Major Economies Forum (MEF), a group of 17 major emitters representing 80% of global emissions. MEF parties established a Global Partnership to speed clean technology deployment.</li> </ul>
<b>Energy</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• The world's largest producer and consumer of energy</li> </ul>
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• As of 2009, renewable energy made up approx. 5% of the energy mix; Obama is committed to double the supply of renewable energy from 2008 levels by the end of 2012 under the <i>Strategy for American Innovation</i></li> </ul>
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• The <i>American Recovery and Reinvestment Act</i> (ARRA), signed into law in February 2009, allocated \$90B for investment in clean energy technologies</li> </ul>

## Japan

### **Goshi Hosono, Minister of the Environment**



- Appointed as Minister of the Environment and reappointed as Nuclear Disaster Minister in September 2011; he is the youngest Minister in PM Noda's Cabinet.
- Since March 2011 he has served as the main link between the government and the Tokyo Electric Power Company (TEPCO) in the wake of the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear crisis.
- First elected to the Lower House in 2000 and is currently serving a fourth term; member of the Democratic Party of Japan.

#### **Japan's Climate Change Position & Policy:**

- According to UNFCCC data, Japan's 2009 emissions were less than 1% above 1990 levels (excluding LULUCF). Despite the recent earthquake and nuclear crisis, Japan is still likely to meet its Kyoto target of a 6% reduction from 1990 levels due to decline in industrial activity and purchase of Kyoto credits.
- Associated with the Copenhagen Accord, with a target of 25% reduction from 1990 levels by 2020; providing strong support for fast start financing with a \$15B pledge.
- Due to the March 2011 earthquake and nuclear crisis, Japan is reassessing its long-term energy policy, which relied heavily on nuclear power. The Environment Ministry, however, has indicated that it will continue to push for the development of renewable energy sources. The reassessment of its energy policy may have implications for its domestic mitigation actions.
- Like Canada, Japan has stated unequivocally that it would not take on a second commitment period target under the Kyoto Protocol, and that its post-2012 commitment is as inscribed under the Copenhagen Accord.

s.15(1)

#### **Points to register:**

s.15(1)

s.21(1)(a)

s.21(1)(b)

**Blank page**

# JAPAN – Economy, Emissions, Commitments


	Indicators	Japan	Canada
Economy	GDP (PPP – 2010 est.)	US \$4.3T	US \$1.3T
	Commerce (2010)	Exports to Japan: \$9.2B	Imports from Japan: \$13.4B
Emissions*	Total 1990 GHGs	1268.7 Mt CO <sub>2</sub> eq.	591.8 Mt CO <sub>2</sub> eq.
	Total 2008 GHGs	1281.8 Mt CO <sub>2</sub> eq. (1.0% increase on 1990 levels)	734.4 Mt CO <sub>2</sub> eq. (24.1% increase on 1990 levels)
	2008 GHG/capita (Annex 1 rank)	10.2 t CO <sub>2</sub> eq. per person (22nd)	22.0 t CO <sub>2</sub> eq. per person (4th)
	2008 GHG/GDP	293.5 t CO <sub>2</sub> eq./M US\$	557.2 t CO <sub>2</sub> eq./M US\$
	2008 % of Annex 1 total	Approximately 5.39%	Approximately 4.14%
Commitments	Kyoto Protocol	Ratified June 2002, <b>6% reduction</b> from 1990 levels	Ratified February 2002, <b>6% reduction</b> from 1990 levels
	Copenhagen Accord	<b>25% reduction</b> from 1990 levels	<b>17% reduction</b> from 2005 levels, aligned with U.S. target

\*GHG figures include CO<sub>2</sub>, CH<sub>4</sub>, N<sub>2</sub>O, PFCs, HFCs, SF<sub>6</sub>, not LULUCF or international bunkers.


Sources: GDP (PPP-2010 est.) and GDP for 2008 GHG/GDP (PPP-2008 est.): CIA World Fact Book ([www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook](http://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook)); GHG emissions data: UNFCCC (<http://unfccc.int/di/FlexibleQueries/Event.do>); Population source for 2007 GHG/capita data: UNFCCC (<http://unfccc.int/di/FlexibleQueries/Event.do>).

# JAPAN – Comparative GHG Emissions Performance

Japan - GHG Emissions by Sector (2008) – Total 1281.8 Mt\*



Canada - GHG Emissions by Sector (2008) – Total 734.4 Mt\*




\*GHG data includes CO<sub>2</sub>, CH<sub>4</sub>, N<sub>2</sub>O, PFCs, HFCs, SF<sub>6</sub> and not LULUCF.

\*\*IE = Included Elsewhere, NA = Not Applicable

Sources: UNFCCC ([http://unfccc.int/ghg\\_data/ghg\\_data\\_unfccc/ghg\\_profiles/items/4625.php](http://unfccc.int/ghg_data/ghg_data_unfccc/ghg_profiles/items/4625.php))

# JAPAN – Emissions Trends and Projections

- Japan's emissions peaked in 2007 at 9% over 1990 levels
- Emissions declined markedly in 2008 and 2009, largely due to the drop in energy demand in the industrial sector as a result of the economic downturn
- Increased nuclear plant utilization helped to reduce fossil fuel use
- To meet its Kyoto target of a 6% decrease, Japan acquired 95.10 Mt CO<sub>2</sub> credits as of April 1, 2009 (equivalent to 1.6% reduction)
- Future emissions reductions to come from the industrial, commercial, household and transport sectors (equivalent to a 9.6 % reduction)
- Expects enhancing forest sinks will lead to a further 3.5% reduction





# JAPAN – Domestic Targets & Commitments

Targets & Emissions	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Due to the March 11<sup>th</sup> earthquake, tsunami and nuclear crisis, the proposed Climate Change Bill is unlikely to be passed in the current Diet session                             <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Bill was to provide legislative basis for the 2020 target, provisions for domestic emissions trading system, carbon tax, and incentives to boost renewable energies</li> </ul> </li> </ul>
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Despite recent crises, Japan expects it will meet its commitments under the Kyoto Protocol and remains supportive of domestic efforts to reduce emissions                             <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Over the medium term, however, it will reconsider its overall energy strategy, which envisages over 50% of total electricity coming from nuclear power</li> <li>A reassessment of its energy policy will likely impact domestic mitigation policies including its plans to reduce emissions 25% by 2020 on 1990 levels</li> </ul> </li> </ul>
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Aims to achieve 15% of cuts domestically, including through fossil fuel tax hikes, and 10% abroad, such as by carbon credit purchases</li> </ul>
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Beginning in 2010, the City of Tokyo established a cap-and-trade system to reduce municipal emissions by 25% by 2020 from 2000 levels</li> </ul>
Energy	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Aug 2011: Upper and Lower Houses of Parliament approved a bill to subsidize electricity from renewable sources                             <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Allows for incentives that guarantee above-market rates for wind, solar and geothermal</li> <li>The legislation will become effective on July 1, 2012 and will require that utilities to buy electricity generated by renewable sources.</li> </ul> </li> </ul>
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>New <b>Strategic Energy Plan (SEP)</b>, focusing on energy security, energy efficiency and energy-based growth, sets ambitious targets that will result in an expected 30% reduction in energy-based GHGs from 1990 levels for 2030</li> </ul>

# JAPAN – International Position

Japan's 2020 emissions reduction target inscribed in the Copenhagen Accord	Canada's 2020 emissions reduction target inscribed in the Copenhagen Accord
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• <b>25% reduction</b> on 1990 levels; the target is premised on the establishment of a fair and effective international framework in which all major economies participate and on agreement by those economies on ambitious targets</li> <li>• Associated with the Accord</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• <b>17% reduction</b> from 2005 levels, aligned with U.S. target</li> <li>• Associated with the Accord</li> </ul>

- Pledged US\$15B for fast-start funding: US\$7.2B in ODA and US\$7.8B in other official financing in collaboration with the private sector. Nearly half (US\$7.2B) has already been allocated. Priorities are mitigation, adaptation, and REDD+
- Although reconstruction after the March 11<sup>th</sup> earthquake and nuclear crisis is its financial priority, fast-start funding disbursements up to 2012 are expected to continue, but at a slower pace
- In Sept. 2009 announced US\$15B over three years in support for developing countries address climate change under the **Hatoyama Initiative**
  - Initiative built on its Cool Earth Partnership commitment of US\$10B over five years
  - Unclear if finance pledges under the Copenhagen Accord include Hatoyama Initiative commitments


# JAPAN – Other Considerations

<p>s.15(1) s.21(1)(a) s.21(1)(b)</p> <p><b>International Negotiations</b></p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>•</li> </ul>
<p><b>Energy</b></p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Energy accounts for 90.5% of total emissions – largely from fuel combustion and fugitive emissions</li> <li>• Having few fossil fuel resources, highly dependant on other countries for its energy. Given its foreign energy dependence, Japan has aimed to diversify its energy sources and maintain high levels of domestic energy efficiency</li> <li>• Currently one of the world's most efficient advanced economies, which will likely make additional emission reductions challenging; now working to achieve low-carbon growth</li> </ul>

## **Russian Federation**

**Alexander Bedritsky**

**Advisor to the President, Special Envoy for Climate**



- In November 2009, named Advisor to the President of Russia, Special Envoy for Climate.
- In 2003, elected for a four-year term as President of the World Meteorological Organization (WMO); in 2007, he was re-elected for a second term.
- From 1993-2009 he served as Head of the Russian Federal Service for Hydrometeorology and Environmental Monitoring (Roshydromet); he obtained a doctorate in this field in 2000.

### **Russia's Climate Change Position & Policy:**

- According to UNFCCC data, 2009 emissions were 39% below its 1990 levels; this significant reduction is largely due to its post-Soviet economic contraction.
- Like Canada, Russia has asserted that it will not take on a 2<sup>nd</sup> commitment period under the Kyoto Protocol and that its post-2012 target will be undertaken in the context of a broader agreement that includes commitments from all major emitters, including the US and China.
- Under the Copenhagen Accord, Russia inscribed a 2020 target of a 15-25% reduction from 1990 levels, dependent on proper accounting for Russia's forests, and undertaking by all major emitters legally binding obligations to reduce anthropogenic GHG emissions.
- Russia has a significant share of surplus Assigned Amount Units (AAUs); however, since it has indicated that it will not take on a 2<sup>nd</sup> commitment period, it would not be able to carry-over any surplus AAUs under the KP regime.
- In 2009, Russia published Guidelines on Energy Efficiency setting a target for the share of renewable energy in electricity generation – excluding large hydro – at 4.5% in 2020. This builds on the 2003 Energy Strategy to 2020, which called for an increase in the share of renewable energy and the building of new hydro-electric stations.

**s.15(1)**

### **Points to Register:**

**s.15(1)**

**s.21(1)(a)**

**s.21(1)(b)**

**Blank page**

# RUSSIA – Economy, Emissions, Commitments

	Indicators	Russia	Canada
Economy	GDP (PPP – 2010 est.)	US \$2.2T	US \$1.3T
	Commerce (2010)	Exports to Russia: \$1.2B	Imports from Russia: \$1.6B
Emissions*	Total 1990 GHGs	3321.7 Mt CO <sub>2</sub> eq.	591.8 Mt CO <sub>2</sub> eq.
	Total 2008 GHGs	2229.6 Mt CO <sub>2</sub> eq. (32.9% decrease on 1990 levels)	734.4 Mt CO <sub>2</sub> eq. (24.1% increase on 1990 levels)
	2008 GHG/capita (Annex 1 rank)	15.7 t CO <sub>2</sub> eq. per person (6th)	22.0 t CO <sub>2</sub> eq. per person (4th)
	2008 GHG/GDP	970.2 t CO <sub>2</sub> eq./M US\$	557.2 t CO <sub>2</sub> eq./M US\$
	2008 % of Annex 1 total	Approximately 12.55%	Approximately 4.14%
Commitments	Kyoto Protocol	Ratified, <b>0% reduction</b> from 1990 levels	Ratified February 2002, <b>6% reduction</b> from 1990 levels
	Copenhagen Accord	<b>15-25% reduction</b> on 1990 levels, associated with the Accord	<b>17% reduction</b> from 2005 levels, aligned with U.S. target


\*GHG figures include CO<sub>2</sub>, CH<sub>4</sub>, N<sub>2</sub>O, PFCs, HFCs, SF<sub>6</sub> and not LULUCF.

Sources: GDP (PPP-2010 est): CIA World Fact Book 2009, GDP source for 2007 GHG/GDP (PPP-2007 est.): CIA World Fact Book 2010 ([www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook](http://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook)) accessed online May 5, 2010; GHG emissions data: UNFCCC (<http://unfccc.int/di/FlexibleQueries/Event.do>); Population source for 2007 GHG/capita data: UNFCCC (<http://unfccc.int/di/FlexibleQueries/>)


000220

# RUSSIA – Comparative GHG Emissions Performance

Russia - GHG Emissions by Sector (2008) – Total 2,229.6 Mt\*



Canada - GHG Emissions by Sector (2008) – Total 734.4 Mt\*




\*GHG data includes CO<sub>2</sub>, CH<sub>4</sub>, N<sub>2</sub>O, PFCs, HFCs, SF<sub>6</sub> and not LULUCF.

\*\*IE = Included Elsewhere, NA = Not Applicable

Sources: UNFCCC ([http://unfccc.int/ghg\\_data/ghg\\_data\\_unfccc/ghg\\_profiles/items/4625.php](http://unfccc.int/ghg_data/ghg_data_unfccc/ghg_profiles/items/4625.php))

# RUSSIA – Recent CO<sub>2</sub> Projections

- According to the World Resources Institute (WRI), BAU CO<sub>2</sub> emissions are estimated to **grow by about 20% by 2030**; there is little information that explains this estimated growth
- In June 2009, President Medvedev said emissions would be around 10-15% below 1990 levels by 2020, which means a rise from now since emissions were 34% below 1990 levels in 2007





# RUSSIA – Domestic Targets and Commitments

<b>Emissions Targets</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Due to its <b>post-Soviet economic contraction</b>, emissions are well below its Kyoto target to stabilize emissions at 1990 levels</li> </ul>
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Stated that it <b>will not take on a new target under a second commitment period</b> of the Kyoto Protocol</li> </ul>
<b>Domestic Policies</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Dec. 2009: Medvedev approved the <b>Climate Doctrine</b> containing an overview of goals, principles and ways to implement a unified public policy on climate change; no emissions target was identified</li> </ul>
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>May 2008: <b>Ministry of Natural Resources and Ecology</b> was created to bring all government bodies dealing with climate change and environment together                             <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>– Tasked with developing a federal program for ecological and radiation security, which will also include a climate change component</li> </ul> </li> </ul>
<b>Energy</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Jan. 2009 <b>Guidelines on Energy Efficiency</b> set targets for the share of renewable energy in electricity generation excluding large hydro over 25MW: 1.5% in 2010, 2.5% in 2015, 4.5% in 2020                             <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>– In 2009, renewables in electricity were less than 1%, excluding large hydro.</li> </ul> </li> </ul>
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>President has set the goal of reducing energy intensity by 40% by 2020</li> </ul>

# RUSSIA – International Position

Russia's 2020 emissions reduction target inscribed in the Copenhagen Accord	Canada's 2020 emissions reduction target inscribed in the Copenhagen Accord
<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• A <b>15-25% reduction</b> on 1990 levels, which depends on the following conditions</li><li>• Appropriate accounting of the potential of Russia's forestry in frame of contribution in meeting the obligations of the anthropogenic emission reduction;</li><li>• Undertaking by all major emitters the legally binding obligations to reduce anthropogenic GHG emissions</li><li>• Associated with the Accord</li></ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• <b>17% reduction</b> on 2005 levels, aligned with the U.S. target</li><li>• Associated with the Accord</li></ul>

# RUSSIA – Canada's Engagement

<b>International Negotiations</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>•</li><li>•</li><li>•</li><li>•</li><li>•</li></ul>
<b>Multilateral Engagement</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• Participates in:<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>– G8</li><li>– Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD)</li><li>– Global Methane Initiative (GMI)</li><li>– Major Economies Forum (MEF)</li></ul></li><li>• Like Canada, signed the 2008 Hokkaido Summit Declaration, adopting a global goal of at least 50% reduction in global GHG emissions by 2050</li></ul>

# RUSSIA – Other Considerations

<b>International Negotiations</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>•</li> <li>•</li> <li>•</li> </ul>
<b>Oil and Gas</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• A major exporter of oil and natural gas; its economic growth over past decade has been driven primarily by energy exports. Gets over half of its domestic energy needs from natural gas.</li> <li>• Strategic energy supplier to EU with 80% of its oil exports going there; EU's commitment to reduce emissions by 20% by 2020 could have economic consequences for Russia.</li> </ul>
<b>Forests</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Its forests are a critical component of the global carbon cycle, estimated to contain nearly 21% of the world's total forest stock, and potentially store 28% of global carbon.</li> </ul>
<b>Climate Change Impacts</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• May benefit from climate change as vast Northern region warms: Russian North-East Passage already open to commercial shipping.</li> <li>• Warming could make northern oil and gas reserves more accessible.</li> </ul>

## Mexico

### **Juan Elvira Quesada, Secretary of the Environment and Natural Resources**



- Appointed to current position in 2006 by President Calderón.
- During his time as Secretary of the Ministry of Environment and Natural Resources (SEMARNAT), Mr. Elvira has placed considerable emphasis on climate change. Mexico's National Climate Change Strategy and the Special Program on Climate Change (PECC) have both been published during Elvira's term as Secretary.
- Mr. Elvira holds an MA in Agricultural Engineering and Agricultural Mechanization from the Cranfield Institute of Technology in Bedfordshire, England.

#### **Mexico's Climate Change Position & Policy:**

- Classified as a developing country under the UNFCCC, Mexico has associated with the Copenhagen Accord (CA) and has submitted mitigation actions for inclusion in Appendix II of the CA: Mexico aims to reduce its GHG emissions by up to 30% with respect to the business as usual scenario by 2020, provided the provision of adequate financial and technological support from developed countries as part of a global agreement.
- While Mexico maintains that developed countries should take the lead on climate change actions, its views are generally more moderate than most developing countries, particularly on the key issue of emissions reduction commitments.
- Canada engages Mexico through the CMP (Canada-Mexico Partnership), including cooperation on emissions inventories, renewable energy, landfill, zero energy housing, and multilateral financing mechanisms for climate change.
- Canada and Mexico jointly participate in several partnerships, including the Global Methane Initiative (GMI) under which both countries recently signed an MOU to reduce emissions from the landfill sector.
- In September 2011, Canada attended the Short Lived Climate Forcers (SLCFs) Ministerial meeting hosted by Mexico. Both countries have identified SLCFs as a priority, and it is expected that work will continue in this area.
- As part of our continued bilateral cooperation and our fast-start financing commitments for 2011-2013, Canada plans to collaborate with Mexico in the development of sector mitigation projects and Nationally Appropriate Mitigation Actions (NAMA) development.

#### **Points to register:**

s.15(1)  
s.21(1)(a)  
s.21(1)(b)

**Page(s) 000228 to\à 000228**

**Is(Are) exempted pursuant to section(s)  
est(sont) exemptée(s) en vertu de(s)(l')article(s)**

**15(1), 21(1)(a), 21(1)(b)**

**of the Access to Information Act  
de la Loi sur l'accès à l'information**

# MEXICO – Commitments, Emissions, Economy

	Indicators	Mexico	Canada
Economy	GDP (PPP – 2010 est.)	US \$1.6T	US \$1.3T
	Commerce (2010)	Exports to Mexico: \$5.0B	Imports from Mexico: \$22.1B
Emissions*	Total 1990 GHGs	459.3 Mt CO <sub>2</sub> eq.	591.8 Mt CO <sub>2</sub> eq.
	Total 2005 GHGs	645 Mt CO <sub>2</sub> eq. (40.4% increase on 1990 levels)	739.4 Mt CO <sub>2</sub> eq. (25% increase on 1990 levels)
	2005 GHG/capita (rank globally)	6.3 t CO <sub>2</sub> eq. per person (75th)	22.9 t CO <sub>2</sub> eq. per person (10th)
	2005 GHG/GDP	498 t CO <sub>2</sub> eq./Mill. \$Intl 2005	653.7 t CO <sub>2</sub> eq./Mill. \$Intl 2005
	2005 % of global total	Approximately 1.71%	Approximately 1.96%
Commitments	Kyoto Protocol	Ratified Sept. 2000, no target	Ratified February 2002, <b>6% reduction</b> from 1990 levels
	Copenhagen Accord	Aims at reducing its GHG emissions up to 30% with respect to the business as usual scenario by 2020	<b>17% reduction</b> from 2005 levels, aligned with U.S. target


\*GHG figures include CO<sub>2</sub>, CH<sub>4</sub>, N<sub>2</sub>O, PFCs, HFCs, SF<sub>6</sub>; not LULUCF or international bunkers.

Sources: GDP (PPP – 2010 est) and GDP for 2005 GHG/GDP (PPP – 2005 est): CIA World Fact Book ([www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/](http://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/)); GHG Emissions Data: Climate Analysis Indicators Tool (CAIT) Version 8.0. (World Resources Institute, 2011, <http://cait.wri.org/cait.php>);


Total 1990 GHGs for Canada: UNFCCC ([http://unfccc.int/ghg\\_data/ghg\\_data\\_unfccc/items/4146.php](http://unfccc.int/ghg_data/ghg_data_unfccc/items/4146.php))

# MEXICO – Comparative GHG Emissions Performance

Mexico - GHG Emissions by Sector (2005) - Total 645 Mt\*



Canada - GHG Emissions by Sector (2005) – Total 739.4 Mt\*



\*GHG data includes CO<sub>2</sub>, CH<sub>4</sub>, N<sub>2</sub>O, PFCs, HFCs, SF<sub>6</sub> and not LULUCF.

Sources: Climate Analysis Indicators Tool (CAIT) Version 8.0. (World Resources Institute, 2011, <http://cait.wri.org/cait.php>);


UNFCCC data for Canadian total GHG emissions ([http://unfccc.int/di/flexible\\_queries.do](http://unfccc.int/di/flexible_queries.do)).



# MEXICO – GHG Projections

- Energy system **highly dependant** on oil and gas; the dominance of oil in energy mix leads to comparatively high emissions; oil funds 40% of the national budget
- In 2006, the world's **6<sup>th</sup> largest producer of oil**, but production is declining
  - Proven reserves fell from 49.3B barrels in 1986 to 12.4B barrels in 2007
- **Electricity generation** is mainly from natural gas (36%), oil (28%) and coal (14.8%). Emissions from **land-use management** are also substantial
- A **high mitigation potential** exists at comparatively low costs
- Despite improvements in energy efficiency, **growth in emissions** is mainly driven by:
  - **High population growth rate:** 28% increase between 1990 and 2005
  - **Higher living standard:** GDP per capita grown 25% between 1990 and 2006
  - **Carbon intensity:** grown 7% between 1990 and 2005

Estimated BAU is forecasted to grow about 240% by 2040



# MEXICO – Domestic Targets & Commitments

<b>Targets</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• <b>Special Program on Climate Change</b> (PECC in Spanish) (June 2009): a comprehensive strategy to <b>cut emissions</b> and <b>reduce energy use</b> while putting the Mexican economy on a <b>low carbon growth path</b></li> <li>• PECC anticipates long term mitigation plans that will accomplish a <b>21% emissions reduction by 2020</b> and <b>41% reduction by 2030</b> based on 2000 levels</li> </ul>
<b>Mitigation</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• PECC has four main pillars: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>– <b>Long-term view</b> with a target of a 50% GHG emission reduction by 2050 from 2000 levels</li> <li>– <b>Mitigation:</b> de-carbonize the economy by reducing carbon intensity that will lead to 85% of the reductions called for by the plan. The remaining 15% will be achieved through 31 goals in four categories: energy generation, energy use, land use, land-use change and forestry, and waste</li> <li>– <b>Adaptation:</b> the main components of this policy are to develop capacity building objectives for people, their goods, infrastructures and the ecosystems and align public policy on adaptation. It identifies the importance of managing risks, in particular as it refers to extreme hydrometereological changes</li> <li>– <b>Transversal policy</b> to integrate climate change policies across government departments</li> </ul> </li> </ul>

# MEXICO – International Position & Mitigation Actions

Mexico's domestic mitigation actions inscribed in the Copenhagen Accord	Canada's 2020 emissions reduction target inscribed in the Copenhagen Accord
<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• Aims at <b>reducing its GHG emissions up to 30%</b> with respect to the business as usual scenario by 2020</li><li>• Associated with the Accord</li></ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• <b>17% reduction</b> from 2005 levels, aligned with U.S. target</li><li>• Associated with the Accord</li></ul>

# MEXICO – Canada's Engagement

<b>Bilateral Engagement</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Successfully used the <b>Canada-Mexico Partnership (CMP)</b> to discuss climate change issues</li> </ul>
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Since the March 2009 CMP meeting, cooperation has been advanced in:                             <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>The comparability and compatibility of national GHG emission inventories and reporting systems</li> <li>Identifying projects on methane capture initiatives in the oil, gas, landfill and agricultural sectors</li> <li>Energy efficient housing</li> </ul> </li> </ul>
<b>Technology Partnerships</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Participates in:                             <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Global Methane Initiative (GMI)</li> <li>Carbon Sequestration Leadership Forum (CSLF)</li> <li>Renewable Energy and Energy Efficiency Partnership (REEEP)</li> </ul> </li> </ul>
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Canada and Mexico are currently working together on 77 Zero Energy Housing demonstration projects in Mexico</li> </ul>
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Under the <b>GMI partnership</b>, Canada and Mexico have <b>three projects</b> together under two subcommittees: landfill and oil and gas</li> </ul>
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Since 2009, Canada has invested over \$1.5M in clean technology projects in Mexico under REEEP and GMI; this investment has leveraged \$5.4M from the private sector and other governments</li> </ul>
<b>Multilateral Engagement</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Participates in:                             <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>The Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD)</li> <li>G8+5 Summits</li> <li>Major Economies Forum (MEF)</li> <li>Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC)</li> </ul> </li> </ul>

# MEXICO – Other Considerations

<p>s.15(1) s.21(1)(a) s.21(1)(b)</p> <p><b>International Negotiations</b></p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>•</li> </ul> <p style="text-align: right;">g</p>
<p><b>North American Cooperation</b></p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• The <b>Leader's Declaration on Climate Change and Clean Energy</b> from the August 2009 North America Leaders Summit (NALS) reaffirmed: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>– A shared vision for a <b>low-carbon</b> North America, through respective domestic implementation of mid-term and long-term goals to reduce emissions</li> <li>– Underscored the importance of developing and strengthening <b>financial instruments</b> to support mitigation</li> </ul> </li> <li>• At the Council Session of the <b>Commission for Environmental Cooperation</b> (CEC) in June 2008, Mexico proposed preliminary exchange of ideas on a North American carbon market: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>– The objective was enhancing mitigation actions at a lower cost</li> <li>– Proposal is forward looking with the potential to bring the various sub-regional initiatives underway in the US and Canada into a coordinated North American framework</li> </ul> </li> <li>• Interested in <b>North American cooperation</b>, potentially including a common approach to emissions trading and common vehicle emissions standards</li> </ul>

## UNFCCC

### **Christiana Figueres, Executive Secretary of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change**



- Appointed to current position in 2010 by UN Secretary General Ban Ki-Moon. Ms. Figueres has been involved in climate change negotiations since 1995, as a part of the Costa Rican delegation, a representative on the Executive Board of the Clean Development Mechanism and as Vice President of the Bureau of the Conference of the Parties.
- Ms. Figueres holds a Masters Degree in Anthropology from the London School of Economics, and a certificate in Organizational Development from Georgetown University.

#### **Position:**

- Ms. Figueres has indicated that she believes that governments are on track to deliver on the main commitments made in the Cancun Agreements on finance, technology, and adaptation measures.
- She has also emphasized the important role of the private sector in this endeavour, stating that public funds must effectively lever private capital in order to reach the \$100B goal.
- Ms. Figueres has affirmed her hope that the creativity of Parties will yield a result representative of a middle ground acceptable to all in Durban. While Canada has formally announced within the UNFCCC that it will not take on a second commitment period under the Kyoto Protocol and has remained firm in this regard, Ms. Figueres may press you on this point.

#### **Funding Support**

- Canada has provided \$300,000 to the UNFCCC Supplementary Trust Fund in voluntary contributions in 2009-2010.
- In 2010-11, as part of Canada's first tranche of fast start financing, \$763,000 was combined with other international assistance resources to support a total \$1 million contribution to the UNFCCC Trust Fund for Participation.
- This year, Canada has provided \$40,000 to the UNFCCC to support translation services for the African Group's meeting prior to CoP17 in South Africa. This contribution is a result of a request made by the UNFCCC Secretariat to Canada's Chief Negotiator and Ambassador for Climate Change, Guy Saint-Jacques.

s.15(1)  
s.21(1)(a)  
s.21(1)(b)

**Page(s) 000237 to\à 000237**


**Is(Are) exempted pursuant to section(s)  
est(sont) exemptée(s) en vertu de(s)(l')article(s)**

**15(1), 21(1)(a), 21(1)(b)**

**of the Access to Information Act  
de la Loi sur l'accès à l'information**

## **Grenada**

### **Karl Hood, Minister of Foreign Affairs**



- Previously served as Minister of Health and Minister of Labour, Social Security and Ecclesiastic Affairs.
- Pastor Hood is a trained Optician, a Minister of Religion, and holds a Master's Degree in leadership.
- Elected in 2008, he represents the constituency of St. George South East, and is a member of the party National Democratic Congress.

#### **AOSIS' Climate Change Position & Policy:**

- Grenada currently chairs the Alliance of Small Island Developing States (AOSIS), which is a coalition of small island and low-lying coastal countries that share similar development challenges and concerns about the environment, especially their vulnerability to the adverse effects of global climate change. AOSIS functions primarily as an ad hoc lobby and negotiating voice for small island developing States (SIDS) within the United Nations system. AOSIS has a membership of 42 States and observers.
- In the UNFCCC negotiations, Grenada has often emphasized that developed countries must take the primary responsibility in mitigation climate change. Similarly, AOSIS has consistently called for developed countries to take strong mitigation and adaptation measures, based on their historical responsibility for emissions and agree to limit average global temperatures to less than a 1.5 C increase over pre-industrial levels.
- Additionally, AOSIS supports a two-track approach, and has advocated for a new legally-binding agreement that engages the US and major emerging economies.

**s.15(1)**

- Grenada is one of the islands in the region targeted as part of the World Bank's Pilot Program on Climate Resilience. Over FY 2008/09 and 2009/10, Canada contributed \$100M to this fund. Grenada has received financial support to design their Strategic Program for Climate Resilience, which is expected to be completed in February 2011.

#### **Canada's Fast Start Financing Contributions**

- In November 2010, Canada provided \$237,000 in fast start financing for an AOSIS Ministerial meeting hosted by Grenada allowing AOSIS members to engage in a focused dialogue prior to the Cancun Climate Conference.
- This year, Canada provided support for AOSIS members to travel to the UNFCCC negotiation session in Panama in October. For CoP17, Canada provided hotel rooms for members of the AOSIS delegation.



**Page(s) 000239 to\à 000239**

**Is(Are) exempted pursuant to section(s)  
est(sont) exemptée(s) en vertu de(s)(l')article(s)**


**15(1), 21(1)(a), 21(1)(b)**

**of the Access to Information Act  
de la Loi sur l'accès à l'information**

## **BIOGRAPHY**

### **Joseph Gilbert**

#### **Minister of Environment, Foreign Trade and Export Development, Grenada**



Joseph Gilbert studied civil engineering at the University of Camaguey in Cuba.

Prior to entering politics, he was a teacher and a civil engineer project manager, specialising in rural development.

He has served for many years as the President of the Catholic Youth Organisation and President of the Marli Sports and Community Development Organisation.

He is a strong advocate for rural development and community development.

**SUBMISSION BY THE  
GOVERNMENT OF CANADA**

**CANADA – 2010 FAST-START FINANCING  
May 2011**

**Introduction**

Canada supports the outcomes of the 2010 Cancun Climate Conference. The Cancun Agreements reflect the resolve by all Parties to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) to work together to address the global threat of climate change. Canada believes that the Cancun Agreements strike an appropriate balance between the interests of Parties through the adoption of a comprehensive package of decisions on a wide range of issues, and represent a significant step in the international effort to reach a fair, effective and comprehensive post-2012 climate change regime.

As part of accelerating progress towards a post-2012 regime in line with Parties' ambitions, Canada joined other developed countries in supporting the Copenhagen Accord commitment to deliver fast-start financing, a commitment which was reiterated in the Cancun Agreements. Canada has committed to delivering its fair share of fast-start financing. In Decision 1/CP.16 (paragraph 96), the CoP "*Invites*, in order to enhance transparency, developed country Parties to submit to the secretariat for compilation into an information document, by May 2011, 2012 and 2013, information on the resources provided to fulfil the commitment [...], including ways in which developing country Parties access these resources". Canada has the honour of responding to this invitation via this submission which reports on Canada's fast-start financing in Canada's 2010/11 fiscal year, namely April 1, 2010 to March 31, 2011.

**Delivering on Canada's commitment**

Canada associated with the Copenhagen Accord at the 15<sup>th</sup> Conference of the Parties to the UNFCCC in December 2009, which was attended by the Right Honourable Stephen Harper, Prime Minister of Canada. On March 3, 2010, Her Excellency the Right Honourable Michaëlle Jean, then Governor General of Canada, delivered the Government's Speech from the Throne to open the Third Session of Canada's 40th Parliament and outline the broad agenda of the Government of Canada. The Speech from the Throne confirmed that the "Government has advocated for an agreement that includes all the world's major greenhouse gas emitters", that the "Copenhagen Accord [...] is fully supported by the Government of Canada", and that "Together with other industrialized countries, Canada will provide funding to help developing economies reduce their emissions and adapt to climate change".

In order to fulfill Canada's commitment to new and additional climate change financing, an estimate of Canada's international climate change support planned prior to Canada's association with the Copenhagen Accord was completed. This estimate suggested that during Canada's 2010/11 fiscal year, which began April 1, 2010, approximately \$41 million would flow, including the climate change portion of Canada's contributions to the Global Environment Facility. The Government determined that, as part of providing its fair share of the developed country commitment, \$400 million in new and additional climate change financing would be allocated above and beyond our pre-Copenhagen estimate of planned support during the 2010/11 fiscal year.


A process was undertaken to identify a strategy to direct Canadian support to key initiatives, based on a number of factors, including: priorities identified by developing countries in the negotiations and through bilateral channels; whether potential recipients had projects that were ready to be funded; and, the ability of recipient organizations to manage resources effectively for rapid disbursement, maximum leverage of private sector finance, and real results, such as measurable emissions reductions and improved climate resilience. This process led Canada to identify three key priorities for its climate financing, namely: (i) adaptation by the poorest and most vulnerable; (ii) clean energy; and (iii) forests and agriculture.

On October 1, 2010, the Government of Canada announced the details of Canada's provision of fast start financing in fiscal 2010/11. By the end of fiscal 2010/11, all resources provided for under Canada's fiscal 2010/11 fast-start package were made available to recipients.

### Canada's fiscal 2010/11 fast-start financing package

Canada's fast-start investment in fiscal year 2010/11 represents our largest ever contribution to support international efforts to address climate change. The October 1, 2011, announcement estimated that Canada's total international public climate finance would reach \$441 million (see graph) in fiscal 2010/11, including \$400 million in new and additional climate change financing.<sup>1</sup>

**Canada - public international climate change financing**  
(Millions of Canadian dollars - estimated)



### Adaptation

Canada's fast-start financing in fiscal 2010/11 provided additional support for adaptation by the poorest and most vulnerable countries, including Least Developed Countries (LDCs), Small Island Developing States (SIDs), and countries in Africa. Our fiscal 2010/11 adaptation financing package built upon significant past contributions to adaptation efforts internationally, including our previous contribution of \$100 million to the World Bank's Pilot Program on Climate Resilience over fiscal 2008/09 and 2009/10, and included:

- **\$20 million** to the Least Developed Countries Fund (LDCF) in support of urgent and priority adaptation needs of the poorest and most vulnerable countries in the world; this funding has been disbursed to the LDCF, which will use it to support the implementation of National Adaptation Plans of Action.

<sup>1</sup> We expect disbursement may exceed this estimate when final statistics are available on Canada's international assistance flows through all government departments and agencies. Information on final disbursement will be provided to the Secretariat when it is available.

- **\$10 million** to the International Development Research Centre to support the Africa Adaptation Research Centre Initiative (AARC), to build the capacity of African organizations to do policy-relevant adaptation-related research; seven research centres in different regions of Africa have been selected for support through a call for proposals, and have received initial funding under this initiative;
- **\$4.5 million** for three climate change adaptation initiatives in Haiti, working with Oxfam-Québec, the Alliance Agricole Internationale and the United Nations Development Programme;
- **\$7 million** of Canada's fast-start financing, combined with other international assistance resources, for a contribution **totalling \$15 million** to the World Food Program for the Managing Environmental Resources to Enable Transitions to More Sustainable Livelihoods initiative in Ethiopia to; and,
- **\$3 million** of Canada's fast-start financing, combined with other international assistance resource, for a **total of \$4.45 million** in support of Vietnam's National Target Program on Climate Change.

## Clean Energy

Canada provided the International Finance Corporation (IFC), a member of the World Bank Group, with **\$285.7 million** to be used as concessional financing for a broad portfolio of clean energy projects in developing countries, as part of Canada's commitment to support mitigation efforts.

In addition, **\$5.8 million** in grant financing was provided to support IFC's Advisory Services to help remove barriers to private clean energy investment and build technical expertise. For example, this grant financing will support advice to financial institutions to strengthen their capacity to identify, assess and structure loans to energy efficiency and renewable energy projects.

Canada's investments will support greenhouse gas abatement opportunities and will be deployed to catalyze private sector financing for clean energy projects. Canada will work with the IFC to track the amount of private investment directly mobilized by Canada's public finance contribution to the IFC, as well as the emissions reductions achieved. This type of innovative approach will be key to achieving long-term financing and mitigation goals.

Canada's contributions are being managed by IFC's Financial Mechanisms for Sustainability Group, which deploys donor funds on concessional terms alongside IFC investments, as well as provides grant financing for technical assistance and capacity building.

To be eligible to receive concessional or grant financing from Canada's contributions to IFC, a project must satisfy IFC's standard criteria and due diligence. Please see the Investment and Advisory Services page on [www.ifc.org](http://www.ifc.org).

## Forests and Agriculture

Significant investments were also made to support sustainable land use:

- A **\$40 million** contribution was made to the World Bank's Forest Carbon Partnership Facility's (FCPF) Readiness Fund to support the building of national capacity to address deforestation and forest degradation in developing countries.

- A **\$4.5 million** contribution to the World Bank's BioCarbon Fund, a public/private initiative to support demonstration projects that sequester or conserve carbon in forest and agro-ecosystems. The Fund aims to deliver cost-effective emission reductions, while promoting better understanding of how to manage soil carbon and supporting poverty alleviation.

### Other support

An additional **\$1 million** was invested in two activities that supported the inclusion of developing country perspectives in international climate change discussions:

- **\$763,000** in fast-start financing was combined with other international assistance resources to support a **total \$1 million** contribution to the UNFCCC Trust Fund for Participation to support participation by developing country representatives in UNFCCC negotiations.
- **\$237,000** supported an Alliance of Small Island States (AOSIS) Ministerial Meeting in November 2010 allowing AOSIS members and their partners to engage in a focused dialogue during a critical time in the climate change negotiations leading to the Cancun Climate Conference in December 2010.


Finally, Canada is contributing **\$238.4 million** over four years to support the Fifth Replenishment of the Global Environment Facility (GEF), the world's largest environmental fund, which marks an increase of 50% over Canada's contribution over the past four years. **\$18.5 million** in fiscal 2010/11 was drawn from the \$400 million identified for fast-start financing to support the increase in Canada's annual contribution to the GEF during that fiscal year.

### Access to Canadian resources

Access provisions for resources provided by Canada to multilateral and plurilateral organizations are based on the rules and guidelines of those organizations, plus any provisions provided for in the contribution agreements. Countries seeking information should contact representatives of those organizations. Canada remains interested, however, to understand the perspectives of developing countries on access to resources from these organizations, in order to effectively perform our role in ensuring effective and accountable governance, a key priority for Canada.

Access to Canadian bilateral support is generally assured through our bilateral development assistance partnerships, which are managed by the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA) in discussion with its developing country partners. Bilateral programs supported in our fast-start financing package were identified in consideration of overall priorities for bilateral support communicated by partner governments. In addition to any suggestions or proposals that might be communicated through climate change channels, we encourage countries interested in exploring opportunities for bilateral climate change related support to consider identifying them during bilateral consultations with CIDA.

For further information on Canada's international climate change related support, please visit [www.climatechange.gc.ca](http://www.climatechange.gc.ca).



## Table of Contents

**TUESDAY DECEMBER 6 – FRIDAY DECEMBER 9, 2011**  
**COP17 HIGH LEVEL SEGMENT**  
**Durban, South Africa**

TAB	
	<b>Background Documents</b>
1	
2	
3	
4	
5	
6	
7	
8	
9	
	<b>Information Documents</b>
10	Position Table of Key Countries and Blocs
11	Annual Summary of Greenhouse Gas Trends
12	UNFCCC Report on Canada's 5th National Communication (NC5)
13	9th BASIC Statement
14	MEF Leaders Declaration and MEF Statements
	<b>UNFCCC Documents</b>
15	Cancun Agreements
16	Copenhagen Accord and List of Country Association
17	
18	Kyoto Protocol
19	Climate Change Convention
20	Glossary of Climate Change Terms
21	List of Past COPs

**Page(s) 000246 to\à 000251**

**Is(Are) exempted pursuant to section(s)  
est(sont) exemptée(s) en vertu de(s)(l')article(s)**

**15(1), 21(1)(a), 21(1)(b)**

**of the Access to Information Act  
de la Loi sur l'accès à l'information**



**Page(s) 000252 to\à 000257**

**Is(Are) exempted pursuant to section(s)  
est(sont) exemptée(s) en vertu de(s)(l')article(s)**

**15(1), 21(1)(a), 21(1)(b)**

**of the Access to Information Act  
de la Loi sur l'accès à l'information**

**Page(s) 000258 to\à 000261**

**Is(Are) exempted pursuant to section(s)  
est(sont) exemptée(s) en vertu de(s)(l')article(s)**

**15(1), 21(1)(a), 21(1)(b)**

**of the Access to Information Act  
de la Loi sur l'accès à l'information**

**Page(s) 000262 to\à 000269**

**Is(Are) exempted pursuant to section(s)  
est(sont) exemptée(s) en vertu de(s)(l')article(s)**

**15(1), 21(1)(a), 21(1)(b)**

**of the Access to Information Act  
de la Loi sur l'accès à l'information**

**Page(s) 000270 to\à 000274**

**Is(Are) exempted pursuant to section(s)  
est(sont) exemptée(s) en vertu de(s)(l')article(s)**

**15(1), 21(1)(a), 21(1)(b)**

**of the Access to Information Act  
de la Loi sur l'accès à l'information**

**Page(s) 000275 to\à 000278**

**Is(Are) exempted pursuant to section(s)  
est(sont) exemptée(s) en vertu de(s)(l')article(s)**

**15(1), 21(1)(a), 21(1)(b)**

**of the Access to Information Act  
de la Loi sur l'accès à l'information**

**Page(s) 000279 to\à 000283**

**Is(Are) exempted pursuant to section(s)  
est(sont) exemptée(s) en vertu de(s)(l')article(s)**

**15(1), 21(1)(a), 21(1)(b)**

**of the Access to Information Act  
de la Loi sur l'accès à l'information**

**Page(s) 000284 to\à 000286**

**Is(Are) exempted pursuant to section(s)  
est(sont) exemptée(s) en vertu de(s)(l')article(s)**

**15(1), 21(1)(a), 21(1)(b)**

**of the Access to Information Act  
de la Loi sur l'accès à l'information**

**Page(s) 000287 to\à 000290**

**Is(Are) exempted pursuant to section(s)  
est(sont) exemptée(s) en vertu de(s)(l')article(s)**

**15(1), 21(1)(a), 21(1)(b)**

**of the Access to Information Act  
de la Loi sur l'accès à l'information**




**Page(s) 000291 to\à 000304**

**Is(Are) exempted pursuant to section(s)  
est(sont) exemptée(s) en vertu de(s)(l')article(s)**

**15(1), 21(1)(a), 21(1)(b)**

**of the Access to Information Act  
de la Loi sur l'accès à l'information**



# **CANADA'S 2009 GREENHOUSE GAS INVENTORY**

## **A Summary of Trends: 1990–2009**

Environment Canada

February 22, 2011



# CANADA'S 2009 GREENHOUSE GAS INVENTORY

## A Summary of Trends: 1990-2009

### Snapshot of National Emission Trends


Each year, Canada prepares a national inventory of human-induced greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions from sources (e.g., fuel combustion, industrial processes) and removals by sinks (e.g., growing trees). This summary presents information on Canadian GHG emissions and removals from the most recent national inventory and *Canada's National Inventory Report: 1990-2009*.

Total GHG emissions in Canada in 2009 were 690 megatonnes of carbon dioxide equivalent<sup>1</sup> (Mt of CO<sub>2</sub> eq), approximately 82% of which was generated from energy sources, (includes all energy production and consumption). The remaining 18% was largely generated by agricultural sources and industrial processes, with smaller contributions from waste and solvent and other product uses.

The GHGs that have been estimated in the national inventory are carbon dioxide (CO<sub>2</sub>), methane (CH<sub>4</sub>), nitrous oxide (N<sub>2</sub>O), sulphur hexafluoride (SF<sub>6</sub>), perfluorocarbons (PFCs), and hydrofluorocarbons (HFCs). CO<sub>2</sub> is the largest contributor to Canada's GHG Emissions, accounting for 78.6% of all emissions.

Although emissions in 2009 were 17% above the 1990 total of 590 Mt (see Figure 1 below), the trend has changed in recent years; fluctuating levels between 2005 and 2008 were followed by a steep decline. Canada's 2009 GHG emissions decreased 5.7% from 2008 levels, attributed primarily to the global economic recession and the utilization of lesser amounts of coal for electricity generation.

Figure 1 – Canada's GHG Emissions 1990-2009



### National Inventory

As an Annex I Party (Developed Countries) to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), Canada is required to prepare and submit a national inventory of human-induced greenhouse gas emissions from sources and removals by sinks in the form of a National Inventory Report (NIR) and a set of Common Reporting Format (CRF) tables. The National Inventory must meet international reporting guidelines and quality standards, and is reviewed annually by a UNFCCC Expert Review Team.

This year's inventory covers the period from 1990 to 2009 and incorporates updates throughout the entire time series.

This year's submission to the UNFCCC represents Canada's annual report under the Kyoto Protocol. The 2009 inventory year is the second of five in the Kyoto reporting period (2008-2012). 2009 was also the year Canada associated with Copenhagen Accord and committed to reducing emissions to 17% below 2005 levels by 2020.

<sup>1</sup> Each greenhouse gas has a different impact on warming. To account for this, scientists assign each gas a numeric "global warming potential" (GWP), based on the gas' ability to contribute to climate change. Carbon dioxide is set as the baseline with a global warming potential of 1, while other gases have larger values (for example, the GWP for methane (CH<sub>4</sub>) is 21).

## Short-Term Changes and Comparisons: 2005-2009

Since 2005, total Canadian GHG emissions have decreased by 41 Mt (or 5.7%, identical to the '08-'09 reduction). Although Gross Domestic Product (GDP) rose marginally between 2005 and 2009 (Table 1), its annual rate of increase slowed in each successive year of the period. The recent economic recession began in the last quarter of 2008, causing Canada's GDP to shrink by 2.5% in 2009.

Table 1: Trends in Emissions and Economic Indicators for Selected Years (1990–2009)

	1990	1995	2000	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009
<b>Total GHG (Mt)</b>	<b>590</b>	<b>637</b>	<b>716</b>	<b>731</b>	<b>719</b>	<b>748</b>	<b>732</b>	<b>690</b>
<i>Change Since 1990 (%)</i>	<i>N/A</i>	<i>7.9</i>	<i>21.3</i>	<i>23.9</i>	<i>21.8</i>	<i>26.7</i>	<i>23.9</i>	<i>16.9</i>
<i>Annual Change (%)</i>	<i>N/A</i>	<i>2.4</i>	<i>3.8</i>	<i>-1.5</i>	<i>-1.7</i>	<i>4.0</i>	<i>-2.2</i>	<i>-5.7</i>
<i>Average Annual Change (%)*</i>	<i>N/A</i>	<i>1.6</i>	<i>2.1</i>	<i>1.6</i>	<i>1.4</i>	<i>1.6</i>	<i>1.3</i>	<i>0.9</i>
<b>GDP (Billions 2002\$)</b>	<b>825</b>	<b>899</b>	<b>1101</b>	<b>1248</b>	<b>1283</b>	<b>1311</b>	<b>1318</b>	<b>1286</b>
<i>Change Since 1990 (%)</i>	<i>N/A</i>	<i>8.9</i>	<i>33.3</i>	<i>51.2</i>	<i>55.5</i>	<i>58.9</i>	<i>59.7</i>	<i>55.8</i>
<i>Annual Change (%)</i>	<i>N/A</i>	<i>2.8</i>	<i>5.2</i>	<i>3.0</i>	<i>2.8</i>	<i>2.2</i>	<i>0.5</i>	<i>-2.5</i>
<b>GHG Intensity (Mt/\$B GDP)</b>	<b>0.72</b>	<b>0.71</b>	<b>0.65</b>	<b>0.59</b>	<b>0.56</b>	<b>0.57</b>	<b>0.56</b>	<b>0.54</b>
<i>Change Since 1990 (%)</i>	<i>N/A</i>	<i>-0.9</i>	<i>-9.0</i>	<i>-18.1</i>	<i>-21.6</i>	<i>-20.2</i>	<i>-22.4</i>	<i>-25.0</i>
<i>Annual Change (%)</i>	<i>N/A</i>	<i>-0.4</i>	<i>-1.4</i>	<i>-4.4</i>	<i>-4.4</i>	<i>1.8</i>	<i>-2.7</i>	<i>-3.3</i>

\*Average annual change since 1990.

GDP: Statistics Canada - Table 384-0002 - Expenditure-based, annual, chained (Billions)

Annual Change: Implies change over previous calendar year.

Fluctuations in emission levels since 2005 are due primarily to changes in the mix of sources used for electricity production (coal use varied with demand and the availability of hydro and nuclear generation), changing emissions from fossil fuel production (as a result of the level of petroleum extraction activities), and varying demand for heating fuels for winters. Increases in areas such as Mining and Oil and Gas Extraction were offset by declines in emissions from Electricity and Heat Generation, as well as manufacturing. Although in 2008, GHG emissions stood at levels almost identical to 2005, the sharp decline in 2009 led to significant reductions in the period. The following are further details on the short-term trends and comparisons (refer also to Table 2).

- Between 2005 and 2009, there were large emission fluctuations from electricity and heat generation. Against a backdrop of increasing coal power usage in some areas, fossil fuel generation varied with the availability of electricity from hydro, nuclear and, to some extent, wind power sources. Hydroelectric power generation increased throughout Canada as a result of increased hydro-generating capacity and higher water levels. At the same time, efforts have been made in Ontario to decrease coal generation. These efforts were more successful in 2006 and 2008 than 2007, when some nuclear outages necessitated increased coal generation (and hence, emissions). In 2009, Canadian electricity GHG emissions shrank by 18 Mt (16%) from 2008 levels as demand fell and coal-fired generation dropped to its lowest level since 1990.
- Emissions from manufacturing<sup>2</sup> dropped by 17 Mt (15%) between 2005 and 2009, due to significantly lowered production evidenced by falling manufacturing GDP, particularly in last year of the period. In 2009 the value of exported Canadian industrial goods and machinery fell by about 30% compared to 2008.<sup>3</sup>
- The fossil fuel industries<sup>4</sup>, consisting of oil, gas and coal production, refining and transmission, showed an increase of about 4 Mt (2%) in GHG emissions between 2005 and 2009. This rise was fuelled by a 40% growth in emissions from oil sands activities, offset by 12% and 1% reductions in conventional oil production and natural gas production and processing, respectively. During the period, crude oil exports increased, driven by increasing demand for bitumen and synthetic crude in the U.S. Although net GHG growth over the '05 to '09 period was positive, emissions from this sector fell in 2009 as compared to 2008.
- Between 2005 and 2009, transportation (not including pipelines) GHG emissions rose by less than one Mt. This is in contrast to the long term, high growth trend for this sector. In fact, emissions fell by about 5 Mt between 2008 and 2009. Most of this drop occurred in diesel transport. Emissions from both heavy duty diesel on-road vehicles for shipping, and off-road vehicles (for industry) fell, primarily a result of reduced economic activity.

2. Manufacturing includes the Manufacturing Industries subsector (*Energy Sector*) and the Industrial Processes Sector

3. Statistics Canada, CANSIM Table 228-0056

4. Fossil fuel industries comprise the sum of the Mining and Oil and Gas Extraction, Fossil Fuel Production and Refining, Pipelines (Transportation) and Fugitive releases.

## Long-Term Trends and Comparisons by Sector: 1990–2009

Between 1990 and 2009, the net increase in Canada's annual GHG emissions totaled about 100 Mt (table 2 provides a breakdown by sector). While the long-term trend has shown an overall increase of almost 17% since 1990, the trend in more recent years (starting in 2000) demonstrates a decline in the rate of increase (even ignoring the 2009, economic recession year). From 1990 to 2000 the average annual growth in emissions was 2.1%, while in contrast, between 2000 and 2008, the average annual emission growth was 0.3%.

The change in the rate of growth in emissions since 2000 can be attributed to:

- Increases in efficiency, modernization of industrial processes, and structural changes in the composition of the economy, which are long term trends that have had an increased impact on emissions since the late 1990s.
  - The structural changes have involved a move from an industrial-oriented economy to a more service-based economy. Between 2000 and 2008, the GDP of the service industries rose by 28%, while heavy industries and manufacturing together grew by only 3%. Since service industries have a much lower economic GHG intensity than that of the goods-producing industries, this ongoing change has lowered Canadian GHG emissions.
  - Together, efficiency increases and technological and structural changes have resulted in a continuing weakening of the link between GDP growth and emissions, so that the GHG intensity of the economy (that is, GHG emissions per \$ GDP) has decreased on average by 2.2% per year since 1996 (see Figure 2). This has allowed the economy to grow much more rapidly than emissions.
- Leveling off of emissions from electric power generation, which had been rising rapidly until then. In 2000, coal generation was at or close to its highest level ever. Since then, the contribution of coal generation to the electricity supply mix has been declining.
- Production of conventional oil peaked in 1998 in Canada and gas production leveled off in 2002. In both cases, this was the result of limited conventional reserves. More recently, conventional oil and natural gas production has fallen, which has offset the impact of oil sands growth.


Returning to the overall long term greenhouse gas emission trend from 1990 to 2009, there are a number of factors which have contributed to the noted growth.

- Between 1990 and 2009, major increases in oil and gas production (much of it for export), as well a large increase in the number of motor vehicles and greater amounts of fossil fuel-based electricity generation, have resulted in a significant rise in GHG emissions. The growth in emissions since 1990 largely mirrors an increase in primary energy use, although emissions per unit of energy consumed fell slightly (Figure 2).
- Over this period, emissions from the energy industries<sup>5</sup> and transportation areas rose by about 106 Mt, accounting for most of the overall increase. Within these two energy areas, the greatest contributors to the overall increase were the 104% increase from light-duty gasoline trucks, the 24% increase from fossil fuel production and refining, and the 91% increase from heavy-duty diesel vehicles. Much of the increase in fossil fuel production is attributable to the rapid growth in crude oil and natural gas exports to the United States over the period.
- The Industrial Processes, Agriculture and Waste Sectors contributed to changes in emissions levels; they showed a 10.4 Mt decrease, a 9.0 Mt increase and a 2.5 Mt increase, respectively, since 1990.

---

<sup>5</sup> Energy Industries comprise: the fossil fuel Fossil Fuel Production and Refining Subsectors (Energy Sector) and the Electricity and Heat Generation subsector (Energy).

**Figure 2: Key GHG Emission Indicators**



Populations: Statistics Canada publication: Catalogue no. 91-215-X Annual Demographic Estimates: Canada, Provinces and Territories - 2009 and 2010  
 Energy Use: Statistics Canada - <http://www40.statcan.gc.ca/101/cst01/prim71-eng.htm>, Feb 8, 2011

## Energy Sector

- As indicated earlier, emissions from the energy industries rose by 106 Mt between 1990 and 2009. Over half of that increase (about 55 Mt) was from the fossil fuels industries, a product of the increase in oil and gas production over the period. The remainder of the increase in the energy industries (6 Mt) was from the Electricity and Heat Generation subsector.
- Emissions from the Mining and Oil and Gas Extraction subsector rose by 25 Mt or about 370% since 1990. While this subsector does include emissions from coal, metals and minerals mining, a rapidly increasing proportion of these emissions are from activities associated with Canada's oil sands.
- The Fugitive Sources subsector (e.g. venting and flaring from oil production, methane leaks from pipelines) contributed significantly to GHG emissions. The current estimates show an increase of about 19 Mt between 1990 and 2009, a growth of 44%. Much of this increase was the result of higher crude oil and natural gas exports. Since about 2000, though, when natural gas and conventional oil production peaked, fugitive emission growth has flattened.

## Transportation Subsector

- Emissions in the Transportation subsector rose by about 44 Mt, or 30% from 1990 to 2009. Of particular note in this sector is a 21 Mt-increase (almost 104%) in the emissions from light-duty gasoline trucks, reflecting the growing popularity of sport utility vehicles.
- Emissions from heavy-duty diesel vehicles increased by about 18 Mt over the period, indicative of greater heavy-truck transport. Offsetting these increases were reductions of 4.1 Mt from gasoline-fuelled cars and 1.4 Mt from alternatively fuelled cars.

## Residential Subsector

- Residential emissions were less in 2009 than they were in 1990 (down 6.5% or 2.8 Mt). The impact of the long-term trend of improved energy standards for homes and the adoption of higher-efficiency furnaces and other improved appliances has served to reduce emissions.

## Industrial Processes Sector

- Emissions in the Industrial Processes Sector decreased 10.4 Mt, or 18.4%, from 1990 to 2009. Some activities within this group did show significant emission increases including ammonia manufacturing and the use of HFCs (substitutes for ozone-depleting substances) in refrigeration and air conditioning (where GHG growth was over 5 Mt). However, there were significant reductions that more than made up for the increases.
- Emission reductions occurred in the chemical, aluminum, and steel subsectors. A variety of factors have been at play here, such as more effective emission control measures taken on by the aluminium and chemical industries, and the increased use of re-cycled steel in steel manufacturing. The overall reduction in the manufacturing output for all three subsectors was another factor.

## Agriculture Sector

- The Agriculture Sector consists exclusively of emissions of CH<sub>4</sub> and N<sub>2</sub>O from agricultural production systems. In 2009, it represented 8.1% of total national emissions. Emissions from this sector have increased by 19% (9.0 Mt) since 1990, accounting for 9% of the national trend. The main drivers of the emission trend in the Agriculture Sector are the expansion of the beef cattle and swine populations, and increases in the application of synthetic nitrogen fertilizer in the Prairies. These were partially offset by a significant reduction of the dairy population, itself explained by higher rates of milk production per animal while total milk production is set to meet national demand.
- There has been little change in overall emissions from the Agriculture Sector since 2005, because the effects of higher consumption of synthetic nitrogen fertilizers and crop production were offset by a recent decline in beef cattle population.

## Waste Sector

- From 1990 to 2009, GHG emissions from the Waste Sector increased by about 2.5 Mt, or 13.1%—lower than the population growth of approximately 22%. The vast majority of this growth is due to the generation of increasing amounts of waste in landfills. This increase would have been larger but for the implementation of landfill gas recovery projects and waste diversion programs (composting and recycling) in Canada.


## Land Use, Land-Use Change and Forestry Sector (not included in national totals)

- The trend in emissions from sources and removals by sinks in Land Use, Land-Use Change and Forestry (LULUCF) (i.e., agricultural soils, managed forests, managed wetlands and land-use change) shows that the whole sector can either be a net sink (removing CO<sub>2</sub> from the atmosphere) or a net source of GHGs to the atmosphere. In 2009, the LULUCF sector amounted to a net sink of 12 Mt. Trends in the sector are primarily driven by changes occurring in managed forests and cropland.
- Net fluxes in managed forests reflect the erratic pattern of forest fires, the trends in management activities such as harvest, and the long-term impact of major forest infestations like the mountain pine beetle in British Columbia. For the second consecutive year since 2001 and the beginning of the mountain pine beetle infestation, managed forests acted as net sinks in 2009 (17 Mt), due to the combined effect of reduced harvest rates, lower than anticipated insect outbreak activity, and low fire activity in 2008 and 2009.
- The cropland category includes the effect of agricultural practices on the carbon balance of arable soils (soils suitable for growing crops) and the impact of converting forest and grassland to cropland. In 2009, carbon sequestration in arable soils more than made up for emissions from lands converted to cropland with, as a result, a net sink of 6.9 Mt. The continued adoption of no-till and reduced-tillage practices and the reduction of summer fallow have resulted in a steadily increasing ability of cultivated soils to behave like sinks.
- Forest land converted to cropland, wetlands and settlements (not shown in the summary table) amount to emissions of about 19 Mt in 2009, down from 26 Mt in 1990. The conversion of forest and grassland to cropland alone shows a steady decrease in GHG emissions from 13 Mt in 1990 to 7.3 Mt in 2009.
- This year includes the second reporting of Land Use, Land Use Change and Forestry activities under articles 3.3 and 3.4 of the Kyoto Protocol, with emission and removal estimates for afforestation and deforestation (mandatory), and cropland management (elected by Canada) for the years 2008 and 2009. These estimates do not affect the national totals, and will only be accounted for at the end of the five-year commitment period (2012 inventory year).

## Provincial Comparisons: 1990–2009

GHG emissions are not distributed evenly across Canada (see Figure 3). In 2009, the combined emissions from Alberta and Ontario contributed almost 58% (33.8% and 23.9%, respectively) to the national total of 690 Mt. Other significant contributors in 2009 were Quebec (11.8%), Saskatchewan (10.6%) and B.C. (9.2%). On a per capita basis, Yukon had the lowest per capita emissions, (9.4 t/person), followed by Nunavut (10.2), Quebec (10.4), Ontario (12.6) and PEI (13.4). Saskatchewan had the highest per capita emissions (71.0) followed by Alberta (63.6) and North-West Territories (28.2). The Canadian average was 20.5 t/person in 2009.

Figure 3: Emissions by Province 1990, 2008, 2009



Regional factors play a significant role in per capita emissions since energy supply and demand are coupled with population, resource availability and/or industry and travel patterns. For example, Quebec is Canada's second most populous province and has significant hydro (and wind) power generation, which are non-GHG emitting electrical energy sources. As such, industrial and residential consumption of electricity and seasonal heating and cooling have minimal impact on GHG emissions. Saskatchewan and Alberta however, have low cost, local sources of fossil energy (coal, natural gas and oil) which act as the main supply to serve demand by both the industrial and residential sectors. In general, provinces with significant non-GHG emitting electricity sources tend to have lower per capita emissions, since hydro has an economic advantage over fossil fuels and no associated GHG emissions.



Table 2: Sectoral GHG Emission Summary

Source Categories	1990	2005	2008	2009	2008 to 2009		2005 to 2009	
					Change		Change	
					Absolute	%	Absolute	%
TOTAL <sup>1</sup>	590,000	731,000	732,000	690,000	-41,687	-5.7	-41,398	-5.7
<b>ENERGY</b>	<b>468,000</b>	<b>595,000</b>	<b>597,000</b>	<b>566,000</b>	<b>-31,111</b>	<b>-5.2</b>	<b>-28,813</b>	<b>-4.8</b>
<b>a. Stationary Combustion Sources</b>	<b>279,000</b>	<b>339,000</b>	<b>339,000</b>	<b>315,000</b>	<b>-23,461</b>	<b>-6.9</b>	<b>-23,456</b>	<b>-6.9</b>
Electricity and Heat Generation	92,000	123,000	116,000	98,000	-18,367	-15.8	-24,966	-20.3
Fossil Fuel Production and Refining	51,000	66,000	69,000	64,000	-5,527	-8.0	-2,759	-4.2
Mining & Oil and Gas Extraction	6,700	18,600	27,600	31,300	3,686	13.3	12,699	68.3
Manufacturing Industries	56,000	48,800	43,700	42,600	-1,166	-2.7	-6,249	-12.8
Construction	1,870	1,360	1,260	1,080	-183	-14.5	-282	-20.7
Commercial & Institutional	25,700	36,700	35,200	36,000	843	2.4	-639	-1.7
Residential	43,000	42,000	43,000	41,000	-2,545	-5.9	-1,343	-3.2
Agriculture & Forestry	2,390	1,970	2,260	2,050	-202	-8.9	85	4.3
<b>b. Transport</b>	<b>146,000</b>	<b>193,000</b>	<b>196,000</b>	<b>190,000</b>	<b>-6,057</b>	<b>-3.1</b>	<b>-2,923</b>	<b>-1.5</b>
Civil Aviation (Domestic Aviation)	7,200	7,700	7,800	7,200	-617	-7.9	-523	-6.8
Road Transportation	97,000	130,000	132,000	131,000	-660	-0.5	1,369	1.1
Light-Duty Gasoline Vehicles	45,500	40,000	39,700	41,400	1,658	4.2	1,404	3.5
Light-Duty Gasoline Trucks	20,300	42,500	42,600	41,300	-1,265	-3.0	-1,163	-2.7
Heavy-Duty Gasoline Vehicles	7,440	6,540	6,840	6,990	148	2.2	446	6.8
Motorcycles	152	254	264	245	-19	-7.2	-9	-3.5
Light-Duty Diesel Vehicles	469	574	652	663	11	1.7	89	15.6
Light-Duty Diesel Trucks	700	1,930	2,020	1,940	-82	-4.1	11	0.6
Heavy-Duty Diesel Vehicles	20,000	37,640	39,180	38,170	-1,016	-2.6	531	1.4
Propane & Natural Gas Vehicles	2,210	720	880	780	-95	-10.8	59	8.2
Railways	7,000	6,000	7,000	7,000	-234	-3.3	712	11.5
Navigation (Domestic Marine)	5,000	6,400	5,900	5,100	-800	-13.6	-1,377	-21.4
Other Transportation	30,000	43,000	43,000	40,000	-3,747	-8.7	-3,104	-7.3
Off-Road Gasoline	7,800	8,300	7,400	7,600	187	2.5	-648	-7.8
Off-Road Diesel	16,000	24,000	28,000	26,000	-2,793	-9.8	1,293	5.3
Pipelines	6,850	10,070	7,460	6,320	-1,140	-15.3	-3,749	-37.2
<b>c. Fugitive Sources</b>	<b>42,100</b>	<b>63,100</b>	<b>62,300</b>	<b>60,700</b>	<b>-1,593</b>	<b>-2.6</b>	<b>-2,434</b>	<b>-3.9</b>
Coal Mining	1,900	700	800	700	-45	-5.9	-16	-2.3
Oil and Natural Gas	40,200	62,400	61,500	60,000	-1,548	-2.5	-2,418	-3.9
Oil	4,190	5,650	5,550	5,530	-13	-0.2	-118	-2.1
Natural Gas	11,400	19,200	19,700	19,400	-351	-1.8	229	1.2
Venting	20,200	32,100	30,700	28,700	-2,062	-6.7	-3,414	-10.6
Flaring	4,400	5,500	5,500	6,400	878	15.9	885	16.1
<b>INDUSTRIAL PROCESSES</b>	<b>56,800</b>	<b>57,200</b>	<b>54,500</b>	<b>46,300</b>	<b>-8,192</b>	<b>-15.0</b>	<b>-10,892</b>	<b>-19.0</b>
<b>a. Mineral Products</b>	<b>8,300</b>	<b>9,500</b>	<b>8,600</b>	<b>6,800</b>	<b>-1,876</b>	<b>-21.7</b>	<b>-2,710</b>	<b>-28.6</b>
<b>b. Chemical Industry</b>	<b>16,800</b>	<b>10,300</b>	<b>10,400</b>	<b>8,100</b>	<b>-2,317</b>	<b>-22.3</b>	<b>-2,223</b>	<b>-21.6</b>
<b>c. Metal Production</b>	<b>22,600</b>	<b>19,600</b>	<b>18,500</b>	<b>15,000</b>	<b>-3,423</b>	<b>-18.5</b>	<b>-4,539</b>	<b>-23.2</b>
<b>d. Production and Consumption of Halocarbons and SF<sub>6</sub></b>	<b>1,000</b>	<b>5,400</b>	<b>5,700</b>	<b>7,000</b>	<b>1,262</b>	<b>22.1</b>	<b>1,572</b>	<b>29.1</b>
<b>e. Other &amp; Undifferentiated Production</b>	<b>8,000</b>	<b>12,000</b>	<b>11,000</b>	<b>9,000</b>	<b>-1,839</b>	<b>-16.3</b>	<b>-2,992</b>	<b>-24.1</b>
<b>SOLVENT &amp; OTHER PRODUCT USE</b>	<b>180</b>	<b>180</b>	<b>340</b>	<b>260</b>	<b>-80</b>	<b>-23.6</b>	<b>78</b>	<b>42.4</b>
<b>AGRICULTURE</b>	<b>47,000</b>	<b>58,000</b>	<b>58,000</b>	<b>56,000</b>	<b>-2,526</b>	<b>-4.3</b>	<b>-2,076</b>	<b>-3.6</b>
<b>a. Enteric Fermentation</b>	<b>16,000</b>	<b>22,000</b>	<b>20,000</b>	<b>19,000</b>	<b>-930</b>	<b>-4.6</b>	<b>-2,635</b>	<b>-12.0</b>
<b>b. Manure Management</b>	<b>5,700</b>	<b>7,500</b>	<b>6,800</b>	<b>6,600</b>	<b>-282</b>	<b>-4.1</b>	<b>-897</b>	<b>-12.0</b>
<b>c. Agriculture Soils</b>	<b>25,000</b>	<b>28,000</b>	<b>31,000</b>	<b>30,000</b>	<b>-1,314</b>	<b>-4.2</b>	<b>1,452</b>	<b>5.1</b>
<b>d. Field Burning of Agricultural Residues</b>	<b>210</b>	<b>40</b>	<b>50</b>	<b>40</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>-0.5</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>9.7</b>
<b>WASTE</b>	<b>19,000</b>	<b>21,000</b>	<b>21,000</b>	<b>22,000</b>	<b>223</b>	<b>1.0</b>	<b>305</b>	<b>1.4</b>
<b>a. Solid Waste Disposal on Land</b>	<b>18,000</b>	<b>20,000</b>	<b>20,000</b>	<b>20,000</b>	<b>212</b>	<b>1.1</b>	<b>252</b>	<b>1.3</b>
<b>b. Wastewater Handling</b>	<b>780</b>	<b>980</b>	<b>1,000</b>	<b>1,010</b>	<b>7</b>	<b>0.7</b>	<b>33</b>	<b>3.4</b>
<b>c. Waste Incineration</b>	<b>400</b>	<b>240</b>	<b>250</b>	<b>260</b>	<b>5</b>	<b>1.9</b>	<b>20</b>	<b>8.5</b>
<b>Land Use, Land-use Change and Forestry</b>	<b>-67,000</b>	<b>54,000</b>	<b>-17,000</b>	<b>-12,000</b>	<b>4,848</b>	<b>-28.6</b>	<b>-65,633</b>	<b>-122.6</b>
<b>a. Forest Land</b>	<b>-93,000</b>	<b>46,000</b>	<b>-22,000</b>	<b>-17,000</b>	<b>5,568</b>	<b>-25.2</b>	<b>-62,502</b>	<b>-136.0</b>
<b>b. Cropland</b>	<b>11,300</b>	<b>-4,300</b>	<b>-6,300</b>	<b>-6,900</b>	<b>-644</b>	<b>10.3</b>	<b>-2,577</b>	<b>59.6</b>
<b>c. Grassland</b>	<b>-</b>	<b>-</b>	<b>-</b>	<b>-</b>	<b>NA</b>	<b>NA</b>	<b>NA</b>	<b>NA</b>
<b>d. Wetlands</b>	<b>5,000</b>	<b>3,000</b>	<b>3,000</b>	<b>2,000</b>	<b>-105</b>	<b>-4.1</b>	<b>-492</b>	<b>-16.6</b>
<b>e. Settlements</b>	<b>9,000</b>	<b>9,000</b>	<b>9,000</b>	<b>9,000</b>	<b>29</b>	<b>0.3</b>	<b>-63</b>	<b>-0.7</b>
<b>LAND USE, LAND-USE CHANGE AND FORESTRY</b>								
<b>Activities under the Kyoto Protocol</b>								
<b>a. Article 3.3</b>								
Afforestation / reforestation	NA	NA	-1,000	-1,000	-59	8.0	NA	NA
Deforestation	NA	NA	15,000	15,000	166	1.1	NA	NA
<b>b. Article 3.4</b>								
Cropland Management	4,000	NA	-12,000	-12,000	-673	5.7	NA	NA

Notes:

NA = Not Applicable

1. National totals exclude all GHGs from the Land Use, Land-use Change and Forestry Sector.

2. Absolute and percent changes shown are based on UNROUNDED values.

3. Due to rounding, totals may not add up.

Red text identifies an INCREASE  
Green text identifies a DECREASE



---

**COMPLIANCE COMMITTEE**

**CC/ERT/2011/25  
10 November 2011**

**Report of the in-depth review of the fifth national communication  
of Canada**

**Note by the secretariat**

The report of the in-depth review of the fifth national communication of Canada was published on 10 November 2011. For purposes of rule 10, paragraph 2, of the rules of procedure of the Compliance Committee (annex to decision 4/CMP.2, as amended by decision 4/CMP.4), the report is considered received by the secretariat on the same date. This report, FCCC/IDR.5/CAN, contained in the annex to this note, is being forwarded to the Compliance Committee in accordance with section VI, paragraph 3, of the annex to decision 27/CMP.1.

**Page(s) 000314 to\à 000351**

**Page(s) 000314 to\à 000351  
est(sont) exclue(s) en vertu de(s)(l')article(s)**

**68(a)**

**of the Access to Information Act  
de la Loi sur l'accès à l'information**

**Joint Statement Issued at the Conclusion of the Ninth BASIC  
Ministerial Meeting on Climate Change  
Beijing, China, 1 November 2011**

1. The Ninth BASIC Ministerial Meeting on Climate Change was held in Beijing, China from 31 October to 1 November 2011. H.E. Mr. Xie Zhenhua, Vice Chairman of the National Development and Reform Commission of China, H.E. Mr. Liu Zhenmin, Assistant Minister of Foreign Affairs of China, H.E. Mr. Francisco Gaetani, Deputy Minister of Environment of Brazil, H.E. Ms. Jayanthi Natarajan, Minister of State (Independent Charge), Environment and Forests of India, and H.E. Ms. Bomo Edna Edith Molewa, Minister of Water and Environment Affairs of South Africa, as well as H.E. Ms. Maite Nkoana-Mashabane, Minister of International Relations and Cooperation in her capacity as the incoming COP president attended the meeting. In line with BASIC-plus approach, representatives of Argentina (as chair of the G77 and China), Egypt (as representative of the Arab Group) and Grenada (as chair of Alliance of Small Island States) were invited and participated in the meeting as observers.

2. The BASIC ministers reaffirmed their continued full support to the government of South Africa to make Durban Conference a success in an open, transparent, inclusive and party-driven process. They agreed that Durban should achieve a comprehensive, fair and balanced outcome to enable the full, effective and sustained implementation of the Convention and its Kyoto Protocol, in accordance with the principles of equity and common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities, and fulfilling the mandate of Bali Roadmap in the two-track process of negotiation. Ministers emphasized the need to implement the Cancun decisions as well as to address the unresolved issues from the Bali Roadmap. They called upon the Conference to clearly establish the second commitment period under the Kyoto Protocol where the developed country parties to the Kyoto Protocol shall undertake quantified emission reduction commitments. They called for the Durban Conference to accomplish the Bali Action Plan where developed country parties that are not Parties to the Kyoto Protocol to undertake comparable quantified emission reduction commitments under the Convention and for developing country parties to implement enhanced mitigation actions in the context of sustainable development and enabled and supported by finance, technology and capacity building. Ministers stressed the need for early and effective operationalisation of the procedures and mechanisms for adaptation, finance, technology transfer, capacity building and transparency.

3. Ministers emphasized that the Kyoto Protocol is the cornerstone of the climate regime and its second commitment period is the essential priority for the success of Durban Conference. Ministers underlined that the continuation of the flexibility mechanisms of the Kyoto Protocol is contingent upon the establishment of quantified emissions reduction commitments by Annex I Parties under the second commitment period. Ministers reiterated their support to work towards

the perspective of a comprehensive, ambitious and fair outcome, ensuring the full, effective and sustained implementation of UNFCCC and its Kyoto Protocol.

4. Noting that while sustainable development and poverty eradication remain urgent challenges and overriding priorities for them, the developing countries, in particular the BASIC countries have pledged ambitious actions to reduce emissions at substantial cost to their economies. Ministers called upon the developed country parties to rise up to their historical responsibilities and undertake ambitious and robust mitigation commitments consistent with science and in accordance with the principles of equity and common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities. Ministers recalled the robust contribution already offered by many developing countries in emission reductions by which these countries have become the active leaders of the global effort against climate change. This has come about despite the responsibility, established under the Convention, that developed countries “take the lead”.

5. Ministers recalled that parties were working under the mandate of the Bali Roadmap to agree on a second commitment period under the Kyoto Protocol and to enable the full, effective and sustained implementation of the Convention through long-term cooperative action, now, up to and beyond 2012 and reaffirmed the need to focus on this mandate.

6. In this connection, they stressed that deliberations and discussions for the further implementation of the Convention beyond 2020 must be firmly based on the principles and provisions of the Convention and consistent with the latest findings of science as per the forthcoming 5th Assessment Report of the Inter-Governmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC). In this context, they noted the importance of the Review process which is to be completed by 2015.

7. Ministers reaffirmed that any outcome on shared vision needs to be firmly based on the principles of equity and common but differentiated responsibilities.

8. Ministers underscored that financing is one of the pressing priorities at the Durban Conference. Ministers welcomed the work of the Transitional Committee and envisaged the consideration and approval of its draft report by the COP. Ministers agreed that the Durban Conference should decide to initiate the operationalisation of the Green Climate Fund with accountability to and under the guidance of COP, ensuring adequate financial support for developing countries. Therefore, they urged developed countries to capitalize the Green Climate Fund from their public financial resources as soon as possible.

9. Ministers were of the view that developed countries should fulfill their commitment of providing US\$ 30 billion as fast start funding, ensuring new and additional funding and transparent information of its performance. Ministers reiterated the importance of ensuring the accounting of finance on the fast start funding is transparent, measurable, reportable and verifiable. They requested developed countries to submit information on the fast start funding to the UNFCCC secretariat in a common and comparable format to strengthen mutual trust between developed and developing countries. This could serve as the first step in more accurate reporting on long-term financing, generating information to assess progress towards the collective financial commitments by Annex I Parties.

10. Ministers urged developed countries to honor their commitment to provide US\$100 billion per year by 2020 in a predictable manner with specific measures and clear roadmap to be adopted in Durban, ensuring that there is no funding gap from 2013 to 2020. This funding should mainly come from public financial resource and private and other alternative resources of funding should only be supplementary.

11. Ministers emphasized that adaptation is the most urgent task in developing countries and supported the African Group's position on prioritizing this issue in Durban. They called for immediate operationalisation of the Adaptation Committee, which should contribute to adaptation policy development and implementation of adaptation actions in developing countries following the requests of developing countries and respecting a country-driven approach. Ministers highlighted that the Adaptation Committee should establish effective links with the finance and technology mechanisms to support adaptation actions for all developing countries, particularly SIDs, LDCs and Africa.

12. Ministers welcomed with appreciation the functioning of the Technology Executive Committee and the progress on the set-up of the Technology Centre and Network. They urged a clear definition of the relationship between the two bodies and the link between the technology mechanism and the finance mechanism. Ministers highlighted the need to address the IPR issue properly and the early operation of the technology mechanism to advance climate-friendly technology transfer to developing countries.

13. Ministers stressed that the Review must be conducted in accordance with the principles and provisions of the Convention itself. They stressed that the Review must include a review of the adequacy of global temperature goal and effectiveness of ambitious quantified emission reduction commitments by Annex I Parties and the provision of finance and technology support by developed countries to enable developing countries to implement enhanced mitigation and adaptation actions under the UNFCCC.

14. Ministers underlined the importance of the Indian proposal to include the issues of equity, trade and intellectual property right (IPR) in the provisional agenda of the COP17. They agreed that discussions on these important issues which are crucial to many developing countries, would contribute to a comprehensive and balanced outcome at Durban.

15. Ministers emphasized the need to address emissions from international aviation and maritime transport in a multilateral context and in accordance with the principle of common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities. They highlighted that unilateral measures on climate change, such as the inclusion of emissions from international aviation in the EU-ETS, would violate the principles and provisions of the Convention and jeopardize the effort of international cooperation in addressing climate change.

16. Ministers received reports on the progress made by the BASIC experts group on Equitable Access to Sustainable Development and supported the publication of the paper as a contribution to the scientific body of knowledge. They also received reports on common accounting rules for emission reductions by Annex I Parties, lower carbon development strategies and common reporting format for accounting of finance by Annex I Parties. Ministers considered their work would usefully inform the negotiations under the Bali Roadmap. Ministers decided that the BASIC experts group would continue to meet in parallel with BASIC ministerial meetings.

17. Ministers stressed their dedication towards consolidating and strengthening the unity of G77 and China and decided to continue to enhance transparency and inclusiveness through the BASIC-plus approach. Ministers appreciated the role played by South Africa as the incoming Presidency and its efforts to achieve a successful outcome in Durban. They reaffirm their determination to work with all parties to Save Tomorrow Today.

18. Ministers welcomed the offer of India to host the Tenth BASIC Ministerial Meeting on Climate Change in the first quarter of 2012.

## **DECLARATION OF THE LEADERS THE MAJOR ECONOMIES FORUM ON ENERGY AND CLIMATE**

We, the leaders of Australia, Brazil, Canada, China, the European Union, France, Germany, India, Indonesia, Italy, Japan, the Republic of Korea, Mexico, Russia, South Africa, the United Kingdom, and the United States met as the Major Economies Forum on Energy and Climate in L'Aquila, Italy, on July 9, 2009, and declare as follows:

Climate change is one of the greatest challenges of our time. As leaders of the world's major economies, both developed and developing, we intend to respond vigorously to this challenge, being convinced that climate change poses a clear danger requiring an extraordinary global response, that the response should respect the priority of economic and social development of developing countries, that moving to a low-carbon economy is an opportunity to promote continued economic growth and sustainable development, that the need for and deployment of transformational clean energy technologies at lowest possible cost are urgent, and that the response must involve balanced attention to mitigation and adaptation.

We reaffirm the objective, provisions and principles of the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change. Recalling the Major Economies Declaration adopted in Toyako, Japan, in July 2008, and taking full account of decisions taken in Bali, Indonesia, in December 2007, we resolve to spare no effort to reach agreement in Copenhagen, with each other and with the other Parties, to further implementation of the Convention.

Our vision for future cooperation on climate change, consistent with equity and our common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities, includes the following:



## **1. Consistent with the Convention's objective and science:**

Our countries will undertake transparent nationally appropriate mitigation actions, subject to applicable measurement, reporting, and verification, and prepare low-carbon growth plans. Developed countries among us will take the lead by promptly undertaking robust aggregate and individual reductions in the midterm consistent with our respective ambitious long-term objectives and will work together before Copenhagen to achieve a strong result in this regard. Developing countries among us will promptly undertake actions whose projected effects on emissions represent a meaningful deviation from business as usual in the midterm, in the context of sustainable development, supported by financing, technology, and capacity-building. The peaking of global and national emissions should take place as soon as possible, recognizing that the timeframe for peaking will be longer in developing countries, bearing in mind that social and economic development and poverty eradication are the first and overriding priorities in developing countries and that low-carbon development is indispensable to sustainable development. We recognize the scientific view that the increase in global average temperature above pre-industrial levels ought not to exceed 2 degrees C. In this regard and in the context of the ultimate objective of the Convention and the Bali Action Plan, we will work between now and Copenhagen, with each other and under the Convention, to identify a global goal for substantially reducing global emissions by 2050. Progress toward the global goal would be regularly reviewed, noting the importance of frequent, comprehensive, and accurate inventories.

We will take steps nationally and internationally, including under the Convention, to reduce emissions from deforestation and forest degradation and to enhance removals of greenhouse gas emissions by forests, including providing enhanced support to developing countries for such purposes.

2. Adaptation to the adverse effects of climate change is essential. Such effects are already taking place. Further, while increased mitigation efforts will reduce climate impacts, even the most aggressive mitigation

efforts will not eliminate the need for substantial adaptation, particularly in developing countries which will be disproportionately affected. There is a particular and immediate need to assist the poorest and most vulnerable to adapt to such effects. Not only are they most affected but they have contributed the least to the build up of greenhouse gases in the atmosphere. Further support will need to be mobilized, should be based on need, and will include resources additional to existing financial assistance. We will work together to develop, disseminate, and transfer, as appropriate, technologies that advance adaptation efforts.

3. We are establishing a Global Partnership to drive transformational low-carbon, climate-friendly technologies. We will dramatically increase and coordinate public sector investments in research, development, and demonstration of these technologies, with a view to doubling such investments by 2015, while recognizing the importance of private investment, public-private partnerships and international cooperation, including regional innovation centers. Drawing on global best practice policies, we undertake to remove barriers, establish incentives, enhance capacity-building, and implement appropriate measures to aggressively accelerate deployment and transfer of key existing and new low-carbon technologies, in accordance with national circumstances. We welcome the leadership of individual countries to spearhead efforts among interested countries to advance actions on technologies such as energy efficiency; solar energy; smart grids; carbon capture, use, and storage; advanced vehicles; high-efficiency and lower-emissions coal technologies; bio-energy; and other clean technologies. Lead countries will report by November 15, 2009, on action plans and roadmaps, and make recommendations for further progress. We will consider ideas for appropriate approaches and arrangements to promote technology development, deployment, and transfer.

4. Financial resources for mitigation and adaptation will need to be scaled up urgently and substantially and should involve mobilizing resources to support developing countries. Financing to address climate change will derive from multiple sources, including both public and private funds and carbon markets. Additional investment in developing countries should be mobilized, including by creating incentives for and

removing barriers to funding flows. Greater predictability of international support should be promoted. Financing of supported actions should be measurable, reportable, and verifiable. The expertise of existing institutions should be drawn upon, and such institutions should work in an inclusive way and should be made more responsive to developing country needs. Climate financing should complement efforts to promote development in accordance with national priorities and may include both program-based and project-based approaches. The governance of mechanisms disbursing funds should be transparent, fair, effective, efficient, and reflect balanced representation. Accountability in the use of resources should be ensured. An arrangement to match diverse funding needs and resources should be created, and utilize where appropriate, public and private expertise. We agreed to further consider proposals for the establishment of international funding arrangements, including the proposal by Mexico for a Green Fund.

5. Our countries will continue to work together constructively to strengthen the world's ability to combat climate change, including through the Major Economies Forum on Energy and Climate. In particular, our countries will continue meeting throughout the balance of this year in order to facilitate agreement in Copenhagen.

**Twelfth Meeting of the Leaders' Representatives of the  
Major Economies Forum on Energy and Climate  
Chair's Summary**

The twelfth Meeting at the Leaders' Representative level of the Major Economies Forum on Energy and Climate was held in Crystal City, Virginia, November 17 - 18, 2011. It was attended by ministers and officials from the seventeen major economies, as well as the United Nations, with Argentina, Barbados, Ecuador, New Zealand, Singapore, and Spain also participating in the session. Algeria and Mali were also invited. Minister Mashabane, speaking for the South African Presidency, emphasized the need for a balanced package in Durban that makes operational the Cancun agreements, which many participants also highlighted.

The MEF considered the distinct but related issues of potential second period commitments under the Kyoto Protocol, the form of the Cancun package through 2020, and the question of whether Durban should set forth expectations regarding, and a process and timeline towards developing, a post-2020 global approach. Regarding Kyoto, many emphasized the importance of continuing commitments beyond 2012, including in terms of public attention. "Middle ground" options were suggested regarding the legal form of such Kyoto commitments. Participants explained their need for mutual "reassurances" regarding the post-2020 period, including in relation to taking on a further Kyoto target. With respect to the period through 2020, it appeared unrealistic to change the legal form of Cancun targets and actions, but it was noted that this was a separate issue from the importance of promoting increased ambition. Concerning the post-2020 period, various elements relating to both substance and process were identified. Some were more comfortable characterizing the post-2020 period than others; also, some were more interested in beginning the process earlier than others, who preferred to wait until after the 2015 review. In general, there was significant emphasis on finding common ground in Durban and avoiding proposals that crossed other countries' redlines.

There was general agreement that the overriding objective of transparency is not to find fault in others, but to enhance understanding of each others' mitigation efforts to build confidence and share lessons learned. In that regard, Parties emphasized that the spirit in which IAR and ICA are conducted should be non-confrontational, non-intrusive, and respectful, and that the guidelines for the facilitative discussions under the SBI should take these principles into account. Participants felt that the guidelines for biennial reports, IAR and ICA should be agreed in Durban as part of a balanced package. There was broad agreement that reports should be submitted biennially including the information outlined in paragraph 64 of the Cancun text; these reports would be subsumed in the full national communications every four years, with separate updates in between. Some suggested that submission of first biennial reports in 2014 would constitute a key input to the 2013-15 Review. It was recognized that there is a need for provisions to allow for flexibility for other less capable developing countries, although there were diverging views on how to do this. Several Parties recognized the need to provide support to developing countries for preparation of biennial reports and that support for capacity building will also be critical.

There was strong support for making the Green Climate Fund operational as a crucial element of a balanced outcome in Durban. Many participants expressed concern about opening the draft

governing instrument contained in the TC report for negotiation at the COP, while some also noted a need to find a way to resolve remaining concerns. On long-term finance, there was a broad view that both public and private finance would be needed, and that they should play a complementary role, although participants had differing views on the relative importance of each. Several countries noted the ongoing work on long-term sources in other forums, including the G20, IMO, and ICAO. A number of developed countries discussed their ongoing fast start finance programs. Participants expressed the view that there should be no gap in funding after the conclusion of the fast start period.

There was broad agreement that mitigation efforts are at the core of our collective goal of keeping temperature rise below 2 degrees Celsius, and noted that while Parties remain committed to the mitigation efforts pledged in Copenhagen and anchored in Cancun, there is a need for greater ambition to reach our long-term goal. There was broad agreement on the need for a practical focus on domestic implementation of the 2020 pledges. Most participants emphasized the importance of transparency and clarity to build confidence in our pledges, though views varied on how a Durban outcome could reflect this. Several suggested that a template or other structured format for clarifying pledges could be a first step toward better understanding and enhancing our efforts, recognizing the commonalities and differences in approaches. Several also raised the need for a rules-based system to ensure environmental integrity, noting the important role of markets and the need for the multilateral system to evolve to accommodate a wider range of Parties as both developed and developing countries take action. Views diverged on the effectiveness and feasibility of applying a top-down accounting system, with some saying common rules should be based on Kyoto, and some highlighting that any accounting rules would need to apply to a wider set of Parties, including both developed and some developing countries.

There was a discussion of whether it would make sense to have a permanent home for the COP rather than rotating to a different venue every year. Participants also expressed various views on the substance of proposed new COP agenda items, but all felt that the proposals should not derail the adoption of the agenda.

In closing, the Chair suggested that the Major Economies Forum consider next year its broader mission to facilitate concrete action among this group to address climate change.

**Eleventh Meeting of the Leaders' Representatives of the  
Major Economies Forum on Energy and Climate  
Chair's Summary**

The eleventh Meeting at the Leaders' Representative level of the Major Economies Forum on Energy and Climate was held in Washington, D.C., September 16 - 17, 2011. It was attended by ministers and officials from the seventeen major economies, as well as the United Nations, with Barbados, Colombia, New Zealand, Singapore, and Spain also participating in the session. Argentina, Bangladesh, Democratic Republic of the Congo, and Egypt were also invited. Participants emphasized the importance of agreeing on a balanced package in Durban, and discussed in detail how to succeed in doing this.

UK Minister of State Greg Barker opened with a presentation on finance. Speaking of long-term finance, he emphasized the importance of public funding, not only in its own right but also to leverage private capital. He also noted the role of public policies in creating an enabling framework that can mobilize private finance at a scale sufficient to address climate change. There was general agreement on the need for funding to come from a variety of sources, with some noting that public funding will be more necessary for adaptation and in countries where climate finance has been limited. Some suggested that countries should focus on the details of how to invest funds in needed infrastructure in a wider range of developing countries, rather than on the narrow issue of whether finance is public or private. In this vein, participants discussed the need to reduce risk to make investments more attractive and thereby tap the large pools of available funding. There was also discussion of what makes funding "additional" in the private sector context and how to facilitate access to funding. With respect to fast start funding, participants underscored the importance of transparency in the disbursement of funds. Several raised a concern about a possible gap between fast start and long term finance. With respect to Durban, several finance-related issues are on the table; some noted the need for finance issues to move in parallel with other Durban issues, and there was a discussion of the appropriate timing, and purpose, of initial capitalization of the Green Climate Fund.

Participants had an extended, frank discussion about the Kyoto Protocol and the shape of future arrangements. Many commented on the utility of the open and detailed exchange of views afforded by the MEF. On the Kyoto Protocol, the discussion focused on whether certain Parties might take on a second period target and under what circumstances. In terms of future arrangements, there was a wide-ranging discussion about form (what do we mean by "legal," what do we mean by "parallelism," etc.), nature (top down, bottom up, etc.), ambition in relation to the two degree goal, evolution of the Annex I/Non-Annex I approach, and views on the existing legal framework, the Bali Action Plan, the Bali Road Map, etc. Some spoke of the next several years, for example up to 2020, as a "transitional" period.

Noting that countries are not expected to make new mitigation pledges in Durban, there was a discussion of how to build confidence in the mitigation pledges made in Copenhagen and anchored in Cancun. Some suggested that this was best accomplished by providing up front clarification of pledges in a structured manner, e.g., by specifying what gases and sectors are included, what methodologies are used to do inventories, and what assumptions and conditionalities apply. Some suggested that this clarification be applied to all Parties.

Recognizing that current mitigation pledges will not of themselves constrain temperature rise to two degrees, some participants suggested the need for a future process to address the gap.

The discussion on transparency reflected suggestions that: the approach should build on existing systems and structures; that the first reports would not be perfect; and that guidelines would evolve over time. Some expressed the expectation that all major economies would submit their communications by 2014 as a key input to the 2013-15 review. There was a recognition of the utility of this exercise for improving domestic capacity for MRV, and for building confidence and gaining understanding of progress and gaps. There were different views on the extent to which the nature of transparency for developed and developing countries should differ, and on the relationship between transparency provisions under development with existing approaches in the UNFCCC and the Kyoto Protocol.

In closing, the Chair suggested that the Major Economies Forum should recall its dual-mandate of helping to advance the negotiations, and to facilitate concrete action to cut emissions among this group – such as the cooperation on clean technology that led to the Clean Energy Ministerial – and noted recent interest in short-lived climate forcers.

**Tenth Meeting of the Leaders' Representatives of the  
Major Economies Forum on Energy and Climate  
Co-Chairs' Summary**

The tenth Meeting at the Leaders' Representative level of the Major Economies Forum on Energy and Climate was hosted by the European Commission in Brussels, Belgium, April 26 - 27, 2011. It was attended by ministers and officials from the seventeen major economies, as well as the United Nations, with Denmark, Egypt, Republic of Maldives, New Zealand, Poland, Singapore, Spain, and the UAE also participating in the session. Argentina, Barbados, Colombia, Democratic Republic of the Congo, and Ethiopia were invited. Participants discussed how to advance prospects for a successful outcome in Durban that is ambitious yet pragmatic, and provides opportunities for Africa.

Participants emphasized the importance of operationalizing in Durban the balanced package agreed in Cancun. In light of the significance, amount, and challenge of this work, many expressed concern about the pace of progress this year and emphasized their support for the present and incoming Presidencies to organize informal discussions in support of the negotiations. Countries welcomed South Africa's intention to put forward a schedule of informal meetings before the Bonn session in June. Unresolved issues (countries suggested issues such as: second commitment period of Kyoto, legal options, agriculture, bunkers, equity, the need for mitigation responsibilities to evolve, IPR, trade) also remain to be considered this year, noting that there are differences on many of those issues.

Several participants expressed the view that the mitigation workshops should be used to understand mitigation listings and the assumptions and conditions underlying them. Many participants expressed concern about the collective level of ambition and the need to stay on a pathway to two degrees. They underlined the importance of delivering operational transparency guidelines in Durban, and the need to deliver biennial reports by 2014. The value of making the technology mechanism and adaptation committee and work program operational in Durban was also emphasized.

Concerning finance, participants emphasized the importance of transparency in the distribution of fast start funding. Participants identified the need to mobilize all kinds of public and private finance, to consider innovative sources of long-term finance—including potentially through the G20—and to reduce fossil fuel subsidies. There was also the view that the Green Fund discussions and those in the Convention on mitigation and transparency are related and will need to move forward together in Durban.

There was an extensive discussion of "legal options" as set forth in Cancun. A point that ran through the discussion was that the issue requires more sophisticated and subtle analysis than a simple yes or no answer. Participants raised and considered a variety of issues.

While all participants agreed on the need for environmental integrity, there continue to be substantial differences concerning a second commitment period under the Kyoto Protocol. Some consider a second commitment period under the Kyoto Protocol important because it contains legally binding mitigation targets, because it is rule-based, or for other reasons. Some consider it an inappropriate legal vehicle for mitigation commitments, given that it covers only a small fraction of global emissions, and therefore does not lead to environmental integrity. Others are willing to move forward with the second commitment period under certain conditions, e.g., that it involves action from all major economies and is transitional en route to a global agreement.



**Ninth Meeting of the Leaders' Representatives of the  
Major Economies Forum on Energy and Climate  
Chair's Summary**

The Ninth Meeting at the Leaders' representative level of the Major Economies Forum on Energy and Climate took place in Crystal City, Virginia, November 17 - 18, 2010. It was attended by ministers and officials from the seventeen major economies, as well as the United Nations, with Barbados, Colombia, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Denmark, New Zealand, Singapore, and Spain also participating in the session. Bangladesh, Costa Rica, Ethiopia, and Yemen were invited but unable to attend. There was full support for concluding a package of decisions in Cancun, including among adaptation, mitigation, MRV/ICA, finance, and technology, and many participants included agreement on future Kyoto commitments in a Cancun package. Participants discussed how to advance each of these issues at the climate negotiations in Cancun. There was also discussion of the relationship between the Kyoto Protocol and LCA tracks.

On technology, participants noted that the Technology Mechanism to be established should consist of a Technology Executive Committee and a Clean Technology Center and Network. Participants discussed the functions of these bodies, their relationship to each other, to the COP, and to the Convention's financial mechanism. They also exchanged views on which aspects of the two bodies might be left for further discussion following Cancun, with a view to establishing the bodies at COP-17 in Durban.

Recognizing that the Cancun outcome is likely to take the form of one or more COP and CMP decisions, participants noted that such an outcome did not mean that a future legally binding outcome is "off the table." Participants held different views as to whether Cancun needed to expressly refer to a future legal outcome, noting, among other things, that there would be a concern if issues of "form" were to make it difficult to reach agreement on "substance."

Concerning finance, participants discussed three issues: fast start finance; a new Green Fund; and sources of long-term funding. With respect to the Fund, there were discussions about the desired features of such a Fund; about its status (i.e., its relationship to the COP); and the process that should be used to design it. Regarding sources of long-term funding, participants commented on the significance of the report of the Advisory Group on Climate Finance, with many suggesting that it would be useful to note the report in the Cancun outcome. Regarding fast start funding, it was considered whether the donors' commitment from the Copenhagen Accord should be noted in the Cancun outcome as part of a balanced package that reflects the other elements agreed in the Accord.

On adaptation, there was no disagreement that existing institutions should be strengthened, noting the inherent linkages between adaptation and development. There were different views on whether a new adaptation institution is needed, in part due to different views on what functions it would serve, including with respect to finance. Some participants spoke to the centrality of national actions and capacity building.

On MRV and ICA, many commented on the critical nature of this issue in the Copenhagen Accord and for the Cancun outcome. Much of the discussion revolved around a non paper put forward by Minister Ramesh of India, which proposed not only general principles but also suggestions regarding the scope and application of ICA, its purpose, frequency, and some detail as to how it would operate. Most considered that Cancun must set forth a greater level of detail than general principles, both given the importance of ICA and in light of overall balance with other elements. There was also discussion about a follow-on process, whether through a dedicated ad hoc committee, the LCA, or the SBI, aimed at agreeing on operational guidance in Durban. Several countries emphasized that a Cancun outcome would also need to include enhanced MRV for developed countries.

On mitigation, there was a full discussion of how to "anchor" submissions from the Copenhagen Accord in the Cancun outcome, as well as any additional submissions by other Parties and a subsequent process to consider them. Some noted that the aggregate effort is not sufficient in light of the long-term goal. Some stressed the importance of continuing the Kyoto Protocol alongside the LCA outcome; some suggested Parties could "anchor" in both places. Some suggested a "clarification" process to better understand pledges, such as their underlying assumptions. The importance and role of market mechanisms were also discussed.

**Eighth Meeting of the Leaders' Representatives of the  
Major Economies Forum on Energy and Climate  
Chair's Summary**

The eighth Meeting at the Leaders' representative level of the Major Economies Forum on Energy and Climate took place in New York City, September 20 - 21, 2010. It was attended by officials from the seventeen major economies, as well as the United Nations, with Barbados, Denmark, Egypt, Singapore, and Spain also participating in the session. Bangladesh, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Ethiopia, Grenada, Peru, the United Arab Emirates, and Yemen were invited but unable to attend. Participants discussed how to advance prospects for a successful outcome at the climate negotiations in Cancun.

Mexican Foreign Secretary Espinosa, the incoming COP President, emphasized in her opening remarks the importance of success in Cancun for the credibility of the multilateral system. She pressed participants to agree on a balanced package of decisions in Cancun, recognizing that it will not be possible to agree on all of the details there.

Participants agreed on the importance of making progress in Cancun and expressed concern about the pace of negotiations. Support was expressed for concluding a balanced package of decisions in Cancun, potentially including adaptation, mitigation/REDD+, MRV/ICA, finance, and technology, recognizing that there are different views about exactly what constitutes "balance." With respect to the breadth and depth of decisions, many suggested that they should be "comprehensive but not necessarily exhaustive." It was also noted that, for more difficult issues, Cancun might decide on the follow-up work to be undertaken issue-by-issue. In general, it was considered that, in order to maintain political balance, issues should make progress at the same pace. Some recalled the "Grand Bargain" reached among Leaders in the Copenhagen Accord and the importance of reflecting such a bargain in decisions.

Participants considered whether plurilateral approaches might be viable, recalling that they are used in other multilateral fora. It was noted that plurilateral approaches might, e.g., implement an existing multilateral agreement, or feed into multilateral negotiations. The issue could be further discussed.

There was also discussion of individual issues. For example, the importance of providing Fast Start finance (per the Copenhagen Accord) in a transparent fashion was emphasized. MRV and ICA were discussed, including the need for a "multilateral anchor" for ICA procedures. Formalization of Copenhagen mitigation pledges was also discussed. There was support for making progress on REDD+, starting with readiness activities, including by advancing the REDD+ partnership.

Regarding work following Cancun, many expressed the view that existing mandates are sufficient for carrying work forward and that it would be inadvisable to develop new mandates, including because it would take up too much of the Cancun meeting. One idea was for each individual decision, while being as ambitious as possible, to identify additional elements for follow-up.

In terms of the Kyoto Protocol, participants discussed various options. Views were divided. Some participants attached great importance to the continuation of the Kyoto Protocol, including for its "rule-based" approach. Others stated that they will not agree to a second commitment period. Still others stated that they are willing to agree to a second commitment period if certain conditions were met concerning an agreement covering the major economies.

Participants noted that given the length of, and extent of disagreement in, the text, negotiations could not proceed line-by-line and result in agreement in Cancun. Rather, negotiations in Tianjin should focus on key issues, including through focused break-out groups, and "extract" from the text what is needed for decisions in Cancun. It was suggested that the LCA Chair should be supported in her efforts and it might be helpful for negotiators to focus on "what" they can agree to do, rather than "why."

There was a discussion of equity, which is referred to in the Convention and the Copenhagen Accord as a consideration in efforts to address climate change. A range of views was expressed regarding what equity refers to and how it applies.

**Seventh Meeting of the Leaders' Representatives of the  
Major Economies Forum on Energy and Climate  
Co-Chair's Summary**

The seventh Meeting at the Leaders' representative level of the Major Economies Forum on Energy and Climate took place in Rome, Italy, June 30 - July 1, 2010. It was attended by officials from the seventeen major economies, as well as the United Nations, with Bangladesh, Denmark, Barbados, Ethiopia, Singapore, and the United Arab Emirates also participating in the session. The Democratic Republic of the Congo, Peru, and Yemen were invited but unable to attend. Participants held frank and constructive discussions on issues that are central to advancing agreement on a balanced package outcome.

Participants emphasized the importance of quickly implementing the Copenhagen Accord's Fast Start financing provisions and highlighted that maximum clarity and transparency would build international confidence and would be an essential part of a balanced outcome in Cancun. Some proposed that a website could help provide clarity. Many emphasized the need to focus adaptation efforts on countries in need and those particularly vulnerable to climate change. Countries provided updates on their actions to meet their fast start financing commitments under the Accord. Spain reported on the initiative it launched with Costa Rica and the U.S. to build communities of practice to accelerate implementation of adaptation actions.

The MEF had an extensive discussion of MRV/transparency. It was suggested that, per the Copenhagen Accord, there are essentially three areas of MRV to be addressed: (1) Annex I Party mitigation, (2) financial and technological support of non-Annex I mitigation, and (3) non-Annex I mitigation. Various views were expressed concerning the timing of MRV decisions, i.e., how extensive Cancun decisions need to be.

Regarding Annex I Party mitigation and support, participants noted that there are several sets of existing guidelines that apply; there was discussion about the extent to which these guidelines are sufficient with respect to both frequency and content. Regarding non-Annex I Party mitigation, several ideas were put forward concerning in particular how the "international consultation and analysis" process should work. These included both possible principles (e.g., that it should be Party-driven, that it should be non-politicized, that there should be a "multilateral anchor," that the starting point should be national communications, that the purposes of MRV include the environmental purpose of seeing whether efforts are leading, individually and collectively, to the intended environmental outcome) and possible operational elements (e.g., that each Party should have a focal point, that there should be an opportunity for written questions to be submitted before consultations in addition to any oral questions).

Participants noted the various mitigation targets and actions listed under the Copenhagen Accord. They further discussed how such targets and actions might be reflected in a future outcome, including with respect to whether or not they should have a legally binding character, whether there should be a single instrument or two instruments, the timing of reflecting mitigation targets/actions, the application of the principle of common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities, and other aspects. Participants discussed the role of equity and the extent to which it is already reflected or needs to be further reflected, e.g., in relation to the 2 degree long-term goal. Some participants sought further clarity on the nature and implications of legally binding obligations, e.g., in relation to consequences for non-fulfillment. The issue was raised whether Annex I should list more Parties as they evolve. Several participants raised the important role of other processes, such as the Paris-Oslo process addressing deforestation, in advancing mitigation objectives.

To advance key activities in the Technology Action Plans of the Global Partnership launched by Leaders in L'Aquila July 2009, a Clean Energy Ministerial meeting 19-20 July in Washington, DC will launch new initiatives on energy efficiency, energy supply, and energy access. Mexico and India will co-host a ministerial meeting on technology 8-9 November to consider a range of important issues and advance the negotiations.

Mexico informed participants of their plans to promote a successful outcome in Cancun by undertaking intensive consultations on a range of issues, including by co-hosting ministerial meetings with other countries.

## **Sixth Meeting of the Leaders' Representatives of the Major Economies Forum on Energy and Climate**

### **Chair's Summary**

The sixth Meeting at the Leaders' representative level of the Major Economies Forum on Energy and Climate met in Washington, DC, April 19, 2010. It was attended by officials from the seventeen major economies, as well as the United Nations, with Colombia, Denmark, Grenada, and Yemen also participating in the session.

Participants agreed that smaller, informal discussions such as the Major Economies Forum contributed to success in Copenhagen and can facilitate and enrich the discussions under the UNFCCC, the multilateral forum for negotiating climate change. Parties also highlighted the importance of discussions being representative and transparent.

Participants generally felt that Copenhagen Accord represented an important step forward, and that it provided important political consensus that should be reflected regarding the key issues in the negotiations leading up to Cancun.

Participants discussed goals for Cancun and beyond. There was a discussion of the role of the Kyoto Protocol and the form of a legal outcome. There was also a discussion of the key issues that need to be addressed to have a successful outcome in Cancun, noting the importance of setting realistic expectations for Cancun. Recognizing the urgency of moving forward, participants felt that in Cancun countries should at a minimum agree on a balanced set of decisions informed by the Copenhagen Accord.

Participants discussed what work needs to be done in the year ahead, including the need to elaborate the measurement, reporting, and verification and other transparency provisions of the Accord. In this regard, they welcomed India's presentation on practical approaches to MRV and international consultations and analysis. Various participants also spoke to equity, the role of markets, engaging smaller countries in the mitigation effort, how to ensure that the approach going forward reflects the dictates of science, domestic actions already underway to implement mitigation commitments under the Accord, and actions to reduce deforestation. Participants supported the Mexican Presidency's efforts to prepare COP16.

Many countries noted the importance of moving forward promptly with the Accord's Fast Start financing provisions in a transparent fashion. Several countries presented information on the actions they were already undertaking in response to their fast start financing commitment under the Copenhagen Accord.

The participants were briefed on the Clean Energy Ministerial to be held July 19-20, 2010 in Washington D.C. that aims to advance key activities in the Technology Action Plans of the Global Partnership launched by Leaders in L'Aquila July 2009.

**Fifth Meeting of the Leaders' Representatives  
of the Major Economies Forum on Energy and Climate**  
Co-Chair's Summary

The fifth meeting at the Leaders' representative level of the Major Economies Forum on Energy and Climate met in London, United Kingdom, October 18-19, 2009. It was attended by officials from seventeen major economies, as well as the United Nations and Denmark, with ministerial observers from Lesotho and the Maldives participating in the session, and additional observers from Bangladesh, Costa Rica, Ethiopia, and Norway.

To contribute to success at the Copenhagen Climate Conference, countries focused on finding convergence among their views on finance, technology, mitigation pathways, how to reflect mitigation commitments and actions, and means to improve transparency and accountability.

On finance, there was substantial agreement:

- that significantly scaled up financing will be important;
- on the need for substantial public finance in addition to the private sector and carbon market;
- that public finance should take advantage of various financial tools to leverage significant investment that would not otherwise occur;
- that there are opportunities for the private sector to invest in least developed countries;
- that consideration should be given to a new fund and better use of existing mechanisms, possibly with multiple windows to support adaptation and mitigation, including technology and capacity building, governed in a balanced and equitable manner under the guidance and accountable to the Convention's Conference of the Parties (noting the distinction between political and operational issues), and designed to improve access to financing while respecting fiduciary standards;
- that existing delivery mechanisms should be reformed to be more effective and efficient;
- that increased predictability in the provision of finance was desirable;
- that funding should be in accordance with national priorities and consideration given to further use of programmatic approaches;
- that there should be further discussion on the level of finance;
- that G20 finance ministers should advance these discussions at their St. Andrews meeting in November.

We discussed the potential role of carbon markets to deliver private sector investment in developing countries, in addition to public finance. These flows could deliver significant benefits to developing countries in terms of both on the ground investment and environmental and energy security co-benefits.

Lord Stern (via video) and Nobuo Tanaka, Executive Secretary of the International Energy Agency, presented on pathways to stabilize concentrations at 450 ppm or limit temperature increase to 2 degrees C. Both emphasized that: all countries are undertaking significant actions; that these long-term goals are achievable; and that while the gap between current efforts and necessary reductions is narrowing, more needs to be done.

On mitigation architecture, the discussion focused on two distinct issues: how to “internationalize” mitigation targets/actions ex ante in some kind of listing; and how to report on and review their implementation in a transparent manner.

On listing, it was considered that it would be necessary to reflect the mitigation efforts that countries intend to take, with developed countries reflecting emission reduction targets and developing countries reflecting actions. Further consideration could be given to various options for listing intended actions, including the Australian schedules proposal and the Korean registry proposal.

On transparency, it was noted that review of developed country targets would look at implementation of quantitative outcomes and review of developing country actions would look at implementation of such actions. The use of national communications for transparency and accountability was noted; it was also noted that the frequency, timeliness, and content of national communications could be improved. In addition, it would be important for all countries except least developed countries to provide regular national emissions inventories using IPCC guidelines appropriate for their capabilities. “Party review,” which has been used in other fora, was suggested as a useful approach.

It was considered important to design both listings and transparency mechanisms to respect the sovereignty of countries.

Countries discussed the utility of Low Carbon Growth Plans for developed and developing countries; it was agreed that development strategies and priorities are sovereign decisions to be taken by each country. However, a number of countries expressed a view that such plans could help frame actions being taken in the near term in the context of longer term environmental goals. Countries also recognized the importance of developing a credible system that will enable those providing support to understand how their contributions will contribute to the objective of the Convention; in this context, strong concern was expressed that plans should not be a pre-condition for financing.

The Leaders’ representatives were apprised of the solid progress made on the eight technology action plans, which are on schedule for release on 15 November to articulate a menu of voluntary actions that MEF and other countries will undertake individually and multilaterally. The group agreed that it would be useful to establish an organized process for how to take this work forward and to monitor its future progress. Interest was expressed in potentially recognizing activities of the Global Partnership and other future technology collaboration under the Convention.

At a dinner of the Leaders’ representatives, it was noted that developing countries are developing ambitious REDD+ plans and financing their own efforts. The need for urgently and significantly scaled up international finance for REDD+ was discussed, ahead of linkage to the market. Such finance could be for capacity building, to leverage private sector investment and for payment by results, accommodating different national circumstances. It was suggested that existing institutions propose investment instruments and how to improve coherence.

**Fourth Meeting of the Leaders' Representatives  
of the Major Economies Forum on Energy and Climate**  
Chair's Summary

The fourth meeting at the Leaders' representative level of the Major Economies Forum on Energy and Climate met in Washington, DC, September 17-18, 2009. It was attended by officials from seventeen major economies, as well as the United Nations and Denmark.

Participants agreed that the Forum continues to provide a useful opportunity to discuss key issues, explore new ideas, and identify points of shared understandings, as a contribution to the preparations for the Copenhagen Climate Conference in December 2009. There was wide interest in focusing on matters where discussions could help advance toward a convergence of views in Copenhagen. Participants continued their robust exchange of views on adaptation, mitigation, measuring, reporting, and verification, and technology at the session.

Participants recognized the urgency of adaptation and noted the need for a sharper focus on this issue. Participants agreed that, while adaptation actions need to be domestically driven, many of those most impacted by climate change also have the least ability to respond. The group also discussed the importance of observations and early warning systems as tools for adaptation, and the need to significantly scale up funding in the near term.

The participants explored in detail various purposes and means of reflecting national actions internationally in the Copenhagen outcome. They recognized that creative ideas are needed and that the final agreement may be a hybrid of different approaches. Australia explained its "schedules" proposal as flexible and compatible with other approaches, and in which all countries could reflect their targets, pathways, or actions. The Republic of Korea shared its "registries" proposal designed to provide international recognition for unilateral domestically binding actions, and serve as a tool for measuring, reporting, and verifying actions.

Measuring, reporting and verifying (MRV) actions and support was highlighted as an instrument for encouraging action and building trust, as it provides transparency, credibility, and the ability to learn from each other. The concept of expert teams and peer reviews was raised, as well as the importance of full information to ensure the world is on the right trajectory. The importance of enhancing capacity to enable appropriate MRV actions and of building on existing systems was highlighted. There was discussion about the range of actions to which MRV would apply.

The group received a status report on the technology action plans requested by MEF Leaders and was pleased to learn that the work is making solid progress and active collaboration among MEF countries is already underway. Participants discussed opportunities to advance technology cooperation, with many expressing the view that such efforts are both an essential element of an agreement in Copenhagen and for achieving low-carbon growth. Participants also discussed how to enhance global R&D cooperation and technology transfer, the potential for new mechanisms to build capacity and enhance expertise in developing countries and the need to address adaptation and energy poverty.

# Major Economies Forum on Energy and Climate

## The Third Leaders' Representatives Meeting

22-23 June 2009 – Jiutepec, Mexico

### **Chair's Summary: Third Preparatory Meeting of the Major Economies Forum on Energy and Climate**

The third preparatory meeting of the Major Economies Forum on Energy and Climate met in Jiutepec, Mexico, June 22-23, 2009, attended by Leaders representatives and other officials from seventeen major economies, as well as the United Nations and Denmark.

Participants agreed on the need for a strong political message in support of action on climate change including for a successful outcome in Copenhagen at the upcoming Leaders' Meeting in Italy, building on the outcome from the Leaders' Meeting in Hokkaido Toyako, Japan, in July 2008. Participants continued active discussions on key elements that Leaders might focus on in their discussions including mitigation, financing, technology, and adaptation.

President Calderón of Mexico spoke to delegates, noting there is not time to lose and calling for urgent unilateral and cooperative actions to address climate change with efficient mechanisms to support them.

Discussion on mitigation focused on such issues as long-term goals, mid-term targets, peaking years, and low-carbon growth plans, consistent with the science. Many Leaders' representatives expressed support for agreeing to a global long-term goal by 2050 in the context of a specific developed country 2050 goal, and robust mid-term actions for developed countries. There was discussion of the importance of mitigation actions by all, taking into account equity and national circumstances, and the development of low-carbon growth plans.

There was a clear view on the importance of financing, and discussion about various possible financing concepts, including the Mexican Green Fund proposal. There was broad interest in exploring proposals for possible fast-track funding to address specific mitigation and adaptation challenges.

On adaptation, participants recognized the need for enhanced support for developing countries which will be disproportionately affected, and discussed supporting formulation and implementation of adaptation programs



and their integration into national development plans. Many noted the special needs of Africa and small island developing states.

On technology, there was a determination that major economies have a key role to play to drive innovation in transformational low-carbon technologies. Countries called for discussions on removing barriers, establishing incentives and sharing best practices, technology transfer, and substantially increasing public investments in research, development, and demonstration of such technologies. Participants looked forward to the meeting of Leaders in L'Aquila, Italy, on July 9.

Second Preparatory Meeting of the Major Economies Forum on Energy and Climate  
Chairs' Summary

The second preparatory meeting of the Major Economies Forum on Energy and Climate, representing 17 developed and developing economies, was convened in Paris, May 25-26, 2009, to inform and complement and make a contribution to success in the UN negotiations in Copenhagen, as well as implementation of the Bali Roadmap. Participants built on the initial discussions in Washington in April, reiterating that climate change demands immediate action by all major economies. They agreed on the importance of leadership by the major economies, including that their level of ambition should reflect science and that their robust national actions should contribute to credible long-term emissions reductions. They also shared the view that the transformation to a low-carbon economy can be an opportunity for growth and sustainable development.

Participants discussed a wide range of mitigation issues, including a peak year, the notion that countries will reflect their actions through various baselines, low-carbon strategies, aggregate goals, mid-term and long-term emission targets (including an ambitious 2050 goal for developed countries), and the readiness and capacity of economies to undertake mitigation actions and to raise the global level of ambition, in accordance with their common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities. They noted that developed countries should have ambitious mid-term targets as a way to define pathways towards long-term emissions goals. There was interest in assessing a mid-term aggregate goal for developed countries. Participants discussed the need for the major developing countries to build on the effective national actions they have already taken with enhanced national actions. Participants also discussed proposals for reflecting domestically binding low carbon actions, the character and reviewability of such actions, and promoting transparency. In addition, there was discussion of how offsets and the carbon market could contribute to the overall level of ambition.

On financing, participants articulated principles that could govern financing for climate change. Mexico presented its proposal for a Green Fund, which generated substantial interest. Participants observed that all major economies should continue to take action to mobilize financing to address climate change, and recognized the diversity among countries and national circumstances in terms of ability to finance national actions and international support. Participants shared the view that financing should derive from multiple sources, public and private, domestic and international, including carbon markets, and that existing institutions should be utilized. Many stressed the desirability of predictable funding in the context of developing country actions in the 2020 timeframe. They confirmed the importance of facilitating the matching of resources to needs and of accountability for the use of resources. There was a convergence of views that governance should be transparent, fair, effective and efficient, and involve balanced representation. Participants agreed on the importance of adaptation to climate change, and the need to provide support, especially for the most vulnerable countries.

Participants had a further discussion on the potential for the Leaders of the major economies to advance and support at a political level the development and deployment of transformational technologies. Participants also exchanged views on the transfer of technology. A number of countries outlined their proposals for specific areas of focus, including bioenergy, carbon capture and storage and power plant efficiencies, renewables, energy efficiency, and smart grids. Participants will have further discussions to define objectives in these areas. There was interest in adding further specificity to the proposals and for articulating the role of the Leaders in advancing the transformation of these key technologies.

Participants will continue these discussions at the next preparatory meeting in June in Mexico, with a view toward the Leaders' Meeting in L'Aquila, Italy.

# Major Economies Forum on Energy and Climate

## The First Leaders' Representatives Meeting

27-28 April 2009 – Washington, DC, USA

### **Chair's Summary: First Meeting of the Leaders' Representatives of the Major Economies Forum on Energy and Climate**

The first preparatory meeting of the Major Economies Forum on Energy and Climate met April 27-28, 2009, in Washington, DC, attended by Leaders' representatives and other officials from seventeen major economies, as well as the United Nations and Denmark. Participants welcomed President Obama's initiative in convening the Major Economies Forum. Discussion was open and candid. Participants agreed that the Forum is not an alternative to the UN Framework Convention process, but could inform and complement and make a major contribution to success in the UN negotiations in Copenhagen, as well as implementation of the Bali Roadmap.

Participants shared the view that climate change is a clear and present danger to our world that demands immediate attention from all countries, and that the Major Economies Leaders Meeting in July should send a strong political signal to add momentum to the Copenhagen process and to collective efforts to achieve a low-carbon future. It was noted that all major economies are already taking actions in accordance with their common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities.

Participants expressed the need to ensure that developed countries' actions are clear and robust, and the view was also expressed that all major economies must take actions, consistent with the science, which support energy security and sustainable development. Participants also highlighted the importance that international cooperation can play in facilitating global technology innovation, commercialization, and deployment.

There was wide support for considering how best the Major Economies Forum can contribute to a successful outcome at the UN climate negotiations in Copenhagen in December. The meeting included active exchanges on this topic, and participants agreed to continue discussions on mitigation, finance, adaptation and related issues at their next meeting, including exploring shared assumptions. The discussions underscored the need for near term ambitious actions for all, as well as pathways, and the development of mid-term goals for developed countries.

Participants commented on the potential for the Major Economies Forum to support the development of transformational technologies critical to mitigating climate change globally. Many in the group noted that the forum could provide valuable support and impetus at a political level for the development of critical technologies and supported exploring cooperation on innovation and policies to enable deployment of technologies, including carbon capture and storage, clean coal, buildings, energy efficiency, solar energy and biofuels, among others. The role of legal and regulatory systems in facilitating enabling environments was also raised. Delegations were invited to submit concrete proposals for cooperation to facilitate discussions at the next preparatory meeting.

There was wide support for two further preparatory meetings to create a foundation for the Leaders to meet in Italy in July. Delegations welcomed France's offer to host the next preparatory meeting in May. The Leaders' representatives of the Major Economies Forum agreed that their next meeting would focus on the Copenhagen process, including mitigation, adaptation and finance, as well as on issues regarding development of transformational technologies and the deployment and transfer of technology.



United Nations

FCCC/CP/2010/7/Add.1



## Framework Convention on Climate Change

Distr.: General  
15 March 2011

Original: English

---

### Conference of the Parties

#### **Report of the Conference of the Parties on its sixteenth session, held in Cancun from 29 November to 10 December 2010**

#### **Addendum**

#### **Part Two: Action taken by the Conference of the Parties at its sixteenth session**

### Contents

#### **Decisions adopted by the Conference of the Parties**

	<i>Page</i>
<i>Decision</i>	
1/CP.16      The Cancun Agreements: Outcome of the work of the Ad Hoc Working Group on Long-term Cooperative Action under the Convention .....	2

**Page(s) 000378 to\à 000407**

**Page(s) 000378 to\à 000407  
est(sont) exclue(s) en vertu de(s)(l')article(s)**

**68(a)**

**of the Access to Information Act  
de la Loi sur l'accès à l'information**



United Nations

FCCC/KP/CMP/2010/12/Add.1



## Framework Convention on Climate Change

Distr.: General  
15 March 2011

Original: English

---

### Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to the Kyoto Protocol

#### Report of the Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to the Kyoto Protocol on its sixth session, held in Cancun from 29 November to 10 December 2010

#### Addendum

#### Part Two: Action taken by the Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to the Kyoto Protocol at its sixth session

#### Contents

#### Decisions adopted by the Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to the Kyoto Protocol

	<i>Page</i>
<i>Decision</i>	
1/CMP.6 The Cancun Agreements: Outcome of the work of the Ad Hoc Working Group on Further Commitments for Annex I Parties under the Kyoto Protocol at its fifteenth session .....	3
2/CMP.6 The Cancun Agreements: Land use, land-use change and forestry .....	5
5/CMP.6 Report of the Adaptation Fund Board .....	13
6/CMP.6 Review of the Adaptation Fund.....	16
8/CMP.6 Proposal from Kazakhstan to amend Annex B to the Kyoto Protocol.....	19
9/CMP.6 Methodology for the collection of international transaction log fees in the biennium 2012–2013 .....	20
10/CMP.6 Supplementary information incorporated in national communications submitted in accordance with Article 7, paragraph 2, of the Kyoto Protocol.....	24

**Page(s) 000409 to\à 000439**

**Page(s) 000409 to\à 000439  
est(sont) exclue(s) en vertu de(s)(l')article(s)**

**68(a)**

**of the Access to Information Act  
de la Loi sur l'accès à l'information**





**UNITED  
NATIONS**



**Framework Convention  
on Climate Change**

Distr.  
LIMITED

FCCC/CP/2009/L.7  
18 December 2009

Original : ENGLISH

**CONFERENCE OF THE PARTIES**  
**Fifteenth session**  
**Copenhagen, 7–18 December 2009**

**Agenda item 9**  
**High-level segment**

## **Draft decision -/CP.15**

**Proposal by the President**

### **Copenhagen Accord**

**The Heads of State, Heads of Government, Ministers, and other heads of delegation present at the United Nations Climate Change Conference 2009 in Copenhagen,**

*In pursuit* of the ultimate objective of the Convention as stated in its Article 2,

*Being guided* by the principles and provisions of the Convention,

*Noting* the results of work done by the two Ad hoc Working Groups,

*Endorsing* decision x/CP.15 on the Ad hoc Working Group on Long-term Cooperative Action and decision x/CMP.5 that requests the Ad hoc Working Group on Further Commitments of Annex I Parties under the Kyoto Protocol to continue its work,

*Have agreed* on this Copenhagen Accord which is operational immediately.

1. We underline that climate change is one of the greatest challenges of our time. We emphasise our strong political will to urgently combat climate change in accordance with the principle of common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities. To achieve the ultimate objective of the Convention to stabilize greenhouse gas concentration in the atmosphere at a level that would prevent dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate system, we shall, recognizing the scientific view that the increase in global temperature should be below 2 degrees Celsius, on the basis of equity and in the context of sustainable development, enhance our long-term cooperative action to combat climate change. We recognize the critical impacts of climate change and the potential impacts of response measures on countries particularly vulnerable to its adverse effects and stress the need to establish a comprehensive adaptation programme including international support.

2. We agree that deep cuts in global emissions are required according to science, and as documented by the IPCC Fourth Assessment Report with a view to reduce global emissions so as to hold the increase in global temperature below 2 degrees Celsius, and take action to meet this objective consistent with science and on the basis of equity. We should cooperate in achieving the peaking of global and national emissions as soon as possible, recognizing that the time frame for peaking will be longer in developing countries and bearing in mind that social and economic development and poverty eradication are the first and overriding priorities of developing countries and that a low-emission development strategy is indispensable to sustainable development.

3. Adaptation to the adverse effects of climate change and the potential impacts of response measures is a challenge faced by all countries. Enhanced action and international cooperation on adaptation is urgently required to ensure the implementation of the Convention by enabling and supporting the implementation of adaptation actions aimed at reducing vulnerability and building resilience in developing countries, especially in those that are particularly vulnerable, especially least developed countries, small island developing States and Africa. We agree that developed countries shall provide adequate, predictable and sustainable financial resources, technology and capacity-building to support the implementation of adaptation action in developing countries.

4. Annex I Parties commit to implement individually or jointly the quantified economy-wide emissions targets for 2020, to be submitted in the format given in Appendix I by Annex I Parties to the secretariat by 31 January 2010 for compilation in an INF document. Annex I Parties that are Party to the Kyoto Protocol will thereby further strengthen the emissions reductions initiated by the Kyoto Protocol. Delivery of reductions and financing by developed countries will be measured, reported and verified in accordance with existing and any further guidelines adopted by the Conference of the Parties, and will ensure that accounting of such targets and finance is rigorous, robust and transparent.

5. Non-Annex I Parties to the Convention will implement mitigation actions, including those to be submitted to the secretariat by non-Annex I Parties in the format given in Appendix II by 31 January 2010, for compilation in an INF document, consistent with Article 4.1 and Article 4.7 and in the context of sustainable development. Least developed countries and small island developing States may undertake actions voluntarily and on the basis of support. Mitigation actions subsequently taken and envisaged by Non-Annex I Parties, including national inventory reports, shall be communicated through national communications consistent with Article 12.1(b) every two years on the basis of guidelines to be adopted by the Conference of the Parties. Those mitigation actions in national communications or otherwise communicated to the Secretariat will be added to the list in appendix II. Mitigation actions taken by Non-Annex I Parties will be subject to their domestic measurement, reporting and verification the result of which will be reported through their national communications every two years. Non-Annex I Parties will communicate information on the implementation of their actions through National Communications, with provisions for international consultations and analysis under clearly defined guidelines that will ensure that national sovereignty is respected. Nationally appropriate mitigation actions seeking international support will be recorded in a registry along with relevant technology, finance and capacity building support. Those actions supported will be added to the list in appendix II. These supported nationally appropriate mitigation actions will be subject to international measurement, reporting and verification in accordance with guidelines adopted by the Conference of the Parties.

6. We recognize the crucial role of reducing emission from deforestation and forest degradation and the need to enhance removals of greenhouse gas emission by forests and agree on the need to provide positive incentives to such actions through the immediate establishment of a mechanism including REDD-plus, to enable the mobilization of financial resources from developed countries.

7. We decide to pursue various approaches, including opportunities to use markets, to enhance the cost-effectiveness of, and to promote mitigation actions. Developing countries, especially

those with low emitting economies should be provided incentives to continue to develop on a low emission pathway.

8. Scaled up, new and additional, predictable and adequate funding as well as improved access shall be provided to developing countries, in accordance with the relevant provisions of the Convention, to enable and support enhanced action on mitigation, including substantial finance to reduce emissions from deforestation and forest degradation (REDD-plus), adaptation, technology development and transfer and capacity-building, for enhanced implementation of the Convention. The collective commitment by developed countries is to provide new and additional resources, including forestry and investments through international institutions, approaching USD 30 billion for the period 2010 – 2012 with balanced allocation between adaptation and mitigation. Funding for adaptation will be prioritized for the most vulnerable developing countries, such as the least developed countries, small island developing States and Africa. In the context of meaningful mitigation actions and transparency on implementation, developed countries commit to a goal of mobilizing jointly USD 100 billion dollars a year by 2020 to address the needs of developing countries. This funding will come from a wide variety of sources, public and private, bilateral and multilateral, including alternative sources of finance. New multilateral funding for adaptation will be delivered through effective and efficient fund arrangements, with a governance structure providing for equal representation of developed and developing countries. A significant portion of such funding should flow through the Copenhagen Green Climate Fund.

9. To this end, a High Level Panel will be established under the guidance of and accountable to the Conference of the Parties to study the contribution of the potential sources of revenue, including alternative sources of finance, towards meeting this goal.

10. We decide that the Copenhagen Green Climate Fund shall be established as an operating entity of the financial mechanism of the Convention to support projects, programme, policies and other activities in developing countries related to mitigation including REDD-plus, adaptation, capacity-building, technology development and transfer.

11. In order to enhance action on development and transfer of technology we decide to establish a Technology Mechanism to accelerate technology development and transfer in support of action on adaptation and mitigation that will be guided by a country-driven approach and be based on national circumstances and priorities.

12. We call for an assessment of the implementation of this Accord to be completed by 2015, including in light of the Convention's ultimate objective. This would include consideration of strengthening the long-term goal referencing various matters presented by the science, including in relation to temperature rises of 1.5 degrees Celsius.



## Nationally appropriate mitigation actions of developing country Parties

[illegible]

.....

## Summary of Country Association with the *Copenhagen Accord*

### Quick Facts

- Number of Parties that associate with the *Copenhagen Accord*: 141 Countries.
- Share of global greenhouse gas emissions by countries that associate with the *Accord*: 87.9%.<sup>1</sup>
- Number of developed countries that associate with the *Accord*: 43 countries (EU plus its 27 members). All Annex I Parties have associated with the *Accord* except Turkey.
- Total number of developing countries that associate with the *Accord*: 98 countries.
- Number of developing countries that associate with the *Accord* and have submitted mitigation actions for inclusion in Annex II of the *Accord*: 44 countries.
- Number of developing countries that associate with the *Accord* but have not submitted mitigation actions: 54 countries.
- Number of countries that dissociate with the *Accord*: 8 countries.
- Number of countries that have yet to respond: 40 countries

---

<sup>1</sup> Source, Climate Analysis Indicator Tool- 2005 data, CO<sub>2</sub>eq, Excluding LULUCF

## Developed countries (Annex I) with submitted emissions reduction targets

- |                         |                  |                        |
|-------------------------|------------------|------------------------|
| 1. Australia            | 7. Japan         | 13. Russian Federation |
| 2. Belarus              | 8. Kazakhstan    | 14. Switzerland        |
| 3. Canada               | 9. Liechtenstein | 15. Ukraine            |
| 4. Croatia              | 10. Monaco       | 16. US                 |
| 5. EU (EU+27 countries) | 11. New Zealand  |                        |
| 6. Iceland              | 12. Norway       |                        |

## Developing countries (non-Annex I) which associate with the *Accord* and have submitted mitigation actions for inclusion in Appendix II

- |   |                              |                                     |
|---|------------------------------|-------------------------------------|
| 1. Afghanistan (LDC)                      | 17. Ethiopia (LDC, Africa)   | 32. Papua New Guinea (SIDS)         |
| 2. Antigua & Barbuda (SIDS)               | 18. Gabon (Africa)           | 33. Peru                            |
| 3. Armenia                                | 19. Georgia                  | 34. Republic of Congo (LDC, Africa) |
| 4. Benin (LDC, Africa)                    | 20. Ghana (Africa)           | 35. Republic of Korea               |
| 5. Bhutan (LDC)                           | 21. India                    | 36. Republic of Macedonia           |
| 6. Botswana (Africa)                      | 22. Indonesia                | 37. Republic of Moldova             |
| 7. Brazil                                 | 23. Israel                   | 38. San Marino                      |
| 8. Cameroon (Africa)                      | 24. Jordan                   | 39. Sierra Leone (LDC, Africa)      |
| 9. Central African Republic (LDC, Africa) | 25. Madagascar (LDC, Africa) | 40. Singapore (SIDS)                |
| 10. Chad                                  | 26. Maldives (LDC, SIDS)     | 41. South Africa (Africa)           |
| 11. Chile                                 | 27. Marshall Islands (SIDS)  | 42. Tajikistan                      |
| 12. China                                 | 28. Mauritania (LDC, Africa) | 43. Togo                            |
| 13. Colombia                              | 29. Mexico                   | 44. Tunisia                         |
| 14. Costa Rica                            | 30. Mongolia                 |                                     |
| 15. Côte d'Ivoire (Africa)                | 31. Morocco (Africa)         |                                     |
| 16. Eritrea (LDC, Africa)                 |                              |                                     |

## Developing countries which have only associated with the *Accord* (i.e. have not submitted mitigation actions)

- |                                |  |  |
|--------------------------------|--|--|
| 1. Albania                     | 13. Cape Verde (SIDS, Africa)                      | 24. Jamaica (SIDS)                         |
| 2. Algeria (Africa)            | 14. Comoros (LDC, SIDS, Africa)                    | 25. Kenya (Africa)                         |
| 3. Angola (LDC, Africa)        | 15. Democratic Republic of the Congo (LDC, Africa) | 26. Kiribati (LDC, SIDS)                   |
| 4. Bahamas (SIDS)              | 16. Djibouti (LDC, Africa)                         | 27. Lao People's Democratic Republic (LDC) |
| 5. Bangladesh (LDC)            | 17. Fiji (SIDS)                                    | 28. Lesotho (LDC, Africa)                  |
| 6. Barbados (SIDS)             | 18. Gambia (LDC, Africa)                           | 29. Liberia (LDC, Africa)                  |
| 7. Belize (SIDS)               | 19. Guatemala                                      | 30. Malawi (LDC, Africa)                   |
| 8. Bosnia and Herzegovina      | 20. Guinea (LDC, Africa)                           | 31. Mali (LDC, Africa)                     |
| 9. Brunei Darussalam (Africa)  | 21. Guinea-Bissau (LDC, SIDS, Africa)              | 32. Mauritius (SIDS, Africa)               |
| 10. Burkina Faso (LDC, Africa) | 22. Guyana (SIDS)                                  | 33. Montenegro                             |
| 11. Burundi (LDC, Africa)      | 23. Honduras                                       | 34. Mozambique (LDC, Africa)               |
| 12. Cambodia (LDC)             |  | 35. Namibia                                |

- |                          |                                |   |
|--------------------------|--------------------------------|---|
| 36. Nepal (LDC)          | 44. Serbia                     | 50. United Arab Emirates                      |
| 37. Nigeria (Africa)     | 45. Swaziland (Africa)         | 51. United Republic of Tanzania (LDC, Africa) |
| 38. Palau (SIDS)         | 46. Timor-Leste (SIDS)         | 52. Uruguay                                   |
| 39. Panama               | 47. Tonga (SIDS)               | 53. Vietnam                                   |
| 40. Rwanda (LDC, Africa) | 48. Trinidad and Tobago (SIDS) | 54. Zambia (LDC, Africa)                      |
| 41. Saint Lucia (SIDS)   | 49. Uganda (LDC, Africa)       |   |
| 42. Samoa (LDC, SIDS)    |                                |   |
| 43. Senegal (LDC)        |                                |   |

### **Countries which dissociate with the *Accord***

- |                        |                       |
|------------------------|-----------------------|
| 1. Bolivia             | 6. Nauru (SIDS)       |
| 2. Cook Islands (SIDS) | 7. Tuvalu (LDC, SIDS) |
| 3. Cuba (SIDS)         | 8. Venezuela          |
| 4. Ecuador             |                       |
| 5. Kuwait              |                       |

### **Countries which do not specify association with the *Accord***

1. Argentina
2. Lebanon
3. Philippines

### **Countries that have yet to respond**

- |                                    |   |                                 |
|------------------------------------|---|---------------------------------|
| 1. Azerbaijan                      | 17. Nicaragua                                 | 29. Solomon Islands (LDC, SIDS) |
| 2. Bahrain (SIDS)                  | 18. Niger (LDC, Africa)                       | 30. Sri Lanka                   |
| 3. Dominica (SIDS)                 | 19. Niue                                      | 31. Sudan (LDC, Africa)         |
| 4. Dominican Republic (SIDS)       | 20. Oman                                      | 32. Suriname (SIDS, Africa)     |
| 5. Egypt (Africa)                  | 21. Pakistan                                  | 33. Syria                       |
| 6. El Salvador                     | 22. Paraguay                                  | 34. Thailand                    |
| 7. Equatorial Guinea (LDC, Africa) | 23. Qatar                                     | 35. Turkey (Annex I)            |
| 8. Grenada (SIDS)                  | 24. Saint Kitts and Nevis (SIDS)              | 36. Turkmenistan                |
| 9. Haiti (LDC, SIDS)               | 25. Saint Vincent and the Grenadines (SIDS)   | 37. Uzbekistan                  |
| 10. Iran                           | 26. Sao Tome and Principe (LDC, SIDS, Africa) | 38. Vanuatu (LDC, SIDS)         |
| 11. Kyrgyzstan                     | 27. Saudi Arabia                              | 39. Yemen (LDC)                 |
| 12. Libya (Africa)                 | 28. Seychelles (SIDS, Africa)                 | 40. Zimbabwe (Africa)           |
| 13. Malaysia                       |   |                                 |
| 14. Micronesia (SIDS)              |   |                                 |
| 15. Myanmar (LDC)                  |   |                                 |
| 16. North Korea                    |   |                                 |



**Page(s) 000448 to\à 000449**

**Is(Are) exempted pursuant to section(s)  
est(sont) exemptée(s) en vertu de(s)(l')article(s)**

**15(1), 21(1)(a), 21(1)(b)**

**of the Access to Information Act  
de la Loi sur l'accès à l'information**

Advance unedited version

**Decision -/CP.13**

**Bali Action Plan**

*The Conference of the Parties,*

*Resolving* to urgently enhance implementation of the Convention in order to achieve its ultimate objective in full accordance with its principles and commitments,

*Reaffirming* that economic and social development and poverty eradication are global priorities,

*Responding* to the findings of the Fourth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change that warming of the climate system is unequivocal, and that delay in reducing emissions significantly constrains opportunities to achieve lower stabilization levels and increases the risk of more severe climate change impacts,

*Recognizing* that deep cuts in global emissions will be required to achieve the ultimate objective of the Convention and emphasizing the urgency<sup>1</sup> to address climate change as indicated in the Fourth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change,

1. *Decides* to launch a comprehensive process to enable the full, effective and sustained implementation of the Convention through long-term cooperative action, now, up to and beyond 2012, in order to reach an agreed outcome and adopt a decision at its fifteenth session, by addressing, inter alia:

- (a) A shared vision for long-term cooperative action, including a long-term global goal for emission reductions, to achieve the ultimate objective of the Convention, in accordance with the provisions and principles of the Convention, in particular the principle of common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities, and taking into account social and economic conditions and other relevant factors;
- (b) Enhanced national/international action on mitigation of climate change, including, inter alia, consideration of:
  - (i) Measurable, reportable and verifiable nationally appropriate mitigation commitments or actions, including quantified emission limitation and reduction objectives, by all developed country Parties, while ensuring the comparability of efforts among them, taking into account differences in their national circumstances;
  - (ii) Nationally appropriate mitigation actions by developing country Parties in the context of sustainable development, supported and enabled by technology, financing and capacity-building, in a measurable, reportable and verifiable manner;
  - (iii) Policy approaches and positive incentives on issues relating to reducing emissions from deforestation and forest degradation in developing countries; and

---

<sup>1</sup> Contribution of Working Group III to the Fourth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, Technical Summary, pages 39 and 90, and Chapter 13, page 776.

Advance unedited version

- the role of conservation, sustainable management of forests and enhancement of forest carbon stocks in developing countries;
- (iv) Cooperative sectoral approaches and sector-specific actions, in order to enhance implementation of Article 4, paragraph 1(c), of the Convention;
  - (v) Various approaches, including opportunities for using markets, to enhance the cost-effectiveness of, and to promote, mitigation actions, bearing in mind different circumstances of developed and developing countries;
  - (vi) Economic and social consequences of response measures;
  - (vii) Ways to strengthen the catalytic role of the Convention in encouraging multilateral bodies, the public and private sectors and civil society, building on synergies among activities and processes, as a means to support mitigation in a coherent and integrated manner;
- (c) Enhanced action on adaptation, including, inter alia, consideration of:
- (i) International cooperation to support urgent implementation of adaptation actions, including through vulnerability assessments, prioritization of actions, financial needs assessments, capacity-building and response strategies, integration of adaptation actions into sectoral and national planning, specific projects and programmes, means to incentivize the implementation of adaptation actions, and other ways to enable climate-resilient development and reduce vulnerability of all Parties, taking into account the urgent and immediate needs of developing countries that are particularly vulnerable to the adverse effects of climate change, especially the least developed countries and small island developing States, and further taking into account the needs of countries in Africa affected by drought, desertification and floods;
  - (ii) Risk management and risk reduction strategies, including risk sharing and transfer mechanisms such as insurance;
  - (iii) Disaster reduction strategies and means to address loss and damage associated with climate change impacts in developing countries that are particularly vulnerable to the adverse effects of climate change;
  - (iv) Economic diversification to build resilience;
  - (v) Ways to strengthen the catalytic role of the Convention in encouraging multilateral bodies, the public and private sectors and civil society, building on synergies among activities and processes, as a means to support adaptation in a coherent and integrated manner;
- (d) Enhanced action on technology development and transfer to support action on mitigation and adaptation, including, inter alia, consideration of:
- (i) Effective mechanisms and enhanced means for the removal of obstacles to, and provision of financial and other incentives for, scaling up of the development and transfer of technology to developing country Parties in order to promote access to affordable environmentally sound technologies;
  - (ii) Ways to accelerate deployment, diffusion and transfer of affordable environmentally sound technologies;

Advance unedited version

- (iii) Cooperation on research and development of current, new and innovative technology, including win-win solutions;
- (iv) The effectiveness of mechanisms and tools for technology cooperation in specific sectors;
- (e) Enhanced action on the provision of financial resources and investment to support action on mitigation and adaptation and technology cooperation, including, inter alia, consideration of:
  - (i) Improved access to adequate, predictable and sustainable financial resources and financial and technical support, and the provision of new and additional resources, including official and concessional funding for developing country Parties;
  - (ii) Positive incentives for developing country Parties for the enhanced implementation of national mitigation strategies and adaptation action;
  - (iii) Innovative means of funding to assist developing country Parties that are particularly vulnerable to the adverse impacts of climate change in meeting the cost of adaptation;
  - (iv) Means to incentivize the implementation of adaptation actions on the basis of sustainable development policies;
  - (v) Mobilization of public- and private-sector funding and investment, including facilitation of carbon-friendly investment choices;
  - (vi) Financial and technical support for capacity-building in the assessment of the costs of adaptation in developing countries, in particular the most vulnerable ones, to aid in determining their financial needs;

2. *Decides* that the process shall be conducted under a subsidiary body under the Convention, hereby established and known as the Ad Hoc Working Group on Long-term Cooperative Action under the Convention, that shall complete its work in 2009 and present the outcome of its work to the Conference of the Parties for adoption at its fifteenth session;

3. *Agrees* that the process shall begin without delay, that the sessions of the group will be scheduled as often as is feasible and necessary to complete the work of the group, where possible in conjunction with sessions of other bodies established under the Convention, and that its sessions may be complemented by workshops and other activities, as required;

4. *Decides* that the first session of the group shall be held as soon as is feasible and not later than April 2008;

5. *Decides* that the Chair and Vice-Chair of the group, with one being from a Party included in Annex I to the Convention (Annex I Party) and the other being from a Party not included in Annex I to the Convention (non-Annex I Party), shall alternate annually between an Annex I Party and a non-Annex I Party;

6. *Takes note* of the proposed schedule of meetings contained in the annex;

7. *Instructions* the group to develop its work programme at its first session in a coherent and integrated manner;

Advance unedited version

8. *Invites* Parties to submit to the secretariat, by 22 February 2008, their views regarding the work programme, taking into account the elements referred to in paragraph 1 above, to be compiled by the secretariat for consideration by the group at its first meeting;

9. *Requests* the group to report to the Conference of the Parties at its fourteenth session on progress made;

10. *Agrees* to take stock of the progress made, at its fourteenth session, on the basis of the report by the group;

11. *Agrees* that the process shall be informed by, inter alia, the best available scientific information, experience in implementation of the Convention and its Kyoto Protocol, and processes thereunder, outputs from other relevant intergovernmental processes and insights from the business and research communities and civil society;

12. *Notes* that the organization of work of the group will require a significant amount of additional resources to provide for the participation of delegates from Parties eligible to be funded and to provide conference services and substantive support;

13. *Strongly urges* Parties in a position to do so, in order to facilitate the work of the group, to provide contributions to the Trust Fund for Participation in the UNFCCC Process and the Trust Fund for Supplementary Activities for the purposes referred to in paragraph 12 above and to provide other forms of in kind support such as hosting a session of the group.

Advance unedited version

ANNEX

**Indicative timetable for meetings of the Ad Hoc Working Group on  
Long-term Cooperative Action under the Convention in 2008**

<b>Session</b>	<b>Dates</b>
Session 1	March/April 2008
Session 2	June 2008, in conjunction with the twenty-eighth sessions of the subsidiary bodies
Session 3	August/September 2008
Session 4	December 2008, in conjunction with the fourteenth session of the Conference of the Parties

- - - - -

**KYOTO PROTOCOL TO THE UNITED NATIONS FRAMEWORK  
CONVENTION ON CLIMATE CHANGE**



UNITED NATIONS

1998

**Page(s) 000456 to\à 000475**

**Page(s) 000456 to\à 000475  
est(sont) exclue(s) en vertu de(s)(l')article(s)**

**68(a)**

**of the Access to Information Act  
de la Loi sur l'accès à l'information**



# **UNITED NATIONS FRAMEWORK CONVENTION ON CLIMATE CHANGE**

UNITED NATIONS

1992

**Page(s) 000477 to\à 000508**

**Page(s) 000477 to\à 000508  
est(sont) exclue(s) en vertu de(s)(l')article(s)**

**68(a)**

**of the Access to Information Act  
de la Loi sur l'accès à l'information**

## **Short Glossary of Climate Change Terms**

**Adaptation**: The degree to which adjustments are possible in practices, processes, structures or systems in response to projected or actual changes in climate. Adaptation activities contribute to the mitigation of the effects of climate change on terrestrial and aquatic ecosystems, hydrology and water resources management, agriculture and forestry, human infrastructure and human health.

**Ad-Hoc Working Group on Further Commitments for Annex I Parties under the Kyoto Protocol (AWG-KP)**: A temporary group established for Kyoto Parties to examine possible commitments for industrialized countries (Annex B) in a post-2012 climate change agreement (e.g., means to achieve mitigation objectives, ranges of emissions reductions objectives).

**Ad-Hoc Working Group on Long-Term cooperative Action under the Convention (AWG-LCA)**: A temporary group established for all Parties under the Convention to discuss adaptation, mitigation, technology, financing and a shared vision for a post-2012 climate change regime.

**Annex I Parties (to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change)**: Annex I to the Convention lists 40 industrialized countries that agreed to limit their greenhouse gas emissions. Only these countries that then took on a target and ratified the Kyoto Protocol, however, are bound to make emissions reductions. The Annex I countries are: Australia, Austria, Belarus, Belgium, Bulgaria, Canada, Croatia, Czech Republic, Denmark, European Economic Community, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Latvia, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Monaco, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, the Russian Federation, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, Ukraine, and the United States.

**Annex II Parties (to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change)**: Countries listed in Annex II have a special obligation to help developing countries with financial and technological resources. They include the 24 original OECD members plus the European Union.

**Annex B Parties (to the Kyoto Protocol)**: Annex B to the Kyoto Protocol lists the individual greenhouse gas reduction targets that Annex I parties are required to meet in order to comply with the Kyoto Protocol. Parties to the Kyoto Protocol with emission reduction commitments are termed "Annex B Parties".

**Assigned Amount Unit (AAU)**: A tradable unit of greenhouse gas emissions representing the quantity of greenhouse gases that an Annex I country can release in accordance with the Kyoto Protocol, during the First Commitment Period. The assigned amount is calculated on a Party's baseline of emissions. If a country is currently emitting less than their assigned amount (e.g., former Soviet Bloc states whose economies collapsed in the 1990s), they can trade unused assigned amounts with other Parties through emissions trading. 1 AAU is equal to 1 metric tonne of carbon dioxide equivalent.

**Carbon Sinks**: A carbon sink is an area that can absorb or sequester carbon dioxide from the atmosphere. Forests are the most common form of sink, as well as soils, peat, permafrost, ocean water and carbonate deposits in the deep ocean. A carbon sink can become a carbon source; for example, a growing forest is a carbon sink as it absorbs more carbon than it

releases. When the forest burns, however, it becomes a carbon source as it releases carbon into the atmosphere.

**Carbon Stocks:** Carbon stocks include carbon stored in vegetation (above and below ground), decomposing matter, soils, wood products and the carbon substituted by burning wood for energy instead of fossil fuels.

**Carbon Sequestration:** The process of removing atmospheric carbon dioxide, either through biological processes (e.g., plants and trees), or geological processes through storage of carbon dioxide in underground reservoirs.

**Conference of the Parties (COP):** The COP is the highest body under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate and consists of senior negotiators and ministers who meet once a year to discuss the implementation of the Convention.

**Conference of the Parties serving as the Meeting of the Parties (CMP):** The “supreme body” of the Kyoto Protocol and the highest decision-making authority for issues that involve countries that have ratified the Kyoto Protocol. As evidenced in the title, the CMP is a meeting of the Parties (MOP) held during the Conference of the Parties to reduce costs and improve coordination between the Convention and the Protocol.

**First Commitment Period:** The First Commitment Period of the Kyoto Protocol covers emission reduction commitments by Annex B Parties that are to be made by the period of 2008-2012.

**Greenhouse gases (GHGs):** These are the gases released by human activity that are responsible for climate change and global warming. The six gases covered by the Kyoto Protocol are carbon dioxide (CO<sub>2</sub>), methane (CH<sub>4</sub>), and nitrous oxide (N<sub>2</sub>O), as well as hydrofluorocarbons (HFCs), perfluorocarbons (PFCs), and sulfur hexafluoride (SF<sub>6</sub>).

**Group of 77 (G-77) and China:** A large negotiating alliance of developing countries that focuses on numerous international topics, including climate change. The G-77 was founded in 1967 under the auspices of the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD). It seeks to harmonize the negotiating positions of its 131 member states.

**Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC):** Established in 1988 by the World Meteorological Organization and the UN Environment Programme, the IPCC surveys world-wide scientific and technical literature and publishes assessment reports that are widely recognized as the most credible existing sources of information on climate change. The IPCC also works on methodologies and responds to specific requests from the Convention's subsidiary bodies. The IPCC is independent of the Convention.

**Non-Annex I Parties (to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change):** Refers to signatory countries to the Convention that were considered to be developing countries and are therefore not included in the Convention's Annex I.

**Kyoto Protocol:** An international agreement standing on its own and requiring separate ratification by governments, but linked to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change. The Kyoto Protocol, among other things, sets binding targets for the reduction of greenhouse gas emissions by industrialized countries by an average of 5.2% compared with 1990 emissions, in the period 2008-2012 (The “First Commitment Period” of the Kyoto Protocol). Canada signed onto the Kyoto Protocol on April 29, 1998 and ratified it on December 17, 2002, committing to reduce our greenhouse gas emissions by 6% below 1990 levels. The

Protocol entered into force internationally on February 16, 2005. Australia ratified Kyoto in December 2007, leaving the United States as the only major industrialized nation that has not ratified the agreement.

**Kyoto Mechanisms**: The Kyoto Protocol created three market-based mechanisms that have the potential to help countries reduce the cost of meeting their emissions reduction targets. Use of the mechanisms is restricted to Kyoto Parties and is intended to be supplemental to domestic actions to meet emission reduction targets. The mechanisms are:

**Clean Development Mechanism (CDM)**: Designed to assist developing countries in achieving sustainable development by permitting industrialized countries to finance projects for reducing greenhouse gas emissions in developing countries and receive credit for doing so. This mechanism is provided by Article 12 of the Kyoto Protocol.

**Joint Implementation (JI)**: Allows developed countries to receive "emissions reduction units" when they help to finance projects that reduce net greenhouse gas emissions in another developed country - in practice, the projects are likely to take place in a country with an "economy in transition" such as the former Soviet Block states. The mechanism is provided by Article 6 of the Kyoto Protocol.

**Emissions Trading**: Allows Parties to participate in trading of their assigned amounts for the purposes of fulfilling their commitments at a reduced cost. Parties buying credits can use these toward their commitment under the Kyoto Protocol, while Parties selling must deduct them. Such trading must be supplemental to domestic actions. This mechanism is provided by Article 17 of the Kyoto Protocol.

**Least Developed Countries (LDCs)**: The World's poorest countries. The criteria currently used by the UN's Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) for designation as an LDC include low income, human resource weakness and economic vulnerability. Currently 50 countries have been designated as LDCs.

**Mitigation**: An anthropogenic intervention to reduce the emissions or enhance the sinks of greenhouse gases.

**Subsidiary Body for Implementation (SBI)**: A permanent group established to provide advice to all Parties on all matters concerning policy and implementation of the Convention, including compliance and financial matters.

**Subsidiary Body for Scientific and Technological Advice (SBSTA)**: A permanent group established to provide advice to all Parties on scientific, technological and methodological matters, including climate assessment and observation and serving as a link between information and assessments provided by expert sources (such as the intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change) and the COP.

**Umbrella Group**: A loose coalition of non-European Union developed countries formed following the adoption of the Kyoto Protocol. Although there is no formal membership list, the group usually includes Australia, Canada, Iceland, Japan, New Zealand, Norway, the Russian Federation, Ukraine, and the United States.

**United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC or Convention)**: A treaty signed at the 1992 Earth Summit in Rio de Janeiro that calls for the "stabilization of greenhouse gas concentrations in the atmosphere at a level that would prevent dangerous anthropogenic [human induced] interference with the climate system." The Convention

includes a non-binding call for developed countries to return their emissions to 1990 levels by the year 2000. However, it also included provisions for updates (called "protocols") that would set mandatory emission limits; the principal update being the Kyoto Protocol. Canada ratified the Convention on December 4, 1992 and the Convention took effect in March 1994 upon ratification by more than 50 countries.

### **UNFCCC CoP Meetings and Notable Outcomes**

<b>Date</b>	<b>Meeting</b>	<b>Location</b>	<b>Major Outcomes</b>
1995	CoP 1	Berlin, Germany	The Berlin Mandate
1996	CoP 2	Geneva, Switzerland	No high level declaration *
1997	CoP 3	Kyoto, Japan	Kyoto Protocol
1998	CoP 4	Buenos Aries, Argentina	Buenos Aries Plan of Action
1999	CoP 5	Bonn, Germany	Technical meeting, no major outcomes
2000	CoP 6	The Hague, Netherlands	Suspended without agreement
2001	CoP 6 Bis	Bonn Germany	The Bonn Agreements on the implementation of the Buenos Aries Plan of Action
2001	CoP 7	Marrakesh, Morocco	Marrakesh Accords
2002	CoP 8	New Delhi, India	Delhi Ministerial Declaration on Climate Change and Sustainable Development
2003	CoP 9	Milan, Italy	No high level declaration*
2004	CoP 10	Buenos Aries, Argentina	Buenos Aries Programme of Work on Adaptation and Response Measures
2005	CoP 11	Montreal, Canada	No high level declaration *
2006	CoP 12	Nairobi, Kenya	No high level declaration*
2007	CoP 13	Bali, Indonesia	Bali Action Plan, Bali Road Map
2008	CoP 14	Poznan, Poland	No high level declaration
2009	CoP 15	Copenhagen Denmark	Copenhagen Accord
2010	CoP 16	Cancun, Mexico	Cancun Agreements
2011	CoP 17	Durban, South Africa	
2012	CoP 18	Asia Group	
2013	CoP 19	Western Europe/North America Group	
2014	CoP 20	Latin America	
2015	CoP 21	Africa Group	

\* Decisions were accomplished, but there was lack of an overarching decision or statement

Drafted by: Laura Coates/CCI

Date: Nov. 8, 11



**UNFCCC Negotiations  
Negotiations and Logistics Binder  
COP17 - Durban, South Africa  
November 28 – December 9, 2011**

<b>TAB</b>	
	<b>Overall Logistics</b>
1	CANDEL Calendar
2	Delegation List – Roles and Responsibilities
3	Umbrella Group Heads of Delegation Documents
4	Scenario Note – Réunion de la Francophonie
	<b>Policy Documents</b>
5	Framework Mandate
6	Position Table of Key Blocs and Countries
	<b>LCA Meeting Documents</b>
7	Agenda and Scenario Note
8	Telex of Instructions
	<b>KP Meeting Documents</b>
9	Agenda and Scenario Note
10	Telex of Instructions
	<b>COP</b>
11	Agenda and Annotated Agenda
12	Telex of Instructions
	<b>CMP</b>
13	Agenda and Annotated Agenda
14	Telex of Instructions
	<b>SBSTA Meeting Documents</b>
15	Agenda and Annotated Agenda
16	Telex of Instructions
	<b>SBI Meeting Documents</b>
17	Agenda and Annotated Agenda
18	Telex of Instructions



# COP17 CANDEL Calendar – Negotiations 27 November – 10 December, 2011

Last updated: November 4, 2011

	27 November Sunday	28 November Monday	29 November Tuesday	30 November Wednesday	1 December Thursday	2 December Friday	3 December Saturday
7 <sup>00</sup> to 10 <sup>00</sup>				7:30 – 8:30 – Delegation meeting 8:00 – 9:00 – Daily briefings with stakeholders 9:00 – 10:00 – UG HoDs meeting			
							7:30 (Mike) CCAP Policy Breakfast
10 <sup>00</sup> to 13 <sup>00</sup>	All Day (10:00 – 17:00) UG HoDs Strategy  10:00 – 13:00 UG Expert Groups	10:00 – 11:00 Welcoming Ceremony  11:00 – 13:00 Opening Ceremonies COP17 followed by CMP7	10:00 – 13:00 Opening Plenaries SBSTA and SBI	All Day Workshop on Nairobi Work Program			11:20 DM's arrival
13 <sup>00</sup> to 15 <sup>00</sup>	13:00 – 15:00 UG Expert Groups report to HoDs  UG HoDs Strategy			November 30 or December 1 – Meeting w AFN  Workshop on Nairobi Work Program			
							13:00 to 15:00 - UG Expert Groups Meetings and Side Events
15 <sup>00</sup> to 18 <sup>00</sup>	UG HoDs Strategy	15:00 – 18:00 Opening Plenaries SBSTA and SBI	15:00 – 18:00 Opening Plenaries LCA and KP	Workshop on Nairobi Work Program			15:00 – 18:00 Closing Plenary SBSTA and SBI
18 <sup>00</sup> to 21 <sup>00</sup>	18:30 – 20:30 Delegation Meeting  20:00 Host Country Event						19:30 – 22:00 International Council for Sustainable Energy Annual Dinner (GSJ)
							18:00 to 21:00 - Side Events

# COP17 CANDEL Calendar – Negotiations 27 November – 10 December, 2011

Last updated: November 4, 2011

	4 December Sunday	5 December Monday	6 December Tuesday	7 December Wednesday	8 December Thursday	9 December Friday	10 December Saturday
7 <sup>00</sup> to 10 <sup>00</sup>	8:00 Briefing with the DM (TBC)		7:30 – 8:30 – Delegation meeting (Judy) 8:00 – 8:30 - Ministerial Briefing (SdB) 8:00 – 9:00 – Daily briefings with stakeholders (GSJ) 9:00 – 10:00 – UG HoDs meeting				8:00 – 9:00 Breakfast and Briefing w Minister  9:00 – 9:30 Press Briefing
				Congo Basin Day			
10 <sup>00</sup> to 13 <sup>00</sup>	All Day UG Expert Groups  All Day Side Events		All Day – Negotiations COP, CMP, LCA, KP	All Day – National Statements			
				12:00 – 15:00 Concertation Ministérielle Francophone (Dan)	11:30 – 13:00 SLCF – UNEP Ministerial Announcement	10:00 – 13:00 Closing Plenary LCA and KP	
13 <sup>00</sup> to 15 <sup>00</sup>	UG Expert Groups Side Events	13:00 – 14:30 Briefing w Minister Hotel Candel Room	December 6 or 7 Meeting w Alberta and BC Ministers and Quebec rep	13:00 – 15:00 Provinces and Territories Dinner			
				13:00 to 15:00 – UG Expert Groups Meetings and Side Events			
15 <sup>00</sup> to 18 <sup>00</sup>	UG Expert Groups Side Events	17:00 – 17:30 Press Conference on 1.2 \$ (TBC)	14:30 – 15:00 Minister meet w CANDEL  15:00 – 18:00 Inauguration of High-Level Segment (December 6-9)	17:00 – 17:45 Briefing w Minister		15:00 – 18:00 Closing Plenary COP17 followed by CMP7	
			17:30 – 18:15 – Briefings w Minister (at 17:00 on Wed.) Minister's office at hotel				
18 <sup>00</sup> to 21 <sup>00</sup>	18:30 Networking Dinner (GSJ)  World Business Council for Sustainable Development  21:20 Minister's arrival	18:00 Ministerial Dinner – EU	18:30 – 19:00 – Daily Media Briefings (at 18:00 on Wed.)				
			19:30 – 21:30 UG Ministers Dinner  20:30 Dinner w Nick Stern	18:00 – 18:30 Daily Media Briefings  18:00 SA Reception for Ministers and HoDs		18:00 - Closing Plenary COP17 followed by CMP7 – continued	
						18:00 to 21:00 - Side Events	

# COP 17 ROLES & RESPONSIBILITIES

s.19 (1)

## COP17 High Level Segment Away Team

Name	Position/Team	Contact	Roles and Responsibilities
Paul Boothe (December 4 – December 12 TBC)	Deputy Minister, EC		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Support Minister during High Level Segment</li> <li>Provide regular briefings to Minister and his staff</li> <li>Decision making on the ground on Minister's program (meetings, invitations etc.)</li> <li>Approve briefing materials; communications products</li> <li>Attend bilateral/stakeholder meetings with Minister</li> <li>Attend delegation meetings if appropriate</li> <li>Replace Minister if Minister is not available to attend events, as required</li> <li>Engage separately bilaterally and with stakeholders as necessary</li> <li>Attend negotiation sessions</li> </ul>
Dan McDougall (December 4 – December 12 TBC)	ADM, IAB	Email: <a href="mailto:Dan.McDougall@ec.gc.ca">Dan.McDougall@ec.gc.ca</a> Berry: PIN	
Félix Boudreault (December 4 – December 12 TBC)	Senior Advisor to Deputy Minister	Email: <a href="mailto:Felix.Boudreault@ec.gc.ca">Felix.Boudreault@ec.gc.ca</a> Berry: PIN:	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Support the DM during his attendance at COP</li> <li>Liaise with DMO in Gatineau</li> </ul>
Guy Saint-Jacques (November 26 – December 12)	Chief Negotiator and Ambassador for Climate Change	Email: <a href="mailto:Guy.SaintJacques@ec.gc.ca">Guy.SaintJacques@ec.gc.ca</a> Berry: PIN:	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Lead negotiating process</li> <li>Daily open briefing sessions for stakeholders</li> <li>Daily Umbrella Group Heads of Delegation meetings</li> <li>Daily ad hoc media briefings</li> <li>Participate with Minister at plenary meetings</li> <li>Participate, as necessary, with Minister in bilateral program and stakeholder engagement</li> <li>Engage separately bilaterally and with stakeholders as necessary</li> </ul>
Stephen de Boer (November 26- December 10)	DG, CCI	Email: <a href="mailto:Stephen.deBoer@ec.gc.ca">Stephen.deBoer@ec.gc.ca</a> Berry: PIN:	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Meet the Minister upon arrival, followed by an initial briefing</li> <li>Provide regular briefings to Minister and his staff</li> <li>Approval of Minister's daily program each evening</li> <li>Decision making on the ground re: Minister's meetings</li> <li>Crisis management</li> <li>Focal point for decision making on logistics, Minister's movements etc.</li> </ul>

COP 17 ROLES & RESPONSIBILITIES

		s.19 (1)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Liaise with Communications on all announcements and events</li> <li>• Oversee operations of the High Level Segment</li> <li>• Lead daily high level team meetings for the day and in prep for following day re: Minister's program</li> <li>• Review and make recommendations on invitations to Minister</li> <li>• Approve briefing materials as required</li> <li>• Be on call for Minister's office during high level segment</li> <li>• Accompany Minister to meetings as required</li> </ul>
Laurence Blandford (December 2-December 12)	Director, Partnerships, CCI	Email: <a href="mailto:Laurence.Blandford@ec.gc.ca">Laurence.Blandford@ec.gc.ca</a> Ben PIN	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Support Minister on finance issues; brief and provide support MINO in advance of any finance-related announcements</li> <li>• Brief Minister on progress in the finance negotiations including on fast start financing</li> <li>• Negotiations on GCF and other finance issues</li> </ul>
Kelsey Benson (November 25-December 12)	Lead Logistics, IAB	Email: <a href="mailto:Kelsey.Benson@ec.gc.ca">Kelsey.Benson@ec.gc.ca</a> Berr PIN:	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Overall lead logistics for delegation</li> <li>• Secure accreditation for the whole delegation including Minister and staff</li> <li>• Walk through venue with Chief of Staff, RCMP, etc.</li> <li>• Greet Minister and DM at Hotel upon arrival</li> <li>• Facilitate check in at hotel for Minister, Minister's staff and DM</li> <li>• Help to facilitate Ministers Program, including escorting to all meetings</li> <li>• Attend daily meetings on Ministers Program</li> <li>• Accompany Minister to official/special events</li> <li>• Liaise with IT to provide Minister IT services</li> <li>• Liaise with drivers to coordinate all transportation needs</li> <li>• Respond to requests from MINO as they arise</li> <li>• Organize Minister's office at conference center</li> <li>• Organize meals for Minister and staff</li> <li>• Arrange any official dinners and other meals on site</li> <li>• Facilitate hotel check out and airport drop off for Minister</li> </ul>

# COP 17 ROLES & RESPONSIBILITIES

s.19 (1)

Sarah Bristow (December 3- December 12)	Policy Analyst, Partnerships Division, CCI	Email: <a href="mailto:Sarah.Bristow@ec.gc.ca">Sarah.Bristow@ec.gc.ca</a> Berry PIN:	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Room set-ups and take downs</li> <li>Keeper of the Minister's schedule; responsible for continually updating schedule</li> <li>Liaise with senior management (Stephen) to approve meeting schedule</li> <li>Locate meeting rooms in advance of meetings to ensure the smooth arrival of Minister</li> <li>Confirm meeting times and locations; making adjustments to schedule, timing and movements as necessary and communicating with whole High Level team</li> <li>Provide timely information to senior management about challenges, difficulties and changes to resolve issues quickly</li> <li>Ensure that Minister arrives on time at correct locations for all meetings</li> <li>Liaise with Kelsey to determine movements of the Minister each day</li> <li>Distribute daily schedules to senior management (Stephen)</li> <li>Liaising with RCMP to provide updates on schedule and Minister's movements</li> <li>Respond to requests from MINO as they arise</li> <li>Supporting Kelsey in other logistics issues that arise</li> </ul>
Dany Drouin (November 26- December 12)	Senior Policy Analyst, Negotiations, CCI	Email: <a href="mailto:Dany.Drouin@ec.gc.ca">Dany.Drouin@ec.gc.ca</a> Berry PIN: :	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Support Chief Negotiator on his program and stakeholder engagement</li> <li>Coordinate daily stakeholder briefings</li> <li>Coordinate P/T engagement for Guy and Minister</li> <li>Secure meeting room for daily stakeholder briefings</li> <li>Provide daily reports on stakeholder engagement activities</li> </ul>
Nicolas Leclercq (November 26 - December 12)	Policy Analyst, Negotiations, CCI	Email: <a href="mailto:Nicolas.Leclercq@ec.gc.ca">Nicolas.Leclercq@ec.gc.ca</a> Berry PIN: :	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Coordinate negotiation delegation</li> <li>Update conference documents/binders</li> <li>Prepare daily calendar</li> <li>Develop daily report</li> <li>Prepare and send emails to delegation on logistics and</li> </ul>

# COP 17 ROLES & RESPONSIBILITIES

			processes	<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• Coordinate approval process of draft texts</li><li>• Manage schedule of delegation room</li><li>• Keep track of tweets and meetings</li><li>• Support Chief Negotiator as required</li><li>• General tasks (print documents, check Canada's mailbox, etc)</li><li>• Organize bilateral meetings and interviews for GSJ</li><li>• Prepare documents for daily meeting</li><li>• Backup support for the negotiations</li></ul>
<b>High Commission Staff</b>				
Adèle Dion (December 4 – December 11)	High Commissioner	Email: <a href="mailto:Adele.Dion@international.gc.ca">Adele.Dion@international.gc.ca</a> Ph: 011-27-82-379-1130	<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• Support the Minister during the High Level Segment</li><li>• Host the P/T dinner</li><li>• Meet P/T Ministers at airport</li><li>• Meetings with P/Ts and industry representatives</li></ul>	
Patrick Cram (November 24 – December 11)	Second Secretary, High Commission	Email: <a href="mailto:Patrick.Cram@international.gc.ca">Patrick.Cram@international.gc.ca</a> Ph: 011-27-82-772-7223	<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• Overall logistics support to the delegation and during the High Level segment</li><li>• Main High Commission contact</li><li>• Provide support on setting up bilateral meetings</li></ul>	
Lisa Armstrong (November 24 – December 11)	Management Officer, High Commission	Email: <a href="mailto:Lisa.Armstrong@international.gc.ca">Lisa.Armstrong@international.gc.ca</a> Ph: 011-27-82-413-2366	<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• Manage funds and invoicing</li><li>• Provide logistical support and local knowledge to delegation</li><li>• Logistics for P/T dinner</li></ul>	
Valery Yiptong (November 24 – December 11)	Public affairs Officer, High Commission	Email: <a href="mailto:Valery.Yiptong@international.gc.ca">Valery.Yiptong@international.gc.ca</a> Ph: 011-27-82-440-6566	<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• Support to the P/T representatives</li><li>• Manage schedule for the P/T room</li><li>• Manage local media, liaison with EC Comms on press events</li><li>• Press theatre equipment</li></ul>	
Mike Saulnier (November 24 – December 11)	Security Manager, High Commission	Email: <a href="mailto:Mike.Saulnier@international.gc.ca">Mike.Saulnier@international.gc.ca</a> Ph: 011-27-82-378-1421	<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• Main contact on security issues</li><li>• Liaise with RCMP, local security and UNFCCC security</li></ul>	
<b>EC Communications</b>				
Darcy Cornu (November 28- December 9)	Strategic Communications Advisor, Climate	Email: <a href="mailto:Darcy.Cornu@ec.gc.ca">Darcy.Cornu@ec.gc.ca</a> Ber PIN	<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• Oversight of communications activities and products</li><li>• Monitoring of status of negotiations and adjust communications strategy as required</li></ul>	

s.19 (1)



# COP 17 ROLES & RESPONSIBILITIES

	Change Communications	s.19 (1)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Provide strategic advice to EC members of Canadian delegation</li> <li>• Brief Canadian delegation on media clippings and issues as they arise</li> <li>• Liaison with NHQ team – Lead the morning call</li> <li>• Drafting of communications products as required</li> <li>• Moderate daily media briefings</li> <li>• Provide strategic advice to EC members of Canadian delegation</li> <li>• Media relations support</li> <li>• Provide photography support</li> </ul>
Jennifer Pelley (November 28 – December 9)	Communications Advisor, Climate Change Communications	Email: <a href="mailto:Jenn.Pelley@ec.gc.ca">Jenn.Pelley@ec.gc.ca</a> Berr PIN:	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Drafting of communications products as required</li> <li>• Provide communications support for the Canadian delegation</li> <li>• Media relations support</li> <li>• Media monitoring and stakeholder analysis</li> <li>• Logistical support for daily stakeholder and press briefings</li> <li>• Information gathering and monitoring of negotiation issues</li> <li>• OGD coordination</li> <li>• Provide photography support</li> </ul>
Céline Tremblay (December 5 – 9)	A/Manager, Ministerial Services	Email: <a href="mailto:Celine.Tremblay@ec.gc.ca">Celine.Tremblay@ec.gc.ca</a> Berry PIN: ;	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Logistical support for daily stakeholder and press briefings</li> <li>• Support for events</li> <li>• Provide support for web postings and translation</li> <li>• Ministerial support</li> </ul>

## COP 17 ROLES &amp; RESPONSIBILITIES

COP17 Negotiations Team

Name	Position/Team	Contact	Roles and Responsibilities
Guy Saint-Jacques (November 26)	Chief Negotiator and Ambassador for Climate Change	Email: <a href="mailto:Guy.SaintJacques@ec.gc.ca">Guy.SaintJacques@ec.gc.ca</a> Berry PIN:	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Lead negotiating process</li> <li>• Daily open briefing sessions for stakeholders</li> <li>• Daily Umbrella Group Heads of Delegation meetings</li> <li>• Daily ad hoc media briefings</li> <li>• Participate with Minister at plenary meetings</li> <li>• Participate, as necessary, with Minister in bilateral program and stakeholder engagement</li> <li>• Engage separately bilaterally and with stakeholders as necessary</li> </ul>
Stephen de Boer (November 26)	DG, CCI	Email: <a href="mailto:Stephen.deBoer@ec.gc.ca">Stephen.deBoer@ec.gc.ca</a> Berry PIN:2	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Meet the Minister upon arrival, followed by an initial briefing</li> <li>• Provide regular briefings to Minister and his staff</li> <li>• Approval of Minister's daily program each evening</li> <li>• Decision making on the ground re: Minister's meetings</li> <li>• Crisis management</li> <li>• Focal point for decision making on logistics, Minister's movements etc.</li> <li>• Liaise with Communications on all announcements and events</li> <li>• Oversee operations of the High Level Segment</li> <li>• Lead daily high level team meetings for the day and in prep for following day re: Minister's program</li> <li>• Review and make recommendations on invitations to Minister</li> <li>• Approve briefing materials as required</li> <li>• Be on call for Minister's office during high level segment</li> <li>• Accompany Minister to meetings as required</li> </ul>
Judith Gelbman (November 26)	Director, Negotiations, Climate Change International, EC	Email : <a href="mailto:judith.gelbman@ec.gc.ca">judith.gelbman@ec.gc.ca</a> Berry PIN	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Delegation and issues management</li> <li>• Review of draft text</li> <li>• Support to Chief Negotiator</li> <li>• Lead for all streams of negotiations</li> </ul>



s.19 (1)

# COP 17 ROLES & RESPONSIBILITIES

Laurence Blandford (December 2 - TBC)	Director, Partnerships, CCI	Email: <a href="mailto:Laurence.Blandford@ec.gc.ca">Laurence.Blandford@ec.gc.ca</a> Berr PIN:	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Support Minister on finance issues; brief and provide support MINO in advance of any finance-related announcements</li> <li>Brief Minister on progress in the finance negotiations including on fast start financing</li> <li>Negotiations on GCF and other finance issues</li> </ul>
Mark Berman (November 23 )	Director, Climate Change and Energy Division, DFAIT	Email: <a href="mailto:Mark.berman@international.gc.ca">Mark.berman@international.gc.ca</a> Berry:	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>SBI Coordinator</li> <li>Budget and institutional matters</li> </ul>
Niall O'Dea (November 27)	Director, Climate Change Impacts & Adaptation Division, NRCan	Email: <a href="mailto:niall.o'dea@nrcan.mcan.gc.ca">niall.o'dea@nrcan.mcan.gc.ca</a> Berr PIN:	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Nairobi Work Program</li> <li>Research and systemic observation</li> </ul>
Normand Tremblay (November 26)	Chief, Negotiations, Climate Change International, EC	Email: <a href="mailto:normand.tremblay@ec.gc.ca">normand.tremblay@ec.gc.ca</a> Berry PIN:	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>SBSTA Coordinator</li> <li>Bunkers</li> <li>International Transaction Log</li> <li>Unilateral trade measures support</li> <li>Equitable access to sustainable development</li> </ul>
Richard Tarasofsky (November 26 )	Deputy Director, Environmental Law Section, DFAIT	Email: <a href="mailto:richard.tarasofsky@international.gc.ca">richard.tarasofsky@international.gc.ca</a> Berry:	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Lead legal counsel</li> <li>Review of all draft texts</li> <li>Legal options / legal form</li> <li>Amendments to the Convention</li> <li>Unilateral trade measures</li> </ul>
Anik Beaudoin (November 26)	Legal Counsel, Environmental Law Section, DFAIT	Email: <a href="mailto:anik.beaudoin@international.gc.ca">anik.beaudoin@international.gc.ca</a> Berry	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Legal counsel</li> <li>Review of all draft text</li> <li>Legal options / legal form</li> <li>Amendments to KP</li> </ul>
Cecilia Lei (November 26) 000523	Senior Policy Advisor, Negotiations, Climate Change International, EC	Email: <a href="mailto:cecilia.lei@ec.gc.ca">cecilia.lei@ec.gc.ca</a> Berr PIN	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>COP and LCA Coordinator</li> <li>Shared Vision</li> <li>Mitigation – developed and developing countries</li> <li>Registry</li> <li>Review</li> </ul>
Scott Wilson (November 26)	Senior Policy Analyst, Multilateral Affairs, EC	Email: <a href="mailto:scott.wilson@ec.gc.ca">scott.wilson@ec.gc.ca</a> Berr PIN:	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Finance</li> <li>Financial mechanisms - GCF, LDCF, Adaptation Fund</li> </ul>

## COP 17 ROLES &amp; RESPONSIBILITIES

s.19 (1)

Jodi Browne (November 26)	Senior Policy Analyst, Negotiations, CCI, EC	Email: <a href="mailto:jodi.browne@ec.gc.ca">jodi.browne@ec.gc.ca</a> Berry PIN:	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Carbon Markets</li> <li>Capacity Building</li> </ul>
Michael Enns (November 26)	Senior Policy Analyst, Negotiations, CCI, EC	Email: <a href="mailto:Michael.enns@ec.gc.ca">Michael.enns@ec.gc.ca</a> Berry PIN:	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Mitigation – developed and developing countries</li> <li>Measurement, Reporting, Verification</li> <li>National Communications</li> </ul>
Jackie Mercer (November 26)	Senior Program Engineer, Greenhouse Gas Division, EC	Email: <a href="mailto:Jackie.mercer@ec.gc.ca">Jackie.mercer@ec.gc.ca</a> Berry PIN: ;	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>National Communications</li> <li>Inventories</li> <li>Common Metrics</li> <li>Gases</li> </ul>
Michelle Campbell (November 25)	Senior Advisor, Climate Change and Energy, DFAIT	Email: <a href="mailto:michelle.campbell@international.gc.ca">michelle.campbell@international.gc.ca</a> Berry PIN: ;	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>CMP and KP Coordinator</li> <li>National Communications support</li> <li>Response Measures</li> </ul>
Beth Lavender (November 25)	Senior Policy Analyst, Climate Change and Energy, DFAIT	Email: <a href="mailto:beth.lavender@international.gc.ca">beth.lavender@international.gc.ca</a> Berry:	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Adaptation</li> <li>Capacity Building support</li> <li>Financial Institutions support</li> </ul>
Susan Weston (November 26)	Senior Policy Analyst, Int'l Environmental Policy Division, NRCan	Email: <a href="mailto:susan.weston@nrcan.nrcan.gc.ca">susan.weston@nrcan.nrcan.gc.ca</a> Berry: PIN:	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Technology</li> <li>Intellectual Property Rights</li> </ul>
Tony Lemprière (November 25)	Chief, Climate Change Policy, NRCan	Email: <a href="mailto:tony.lempriere@nrcan.nrcan.gc.ca">tony.lempriere@nrcan.nrcan.gc.ca</a> Berry: PIN:	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>LULUCF</li> <li>REDD+</li> </ul>
Peter Graham (November 23)	Senior Economist, Economic Analysis Division, Canadian Forest Service, NRCan	Email: <a href="mailto:peter.graham@nrcan.nrcan.gc.ca">peter.graham@nrcan.nrcan.gc.ca</a> Berry: PIN:	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>REDD+</li> <li>LULUCF</li> </ul>
Marie Boehm (November 26)	Physical Science Senior Officer, AAFC	Email: <a href="mailto:marie.boehm@agr.gc.ca">marie.boehm@agr.gc.ca</a> Berry PIN:	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Agriculture</li> <li>LULUCF</li> </ul>
Alexandra Conliffe (November 25)	Physical Science Officer, AAFC	Email: <a href="mailto:alexandra.conliffe@agr.gc.ca">alexandra.conliffe@agr.gc.ca</a> Berry: PIN: 2	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Agriculture</li> <li>LULUCF</li> </ul>
Nicolas Leclercq (November 26)	Policy Analyst, Negotiations, CCI	Email: <a href="mailto:Nicolas.Leclercq@ec.gc.ca">Nicolas.Leclercq@ec.gc.ca</a> Berry PIN: ;	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Coordinate negotiation delegation</li> <li>Economies in Transition and Parties with special circumstances</li> <li>Backup support in the negotiations</li> </ul>

000524

s.19 (1)

# COP 17 ROLES & RESPONSIBILITIES

## COP17 Home Team

Name	Team	Work Contact	After Hours	Proposed Role/Responsibility
Christina Paradiso	Senior Advisor to the ADM of IAB	Email: <a href="mailto:Christina.Paradiso@ec.gc.ca">Christina.Paradiso@ec.gc.ca</a> Work Ph: 994-2370 Berr PIN:		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Coordinate requests from Durban to Ottawa and from Ottawa to Durban</li> <li>Regular day-to-day operations of ADMO</li> </ul>
Helena Olivas	Manager, Bilateral and Multilateral Team (Acting Director while Laurence is away), Partnerships Division	Email: <a href="mailto:Helena.Olivas@ec.gc.ca">Helena.Olivas@ec.gc.ca</a> Work Ph: 819-953-8289 Berry: PIN: 2		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Overall responsibility for Home Team as Acting Director (Nov. 30 – Dec. 12)</li> <li>Will be responsible for regular day-to-day CCI business during COP</li> <li>Responsible for bilateral/multilateral files</li> <li>Reviewing dockets and responses to correspondence requests not related to FSF or partnerships.</li> <li>Key contact for scenario note requests</li> <li>Approval of notes before transmitting to Durban</li> <li>Continue to work on OECD Mexico review</li> <li>Continue moving HR processes forward.</li> </ul>
Franck Portalupi	Manager, Partnerships Division	Email: <a href="mailto:Franck.Portalupi@ec.gc.ca">Franck.Portalupi@ec.gc.ca</a> Work Ph: 819-997-2375 Berry PIN: 2		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Responsible for technology partnerships team</li> <li>Provide fast start financing information, project details and updates</li> <li>Ensure continued implementation of FSF activities</li> <li>Responsible for dockets related to partnerships and FSF.</li> </ul>
Erin Silsbe	Senior Policy Analyst	Email: <a href="mailto:Erin.Silsbe@ec.gc.ca">Erin.Silsbe@ec.gc.ca</a> Work Ph: 819-953-9253 Berry PIN: 1		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Key contact on finance issues</li> <li>Provide input into scenario notes on finance issues and FSF project details</li> </ul>
Don Lemmen	Research Manager, Climate Change Impacts & Adaptation Division, NRCan	Email: <a href="mailto:don.lemmen@nrcan-rncan.gc.ca">don.lemmen@nrcan-rncan.gc.ca</a> Berry PIN: 1		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Key contact on the Nairobi Work Program</li> </ul>

# COP 17 ROLES & RESPONSIBILITIES

s.19 (1)

Karin Simonson	Policy Analyst, Economics and Industry Branch, Canadian Forest Service, NRCan	Email: <a href="mailto:karin.simonson@nrcan-mcan.gc.ca">karin.simonson@nrcan-mcan.gc.ca</a> Berry PIN :		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Key contact on LULUCF</li> </ul>
Dan Jutzi	Senior Policy Analyst	Email: <a href="mailto:Dan.Jutzi@ec.gc.ca">Dan.Jutzi@ec.gc.ca</a> Work Ph: 819-994-3654 Berry PIN:		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Leads CCI's input to multilateral processes (e.g. IPCC, G8, G20)</li> <li>• Draft scenario notes</li> </ul>
Amanda Kramer	Senior Program Officer	Email: <a href="mailto:Amanda.Kramer@ec.gc.ca">Amanda.Kramer@ec.gc.ca</a> Work Ph: 819-956-4875 Berry: PIN: 2		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Continue to lead on FSF implementation of building sector NAMAS</li> <li>• Support on FSF questions/input in relation to project implementation</li> <li>• Support with dockets related to partnerships and FSF.</li> </ul>
Joseph Odhiambo	Senior Program Officer	Email: <a href="mailto:Joseph.Odhiambo@ec.gc.ca">Joseph.Odhiambo@ec.gc.ca</a> Work Ph: 819-953-9334 Berry PIN:		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Continue to lead on SLCF and provide input on anything related to that file.</li> <li>• FSF implementation of oil and gas sector NAMAS.</li> <li>• Provide support on the UNEP Short Lived Climate Forces Announcement</li> <li>• Support on FSF questions/input in relation to project implementation</li> <li>• Support with dockets related to partnerships and FSF.</li> <li>• Draft scenario notes</li> </ul>
Waheed Khan	Senior Policy Analyst	Email: <a href="mailto:Waheed@Khan@ec.gc.ca">Waheed@Khan@ec.gc.ca</a> Work Ph: 819-953-8250		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• its implementation.</li> <li>• Support with dockets and ATIPs</li> </ul>
Jessica Strauss	Senior Policy Analyst	Email: <a href="mailto:Jessica.Strauss@ec.gc.ca">Jessica.Strauss@ec.gc.ca</a> Work Ph: 819-953-4474 Berry PIN:		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Provide information on fast start financing contributions and disbursements of developed countries</li> <li>• Respond to dockets and scenario notes</li> <li>• Draft scenario notes</li> </ul>

s.19 (1)

COP 17 ROLES & RESPONSIBILITIES

Laura Coates	Policy Analyst	Email: <a href="mailto:Laura.Coates@ec.gc.ca">Laura.Coates@ec.gc.ca</a> Work Ph: 819-953-4588 Berry PIN:	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Provide analysis on GHG data</li> <li>• General support for negotiations</li> <li>• Respond to dockets and correspondence requests</li> </ul>
Maria Clavijo	Program Officer	Email: <a href="mailto:Maria.Clavijo@ec.gc.ca">Maria.Clavijo@ec.gc.ca</a> Work Ph: 819-956-4914	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Responsible for CCI's input to OECD processes</li> <li>• Draft scenario notes</li> <li>• Respond to dockets and correspondence requests</li> </ul>
<b>EC Communications</b>			
David Henley	Director General, Communications Branch	Email: <a href="mailto:david.henley@ec.gc.ca">david.henley@ec.gc.ca</a> Berry: PIN: ; Work: 819-997-6820	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Oversee branch communications activities</li> <li>• Participate in daily calls</li> <li>• Provide high-level support as needed</li> </ul>
Roch Rollin	Director – Programs & Production Communications	Email: <a href="mailto:Roch.Rollin@ec.gc.ca">Roch.Rollin@ec.gc.ca</a> Berry: PIN: Work:	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Overall responsibility for Home Team including providing direction to support required activities.</li> <li>• Provide strategic advice to DG Comm</li> <li>• Participate in daily call with key players in NHQ and South Africa to identify issues/requirements</li> </ul>
Lindsay Valente	Climate Change Comms	Email: <a href="mailto:Lindsay.Valente@ec.gc.ca">Lindsay.Valente@ec.gc.ca</a> Berry PIN: Work: 819-953-8772	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Detect and correct report</li> <li>• Participate in daily calls</li> <li>• Stakeholder reports and analysis</li> <li>• Develop quick response products as requested</li> </ul>
David Sullivan	Climate Change Comms	Email: <a href="mailto:David.sullivan@ec.gc.ca">David.sullivan@ec.gc.ca</a> Berry: PIN: Work: 819-934-1858	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Proactively monitor stakeholder responses</li> <li>• Assist with detect and correct reports</li> <li>• Approvals tracking</li> </ul>
Chantal Reinert	Director, Ministerial Services	Email: <a href="mailto:Chantal.Reinert@ec.gc.ca">Chantal.Reinert@ec.gc.ca</a> Berry: PIN: 2 Work: 819-953-1702	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Provide strategic advice to the DG of Communications.</li> <li>• Liaise with DMO, MO and PCO on product approvals</li> <li>• Lead daily communications call from NCR</li> <li>• Liaison with away team on media product approvals</li> </ul>

# COP 17 ROLES & RESPONSIBILITIES

s.19 (1)

					<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Manage requests for drafting of speech texts, op eds, speaking notes as required</li> </ul>
Céline Tremblay (week 1)	Manager, Ministerial Services	Email: <a href="mailto:Celine.Tremblay@ec.gc.ca">Celine.Tremblay@ec.gc.ca</a> Berry PIN: Work: 819-934-8094	Home:		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Logistical support for daily stakeholder and press briefings</li> <li>Liaison with MINO</li> <li>Coordinates translation of short text (photo captions, etc)</li> <li>Issue news releases and media advisories to CNW and GL upload</li> </ul>
Back-up (week 2) – Melanie Larose					
Renee David	Manager, Media Services	Email: <a href="mailto:Renee.David@ec.gc.ca">Renee.David@ec.gc.ca</a> Berry PIN: Work: 819-994-8178	Home:		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Oversee coordination of media requests</li> <li>Coordinate daily media clips package</li> <li>Develop media plan</li> <li>Liaison with DMO, MINO and PCO on media requests</li> </ul>
Anie Cyr	Production Services	Email: <a href="mailto:Anie.Cyr@ec.gc.ca">Anie.Cyr@ec.gc.ca</a> Work: 819-953-8029	Home:		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Project manager for production of communications projects (backdrops, fact sheets, etc).</li> </ul>
Jocelyne Lefavre	Editor / Translation	Email: <a href="mailto:jocelyne.lefavre@ec.gc.ca">jocelyne.lefavre@ec.gc.ca</a> Work: (819) 934-1854	Home:		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Coordinate translation requests</li> <li>Provide quick translation service</li> </ul>
Charlie Sanford	Web Team	Email: <a href="mailto:GLUpload@ec.gc.ca">GLUpload@ec.gc.ca</a> Berry: PIN: Work:	<a href="mailto:GLUpload@ec.gc.ca">GLUpload@ec.gc.ca</a>		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Web posting of communications products</li> <li>Posting of photos and social media updates</li> </ul>

**Page(s) 000529 to\à 000538**

**Is(Are) exempted pursuant to section(s)  
est(sont) exemptée(s) en vertu de(s)(l')article(s)**

**15(1), 21(1)(a), 21(1)(b)**

**of the Access to Information Act  
de la Loi sur l'accès à l'information**

**Umbrella Group**

**Heads of Delegation Strategy Meeting**

**s.15(1)**

**27 November 2011**

*Athlone Room, Durban Country Club,*

*Isaiah Ntshangase Road, Durban*

***Chair: H.E. Ms Louise Hand PSM, Ambassador for Climate Change, Australia***

**10:00 – 10:15am**

**10:15 – 10:45am**

**10:45 – 11:00am**

**11:00 – 12:25pm**

**12:25 – 12:30pm**

**12.30 – 1.00 pm**

**1:00 – 1:45 pm      Lunch (Grill Room)**



**s.15(1)**

**1:45 – 2:45 pm**

**2:45 – 3:00pm**

**3:00 – 3.30pm**

**3.30 – 3.50pm(TBC**

**3.50 – 4.10pm(TBC**

**4.10 – 4.30pm(TBC**

**4:30 – 4:50pm**

**4:50 – 5:15pm**

**5:15 – 6:30pm**

**Reception (*Umsinsi Room*)**

DA

<b>NOTE DE SCÉNARIO: DÉJEUNER-DÉBAT CONCERTATION MINISTÉRIELLE À LA CDP-17/RDP-7</b>	
<b>HEURE ET ENDROIT</b>	<p>Date Mercredi 7 décembre 2011</p> <p>Heure 12 h 30 – 15 h (déjeuner-débat)</p> <p>Endroit <u>Suncoast Hotel and Towers</u> Suncoast Boulevard Marine Parade, Durban KwaZulu- Natal; Tél. : (031) 328 3000   Téléc. : (031) 328 3001</p>
<b>PARTICIPANTS (À CONFIRMER)</b>	<p><b>Canada</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• Guy Saint-Jacques, Négociateur en chef et ambassadeur du Canada sur les changements climatiques</li></ul>
<b>CONTEXTE DE LA RENCONTRE</b>	<p>Depuis plusieurs années, les États et gouvernements membres de la Francophonie organisent une rencontre en marge de chacune des conférences des parties à la Convention-cadre des Nations Unies sur les changements climatiques (CCNUC). L'ordre du jour de la rencontre est ci-joint (Annexe I).</p> <p>La Suisse préside cette concertation à Durban, car elle détient la présidence du Sommet de la Francophonie (pendant un cycle de deux ans, 2010-2012), depuis le dernier sommet qui s'est tenu à Montreux du 22 au 24 octobre 2010. Voir ci-joint la Déclaration de Montreux (Annexe II). Notez que le ministre Prentice a présidé les concertations de Copenhague 2009 et Poznań 2008 pendant la présidence canadienne du Sommet de la Francophonie qui s'était tenu à Québec en octobre 2008.</p> <p>Des provinces et territoires canadiennes, seul le Québec sera représenté à la concertation ministérielle francophone par Charles Laroche, sous-ministre adjoint, ou François Émond, le chef de Cabinet de Pierre Arcand, le ministre du Développement durable, de l'Environnement et des Parcs. Contrairement à l'année passée, le ministre Arcand ne fait pas partie de la délégation canadienne à la Conférence des Parties à Durban.</p> <p>L'Institut de l'énergie et de l'environnement de la Francophonie (IEPF) a préparé une série d'événements parallèles auxquels le Québec voudra vraisemblablement participer. Vous trouverez ci-joint les détails des autres événements préparés par l'IEPF à Durban.</p>

	<p>Cette année, le thème de la concertation ministérielle est «<i>La Francophonie : un espace solidaire pour des partenariats innovants dans la lutte contre les changements climatiques</i>».</p> <p>Les notes préparées pour expliquer la position canadienne à Durban seront d'utiles références en vue de ces discussions.</p>
<b>RÔLE</b>	Les participants ont l'occasion de faire une brève intervention exposant leur approche sur les questions à l'ordre du jour de la Conférence des Parties.
<b>OBJECTIFS ET RESULTATS ATTENDUS</b>	

s.14  
s.21(1)(a)  
s.21(1)(b)

s.15(1)

**CONTEXTE**

**Page(s) 000543 to\à 000546**

**Is(Are) exempted pursuant to section(s)  
est(sont) exemptée(s) en vertu de(s)(l')article(s)**

**15(1), 21(1)(a), 21(1)(b)**

**of the Access to Information Act  
de la Loi sur l'accès à l'information**

**ANNEXE I**

## **CONCERTATION MINISTÉRIELLE DÉJEUNER**

**Jeudi 8 décembre 2011; 12h30 – 15h00**

Suncoast Hotel and Towers

Suncoast Boulevard Marine Parade | Durban KwaZulu-Natal

Tél. : (031) 328 3000 | Téléc. : (031) 328 3001

**Objectif**

L'objectif de la concertation ministérielle est d'ouvrir un débat entre les Ministres et les Chefs des délégations francophones et les partenaires au développement autour des principaux enjeux du nouveau régime de gestion du climat après 2012. Le débat portera notamment sur les issues possibles des négociations de la Conférence de Durban et les possibilités de développement de partenariats innovants pour la lutte contre les changements climatiques dans l'espace francophone.

La concertation sera présidée par la Suisse, actuel président du Sommet de la Francophonie.

**Public-cible :**

Ministres et chefs de délégations

Négociateurs / points focaux de la Convention Climat, élus

Organisation régionales et internationales

<b>13:00 – 13:20</b>	<b>Ouverture :</b>  Mot de bienvenue :  Allocution d'ouverture et présidence : SUISSE
<b>13:20- 14:00</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• Exposé introductif : « <b>Quelles perspectives pour l'après Durban ?</b> »</li><li>• Interventions des pays<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>○ Fédération de la Wallonie Bruxelles : "<b>Des outils innovateurs et des effets concrets dans le cadre du financement rapide de la lutte contre le changement climatique</b>".</li><li>○ Autres pays (en attente de confirmation)</li></ul></li><li>• Interventions des Organisations Internationales :<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>○ FEM (en attente de confirmation)</li><li>○ AFD (en attente de confirmation)</li><li>○ BOAD (en attente de confirmation)</li></ul></li></ul>
<b>14:00 – 14:45</b>	▪ Discussions et débats
<b>14 :50 – 15 :00</b>	<b>Clôture</b>

## **ANNEXE II**

### **DÉCLARATION DE MONTREUX**

#### **XIIIe Conférence des Chefs d'État et de gouvernement des pays ayant le français en partage Montreux (Suisse), 23-24 octobre 2010**

1. Nous, Chefs d'État et de gouvernement des pays ayant le français en partage, réunis les 23 et 24 octobre 2010 à Montreux, en Suisse, à l'occasion du XIIIe Sommet de la Francophonie, coïncidant avec le 40e anniversaire de la création de la Francophonie institutionnelle, avons décidé de consacrer ce XIIIe Sommet aux :  
Défis et visions d'avenir pour la Francophonie

2. Nous affirmons que la langue française constitue le creuset originel de la coopération et de la solidarité entre nos États et gouvernements et entre nos peuples, présents sur les cinq continents. Sa promotion est au cœur des missions de la Francophonie.

3. Nous réitérons notre volonté de promouvoir la diversité culturelle et le multilinguisme.

4. Nous réaffirmons, en cette année du 10e anniversaire de la Déclaration de Bamako, que la construction de la paix, la démocratie, l'État de droit, le respect et la promotion des droits de l'Homme et l'égalité entre les hommes et les femmes constituent la clef de voûte des valeurs communes de la Francophonie.

5. Nous tenons à renforcer les solidarités et les concertations francophones, y compris dans le cadre des enceintes multilatérales, pour relever les défis majeurs auxquels nous sommes confrontés.

#### **I. La Francophonie acteur des relations internationales et sa place dans la gouvernance mondiale**

6. Nous décidons de consolider la place et la visibilité de la Francophonie dans la gouvernance mondiale, conscients de sa valeur ajoutée comme acteur des relations internationales. Nous nous accordons sur l'importance d'un système multilatéral équilibré, efficace et représentatif du monde d'aujourd'hui, fondé sur une Organisation des Nations Unies (ONU) à la fois forte et renouvelée. À cet effet, nous affirmons notre engagement à dynamiser la concertation francophone dans les enceintes internationales et à y participer de manière active, en particulier sur les questions de gouvernance politique et économique au sein de l'ONU, en nous appuyant sur des consultations menées avec la société civile. Nous appelons à une réforme urgente du Conseil de sécurité des Nations Unies.

7. Nous nous engageons à conforter la solidarité économique francophone. Nous exprimons notre solidarité avec les pays les plus affectés par la crise économique et nous nous mobilisons pour favoriser l'émergence d'une gouvernance mondiale équitable, prenant en compte la situation des États les plus vulnérables. Nous appelons à une réforme de la gouvernance économique mondiale par le renforcement de la coopération et de la complémentarité entre l'ONU, cœur de la gouvernance mondiale, et les enceintes économiques, dont le G20. Nous les invitons à se mobiliser en 2011 sur les mesures à prendre dans les domaines vitaux pour les pays de l'espace francophone : la sécurité alimentaire, les réformes de la régulation financière et du système monétaire international, et la promotion d'une croissance économique mondiale forte, soutenue, durable et inclusive.

8. Nous tenons à saluer la visite conjointe des Secrétaires généraux de la Francophonie et du Commonwealth préalablement à la tenue du G8 et du G20 à Muskoka et Toronto, au Canada, du 25 au 27 juin 2010, qui leur a permis de présenter les perspectives des deux organisations sur les enjeux figurant à l'ordre du jour de ces réunions. Nous encourageons la poursuite de cette initiative.

9. Nous réaffirmons notre engagement commun à lutter aux niveaux national, régional et international contre les graves menaces transversales que sont le terrorisme, la piraterie, la criminalité organisée, le trafic de drogue et de personnes ainsi que la corruption, qui

compromettent la paix et la stabilité. Nous prenons des engagements dans les résolutions afférentes adoptées par ce Sommet. Nous appelons au respect et à l'application des diverses conventions de lutte contre ces menaces, adoptées dans le cadre des Nations Unies.

10. Nous reconnaissons que le développement, la paix et la sécurité, et les droits de l'Homme sont inséparables et se renforcent mutuellement. La violence armée mine la paix et la sécurité et exerce un effet négatif sur le développement humain, social, politique et économique. Par conséquent, nous nous engageons à combattre, par les moyens diplomatiques et juridiques appropriés, la violence armée, qui porte atteinte à la sécurité, aux principes et valeurs découlant du plein respect des droits de l'Homme, et qui entrave la réalisation des Objectifs du Millénaire pour le Développement (OMD).

11. Nous réaffirmons que la Déclaration de Bamako et celle de Saint Boniface constituent les instruments de référence de la Francophonie au service de la paix, de la démocratie, de la consolidation de l'État de droit, du respect des droits de l'Homme, de la prévention des conflits et de la sécurité humaine. Nous nous engageons à renforcer, dans le cadre de la Résolution adoptée par ce Sommet, leurs modalités de mise en oeuvre et de suivi dans tout l'espace francophone.

12. Nous estimons nécessaire à cet égard de partager les pratiques utiles prévalant dans chacun de nos pays en vue d'une vie politique apaisée, reposant notamment sur la coexistence harmonieuse de toutes les composantes de nos sociétés. Nous demandons à l'OIF, en liaison avec l'APF et les opérateurs, de nous accompagner dans ce dialogue.

13. Nous réaffirmons le rôle privilégié de la Francophonie pour contribuer au règlement des crises et des conflits dans l'espace francophone. Nous déplorons les situations qui perdurent dans certains de nos pays et soulignons notre détermination à accompagner ceux-ci dans les phases de sortie de crise, de transition et de consolidation de la paix, dans le cadre de la Résolution adoptée par ce Sommet.

14. Nous reconnaissons le rôle des entités fédérées, des régions et des collectivités territoriales dans la mise en oeuvre des engagements internationaux touchant leurs secteurs de compétences.

15. Nous saluons la création de l'Agence ONU-Femmes et encourageons l'OIF à travailler en synergie avec elle. Persuadés que le rôle des femmes dans nos sociétés est fondamental et au nom du principe d'égalité, nous réaffirmons notre volonté de renforcer leur participation à la prise de décision. Pour prévenir et combattre les actes de violence ou de discrimination, nous prendrons toutes les mesures déclinées dans la Déclaration francophone sur les violences faites aux femmes.

16. Nous nous félicitons de l'impulsion nouvelle donnée à la participation de pays francophones aux opérations de maintien de la paix (OMP) depuis le Sommet de Québec de 2008, notamment dans le cadre de l'ONU. Nous encourageons la poursuite du travail réalisé par les États membres, en partage de responsabilité avec le Secrétariat général de l'ONU, pour accroître l'offre de contingents francophones civils et militaires et pour prendre des mesures concrètes en vue de renforcer leurs capacités et faciliter l'accès des francophones à des postes de commandement aux OMP. Il appartient à l'ONU de veiller pour sa part au respect du multilinguisme dans les opérations de maintien de la paix.

17. Nous réaffirmons notre soutien aux efforts en vue de parvenir à une paix juste, durable et globale au Moyen-Orient, permettant notamment l'existence de deux États, Israël et la Palestine, vivant côte à côte dans la paix et la sécurité, à l'intérieur de frontières internationalement reconnues. Elle devra être fondée sur les résolutions pertinentes des Nations Unies, particulièrement les résolutions 242, 338, 1397 et 1515 du Conseil de sécurité, les termes de référence de la Conférence de Madrid, la feuille de route du Quartet et l'Initiative de Paix Arabe telle qu'adoptée au Sommet de Beyrouth. Nous soutenons les appels visant à créer au Moyen-Orient une zone exempte d'armes de destruction massive, notamment des armes nucléaires. Nous nous félicitons en ce sens de l'adoption par la 8e Conférence d'examen du traité de non prolifération nucléaire de mai 2010 d'« étapes pratiques » en vue de mettre en oeuvre une telle zone au Moyen-Orient.

18. Nous exprimons notre solidarité avec le peuple haïtien à la suite du terrible tremblement de terre qui a dévasté le pays en janvier 2010 et nous nous engageons à redoubler d'efforts pour la reconstruction du pays. Nous réaffirmons notre volonté de soutenir la mise en oeuvre

du Plan d'action de la Francophonie pour la reconstruction d'Haïti et des engagements de la Résolution concernant Haïti adoptée par ce Sommet.

II. La Francophonie et le développement durable :

les solidarités francophones face aux grands défis (notamment la sécurité alimentaire, le changement climatique, la diversité biologique)

19. Nous réaffirmons notre volonté de poursuivre nos efforts afin d'atteindre les Objectifs du Millénaire pour le Développement (OMD) d'ici à 2015 et notre détermination à mettre en oeuvre les engagements que nous avons pris à cet égard lors du Sommet sur les OMD, tenu à New York du 20 au 22 septembre 2010. Nous nous engageons à mettre la sécurité alimentaire, la lutte contre le changement climatique et la protection de la diversité biologique au centre de nos préoccupations.

20. Nous reconnaissons à cet effet le rôle indispensable des financements innovants qui constituent des ressources complémentaires de l'aide publique et renforcent les mécanismes existants, notamment en faveur de secteurs prioritaires pour les OMD.

21. Nous nous engageons à poursuivre les efforts visant à assurer la réalisation des OMD en matière d'éducation, en donnant notamment à tous les enfants les moyens d'achever un cycle complet d'études primaires. Nous nous engageons également à poursuivre les efforts visant à éliminer les disparités entre les sexes à tous les niveaux de l'enseignement.

22. Nous réitérons notre volonté de réduire la mortalité infantile et d'améliorer la santé maternelle. À cet égard, nous saluons la Stratégie mondiale pour la santé de la femme et de l'enfant, dévoilée à New York le 22 septembre 2010. Nous saluons également la reconstitution triennale du Fonds mondial de lutte contre le sida, la tuberculose et le paludisme. Ces initiatives permettront d'appuyer les efforts consentis par les pays pour atteindre les OMD en matière de santé.

23. Nous nous engageons à renouveler nos efforts en matière de sécurité alimentaire et à mettre en oeuvre de façon non discriminatoire le droit à une alimentation adéquate. Nous exprimons la volonté de renforcer notre concertation au sein des principales instances compétentes, avec l'appui de l'OIF et des opérateurs concernés, et de combattre la volatilité des prix des matières premières. Nous réitérons notre engagement en faveur de la coopération tripartite, adossée à une stratégie appropriée, dans le domaine de la sécurité alimentaire, comme d'ailleurs dans celui de la santé.

24. Nous nous engageons à promouvoir de manière concertée la recherche dans les domaines de l'agriculture, de l'alimentation et de la gestion de l'eau, qui soit respectueuse des principes du développement durable.

25. Nous reconnaissons la contribution essentielle des petits exploitants agricoles, et en particulier celle des femmes, à la sécurité alimentaire dans le monde. Nous veillerons aussi à ce que toutes les parties prenantes soient associées, sur les plans national, régional et international, à la réflexion sur ces thèmes. Nous nous engageons à renforcer notre soutien aux capacités des petits producteurs, notamment en vue de s'adapter au changement climatique et d'en atténuer les effets.

26. Nous estimons que les négociations actuelles sur le climat doivent mener à des décisions concrètes fin 2010 à Cancún, car il s'agira d'une étape déterminante vers l'adoption d'un accord global juridiquement contraignant. Nous nous engageons à rechercher à Cancún des positions concertées et demandons à l'Institut de l'énergie et de l'environnement de la Francophonie (IEPF) de poursuivre ses activités de soutien lors de ces négociations. Nous réaffirmons notre volonté de mettre en oeuvre les engagements qui figurent dans l'Accord de Copenhague, y compris les dispositifs de financement précoce et de long terme, et de garantir la mise en oeuvre intégrale, effective et continue de la Convention cadre des Nations Unies sur les changements climatiques.

27. Nous encourageons les initiatives visant à accroître de manière significative les capacités d'accès des pays francophones du Sud et à faciliter la diffusion de l'instrument « Mécanisme pour un développement propre » (MDP) et, par conséquent, les financements drainés par ce mécanisme. Nous soutenons le renforcement des moyens en faveur des Plans d'action nationaux d'adaptation (PANA) et d'une meilleure coordination des efforts d'adaptation, y compris une allocation plus équitable des moyens disponibles dans les différents fonds pour les pays les plus vulnérables.



28. Nous sommes convaincus que la lutte contre la désertification constitue une des réponses aux effets du changement climatique. C'est pourquoi nous décidons d'accompagner l'initiative africaine de la Grande Muraille verte.

29. Nous apportons notre soutien aux efforts de sauvetage du lac Tchad entrepris par le Gouvernement tchadien et appelons à cet effet à une plus grande solidarité de la communauté internationale.

30. Nous réaffirmons notre engagement à soutenir les partenariats régionaux et internationaux visant à assurer une gestion responsable et durable des forêts afin de lutter contre le changement climatique par la réduction des émissions de gaz à effet de serre, domaines dans lesquels les forêts représentent le poumon écologique mondial.

31. Nous nous félicitons de la tenue de la première Réunion des ministres responsables de l'énergie de la Francophonie, dans le cadre du Congrès mondial de l'énergie, à Montréal, le 13 septembre 2010. Cette rencontre a permis à la Francophonie de se mobiliser et d'apporter sa contribution face aux enjeux liés à l'énergie.

32. En cette Année internationale pour la biodiversité et alors que se tient à Nagoya la 10e Conférence des parties à la Convention sur la diversité biologique, nous nous engageons à mettre en oeuvre cet instrument et les autres instruments relatifs à la conservation et l'utilisation durable de la biodiversité, afin de sauvegarder la biodiversité déjà fortement dégradée de notre planète. En publiant aujourd'hui l'atlas de la biodiversité au sein de la Francophonie, nous nous donnons un outil qui propose des pistes pour une gestion durable de notre diversité biologique.

33. Nous nous engageons à rechercher des positions concertées en vue du Sommet sur le développement durable de Rio en 2012.

34. Nous soulignons le rôle capital de l'eau pour le développement durable. Dans ce contexte, nous saluons l'adoption par l'Assemblée générale de l'ONU, le 28 juillet 2010, de la résolution portant sur le droit et l'accès à l'eau potable, et à des services d'assainissement, et nous nous engageons pour que cela devienne une réalité pour tous.

35. Nous réaffirmons notre engagement à appuyer les efforts pour réduire la vulnérabilité des Petits États Insulaires en Développement (PEID), dans le cadre de la mise en oeuvre de la Stratégie de Maurice, ainsi que celle des autres régions côtières.

36. Nous affirmons l'importance de la contribution de la culture au développement social et économique de nos pays. Dans ce contexte, nous réitérons notre appel à la ratification universelle et à la mise en oeuvre de la Convention sur la protection et la promotion de la diversité des expressions culturelles de l'UNESCO. Nous demandons à l'OIF et aux opérateurs de renforcer l'accompagnement des pays francophones du Sud qui s'engagent dans le développement de leurs politiques nationales en matière de culture et qui travaillent à l'émergence d'industries culturelles sur leur territoire.

### III. La langue française et l'éducation dans un monde globalisé : les défis de la diversité et de l'innovation

37. Nous demandons à l'OIF et aux opérateurs de se donner une politique de promotion du français qui intègre et mette en synergie les actions de l'OIF, des opérateurs et de leurs réseaux, en vue de son adoption lors du XIVe Sommet de la Francophonie. À cet égard, l'OIF organisera, en collaboration avec le gouvernement du Québec, un Forum mondial de la langue française au printemps 2012.

38. Nous nous engageons à promouvoir l'emploi du français dans les organisations internationales et régionales. Nous réaffirmons notre attachement au Vade-mecum relatif à l'usage de la langue française adopté à Bucarest et encourageons les pays dont le français n'est ni la langue officielle ni la langue d'enseignement à lui accorder un statut privilégié dans les programmes d'étude des langues étrangères.

39. Nous encourageons la multiplication des groupes des ambassadeurs francophones, tout en les appelant à coopérer avec les institutions et acteurs partageant les objectifs de la Francophonie.

40. Nous entendons valoriser le français en tant que langue technique, scientifique, juridique, économique et financière. Dans cet esprit, nous demandons à l'OIF et aux opérateurs concernés d'encourager les réseaux professionnels ou universitaires qui emploient et diffusent le français dans leurs domaines de compétence.

41. Nous veillerons à la visibilité du français et au respect de son usage lors des Jeux olympiques et paralympiques de 2012 à Londres, avec le concours du Grand Témoin de la Francophonie.

42. Nous saluons la signature des premiers pactes linguistiques lors de ce Sommet et encourageons la multiplication de ces plans d'action, qui favorisent la promotion du français.

43. Nous reconnaissons que l'accès à une « Éducation Pour Tous » (EPT) de qualité, ainsi qu'à la formation et à l'enseignement professionnel, est une condition essentielle au développement durable des sociétés. Nous nous engageons à promouvoir l'EPT en synergie avec les partenaires au développement et la société civile. Nous réaffirmons la responsabilité principale des autorités publiques pour la formulation et la mise en oeuvre des politiques d'éducation et de formation, dans le respect des langues nationales.

44. Nous réitérons notre soutien aux actions francophones dans le domaine de l'éducation, telle l'Initiative francophone pour la formation à distance des maîtres (IFADEM), dont les effets multiplicateurs sont avérés pour nos populations, et demandons à l'OIF et à l'AUF de poursuivre son déploiement, en priorité en Haïti.

45. Nous réaffirmons notre attachement à la chaîne multilatérale francophone TV5, à son rôle essentiel pour l'apprentissage et le rayonnement international du français. À cet effet, nous entendons faciliter la diffusion et l'accessibilité de TV5, vecteur de la diversité culturelle.

46. Nous réaffirmons notre volonté de faciliter pour les pays francophones du Sud l'appropriation des technologies de l'information et de la communication (TIC) afin de les aider à mieux intégrer l'économie numérique mondiale. Nous demandons à l'OIF et aux opérateurs de mener une réflexion sur une nouvelle stratégie en matière de TIC et sur leur contribution possible à un cyberspace libre et accessible, riche de contenus francophones. Nous soulignons la nécessité d'un dialogue avec toutes les parties concernées, dans le cadre de l'expansion de la Toile, qui prenne en compte l'ensemble des intérêts et qui respecte les droits et libertés de chacun. Nous demandons à l'OIF de contribuer à la réalisation des objectifs du Forum sur la gouvernance d'Internet.

47. Nous entendons favoriser la coopération entre nos pays en matière de recherche, d'innovation, de formation et d'utilisation des techniques d'information et de communication modernes. La diversité propre à la Francophonie constitue un atout à valoriser en mettant en réseau les acteurs de l'innovation. À ce titre, nous encourageons les échanges de professeurs et d'étudiants et les synergies dans le domaine de la recherche scientifique et technologique entre pays francophones, et saluons la constitution d'un « Réseau d'excellence des sciences de l'ingénieur de la Francophonie » (RESCIF). À cet égard, nous appelons ses membres à nouer un partenariat avec l'AUF.

\*\*\*\*\*

Nous saluons le rôle central du Secrétaire général de la Francophonie et son action politique, personification de l'engagement et de la solidarité francophones au plan international. Nous évaluerons ensemble, lors du XVI<sup>e</sup> Sommet, les engagements pris au titre de cette Déclaration.

\*\*\*\*\*

L'avenir du monde francophone est entre les mains de notre jeunesse. Animés du désir de lui confier un héritage d'espoir fondé sur les valeurs qui nous unissent, nous l'aiderons avec force à réaliser cette ambition.

Notre jeunesse enrichira le développement démocratique de nos pays en nourrissant le respect de l'autre et de l'humanité dans sa diversité.

Tel est l'exaltant dessein que nous souhaitons lui léguer en cette Année internationale de la jeunesse.

**Page(s) 000553 to\à 000572**

**Is(Are) exempted pursuant to section(s)  
est(sont) exemptée(s) en vertu de(s)(l')article(s)**

**15(1), 21(1)(a), 21(1)(b)**

**of the Access to Information Act  
de la Loi sur l'accès à l'information**



United Nations

FCCC/AWGLCA/2011/13



## **Framework Convention on Climate Change**

Distr.: General  
14 November 2011

Original: English

---

### **Ad Hoc Working Group on Long-term Cooperative Action under the Convention**

**Fourteenth session, part four  
Durban, 29 November 2011—\***

Agenda item 2(b)

**Organizational matters**

**Organization of the work of the session**

### **Scenario note on the fourth part of the fourteenth session**

**Note by the Chair\*\***

#### **I. Introduction**

1. The Conference of the Parties (COP), at its thirteenth session, established the Ad Hoc Working Group on Long-term Cooperative Action under the Convention (AWG-LCA) to conduct a comprehensive process to enable the full, effective and sustained implementation of the Convention through long-term cooperative action, now, up to and beyond 2012.<sup>1</sup> At its sixteenth session, the COP decided to extend the AWG-LCA for one year in order for it to continue its work with a view to carrying out the undertakings contained in decision 1/CP.16 and present its results to the COP for consideration at its seventeenth session.<sup>2</sup>

2. The AWG-LCA will resume its work at the fourth part of its fourteenth session on 29 November 2011 in Durban, South Africa. The meeting will be held in conjunction with the seventeenth session of the COP, which is to close on 9 December 2011. As per decision 1/CP.16, paragraph 143, the AWG-LCA is to present the results of its work to the COP for consideration.

---

\* The fourth part of the session will be held in conjunction with the seventeenth session of the Conference of the Parties. The AWG-LCA will present the results of its work to the COP for consideration as per decision 1/CP.16, paragraph 143. The closing date of the session of the AWG-LCA will be determined in Durban.

\*\* This document has been submitted at this time because the Chair considers that a scenario note is most useful if it is submitted close to the session to which it applies.

<sup>1</sup> Decision 1/CP.13, paragraphs 1–2. At its fifteenth session, the COP decided to extend the mandate of the AWG-LCA to enable it to continue its work with a view to presenting the outcome of its work to the COP for adoption at its sixteenth session (decision 1/CP.15, para. 1).

<sup>2</sup> Decision 1/CP.16, paragraphs 143 and 144.

## **II. Outcome of the work of the Ad Hoc Working Group on Long-term Cooperative Action under the Convention**

3. Throughout the year, Parties have been working constructively on the broad range of issues before the AWG-LCA. They have submitted written proposals providing the basis for text, and they have engaged with each other on difficult issues striving to find common ground. As a result, the elements of the outcome have become clearer and texts are emerging from the work in the informal groups on the issues before the AWG-LCA – many in the form of draft, consolidated texts and some as a compilation of texts. On some occasions, Parties have also requested revisions. (All material resulting from the third part and prepared for the fourth part of the fourteenth session of the AWG-LCA is available on the UNFCCC website.)<sup>3</sup>

4. Still, compilation texts are not agreed texts, and in some cases, facilitators have only been able to prepare summaries of the discussions, such that with respect to some issues there is as yet no clear picture of where agreement may be possible. Thus, much remains to be done in Durban. Special efforts will be needed to accelerate progress in areas that now lag.

5. It will also be critical to act with utmost effectiveness and efficiency. Time available for negotiations in the AWG-LCA will be very limited, given that the COP, the Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to the Kyoto Protocol (CMP) and the four subsidiary bodies<sup>4</sup> will all be in session.

6. During the first week, in particular, it will be important for Parties to produce concise text in each of the informal groups that can form the basis of a comprehensive AWG-LCA decision. As noted in Panama, the Chair envisions that the AWG-LCA outcome will consist of a single decision text containing multiple parts, and that longer, more technical material will be included in annexes to the decision.

7. Parties will need to have an overview of the entire draft AWG-LCA outcome early enough in the process to consider whether it is likely to be sufficiently balanced, comprehensive and robust and to make appropriate adjustments. Thus, there will be a need to bring together all the pieces emerging from the informal groups early enough for the Parties to have time in the informal groups to refine specific elements of the text and reach agreement on final details.

8. An overview of the possible structure and substantive elements of the AWG-LCA outcome, based on the work undertaken thus far, is suggested in the annex to this scenario note. The purpose is to start the process of visualizing the elements of the emerging package, based on the agreements being reached in the AWG-LCA. This overview is intended to assist Parties in their work, not to be restrictive or exhaustive.

9. The Chair welcomes the consultations on the elements of the broader Durban outcome that the incoming Presidency of COP 17 and CMP 7 has undertaken during the previous sessions in Bonn, Germany, and Panama City. The Chair will continue, with the Vice-Chair, to support and closely cooperate with the incoming COP President.

---

<sup>3</sup> <<http://unfccc.int/bodies/awg-lca/items/6223.php>>.

<sup>4</sup> The Subsidiary Body for Scientific and Technological Advice (SBSTA), the Subsidiary Body for Implementation (SBI), the Ad Hoc Working Group on Further Commitments for Annex I Parties under the Kyoto Protocol (AWG-KP) and the AWG-LCA.

### **III. Organization of the work of the session**

10. The AWG-LCA will resume its work by way of a brief plenary meeting on Tuesday, 29 November. This meeting will provide an opportunity for Parties to share information on initiatives undertaken since the third part of the session that are relevant to the negotiations.
11. Following the practice of previous meetings this year, and in order to resume the substantive work as expeditiously as possible, the Chair will propose that only groups of Parties take the floor in order to make brief remarks.<sup>5</sup>
12. The AWG-LCA will continue with its organization of the work in one contact group, with the respective informal groups, covering all substantive items and sub-items of the agenda, with assistance from the facilitators. It is the Chair's intention that the contact group will resume its work immediately upon conclusion of the plenary meeting on 29 November.
13. The contact group will continue to hold regular, brief 'touch base' meetings to provide delegates and observers with an overview of the progress being made and address questions that may arise.
14. The AWG-LCA will have to concentrate its efforts and work in a focused manner. Parties will need to bridge their differences and reach common ground. The Chair stands ready to guide, assist and facilitate this essential work by the Parties.
15. The Chair is confident that the AWG-LCA will succeed in reaching agreement and will present a balanced, comprehensive and robust outcome to the COP in Durban.

---

<sup>5</sup> Delegates who intend to make remarks on behalf of a group of Parties are kindly requested to inform the secretariat in advance by sending an e-mail to <secretariat@unfccc.int> and to provide a hard copy to the conference officers in advance, in order to facilitate the work of the interpreters.

## **Annex**

### **Overview of substantive elements and structure that the outcome of the Ad Hoc Working Group on Long-term Cooperative Action under the Convention might take**

This annex is intended to provide an overview of the substantive elements of the outcome that might be forthcoming from the Ad Hoc Working Group on Long-term Cooperative Action under the Convention and of the structure that it might take.<sup>1</sup>

#### **I. A shared vision for long-term cooperative action**

#### **II. Enhanced action on mitigation**

##### **1. Nationally appropriate mitigation commitments or actions by developed country Parties**

- Modalities and procedures for international assessment and review;
- Guidelines for biennial reports for developed country Parties;
- Matters relating to paragraphs 36–38 of the Cancun Agreements.<sup>2</sup>

##### **2. Nationally appropriate mitigation actions by developing country Parties**

- Modalities and procedures for international consultation and analysis;
- Guidelines for biennial update reports from Parties not included in Annex I to the Convention;
- The registry;
- Matters relating to paragraphs 48–51 of the Cancun Agreements.<sup>3</sup>

##### **3. Policy approaches and positive incentives on issues relating to reducing emissions from deforestation and forest degradation in developing countries; and the role of conservation, sustainable management of forests and enhancement of forest carbon stocks in developing countries**

##### **4. Cooperative sectoral approaches and sector-specific actions, in order to enhance the implementation of Article 4, paragraph 1(c), of the Convention**

##### **5. Various approaches, including opportunities for using markets, to enhance the cost-effectiveness of, and to promote, mitigation actions, bearing in mind the different circumstances of developed and developing countries**

---

<sup>1</sup> See paragraph 8 above.

<sup>2</sup> Decision 1/CP.16.

<sup>3</sup> Decision 1/CP.16.

**6. Economic and social consequences of response measures**

**III. Enhanced action on adaptation**

- Adaptation Committee.

**IV. Finance**

- Standing Committee;
- Long term finance.

**V. Technology development and transfer**

- Operationalization of the Technology Mechanism including the Climate Technology Centre and Network.

**VI. Capacity-building**

**VII. Review: further definition of its scope and development of its modalities**

**VIII. Continued discussion of legal options with the aim of completing an agreed outcome based on decision 1/CP.13, the work done at the sixteenth session of the Conference of the Parties and proposals made by Parties under Article 17 of the Convention**

**IX. Other matters**

1. Parties included in Annex I to the Convention undergoing the process of transition to a market economy
2. Parties included in Annex I to the Convention whose special circumstances are recognized by the Conference of the Parties

**X. Additional matters**

**Annexes**

(To contain technical details not appropriate to include in the body of the text.)



**Page(s) 000578 to\à 000593**

**Is(Are) exempted pursuant to section(s)  
est(sont) exemptée(s) en vertu de(s)(l')article(s)**

**15(1), 21(1)(a), 21(1)(b)**

**of the Access to Information Act  
de la Loi sur l'accès à l'information**

## ADVANCE VERSION



United Nations

FCCC/KP/AWG/2011/6



### Framework Convention on Climate Change

Distr.: General  
18 November 2011

Original: English

---

#### Ad Hoc Working Group on Further Commitments for Annex I Parties under the Kyoto Protocol Sixteenth session, part four Durban, 29 November 2011—\*

Agenda item 2(b)

Organizational matters

Organization of the work of the session

#### Scenario note on the fourth part of the sixteenth session

Note by the Chair\*\*

#### I. Introduction

1. The fourth part of the sixteenth session of the Ad Hoc Working Group on Further Commitments for Annex I Parties under the Kyoto Protocol (AWG-KP) will open in Durban, South Africa, on 29 November 2011.
2. Documents for the session include the revised proposal by the Chair to facilitate negotiations,<sup>1</sup> the report of the AWG-KP on the first and second parts of its sixteenth session,<sup>2</sup> the synthesis report of the technical assessments of Parties' submissions on their forest management reference levels,<sup>3</sup> and the annotated agenda.<sup>4</sup>
3. This note aims to help Parties to bring the AWG-KP to a successful conclusion in Durban. It updates, rather than replaces, the scenario note for the third part of the session.

---

\* The fourth part of the session will be held in conjunction with the seventh session of the Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to the Kyoto Protocol (CMP). The Ad Hoc Working Group on Further Commitments for Annex I Parties under the Kyoto Protocol (AWG-KP) will aim to complete its work and have its results adopted by the CMP as per decision 1/CMP.6, paragraph 1. The closing date of the session of the AWG-KP will be determined in Durban.

\*\* This document has been submitted at this time because the Chair considers that a scenario note is most useful if it is submitted close to the session to which it applies.

<sup>1</sup> FCCC/KP/AWG/2011/CRP.2/Rev.1.

<sup>2</sup> FCCC/KP/AWG/2011/4.

<sup>3</sup> FCCC/KP/AWG/2011/INF.2

<sup>4</sup> FCCC/KP/AWG/2011/1.

## **II. Snapshot of the negotiations: how far has the Ad Hoc Working Group on Further Commitments for Annex I Parties under the Kyoto Protocol come and where does it need to end up in Durban?**

4. The current revised proposal by the Chair is the result of five and a half years of negotiations. This text reflects Parties' positions and their concerns, but does not resolve them, most notably the central issue of the second commitment period. The text has been refined and streamlined to a point where for the most part further progress is not possible without clarity on overarching political decisions.

5. Discussions during the first three parts of the session in 2011 improved mutual understanding of Parties' positions. Various informal meetings convened by Parties outside the AWG-KP framework have contributed to this improved understanding. These meetings also generated some ideas that could help in reaching consensus if Parties bring them into the formal negotiations.

6. According to its mandate, the AWG-KP "shall aim to complete its work and have its results adopted by the Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to the Kyoto Protocol as early as possible and in time to ensure that there is no gap between the first and second commitment periods".<sup>5</sup>

7. The challenge for the AWG-KP therefore is to achieve a decisive outcome in Durban that completes its work. In Panama City, Panama, Parties indicated that they expected the work of the group to conclude in Durban. Concluding the work means bringing together, in a draft decision form, a package of results on all five chapters of the text. The text could itself provide the structure for a decision or decisions of the Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to the Kyoto Protocol (CMP).

8. There is also the broader context of how the AWG-KP will fit into a balanced and comprehensive Durban outcome under the Bali Road Map. Parties' positions under the AWG-KP are frequently informed by their expectations of the Ad Hoc Working Group on Long-term Cooperative Action under the Convention (AWG-LCA), and vice versa. To secure the desired AWG-KP outcome, Parties will need to resolve the cross-cutting issues.

## **III. The way ahead**

### **A. Dealing with the outstanding issues**

9. The Chair believes that there is a wide recognition among Parties that an agreed substantive outcome of the AWG-KP is a necessary component of a successful outcome of the Durban conference. There is also broad support for what has been called the "smooth continuity" of the Kyoto Protocol acquis beyond the end of 2012.

10. The Chair would like to highlight the following major issues and concerns of Parties in which efforts might best be focused in seeking common ground:<sup>6</sup>

- **Finding consensus on the form and content of the second commitment period**, including exploring options that could provide a workable alternative to full ratification by the beginning of 2013, which does not appear achievable;

<sup>5</sup> Decision 1/CMP.1.

<sup>6</sup> This is not intended to be an exhaustive list of the issues that will need to be finalized in Durban.

- **Clarifying Annex I commitments and the level of ambition**, including conversion of mitigation targets to quantified emission limitation or reduction objectives (QELROs), and how to achieve greater ambition;
- **Ensuring continuity of the rules-based system**, with clarity on the rules that will apply after 2012, including the land use, land-use change and forestry (LULUCF) related rules;
- **Ensuring continuation of the market-based mechanisms**, especially the clean development mechanism;
- **Addressing concerns about environmental integrity**, especially relating to LULUCF rules, market-based mechanisms and carry-over of assigned amount units;
- **Addressing the implications of the decision by some Annex I Parties that they will not take mitigation commitments under the Kyoto Protocol in a second commitment period.**

11. Bearing these major issues in mind, the Chair suggests that the emphasis in the first week of Durban should be to assemble the elements of an AWG-KP package, so that the zone of possible convergence can be seen by the end of the week. It would be important in this regard for Parties to maintain an overview of the text as a whole. At the same time, technical work can continue in areas where Parties see scope for more progress – mainly chapters I and II of the current Chair's text.<sup>7</sup> Such an approach would help Parties to identify the remaining major issues for resolution during the second week.

## **B. Organizing the work**

12. The Chair considers that the contact group would be best placed to carry out the overview role described in paragraph 11 above. With this in mind, the following organization of work is proposed:

- **The holding of plenary meetings at the beginning and end of the session.** The first plenary, scheduled for Tuesday, 29 November, will resume the sixteenth session, and a second, closing plenary will adopt draft decisions to be forwarded to the CMP. At the resumption plenary the Chair will invite statements from groups of Parties, and will also provide an opportunity for Parties to share information on meetings outside the AWG-KP process but relevant to the work of the group, such as informal consultations by the current or incoming Presidencies of the Conference of the Parties (COP) and the CMP. Finally, time permitting, observers will be invited to speak;
- **The holding of a possible additional plenary midway through the session.** The Chair suggests leaving this option open and allowing Parties to decide towards the end of the first week if this would be useful. It could be formal or informal;
- **The holding of regular meetings of the contact group.** The contact group will begin as soon as possible after the resumption plenary and will hold regular meetings throughout the session. As during the earlier parts of the sixteenth session, the contact group will discuss outstanding political and policy issues, but a key task in Durban will be to maintain an overview and to try to bring together elements of the emerging package under the AWG-KP, covering all chapters of the text;
- **The work in the informal spin-off groups as required to advance the text.** Since three of the five groups (mechanisms, methodological issues and potential consequences) indicated that they had got as far as they could in Panama City in the

---

<sup>7</sup> FCCC/KP/AWG/2011/CRP.2/Rev.1.

FCCC/KP/AWG/2011/6

---

absence of a resolution on the outstanding political and policy issues, these chapters will initially be taken up in the contact group, where it is hoped that the presence of heads of delegation will facilitate progress. As progress on the political and policy issues is made, work on the text can continue as needed under the guidance of the facilitators. At the end of the Panama City session, Parties indicated that there was still potential for advancing technical work on chapter I (amendments to the Kyoto Protocol pursuant to its Article 3, paragraph 9 (numbers)) and chapter II (LULUCF). Accordingly, the Chair intends to schedule meetings of these two spin-off groups from the beginning of the session.

13. However efficiently the Durban session is organized, it is unrealistic to expect that the allocated official meeting time will be sufficient to resolve the issues. The Chair would therefore like to encourage Parties to work among themselves from early in the session, so as to bring possible solutions to the table, and stands ready, with the Vice-Chair, to assist.

14. The Chair will undertake pre-session consultations with Parties in order to discuss the organization of the fourth part of the session and its expected outcomes. All groups and Parties are invited to contact the secretariat if they would like to schedule a meeting with the Chair and the Vice-Chair. Groups and Parties are also welcome to contact the Chair and the Vice-Chair directly on any matter.

**C. An outcome of the Ad Hoc Working Group on Further Commitments for Annex I Parties under the Kyoto Protocol as part of the Durban package**

15. The Chair observes that, to a large extent, the major political decisions needed to conclude the AWG-KP appear to be interdependent with those of other negotiation bodies, the AWG-LCA in particular. A substantive outcome of the work of the AWG-KP can only be achieved as part of a comprehensive agreed outcome of the Durban conference.

16. The relationship between the outcome of the AWG-KP and the overall outcome of the Durban conference will be a decisive factor for achieving success in Durban. As this broader picture is beyond what can be delivered by the AWG-KP, a continuation of informal consultations by the incoming COP/CMP Presidency may be useful to ensure that these issues can receive the political attention required. The Chair and the Vice-Chair will continue to support and cooperate with the Presidency in this regard.

---

**Page(s) 000598 to\à 000605**

**Is(Are) exempted pursuant to section(s)  
est(sont) exemptée(s) en vertu de(s)(l')article(s)**

**15(1), 21(1)(a), 21(1)(b)**

**of the Access to Information Act  
de la Loi sur l'accès à l'information**



United Nations

FCCC/KP/CMP/2011/1



## Framework Convention on Climate Change

Distr.: General  
19 September 2011

Original: English

---

### Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to the Kyoto Protocol

Seventh session

Durban, 28 November to 9 December 2011

Item 2(a) of the provisional agenda

Organizational matters

Adoption of the agenda

### Provisional agenda and annotations

#### Note by the Executive Secretary

#### I. Provisional agenda

1. Opening of the session.
2. Organizational matters:
  - (a) Adoption of the agenda;
  - (b) Election of replacement officers;
  - (c) Organization of work, including the sessions of the subsidiary bodies;
  - (d) Approval of the report on credentials.
3. Reports of the subsidiary bodies:
  - (a) Report of the Subsidiary Body for Scientific and Technological Advice;
  - (b) Report of the Subsidiary Body for Implementation.
4. Report of the Ad Hoc Working Group on Further Commitments for Annex I Parties under the Kyoto Protocol.
5. Consideration of proposals by Parties for amendments to the Kyoto Protocol.
6. Proposal from Kazakhstan to amend Annex B to the Kyoto Protocol.
7. Issues relating to the clean development mechanism.
8. Issues relating to joint implementation:
  - (a) Guidance on joint implementation;
  - (b) Review of the joint implementation guidelines.



**Page(s) 000607 to\à 000639**

**is(are) exempted and excluded pursuant to section(s)  
est(sont) exemptée(s) et exclue(s) en vertu de(s)(l')article(s)**

**15(1), 21(1)(a), 21(1)(b), 68(a)**

**of the Access to Information Act  
de la Loi sur l'accès à l'information**



## ADVANCE VERSION



United Nations

FCCC/KP/CMP/2011/1



### Framework Convention on Climate Change

Distr.: General  
19 September 2011

Original: English

---

#### Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to the Kyoto Protocol

Seventh session

Durban, 28 November to 9 December 2011

Item 2(a) of the provisional agenda

Organizational matters

Adoption of the agenda

#### Provisional agenda and annotations

##### Note by the Executive Secretary

#### I. Provisional agenda

1. Opening of the session.
2. Organizational matters:
  - (a) Adoption of the agenda;
  - (b) Election of replacement officers;
  - (c) Organization of work, including the sessions of the subsidiary bodies;
  - (d) Approval of the report on credentials.
3. Reports of the subsidiary bodies:
  - (a) Report of the Subsidiary Body for Scientific and Technological Advice;
  - (b) Report of the Subsidiary Body for Implementation.
4. Report of the Ad Hoc Working Group on Further Commitments for Annex I Parties under the Kyoto Protocol.
5. Consideration of proposals by Parties for amendments to the Kyoto Protocol.
6. Proposal from Kazakhstan to amend Annex B to the Kyoto Protocol.
7. Issues relating to the clean development mechanism.
8. Issues relating to joint implementation:
  - (a) Guidance on joint implementation;
  - (b) Review of the joint implementation guidelines.

**Page(s) 000641 to\à 000669**

**is(are) exempted and excluded pursuant to section(s)  
est(sont) exemptée(s) et exclue(s) en vertu de(s)(l')article(s)**

**15(1), 21(1)(a), 21(1)(b), 68(a)**

**of the Access to Information Act  
de la Loi sur l'accès à l'information**

## ADVANCE VERSION



United Nations

FCCC/SBSTA/2011/3



### Framework Convention on Climate Change

Distr.: General  
19 September 2011

Original: English

---

#### Subsidiary Body for Scientific and Technological Advice

Thirty-fifth session

Durban, 28 November to 3 December 2011

Item 2(a) of the provisional agenda

Organizational matters

Adoption of the agenda

#### Provisional agenda and annotations

##### Note by the Executive Secretary

#### I. Provisional agenda

1. Opening of the session.
2. Organizational matters:
  - (a) Adoption of the agenda;
  - (b) Organization of the work of the session;
  - (c) Election of officers other than the Chair;
  - (d) Election of replacement officers.
3. Nairobi work programme on impacts, vulnerability and adaptation to climate change.
4. Methodological guidance for activities relating to reducing emissions from deforestation and forest degradation and the role of conservation, sustainable management of forests and enhancement of forest carbon stocks in developing countries.
5. Development and transfer of technologies.
6. Research and systematic observation.
7. Forum on the impact of the implementation of response measures at the thirty-fourth and thirty-fifth sessions of the subsidiary bodies, with the objective of developing a work programme under the Subsidiary Body for Scientific and Technological Advice and the Subsidiary Body for Implementation to address these impacts, with a view to adopting, at the seventeenth session of the Conference of the Parties,

**Page(s) 000671 to\à 000700**

**is(are) exempted and excluded pursuant to section(s)  
est(sont) exemptée(s) et exclue(s) en vertu de(s)(l')article(s)**

**15(1), 21(1)(a), 21(1)(b), 68(a)**

**of the Access to Information Act  
de la Loi sur l'accès à l'information**



United Nations

FCCC/SBI/2011/8



## Framework Convention on Climate Change

Distr.: General  
19 September 2011

Original: English

---

### Subsidiary Body for Implementation

Thirty-fifth session

Durban, 28 November to 3 December 2011

Item 2(a) of the provisional agenda

Organizational matters

Adoption of the agenda

### Provisional agenda and annotations

#### Note by the Executive Secretary

#### I. Provisional agenda


1. Opening of the session.
2. Organizational matters:
  - (a) Adoption of the agenda;
  - (b) Organization of the work of the session;
  - (c) Election of officers other than the Chair;
  - (d) Election of replacement officers.
3. National communications and greenhouse gas inventory data from Parties included in Annex I to the Convention:
  - (a) Status of submission and review of fifth national communications from Parties included in Annex I to the Convention;
  - (b) Compilation and synthesis of fifth national communications from Parties included in Annex I to the Convention;
  - (c) Compilation and synthesis of supplementary information incorporated in fifth national communications from Parties included in Annex I to the Convention that are also Parties to the Kyoto Protocol and submitted in accordance with Article 7, paragraph 2, of the Kyoto Protocol;
  - (d) Further implementation of Article 12, paragraph 5, of the Convention;
  - (e) Report on national greenhouse gas inventory data from Parties included in Annex I to the Convention for the period 1990–2009;

**Page(s) 000702 to\à 000749**

**is(are) exempted and excluded pursuant to section(s)  
est(sont) exemptée(s) et exclue(s) en vertu de(s)(l')article(s)**

**15(1), 21(1)(a), 21(1)(b), 68(a)**

**of the Access to Information Act  
de la Loi sur l'accès à l'information**




**s.15(1)**  
**s.21(1)(b)**



United Nations

FCCC/CP/2010/7/Add.1



## Framework Convention on Climate Change

Distr.: General  
15 March 2011

Original: English

---

### Conference of the Parties

#### **Report of the Conference of the Parties on its sixteenth session, held in Cancun from 29 November to 10 December 2010**

#### **Addendum**

#### **Part Two: Action taken by the Conference of the Parties at its sixteenth session**

### Contents

#### **Decisions adopted by the Conference of the Parties**

##### *Decision*

	<i>Page</i>
1/CP.16    The Cancun Agreements: Outcome of the work of the Ad Hoc Working Group on Long-term Cooperative Action under the Convention .....	2



**Page(s) 000752 to\à 000781**

**Page(s) 000752 to\à 000781  
est(sont) exclue(s) en vertu de(s)(l')article(s)**

**68(a)**

**of the Access to Information Act  
de la Loi sur l'accès à l'information**



United Nations

FCCC/KP/CMP/2010/12/Add.1



## **Framework Convention on Climate Change**

Distr.: General  
15 March 2011

Original: English

---

### **Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to the Kyoto Protocol**

#### **Report of the Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to the Kyoto Protocol on its sixth session, held in Cancun from 29 November to 10 December 2010**

#### **Addendum**

#### **Part Two: Action taken by the Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to the Kyoto Protocol at its sixth session**

### **Contents**

#### **Decisions adopted by the Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to the Kyoto Protocol**

	<i>Page</i>
<i>Decision</i>	
1/CMP.6 The Cancun Agreements: Outcome of the work of the Ad Hoc Working Group on Further Commitments for Annex I Parties under the Kyoto Protocol at its fifteenth session .....	3
2/CMP.6 The Cancun Agreements: Land use, land-use change and forestry .....	5
5/CMP.6 Report of the Adaptation Fund Board .....	13
6/CMP.6 Review of the Adaptation Fund .....	16
8/CMP.6 Proposal from Kazakhstan to amend Annex B to the Kyoto Protocol .....	19
9/CMP.6 Methodology for the collection of international transaction log fees in the biennium 2012–2013 .....	20
10/CMP.6 Supplementary information incorporated in national communications submitted in accordance with Article 7, paragraph 2, of the Kyoto Protocol .....	24

**Page(s) 000783 to\à 000827**

**is(are) exempted and excluded pursuant to section(s)  
est(sont) exemptée(s) et exclue(s) en vertu de(s)(l')article(s)**

**15(1), 21(1)(a), 21(1)(b), 68(a)**

**of the Access to Information Act  
de la Loi sur l'accès à l'information**



United Nations

**ADVANCE VERSION**

**FCCC**/SB/2011/INF.1



**Framework Convention on  
Climate Change**

Distr.: General  
10 March 2011

English only

---

**Subsidiary Body for Scientific and Technological Advice**

**Subsidiary Body for Implementation**

**Compilation of economy-wide emission reduction targets to  
be implemented by Parties included in Annex I to the  
Convention**

**Note by the secretariat**

*Summary*

This document presents information communicated by Parties included in Annex I to the Convention on the quantified economy-wide emission reduction targets that they intend to implement. It comprises information on the economy-wide emission reduction targets of these Parties for 2020 and, where available, beyond that date, as well as associated context, conditions and considerations provided by Parties when they communicated their quantified economy-wide emission reduction targets.

**Page(s) 000829 to\à 000836**

**Page(s) 000829 to\à 000836  
est(sont) exclue(s) en vertu de(s)(l')article(s)**

**68(a)**

**of the Access to Information Act  
de la Loi sur l'accès à l'information**

**ADVANCE VERSION**



United Nations

FCCC/AWGLCA/2011/INF.1



**Framework Convention on  
Climate Change**

Distr.: General  
18 March 2011

English only

---

**Ad Hoc Working Group on Long-term Cooperative Action  
under the Convention**

**Compilation of information on nationally appropriate  
mitigation actions to be implemented by Parties not included  
in Annex I to the Convention**

**Note by the secretariat**

*Summary*

This document presents the information communicated by Parties not included in Annex I to the Convention on nationally appropriate mitigation actions that these Parties intend to implement, as well as the related context, conditions and considerations associated with these mitigation actions, including with regard to the support required for their preparation and implementation.

**Page(s) 000838 to\à 000885**

**Page(s) 000838 to\à 000885  
est(sont) exclue(s) en vertu de(s)(l')article(s)**

**68(a)**

**of the Access to Information Act  
de la Loi sur l'accès à l'information**



**Advance Version**



**COMPLIANCE COMMITTEE**

**CC/ERT/2011/25  
10 November 2011**

**Report of the in-depth review of the fifth national communication  
of Canada**

**Note by the secretariat**

The report of the in-depth review of the fifth national communication of Canada was published on 10 November 2011. For purposes of rule 10, paragraph 2, of the rules of procedure of the Compliance Committee (annex to decision 4/CMP.2, as amended by decision 4/CMP.4), the report is considered received by the secretariat on the same date. This report, FCCC/IDR.5/CAN, contained in the annex to this note, is being forwarded to the Compliance Committee in accordance with section VI, paragraph 3, of the annex to decision 27/CMP.1.





United Nations

FCCC/IDR.5/CAN



## Framework Convention on Climate Change

Distr.: General  
10 November 2011

English only

---

### Report of the in-depth review of the fifth national communication of Canada

Parties included in Annex I to the Convention are requested, in accordance with decision 10/CP.13, to submit a fifth national communication to the secretariat by 1 January 2010. In accordance with decision 8/CMP.3, Parties included in Annex I to the Convention that are also Parties to the Kyoto Protocol shall include in their fifth national communications supplementary information under Article 7, paragraph 2, of the Kyoto Protocol. In accordance with decision 15/CMP.1, these Parties shall start reporting the information under Article 7, paragraph 1, of the Kyoto Protocol with the inventory submission due under the Convention for the first year of the commitment period. This includes supplementary information on the minimization of adverse impacts in accordance with Article 3, paragraph 14, of the Kyoto Protocol. This report presents the results of the in-depth review of the fifth national communication of Canada conducted by an expert review team in accordance with the relevant provisions of the Convention and Article 8 of the Kyoto Protocol.

**Page(s) 000888 to\à 000953**

**is(are) exempted and excluded pursuant to section(s)  
est(sont) exemptée(s) et exclue(s) en vertu de(s)(l')article(s)**

**15(1), 21(1)(a), 21(1)(b), 68(a)**

**of the Access to Information Act  
de la Loi sur l'accès à l'information**



United Nations

FCCC/CP/2011/6



## **Framework Convention on Climate Change**

Distr.: General  
18 November 2011

Original: English

---

### **Conference of the Parties**

**Seventeenth session**

**Durban, 28 November to 9 December 2011**

Item 8 of the provisional agenda

**Green Climate Fund – report of the Transitional Committee**

### **Report of the Transitional Committee for the design of the Green Climate Fund**

#### **Note by the Co-Chairs of the Transitional Committee\***

##### *Summary*

In its decision 1/CP.16, the Conference of the Parties (COP) decided that the Green Climate Fund shall be designed by a Transitional Committee (TC) in accordance with the terms of reference contained in appendix III to that decision. Through these terms of reference the TC was tasked to develop and recommend operational documents to the COP for approval at its seventeenth session. This report of the TC was considered by the TC at its fourth and final meeting in Cape Town, South Africa, and is submitted to the COP at its seventeenth session for its consideration and approval, in accordance with the relevant provisions of decision 1/CP.16 and its appendix III. This report contains draft recommendations of the TC to the COP, including a draft governing instrument for the Green Climate Fund.

A letter by which the Co-Chairs have transmitted the report of the TC to the COP is presented in document FCCC/CP/2011/6/Add.1.

---

\* This document was submitted after the due date owing to the timing of the Fourth Meeting of the Transitional Committee for the design of the Green Climate Fund, held in Cape Town, South Africa, from 16 to 18 October 2011.

**Page(s) 000955 to\à 001004**

**is(are) exempted and excluded pursuant to section(s)  
est(sont) exemptée(s) et exclue(s) en vertu de(s)(l')article(s)**

**15(1), 21(1)(a), 21(1)(b), 68(a)**

**of the Access to Information Act  
de la Loi sur l'accès à l'information**